Judgment :- A. KULASEKARAN, J. Appellants impugned in these appeals the common order passed by the learned single Judge dismissing the two writ petitions in W.P. Nos. 8910 of 1998 and 8911 of 1998 filed by them against the recovery of proceedings of the first respondent herein one for the period from January 1, 1983 to February 28, 1983 and the other for the period from March 1, 1983 to November 30, 1989. The appellant company is engaged in distributing and marketing education and reference books. A notice dated January 9, 1990 was issued by the first respondent herein to show cause why the Employees' State Insurance Contribution should not be demanded in view of Section 38 of the Act. Ultimately the first respondent passed order dated October 25, 1991 under Section 45-A of the Act determining the contribution at Rs. 1, 60, 670.30 for the period from March 1, 1983 to November 30, 1989 and contribution of Rs. 2, 772 for the period from January 1, 1983 to February 28, 1983. Aggrieved by the said orders the appellant herein filed two applications under Section 75 of the Act before the Insurance Court/I Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai but the same were dismissed by order dated November 19, 1992. The appellant herein did not agitate the matter any further. Ultimately the respondents herein initiated recovery proceedings under Section 45-C to 45-I of the Act. At that stage the appellant herein filed W.P. Nos. 8910 and 8911 of 1998 and canvassed before the learned single Judge that the recovery proceedings are time barred under Section 77 of the Act and also without jurisdiction. The respondents filed separate identical counters in the said two writ petitions. It is stated in the counters that the appellant herein was not (sic) given adequate opportunity at all. It is mentioned in the said counter that show cause notice was preceded by an inspection by the Insurance Inspector on March 23, 1988 and it was found that the establishment was coverable under the Act from March 1, 1983. Thereafter Code number was allotted on June 8, 1988. A personal hearing was held on March 28, 1990. One Mr. K. Vasu, Manager of the establishment appeared in the personal enquiry. The basis of C-18 notice was explained to him. Thereafter Code number was allotted on June 8, 1988. A personal hearing was held on March 28, 1990. One Mr. K. Vasu, Manager of the establishment appeared in the personal enquiry. The basis of C-18 notice was explained to him. As requested by him time was granted to submit statement of actual dues by April 27, 1990 but none appeared on that day. The counsel for the appellant herein appeared on May 15, 1990 and requested for further time. Accordingly time was granted till November 29, 1990 and again adjourned to April 9, 1991 and May 7, 1991 as requested by the appellant. On May 7, 1991 one Mr. Peter Naidu, Director of the Establishment and their counsel appeared with (sic) their submissions. Thereafter a detailed order was passed under Section 45-A determining the contribution payable by the appellant company. The appellant company has not let in any evidence to say that the claim made under C-18 was baseless. It is also mentioned in the said counter that the appellant had opportunity to go through the inspection report in the proceedings before the E.I. Court. The appellant herein has not filed any reply to the said counter to deny the said facts. After hearing the counsel for both sides the learned single Judge has dismissed both the writ petitions by passing a detailed common orderThe learned counsel for appellant Mr. K. Sridhar canvassed before us (i) that the recovery proceedings are time barred either under Section 77 of the Act or under Article 137 of the Limitation Act since the claim according to the learned counsel is beyond the period of three years and (ii) The Corporation is not vested with jurisdiction in claiming the contribution under the Act. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent Mr. G. Desappan rebutted the contentions. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent Mr. G. Desappan rebutted the contentions. Under Section 45-A of the Act any factory or establishment not submitted returns, particulars, registers or records in accordance with the provisions of Section 44 or any Inspector or other Officials of the Corporation referred to in sub-section (2) of Section 45 is prevented from exercising his functions or discharging his duties, the Corporation may on the basis of information available to it, by order, determine the amount of contribution payable in respect of their employees; Provided that no such order shall be passed by the Corporation unless the Principal or the immediate employer or the person incharge of the factory or establishment has been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The order made by the Corporation under Section 45-A(1) shall be sufficient proof to the claim of the Corporation under Section 75 or for recovery of the amount determined by such order as an arrear of land revenue under Section 45-B or recovery under Sections 45-C to 45-I of the Act. The order made by the Corporation under Section 45-A(1) shall be sufficient proof to the claim of the Corporation under Section 75 or for recovery of the amount determined by such order as an arrear of land revenue under Section 45-B or recovery under Sections 45-C to 45-I of the Act. Section 45-B says that any contribution payable under the Act may be recovered as an arrears of land revenue, "Section 77 speaks of commencement of proceedings which reads as follows: (1) The proceedings before an Employees' Insurance Court shall be commenced by application (1-A) Every such application shall be made within a period of three years from the date on which the cause of action aroseExplanation : For the purpose of this sub-section - (a) the cause of action in respect of a claim for benefit shall not be deemed to arise unless the insured person or in the case of dependents' benefit, the dependents of the insured person claims or claim that benefit in accordance with the regulations made in that behalf within a period of twelve months after the claim became due or within such further period as the Employees' Insurance Court may allow on grounds which appear to it to be reasonable (b) the cause of action in respect of a claim by the Corporation for recovering contributions (including interest and damages) from the principal employer shall be deemed to have arisen on the date on which such claim is made by the Corporation for the first time Provided that no claim shall be made by the Corporation after five years of the period to which the claim relates; (c) the cause of action in respect of a claim by the principal employer for recovering contributions from an immediate employer shall not be deemed to arise till the date by which the evidence of contributions having been paid is due to be received by the Corporation under the regulations. (2) Every such application shall be in such form and shall contain such particulars and shall be accompanied by such fee, if any, as may be prescribed by rules made by the State Government in consultation with the Corporation." Sub-section (1) mandates that the proceedings before the Employees' Insurance Court shall be commenced by an application and sub-section (1-A) prescribes that every such application before the Court shall be made within a period of 3 years from the date on which the cause of action arose. The cause of action in respect of the claim is the basis of reckoning for filing an application before E.I. Court under Section 77. Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the explanation to sub-section (1-A) of Section 77 deals with different kinds of claims and accrual of causes of action thereforClause (a) deals with the claim for the benefit by insured person or for dependents' benefit or by dependents of insured persons. Clause (b) deals with the claim by the Corporation for recovery of contribution. Clause (c) deals with the claim by Principal employer for recovering contribution from the immediate employer. The case in hand comes under Clause (b) which provides that the cause of action in respect of the claim by the Corporation for recovering contributions (including interest and damages) from the Principal employer shall be deemed to have arisen on the date on which such claim is made by the Corporation for the first time. The Proviso to this clause mandates that no claim shall be made by the Corporation after 5 years of the period to which the claim relates. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that contribution in respect of period from March 1, 1983 to November 30, 1989 and January 1, 1983 to February 28, 1983 were made on October 25, 1991 by the Corporation and the same is time barred since it is beyond the period of 5 years. The said argument is unsustainable because the legal fiction in clause (b) is that the cause of action in respect of the claim by the Corporation from the Principal Employer arises on the date on which the Corporation makes the claim for the first time. The said argument is unsustainable because the legal fiction in clause (b) is that the cause of action in respect of the claim by the Corporation from the Principal Employer arises on the date on which the Corporation makes the claim for the first time. The words 5 years of the period to which the claim relates contained in the said proviso shall not be interpreted to mean 5 years of the period in relation to which the amount of contribution is due but refers to the claim arising out of the cause of action as mentioned (supra), it means, in case the Corporation proposes to file an application invoking Section 77(1-A) it cannot make after expiry of 5 years. In this case the application has been filed by the appellants/employers under Section 75 of the Act for determining the dispute as to whether the appellants are liable to pay the contribution, which was dismissed on November 19, 1992, admittedly the appellants herein have not challenged the same any further. The provision of Section 45-A relates to determination of contribution and Section 45-B relates to the recovery of contribution but in both the Sections no time limit is prescribed as available in Section 77. Hence the period of three years and five years are applicable only for commencement of the proceedings before the Employees' Insurance Court but there is no time limit for recovery of contribution amountThe learned counsel appearing for the appellant much relied upon the decision of a Division Bench of Kerala High Court reported in 1998-I-LLJ-1190. The Division Bench held that Section 77 of the Act relates to commencement of proceedings before the Employees' Insurance Court, sub-section (1-A) prescribes the period of limitation, clause (b) of sub-section (1-A) relates to claim by the Corporation, the proviso to clause (b) provides no claim shall be made by the Corporation before the E.I. Court after 5 years from the date of cause of action. The Bench further held that no limitation is provided in the Act as against the recovery of contribution amount from defaulting employer. In the case in hand the appellant himself filed applications u/Section 75 which were dismissed, no further action taken against the same and now at the stage of recovery of contribution as such the said judgment is no way helpful, on the contrary it is adverse to them. In the case in hand the appellant himself filed applications u/Section 75 which were dismissed, no further action taken against the same and now at the stage of recovery of contribution as such the said judgment is no way helpful, on the contrary it is adverse to them. Hence the first ground that the claim is barred by limitation under Section 77(1-A) is unsustainable. Article 137 of the Limitation Act is also not applicable to this case. It is settled law that Article 137 of Limitation Act to be confined to applications under Civil Procedure Code, whereas the subject matter in this case relates to the Labour welfare, a special legislation. The next ground canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellant is jurisdiction of the respondents. In the common counter filed by the respondents it is pointed out that the show cause notice dated January 9, 1990 was preceded by inspection by the Inspector on March 23, 1988 when it was found that the establishment was coverable under Employees' State Insurance Act from March 1, 1983, thereafter it was followed by allotment of code number on June 8, 1988. The appellant herein by their letter dated March 3, 1990 requested the first respondent to furnish a copy of the inspection report. Though it was not furnished it was made available in the proceedings before the E.I. Court and the appellant had the opportunity to go through it. It is also further mentioned in the counter that number of adjournments were also given as required by the appellant and ultimately the order dated October 25, 1991 was passed, that is, more than one year 10 months after date of show cause notice dated January 9, 1990 determining the contribution. No arguments were advanced before us to dispute the said contentions of the respondents by the appellant. The appellants themselves have chosen to file applications under Section 75 of the Act before the E.I. Court, which dismissed the same upholding the demand of the respondents, admittedly no further action was taken by appellants, while so questioning the jurisdiction at the stage of recovery proceedings is untenable. However we have no hesitation to hold that the proceedings of the respondent are well within the jurisdiction. However we have no hesitation to hold that the proceedings of the respondent are well within the jurisdiction. Hence the alleged ground that the respondents are not vested with the jurisdiction is also negativedWe do not find any error or infirmity in the order passed by the learned single Judge. We confirm the order of dismissal of writ petitions passed by the learned single Judge. Hence the writ appeals are liable to be dismissed and accordingly dismissed. No costs. C.M.P. Nos. 19027 of 2000 to 19030 of 2000 are also dismissed.