J U D G M E N T Heard both sides. This second appeal is directed against the judgment of the Subordinate Judge (now, Senior Civil Judge), Proddutur dated 15.10.1988 in A.S.No.81 of 1986 under which the plaintiffs appeal against the judgment of the Principal District Munsif , Proddutur dismissing the suit has been dismissed. The relevant facts leading to this appeal may be stated briefly as follows: The plaintiffs are the appellants herein. The first plaintiff is the wife and the plaintiffs 2 and 3 are the sons and plaintiffs 4 to 7 are the daughters of one Allam nagaiah. The said Allam nagaiah, Mallela Obulreddi and B. Venkatareddy were the partners of partnership firm, by name, Sivasankara Oil Mills at Proddutur. Allam Nagaiah had 50% share , Obulreddy had 38% and his son-in-law Venkatareddy had 12% share in the firm. Nagaiah died on 11.6.1981. Sivasankara Oil Mills firm was dissolved. A sum of Rs.3,697/- was liable to be refunded to the above firm by the Commercial Tax Department towards excess tax paid by the firm. Another sum of Rs. 10,761.20 ps. Was also liable to be refunded to the said firm by the Commercial Tax department towards security deposit made by the firm. Allam Nagaiah was entitled to 50% in the said amounts as he held 50% share in the firm. Mallela Obulreddy, a partner in the Sivasankara oil Mill was also a partner in another firm called Jayalaxmi Oil Traders at Proddutur. The second mentioned firm was due a certain sum to the commercial tax department towards taxes. Mallela Obul Reddy gave a consent letter Ex.B8 on 17.2.1979 to Commercial Tax Officer, Proddutur stating that he had no objection for adjustment of Rs.3,697/- payable to Sivasankara Oil Mill towards the taxes due by Jayalaxmi Oil Traders. In view of this no objection letter, Ex.B8, the second defendant Commercial Tax Officer passed the order under Exs.B4 and B5 adjusting the amount refundable to Sivasankara Oil Mills towards taxes due by Jayalaxmi Oil Traders. On the basis of consent letters Exs.BI to B3 purported to have been given by Obulreddy, Venkatreddy and the first plaintiff orders under Ex.B6 dated 9.4.1979 were passed adjusting the security deposit of Sivasankara Oil Mills towards the arrears of tax payable by Jayalaxmi Oil Traders. Ex.BI is purported to be the consent letter given by plaintiff no. On the basis of consent letters Exs.BI to B3 purported to have been given by Obulreddy, Venkatreddy and the first plaintiff orders under Ex.B6 dated 9.4.1979 were passed adjusting the security deposit of Sivasankara Oil Mills towards the arrears of tax payable by Jayalaxmi Oil Traders. Ex.BI is purported to be the consent letter given by plaintiff no. I. She disputed the genuineness of the said letter and on the basis of evidence, the trial court found that Ex.BI was not a genuine document. However, genuineness of Exs.B2 and B3, consent letters of other partners is not in dispute. The plaintiffs pleaded that they became aware of the adjustments only on 11.5.1983 and after issuing notice under Section 80 of CPC under Ex.B3. the plaintiff filed the suit to recovery 50% of the amounts refundable to Sivasankara Oil Mills with interest thereon from the date of the suit. The defendants contested the suit mainly on the plea that the Civil court was not competent to entertain the suit in view of the bar under Section 36 of the A.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1957. It is thus pleaded that the civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. On these pleadings, the trial Judge, the learned District Munsif, framed the following issues: i. Whether this court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit? ii. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to recover the suit amount? iii. Whether the suit claim is barred by limitation? iv. To what relief? P.W.s.l and 2 have been examined on behalf of the plaintiffs and Exs.AI to A6 have been marked on their behalf. On behalf of the defendants, DWs.l to 3 have been examined and Exs.BI to B8 have been marked. On this evidence the learned District Munsif held that in view of section 42 of the Indian Partnership Act, one of the partner, Sri Obulreddy was not competent to consent for adjustment of the amount payable to Sivasankara Oil Mills towards tax due by another firm. He also concluded that the plaintiffs are entitled to claim refund of the suit amount. He , however, dismissed the suit on the ground that the civil Court was not competent to entertain the suit. In appeal, the learned Senior Civil Judge upheld this finding and dismissed the appeal. He also concluded that the plaintiffs are entitled to claim refund of the suit amount. He , however, dismissed the suit on the ground that the civil Court was not competent to entertain the suit. In appeal, the learned Senior Civil Judge upheld this finding and dismissed the appeal. Thus, the only question that arises for consideration is whether the civil court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit challenging the order of the defendants adjusting the amounts due to the partnership of Sivasankara Oil Mills towards tax amount due to the department from Jayalaxmi Oil Mills. The learned Senior Civil Judge seems to have accepted the contention on behalf of the defendants that Section 36 of the A.P. General Sales Tax Act is bar to such a suit. Section 36 of the Act is extracted below for ready reference: “Section 36: BAR OF JURISDICTION OF COURTS: Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, no Court shall entertain any suit, or other proceedings to set aside or modify or question the validity of any assessment, order or decision made or passed by any officer or authority under this Act or any rules made there under, or in respect of any other matter falling within its or his scope.” The learned Subordinate Judge appears to have relied upon certain judgments cited on behalf of the defendants in support of this finding. One of the cases is STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH V. S.RAMAIAH(1) It has been held in this case that the provision contained in Section 36 of the Act is comprehensive enough to oust the jurisdiction of the civil courts in respect of any orders passed by any officer or authority either under the provisions of the Act or any rules made there under or in respect of any other matter falling within its or his scope. The learned Subordinate Judge referred to the case of KAMALA MILLS LTD. V. STATE OF BOMBAY(2) in which the Supreme Court held that even erroneous order of assessment made would be entitled to protection against the institution of the civil suits. The Supreme Court had considered Section 20 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946 which appears to be in parimateria to Section 36 of the A.P. General Sales Tax Act. V. STATE OF BOMBAY(2) in which the Supreme Court held that even erroneous order of assessment made would be entitled to protection against the institution of the civil suits. The Supreme Court had considered Section 20 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946 which appears to be in parimateria to Section 36 of the A.P. General Sales Tax Act. In yet another decision reported in the case of S.SUBBAIAH SETTY AND SONS V. STATE OF A,P.(3) the Supreme Court held that a suit by assessee for recovery of a sum of money against the state on the ground that the suit amount has been illegally recovered from him as sales tax under Madras General Sales Tax Act 1939 is incompetent in view of the bar contained in Section 18-A of the said Act. It was observed that Section 18(A) was wide enough to cover all assessment made by appropriate authorities under the Act whether the said assessments are correct or not. It is necessary to underline that in tills case the fact that Obulreddy , one of the partners in Sivasankara Oil Mills was not competent to authorize the Commercial Tax Department to adjust the amount payable to Sivasankara Oil Mills towards tax payable by Jayalaxmi traders has been accepted by the learned Senior Judge. In fact, the learned Senior Judge even observed that in the case of S.SUBBAIAH SETTY AND SONS (3 cited supra) , this Court has held that acknowledgment or payment in respect of partnership debt by one of the partners after the death of one of a partner does not bind the legal representatives of the deceased partner. He proceeded on the assumption that one of the partners after the death of another partner could not have authorized for adjustment of dues payable to that firm towards amount due to another firm as stated above. When this is accepted, it is difficult to appreciate how Section 36 of the A.P. General Sales Tax Act could be considered as bar to the maintainability of the suit by the plaintiff. When this is accepted, it is difficult to appreciate how Section 36 of the A.P. General Sales Tax Act could be considered as bar to the maintainability of the suit by the plaintiff. A reading of Section 36 of the A.P. General Sales Tax Act would make it abundantly clear that bar of a suit or other proceedings would be invited if the suit or other proceedings was for the relief to set aside , modify or question the validity of any assessment , order or decision made or passed by any officer or authority under the Act or in the Rules made there under. For the application of the bar under Section 36 of the Act, it is not enough if the suit or the proceedings seeks to challenge an assessment order or decision made or passed by an officer or authority under this Act. The further pre-requisite is that such an assessment , order or decision must have been made or passed by the officer concerned under the Act or any rules made there under or in respect of any other matter falling within its or his scope. In this case, the orders or proceedings which are sought to be questioned in the suit are the orders under which the defendant no.2 , Commercial Tax Officer has adjusted the amount payable by the Department to the partners or their legal representatives of Sivasanakra Oil Mills towards amount due from Jayalaxmi Oil traders to the Department. The learned counsel for the appellant urged that there is no provision under the Act or any rule under the Act which authorises the defendant no.2. Commercial Tax Officer, to make such an adjustment of amount payable to one firm towards amount due from another firm. The learned counsel for the respondents has been unable to point out any such provision. It is obvious from a reading of Section 36 of the Act that bar of jurisdiction of civil courts in respect of orders or decisions passed or made by an authority under the Act is not absolute or all pervasive. The learned counsel for the respondents has been unable to point out any such provision. It is obvious from a reading of Section 36 of the Act that bar of jurisdiction of civil courts in respect of orders or decisions passed or made by an authority under the Act is not absolute or all pervasive. The bar applies where assessment, order or decision which are sought to be challenged have been made or passed under any provision of the Act or rules made there under or such assessment made or order passed was in respect of any other matter falling within the scope of the officers or authority. The bar of Jurisdiction of Civil Courts cannot be readily presumed. The general rule of law is that when a legal right or infringement thereof is alleged, the ordinary civil courts would have jurisdiction unless there is an express or implied bar to the entertainment of the suit in that regard, in view of the provisions in Section 9 of the C.P.C. If an express provision in a statute is cited as constituting the bar for entertainment of the suit in a civil court, it is necessary to examine whether all the requirements for application of the provision are satisfied. The judgment of the supreme Court cited in the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge in the case of S.SUBBAIAH SETTY AND SONS (3rd cited supra) stands on a different footing. In that case the suit was filed to recover certain amounts from the State on the ground that the said amount had been illegally recovered from him as sales tax under the Madras General Sales Act, 1939. Such a suit has been held to be incompetent in view of bar under Section 18(a) of the said Act on the ground that the expression ‘any Assessment made under this Act’ was wide enough to cover all assessments made by the appropriate authorities under the Act , whether the said assessments are correct or not. It is thus obvious that for application of the Bar of jurisdiction of Civil Court under Section 36 of the AP General Sales Act, it is necessary to show that the order was passed or a decision was made in purported exercise of some provision in the Act or the rules. It is thus obvious that for application of the Bar of jurisdiction of Civil Court under Section 36 of the AP General Sales Act, it is necessary to show that the order was passed or a decision was made in purported exercise of some provision in the Act or the rules. Once it is found that the authority concerned has passed some order or made some decision exercising certain powers under a provision of the Act or the Rules, the validity of such an order or decision ( or assessment) cannot be challenged in a civil court on the ground that such order or decision or assessment was incorrect or erroneous. In this case, the order of the defendant no.2, which are questioned in the suit cannot be said to have been authorized under any provisions of the Act or Rules. The order or decision of the defendant no.2 to adjust the amount refundable to the partners of one firm towards amount due from another firm on the mere ground that one of the partners in the two firms is common cannot be said to be authorized under any provisions of the Act. It cannot be said to be a matter falling within the scope of the authority or the officer. This is so in view of the specific and explicit finding that Obulreddy, one of the partners of the firm Sivasankara oil Mills, whose another partner died, had no authority to authorize on behalf of the said firm for such an adjustment and that such an authorization does not bind the legal representatives of the deceased partner. In view of this, it is difficult to conceive how section 36 of the A. P. General Sales Act constitute a bar for the institution of a civil suit in this case for recovery of the amount due to the plaintiffs from the defendant authorities which were unauthorisedly adjusted towards the dues from another partnership firm in respect of which the plaintiffs have no obligation to pay. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the subordinate judge is set aside. The suit of the plaintiff for recovery of Rs.7,662/- against the defendants is decreed with future interest at 6% p.a. from the date of filing of the suit. --X—