JUDGMENT Kuldip Chand Sood, J.:- Dev Singh Panwar son of Shri Jagat Singh joined the Indian Army and was enrolled as Nursing Assistant in the Army Medical Corps on July 15.1964. He was granted annual leave while posted at 902-Base Hospital c/o 56 APO from February 9.1979 to April 11.1979. On March 4. 1979. he met with an unfortunate accident and succumbed to the injuries. He was married to one Sumitra Devi. However, during the life time of Dev Singh Panwar. Sumitra Devi married another person after getting customary divorce. On the death of Dev Singh Panwar. his father Jagat Singh applied for the family pension and other benefits vide letter dated January 30.1980 (annexure-P3). The claim for special family pension was rejected on the grounds that death of Dev Singh Panwar was "due to a wound injury of disease which is neither attributable nor aggravated by his military service". Another representation was filed by Smt. Sunpa Devi, petitioner herein, mother of the deceased Dev Singh Panwar through Zila Sainik Welfare Officer. Sirmaur at Nahan (Annexure P4). the petition remain un-responded. The petitioner in desperation filed a suit in the Court of learned Senior Sub Judge, sirmaur at Nahan which was dismissed on March 31.1993 on the grounds that the Court did not have the jurisdiction to decide the matter. 2. The case of the petitioner is: she being mother of deceased Dev Singh, is entitled to all the benefits including special family pension particularly when she was entirely dependent on her deceased son and is unable to earn her livelihood being 73 years of age. 3. Petitioner prays for the following reliefs : "i) The respondent may be directed to grant the special family pension or ordinary pension in favour of the petitioner from the date of death of her deceased son with 12% simple interest, ii) The petitioner may be allowed with the cost of this petition; iii) Any other relief whichever this Honble Court deems fit and proper in the above mentioned facts and circumstances may kindly be granted in favour of the petitioner". 4. The respondents-Union of India and controller of Defence of Accounts (Pension) Allahabad in a joint return filed on the affidavit of Lt. Col. 4. The respondents-Union of India and controller of Defence of Accounts (Pension) Allahabad in a joint return filed on the affidavit of Lt. Col. S.c. Nanda oppose the writ petition on the grounds: a) the petitioner is not entitled to ordinary family pension as deceased Dev Singh had completed only 14 years 233 days of service whereas the minimum qualifying service for the grant of ordinary family pension under the Pension Regulations is 15 years. b) the case for special family .pension was rejected by Chief GDA (P) Allahabad on the ground that "the cause of death was neither attributable to nor aggravated by military service." c) ordinary family pension is not admissible to parents. 5. We have heard Mr. B.N. Mishra. learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Vinod sharma. learned Additional Central Government Standing counsel for the respondents and perused the record. 6. It is admitted position that Dev Singh Panwar was on sanctioned authorized annual leave form his unit from February 9. 1979 to April 11, 1979. It is also not in dispute that Naik Dev Singh Panwar died in an accident on March 4. 1979 when on authorized leave. It is not in dispute before us that the petitioner is not entitled to ordinary pension as the same is not admissible to the parents and secondly Naik Dev Singh Panwar had not completed fifteen years of minimum qualifying service for pension as contemplated under Regulation 132 of the "Pension Regulations for the Army. 1961". hereinafter referred to as "Pension Regulations". The relevant regulation reads: "132. Unless otherwise provided for. the minimum qualifying colour service for earning a service pension is 15 years." 7. The only question which requires our consideration is whether the petitioner is entitled to "special family pension" under Regulation 213 of the Pension Regulations. Regulation 213 reads: "213. A special family pension may be granted to the family of an individual if his death was due to or hastened by- (a) a wound, injury or disease which was attributable to military service; or (b) the aggravation by military service of a wound, injury or disease which existed before or arose during military service. 8. Regulation 216 lists, the members of the family who are eligible for the grant of family pension if otherwise qualified. The eligible members of the family are: (a) Widow lawfully married. (b) Father (c) Mother (d) Son. 8. Regulation 216 lists, the members of the family who are eligible for the grant of family pension if otherwise qualified. The eligible members of the family are: (a) Widow lawfully married. (b) Father (c) Mother (d) Son. actual and legitimate. (e) Daughter, actual and legitimate. 9. As noticed earlier, the grant of "special family pension" to the petitioner is opposed on the sole ground that death of Naik Dev Singh Panwar was "not attributable to his Military Service". 10. Appendix-IE to the Regulations refers to regulation 173 and 185 relating to the grant of disability pension. Rule 2 and 3 of Appendix-II read: 2. Disablement or death shall be accepted as due to military service provided it is certified that: (a) the disablement is due to a wound, injury or disease which-(i) is attributable to military service; or (ii) existed before or arose during military service and has been and remains aggravated thereby; (b) the death was due to or hastened by- (i) a wound, injury or disease which was attributable to military service: or (ii) the aggravation by military service of a wound, injury or disease which existed before or arose during military service, (emphasis supplied). 3. There must be a causal connection between disablement and military service for attributability or aggravation to be conceded. 11. It may be seen that death of an armed personnel is accepted to be due to military service if such death is caused on account of a wound, injury or disease which is attributable to military service. There has to be a casual connection between the injury sustained and military service for the acceptance of the attributability. 12. Question whether armed forces personnel is on military service when on leave is no longer resintegra. In Krishna Dahiya v. Union of India & Anr. 1996 (3) Punjab Law Reporter. 468. a Division bench of Punjab & Haryana High Court, relying upon Joginder Singh v. Union of India & Ors. 1996(2) S.L.R.149 and Division bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Chairoo Ram v. Secretary: Defence & Ors. 1991 (1) 678. held that an Officer subject to the Army Act while on casual leave is considered to be on duty. 13.In Krishana Dahiya, the petitioner was enrolled in the Army Medical Corpos as Clerk and promoted to the rank of Hawaldar in 1984. He proceeded on casual leave from Army Hospital Delhi Cantt. 1991 (1) 678. held that an Officer subject to the Army Act while on casual leave is considered to be on duty. 13.In Krishana Dahiya, the petitioner was enrolled in the Army Medical Corpos as Clerk and promoted to the rank of Hawaldar in 1984. He proceeded on casual leave from Army Hospital Delhi Cantt. for going to his home village at Bindhroli in District Sonepat of Haryana State. When he was returning after availing the casual leave, he met with an accident while trying to board the train. One leg of the petitioner was chopped off in the accident and the other leg had to be amputated by the Doctors. His claim for the disability pension was rejected on the ground that disability was not attributable to military service and injury did not exist or arose during military service nor aggravated from the military service. A contention was raised before the Division Bench that as the petitioner was travelling at his own expense, therefore, he was not entitled to disability pension, The contention was repelled. It was observed that "the expenses for the travel whether borne by the State or the individuals cannot be made the sine qua non". 14. Rule 6 (c) of Appendix-II of "Pension Regulations" provides that a person subject to Army Act will be deemed to be on duty during the period of participation in recreation, organized or permitted by Service Authorities and of travelling in a body or singly under organized arrangements. A person is also considered to be on duty when proceeding to his leave station or returning to duty from his leave station at public expense. Clause (d) of Rule 6 provides that an accident which occurs when a person is not strictly on duty as defined, may also be attributable to service provided that it is not an accident which could be attributed to risk common to human existence in modern conditions in India Unless such risk is enhanced in kind or degree by the nature, conditions, obligations or incidents of public service. Clause (d) of rule 6 of Appendix-II reads: "(d) An accident which occurs when a man is not strictly on duty as defined may also be attributable to Service, provided that it is not an accident which can be attributed to risk common to human existence in modern conditions in India, unless such risk is definitely enhanced in kind or degree by the nature, conditions, obligations or incidents of the persons service. Thus, for instance, where a person is killed or injured by another party by reason of belonging to the Armed forces, he shall be deemed on duty at the relevant time. This benefit will be given more liberally to the claimant in cases occurring in acting service as defined in the Army/Air force Act..." 15. A bare reading of this provision shows that the object of the rule is to extend the benefit of this beneficial provision liberally. Even the cases where accident occurs when a person may not be strictly on duty which may be attributable to his service, would be covered by this beneficial provision. 16. In "Joginder Singh", petitioner who was serving as Lance Dafadar in regular army was on casual leave from Babina his duty station, to his home in District Faridkot in Punjab. While beading the train, he got involved in an accident as a result of which he fell down from the train and suffered severe injuries. His right leg came under the wheels and was crushed below the knee. The leg was amputated. He was denied disability-pension on the ground that injury was not attributable to military service. The appellant challenged the denial of the disability pension in a writ petition before the High Court. The High Court dismissed the petition on the grounds of delay. A question, in the circumstances, arose before the Apex Court whether the appellant was entitled to disability pension, the Apex court answered the question in affirmative with the observation: ..."We agree with the contention of Mr. B. Kanta Rao, learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant being in regular Army there is no reason why he should not be treated as on duty when he was on casual leave. B. Kanta Rao, learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant being in regular Army there is no reason why he should not be treated as on duty when he was on casual leave. No Army Regulation or rule has been brought to our notice to show that the appellant is not entitled to disability pension.It is rather not disputed that an Army personnel on casual leave is treated to be on duty. We see no justification whatsoever in denying the disability pension to the appellant". (emphasis supplied). 17. In Madan Singh Shekhawat v. Union of India & Ors., 1999 (6) Supreme Court Cases 459. Rule 6 (c) of Appendix-II came up for interpretation. In that case, appellant had joined the Indian Army as Horse rider in the year 1975. On april 25, 1987. he was discharged from the Army on medical grounds which arose from an accident in which the appellant was involved on October 1. 1984 while alighting from the train at a Railway Station. The appellants right hand was amputated four inches below from the joint of collar bone. At the time of accident the appellant was travelling from Jodhpur to his home station on authorized leave granted to him. The appellant applied for special disability pension under the relevant Rules. His application was rejected on the ground that at the time of the accident, the appellant was not on military service. Aggrieved, he filed a writ petition before the High Court which was dismissed on the ground that the petitioner was not entitled to this disability pension as at the time of the accident, he was travelling at his own expenses and the relevant rule did not permit the grant of disability pension. His appeal before the division Bench did not succeed. The appellant approached the apex court by special leave. Interpreting rule 6 (c) of Appendix-H. it was held in para 12.13 and 14: "12. This rule is a deeming provision which provides for situations under which a person on duty, if he suffers diability. is entitled to the grant of disability pension. The last part of this sub-rule provides that a person incurring disability when proceeding to his leave station or returning to duty from his leave station at public expense is also entitled to the grant of disability pension. 13. is entitled to the grant of disability pension. The last part of this sub-rule provides that a person incurring disability when proceeding to his leave station or returning to duty from his leave station at public expense is also entitled to the grant of disability pension. 13. The controversy in this case is whether the qualification "at public expense" found in this rule is so mandatory as to deprive an army personnel who is travelling to his leave station or vice versa "on duty", but at his own expense, of the benefit of disability person if the need arises. 14. If the expression "at public expense" is to be construed literally then under the rules referred to above, an army personnel incurring a disability during his travel at his own expense will not be entitled to the benefit of Rule 6(c) (supra). The object of the rule, as we see. is to provide relief to a victim of accident during the travel. If that be so. the nature of expenditure incurred for the purpose of such travel is wholly alien to the object of the rule". 18. In para 15 of the judgment their Lordships observed that the court is charged with the duty to interpret a beneficial provision liberally rather than a restrictive, meaning which would negate the very object of the rule. Apex Court held tha,t as there was no allegation against the appellant that he was travelling to his home station. Qn the fateful day. unauthorisedly. therefore, he was entitled to the benefit of the disability pension as provided under the rules. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioner also referred to Sukhdev Singh v. Union of India, 2000(5) Service Law Reporter, 181 and Ex.Naik Manjit Singh v. Government of India & Ors., 2000 (1) Service Law Reporter, 100 in support of the argument that the petitioner is entitled to special family pension as her son Naik Dev Singh Panwar died as a result of the injuries sustained by him in an accident while on annual leave and. therefore, such injuries would be attributable to army service. 20. Taking into consideration the facts of the case, the settled position of law discussed above, we are of the view that the death of Naik Dev Singh Panwar son of the petitioner cannot be said to be un-related or unconnected to the military service. therefore, such injuries would be attributable to army service. 20. Taking into consideration the facts of the case, the settled position of law discussed above, we are of the view that the death of Naik Dev Singh Panwar son of the petitioner cannot be said to be un-related or unconnected to the military service. The petitioner, in our opinion, is entitled to special family pension under regulation 213 of the Pension Regulations. . 21. In result, we allow the writ petition and direct the respondents to grant special family pension to the petitioner from the date of death of her deceased son Naik Dev Singh Panwar to be calculated in accordance with the Rules and Regulations. The petitioner shall also be entitled to, interest at the rate of 9% pen annum on the arrears of special family pension from the date of death of her son. There will be no order as to costs.