ORDER: These revision petitions arose out of the order dated 19.11.1996 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate No.II, Coimbatore in C C.Nos.376 to 379 of 1993 respectively, discharging the respondent/ accused in the respective cases. 2. Though the petitioner has raised several grounds in the revision petitions, the only question that has been argued before the Court is as to whether the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Common Cause, A Registered Society v. Union of India, A.I.R 1996 S.C. 1619 is applicable to the case on hand. 3. The respondents/ accused were charged for the offences under Secs.14(1A) and 14(A) of the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 for non-payment of the provident fund to the employees within the time prescribed under the Act. The respondents/ accused are punishable under the Act with imprisonment upto three years for the offences al1eged against them. As the cases were pending from the year 1993, the respondents/ accused filed memo on 5.7.1996 stating that they have got to be discharged/ acquitted as per Clause 2(f) of the Common Cause case, referred to above. 4. Learned Judicial Magistrate, having accepted the contentions of the respondents/ accused, discharged them by an order dated 19.11.1996. Aggrieved by the same, the complainant has preferred these revision petitions. 5. In order to appreciate the question involved in this case, the following dates are important. The complaints, filed against the respondents/ accused were taken on file on 19.11.1993 and the same were posted on 24.12.1993 for the appearance of the respondents/ accused and on that date, they did not appear and therefore, they were adjourned to 10.1.1994. The respondents/ accused appeared on that day and copies were furnished to them. That on 5.7.1994. the accused filed the discharge petitions and the same were dismissed on 22.11.1994. The accused have filed revision petitions on 20.12.1994 before the District Court and the same also came to be dismissed by an order dated 31.7.1995. Records were received by the trial Court from the District Court during the period from 4.8.1995 to 15.9.1995. It appears that the concerned Magistrate was transferred at that time, and till regular magistrate was posted, the cases were adjourned. On 22.3.1996, the respondents/ accused took time to apply to the Government of India for the withdrawal of the cases and nothing turned out. It appears that the concerned Magistrate was transferred at that time, and till regular magistrate was posted, the cases were adjourned. On 22.3.1996, the respondents/ accused took time to apply to the Government of India for the withdrawal of the cases and nothing turned out. Thereafter, only the accused filed a memo on 5.7.1996, seeking to discharge them by claiming the benefit of Clause 2(f) of the Common Cause case, referred to above. 6. Learned Judicial Magistrate, Coimbatore observed that the cases were instituted in the year 1993 and after the dismissal of the revision petitions on 31.7.1995, the petitioner has not chosen to take any step to conduct the case up to the date of filing the memo i.e., 5.7.1996 and that therefore the cases were pen ling for more than two years and came to the conclusion that the respondents/accused are entitled to the benefit of Clause 2(f) of the above said Common Cause case, A.I.R 1996 S.C. 1619. and discharged the respondents/ accused. That is being questioned in these revision petitions. 7. Learned advocate for the petitioners has submitted that the directions given by the Supreme Court in Clause 2(f) of the Common Cause case, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1619 is not applicable to the cases on hand for the reason that the petitioner/ complainant has not wholly or partly responsible for the delay of the proceedings and unless and until it is proved that the delay is attributable by the petitioner, the accused/ respondents are not entitled to the benefit of the directions given by the Supreme Court. 8. It is useful to extract Clause 2(f) of Common Cause case, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1619, which states, “Where the cases pending in Criminal Courts under I.P.C., or any other law for the time being in force are punishable with imprisonment up to three years, with or without fine, and if such pendency is for more than two years and if in such cases, trials have still not commenced, the Criminal Court shall discharge or acquit the accused, as the case may be, and close such cases.” 9. Learned advocate for the petitioner further brought to the notice of the Court that the decision rendered in Common Cause case, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1619 has been further clarified and the same is reported in Common Cause, A Registered Society v. Union of India, A.I.R 1997 S.C. 1539, wherein it is stated “The time limit mentioned regarding the pendency of criminal cases in paragraphs from 2(a) to 2 (f) of our judgment shall not apply to cases wherein such pendency of the criminal proceedings is wholly or partly attributable to the dilatory tactics adopted by the concerned accused or on account of any other action of the accused which results in prolonging the trial. In other words, it should be shown that the criminal proceedings have remained pending for the requisite period mentioned in the aforesaid clauses of paragraph 3 despite full co-operation by the concerned accused to get these proceedings disposed of and the delay in the disposal of these cases is not at all attributable to the concerned accused, nor such delay is caused on account of such accused getting stay of criminal proceedings from higher Courts. Accused concerned are not entitled to earn any discharge or acquittal as per paragraphs 2 (a) to 2 (f) of our judgment if it is demonstrated that the accused concerned seek to take advantage to their own wrong or any other action of their own resulting in protraction of trials against them”. 10. By pointing out the abovesaid passage, learned advocate for the petitioner has submitted that though the case was taken on file on 19.11.1993, the respondents/ accused alone have dragged on the proceedings, by filing the application on 5.7.1994 to discharge them and when the same was dismissed, they did not stop with that and they have taken the same on revisions and the said revisions were also dismissed on 22.11.1994. Thereby, it is made out that the respondents/ accused alone have successfully dragged the cases from 1993 to 1994 by filing the discharge petitions and delayed the disposal of the cases. 11. Thereby, it is made out that the respondents/ accused alone have successfully dragged the cases from 1993 to 1994 by filing the discharge petitions and delayed the disposal of the cases. 11. Learned advocate for the petitioner further pointed out that after the dismissal of the revision petitions by the District Court, the records were received by the trial Court during the period from 4.8.1995 to 15.9.1995 and thereafter also, the trial could not be proceeded with as the concerned Magistrate was transferred and the cases were simply called and adjourned. Further, it is pointed out that on 22.3.1996, the respondent/ accused took time to apply to the Government of India for the withdrawal of the cases and they were not able to succeed even in the said aspect. It is therefore clear that upto March 1996, the accused have been adopting one method or the other to get the cases; adjourned and only in the said circumstances, the cases were adjourned. In the meantime, the judgment of the Supreme Court in Common cause, dated 1.5.1996 came to them handy and then they have filed the applications on 5.7.1996 to discharge them. 12. Learned advocate for the petitioner submits that upto 23.9.1996, the respondents/ accused were successfully dragging the cases and that therefore, the delay, if any, was wholly or partly attributable to the dilatory tactics adopted by the respondents/ accused and not by the complainant/ petitioner and that therefore, the accused are not entitled to the directions given by the Apex Court in Common Cause case. 13. On the contrary, learned advocate for the respondents/ accused would submit that though the respondents/ accused preferred the applications to discharge them on 5.7.1994, the same were dismissed on 22.11.1994 and the revision petitions to the District Court were also dismissed on 31.7.1995. But, there was no stay during the said period and that therefore, there was no impediment for the petitioner/ complainant to proceed with the case, but they have not done so. It is further pointed out that even after the receipt of the records from the District Court, till the date of filing the memo by the accused on 5.7.1996 to discharge them, the petitioner has not chosen to proceed with the case and therefore, the respondents/ accused were not at all responsible for the delay and the entire delay was caused only by the complainant/ petitioner. 14. 14. I have heard the rival submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner and also the respondents. 15. It is clear that the complaints preferred by the complainant were taken on file on 19.11.1993 and after the receipt of the copies of the complaint, the accused filed the applications on 5.7.1994 to discharge them and the same were dismissed on 22.11.1994. The revision petitions to the District Court also came to be dismissed on 31.7.1995. The fact that the records were received from the District Court during the period from 4.8.1995 to 15.9.1995 is not in dispute. Further, the concerned Magistrate was transferred and the cases were simply called and adjourned. On 22.3.1996, the accused took them to apply to the Government of India for withdrawal of the cases. On the said background of these admitted facts, it is very clear that the accused have been dragging the proceedings on one pretext or the other upto 22.3.1996. On 1.5.1996, the Supreme Court delivered the judgment and the accused wanted to have the benefit of the same and filed a memo on 5.7.1996 to discharge them as per Clause 2(f). As it has already been pointed out that upto 22.3.1996, the accused have been dragging on the case and in fact, the learned Magistrate a so in his order has observed that the docket of the case bundles clearly shows that the complainant and the accused were used to present every hearing dates. There is no indication that the complainant has been dragging the matter by adopting dilatory tactics. But, on the other hand, the petitions filed by the accused on 5.7.1994 and the revision petitions to the District Court on 20.12.1994 and also the representation to the Court on 22.3.1996 to get permission from the Government of India for the withdrawal of the cases, would clearly go to show the dilatory tactics adopted by the accused to drag on the proceedings and that therefore, the accused/ respondents are not entitled to the benefit of the directions given by the Supreme Court in Common Cause case. 16. Learned Advocate for the respondents/ accused has further submitted that the judgment in Common Cause case was pronounced on 1.5.1996, whereas the clarificatory order was passed only on 28.11.1996. 16. Learned Advocate for the respondents/ accused has further submitted that the judgment in Common Cause case was pronounced on 1.5.1996, whereas the clarificatory order was passed only on 28.11.1996. But the learned Magistrate passed his order on 19.11.1996 itself and that therefore, the clarificatory order dated 28.11.1996 passed by the Supreme Court is not applicable to the case or hand. I am unable to accept the said contention of the learned counsel for the respondents/ accused. The clarificatory order is only in continuation of the order passed earlier on 1.5.1995 and that therefore, the argument advanced on behalf of the accused otherwise cannot be countenanced and hence, the same has got to be rejected, accordingly rejected. 17. In the result, all the revision petitions are allowed and remanded to the trial Court for trial. As the matters are pending from 1993, the learned Magistrate is directed to take the cases on file and dispose of the cases within three months from the date of receipt of copy of this order.