JUDGMENT 1. :- In this revision petition, Hubert Obediah (petitioner) who was allowed by this Court under its order dated 6.3.1997 in S.B. Civil Revision Petition No.1234/1996, as an objector through his objections filed under section 47 Civil Procedure Code, has now challenged the order dated 29.3.2000 of the learned Civil Judge (JD) Ajmer City (East) whereby the petitioner's application moved for permitting him to lead evidence in support of his objections raised under Section 47 Civil Procedure Code, has been rejected and the learned Civil Judge (Executing Court) had kept the objections of the petitioners for hearing so as to decide the same in accordance with law on 10.5.2000. 2. This revision petition was filed after a delay of 80 days, alongwith application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of such delay. On 18.10.2000 this Court ordered to list the case for orders on application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. On 12.12.2000 this Court issued show cause notice on application for condonation of the delay. The notices issued for service on the respondent had returned duly served. Hence the matter came up for consideration on 19.12.2000 when this Court after having considered the reasons assigned in application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and the fact that none has appeared for respondent to oppose the condonation of delay, allowed petitioner's application and condoned the delay. Thereupon this Court on the very day heard the learned counsel for the petitioner on admission of this petition. 3. Shri Neeraj Kumar Bhatt, learned counsel for the petitioner (objector) contended that in view of the gravity of objections raised to the execution of the decree viz. Thereupon this Court on the very day heard the learned counsel for the petitioner on admission of this petition. 3. Shri Neeraj Kumar Bhatt, learned counsel for the petitioner (objector) contended that in view of the gravity of objections raised to the execution of the decree viz. that the decree under execution had been obtained by fraud; that the suit property did not belong to the respondent because it had been sold to one Jabrilal who had earlier filed a suit against the petitioner but failed, thereby the respondent had no right to file a fresh suit for self same cause; for which the petitioner has to exhibit some of documents to substantiate his objections by leading oral evidence; in case the petitioner is not allowed to lead and produce evidence during execution proceedings for proper decision of his objections uls 47 Civil Procedure Code, purpose of order of this Court passed in earlier revision petition by which the trial Court was directed to decide objections filed by the petitioner under section 47 Civil Procedure Code in accordance with law, will be frustrated, rather would render it meaningless, inasmuch as objections under section 47 Civil Procedure Code having involved disputed questions of fact and based on actual position of the suit property cannot be deeded without evidence. Shri Bhatt placed reliance upon the decisions in Savitridevi v. Sarat Chandra (1996 DNJ (SC) 174 ), Ramchandra v. Bhonridevi (1996 DNJ Raj. 609) , M.T. Gore v. V.R. Kolhatkar AIR 1983 Bombay 277 & Krishna Chandra v. Indramani (AIR 1981 On. 49) . 4. Let me first advert to have a brief resume of the decisions cited by Shri Bhatt. In Krishna Chandra v. Indramani (supra) in execution of civil court decree an objection that civil court had no jurisdiction to try suit for eviction when Rent Control Act was in force, was not raised earlier in suit or in appeal, the High Court of Orissa observed that plea of absence of jurisdiction could still be raised during execution proceedings, and it further held that assuming that the court had directed the execution case to proceed by the time the petitioner raised objection to the executability of the decree, the petitioner was not precluded from raising his objection. It was a case where question for determination in revision was whether the objection raised to the executability of the decree for eviction was barred by principle of res judicata. 5. In M.T. Gore v. V.R. Kolhatkar (supra) the warrant for execution could not be executed for want of identity of property and therefore, the executing court held that the decree was not executable firstly on the ground that the terms of the compromise contained in the decree did not relate to the suit for permanent injunction and such a decree could not be made because of provisions contained in Order 23, Rule 3 Civil Procedure Code and secondly that the decree could not be executed for the reason that the house to which it related was not in existence and accordingly it dismissed the execution application. The Bombay High Court held that the order of the executing court was illegal and it further held that the executing court could go behind the decree if the decree sought to be executed is a nullity for lack of inherent jurisdiction in the court passing it. The High Court further held that when in execution a question arises as to the identity of the property of which possession has to be delivered to the decree holder obviously such a question would relate to the execution of the decree and it would be for the executing court to decide it as required under section 47(1) Civil Procedure Code by holding proper enquiry and determine the question with regard to the identity of the property which has to be delivered to the applicant. It was a case where the executing court refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by holding that decree was inexecutable, the High Court within its revisional power quashed the order of executing court against its refusal to exercise its jurisdiction. 6. It was a case where the executing court refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by holding that decree was inexecutable, the High Court within its revisional power quashed the order of executing court against its refusal to exercise its jurisdiction. 6. In Savitridevi v. Sarat Chandra (supra) after the decree in a suit for recovery of possession having become final and in the meantime the suit property admittedly being an intermediary estates stood vested with State of Orissa by virtue of a notification under section 3(1) of the Orissa Estate Abolition Act, the decree holder presented execution petition to which judgment debtor filed objection Under section 47 Civil Procedure Code challenging executability of the decree and the executing court allowed objection of the judgment debtor finding that the property has been vested in the State Government. But in revision against refusal of execution, the High Court held that the decree was not a nullity. However, the Apex Court held that the executing court was justified in refusing execution and the High Court committed error in directing execution. The Apex Court further held that by virtue of change in law taking away the jurisdiction of court, the decree passed is a nullity and thereby the executing court rightly refused execution. 7. After having considered the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, I am of the view that none of the aforecited decisions render any help to the petitioner in advancing his case because in each of these decisions (supra) execution petitions on having raised objections as to the executability of the decree were finally decided holding the decree as a nullity for want of jurisdiction to pass it. Whereas in the instant case under the impugned order against which this revision petition arises, the executing court has admittedly not decided the execution petition alongwith objections raised thereto by the present petitioner but has merely declined to permit him to lead evidence in support of his objections under section 47 Civil Procedure Code because the facts brought on record in the execution petitions, objections raised thereto and reply to the objections have neither involved disputed questions nor required an enquiry necessitating recording or leading any evidence at least so as to decide objections under section 47 Civil Procedure Code. 8. 8. I have considered the contentions urged by Shri Bhatt and perused the impugned order of the learned Executing Court. In my considered view, the execution proceedings relate to the suit having been filed by Mahendra Kumar (respondent) against the petitioner for entry and use of north portion alleged to have been in his possession and the dispute admittedly related to shifting of iron gate between north and south portions of a house known popularly as Anurag Bhawan situated at Anand Nagar Amer, which admittedly earlier belonged to Mahesh Narain Mehra who had sold the said Bhawan on 10.8.1982 in two portions to different persons namely (1) north portion to Jabrilal to whom the petitioner was tenant being liable to pay rent @ Rs. 220/- per month after 10.8.82 as held by this Court in civil second appeal under its judgment dated 9.12.1994 and (2) south portion to Mahendra Kumar (present respondent). In that suit filed against the petitioner by respondent (owner of south portion of Anurag Bhawan for entry and use of north portion to which the present petitioner is admittedly a tenant, and he had locked the gate to north portion) an ex parte decree was passed on 20.5.1983 against which the petitioner had also filed an application for setting aside ex parte decree but his application was dismissed and whereupon he has also filed suit for declaring ex parte decree as nullity which has been still pending. 9. In this view of the matter, since no jurisdictional error has been committed by the executing court, this court cannot interfere with the impugned order in its revisional jurisdiction nor the impugned order smacks of either failure of jurisdiction or exercise of power in excess of jurisdiction, nor the impugned order has resulted in miscarriage of justice or abuse of process of law. Hence, I do not find any merit in any of the contentions urged by Shri Bhatt so as to invoke Section 115 Civil Procedure Code for interference in the impugned order. 10. As a result of the above discussion, this civil revision petition being devoid of any merit is hereby dismissed in limine. The impugned order dated 29.3.2000 of the learned Civil Jude (JD) Ajmer City (East) Ajmer in execution application No.30/84 declining petitioner on application to allow him to produce evidence on his objections to the execution application of the respondent decree holder, is upheld. The impugned order dated 29.3.2000 of the learned Civil Jude (JD) Ajmer City (East) Ajmer in execution application No.30/84 declining petitioner on application to allow him to produce evidence on his objections to the execution application of the respondent decree holder, is upheld. As the petition for execution of decree dated 27.5.83 has been pending since 1984, the executing court is directed to dispose of the execution application as well as objection filed by the petitioner under section 47 Civil Procedure Code in accordance with law as early as possible but not beyond within three months from the receipt of certified copy of this order.Revision dismissed *******