SHARDA COTTON GINNING & PRESSING FACTORY v. STATE OF HARYANA
2001-03-21
G.S.SINGHVI, NIRMAL SINGH
body2001
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT G. S. SINGHVI, J. - This petition is directed against the order, annexure P3, dated September 18, 2000, vide which the Sales Tax Tribunal, Haryana (for short, "the Tribunal") dismissed the appeals filed by the petitioner and others against the orders passed by the Joint Excise and Taxation Commissioner (Appeals), Hisar/Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner-cum-Revisional Authority, Hisar, rejecting their prayer for grant of rebate on the entire quantity of the raw material, i.e., cotton seeds used for manufacturing the oil. The petitioner is registered as a dealer under the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973 (for short, "the Act"). It is engaged in the business of manufacturing oil from cotton seeds purchased after paying tax at the first stage of sale. It filed returns claiming rebate in lieu of the tax paid on the raw material. Vide orders dated May 12, 1999, May 24, 1999 and May 25, 1999, the Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority, Sirsa, finalised the assessment for the assessment years 1994-95, 1995-96 and 1996-97 and allowed proportionate rebate under rule 24-A of the Haryana General Sales Tax Rules, 1975 (for short, "the Rules") instead of granting full rebate on the tax paid on the cotton seeds. The appeals filed by the petitioner under section 39(1) and (2) of the Act claiming full rebate were dismissed by the Joint Excise and Taxation Commissioner (Appeals), Hisar and the Tribunal vide orders dated January 31, 2000 and September 18, 2000. Reference application filed by the petitioner under section 42 of the Act was also dismissed by the Tribunal vide its order dated September 19, 2000. The petitioner has challenged the order passed by the Tribunal on the ground that it is contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. [1992] 85 STC 220 and its own order dated June 22, 2000, passed in S.T.M. Nos. 10-11 of 1999-2000 (Jyoti Luxman Roller Flour Mills P. Ltd., Rohtak v. State of Haryana). It has averred that "khal" is a by-product obtained in the process of manufacturing oil from cotton seeds and, therefore, the Tribunal has committed a serious illegality by declining its prayer for grant of full rebate on the tax paid on the raw material, i.e., cotton seeds.
It has averred that "khal" is a by-product obtained in the process of manufacturing oil from cotton seeds and, therefore, the Tribunal has committed a serious illegality by declining its prayer for grant of full rebate on the tax paid on the raw material, i.e., cotton seeds. In the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents, reliance has been placed on rule 24-A of the Rules and entry 34 of Schedule B in support of their case that the petitioner is not entitled to full rebate on the tax paid cotton seeds used in the manufacture of oil. Shri B. K. Jhingan relied on the order, annexure P5, passed by the Tribunal in the case of Jyoti Luxman Roller Flour Mills Pvt. Ltd. (S.T.M. Nos. 10-11 of 1999-2000 decided on June 22, 2000) and argued that after having accepted the applicability of the ratio of the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. [1992] 85 STC 220, to the facts of that case, the Tribunal was not at all justified in rejecting the petitioner's claim for full rebate. Learned counsel further argued that the order passed by the Tribunal in the petitioner's case should be declared as vitiated by an error of law because it is based on a complete misreading of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. [1992] 85 STC 220, and is also discriminatory. Shri Jaswant Singh candidly stated that the order passed by the Tribunal in the case of Jyoti Luxman Roller Flour Mills (S.T.M. Nos. 10-11 of 1999-2000 decided on June 22, 2000) is primarily based on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. [1992] 85 STC 220. He also conceded that there is no substantial difference between the case of the petitioner and that of Jyoti Luxman Roller Flour Mills (S.T.M. Nos. 10-11 of 1999-2000 decided on June 22, 2000) and the orders passed by the Tribunal in the two cases appear to be contradictory but, at the same time, he tried to defend the order passed by the Tribunal by arguing that "khal" cannot be treated as a by-product of oil manufactured by the petitioner from cotton seeds so as to entitle it to claim full rebate.
Learned counsel further argued that rule 24-A of the Rules does not entitle the petitioner to claim full rebate because "khal" manufactured by it is a tax-free item. We have given serious thought to the respective arguments. The question which merits consideration in this case is whether in the face of the order passed in the case of Jyoti Luxman Roller Flour Mills (S.T.M. Nos. 10-11 of 1999-2000 decided on June 22, 2000) the Tribunal was justified in rejecting the petitioner's claim for full rebate on the raw material, i.e., cotton seeds used in the manufacturing of oil and whether the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. [1992] 85 STC 220, is applicable to its case. For the purpose of deciding the aforementioned question, it will be useful to refer to the order, annexure P5, passed by the Tribunal in the case of Jyoti Luxman Roller Flour Mills (S.T.M. Nos. 10-11 of 1999-2000 decided on June 22, 2000). The facts of that case were that the assessee was manufacturing atta, maida, suji and wheat by using tax paid wheat. It claimed rebate/refund of tax in lieu of the wheat used in the manufacture of the final product. The Assessing Authority rejected its claim for full rebate on the ground that wheat bran was a tax-free item. The Joint Excise and Taxation Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal upheld the order of the Assessing Authority. However, while deciding the review petition and reference application filed by the assessee by a common order (annexure P5), the Tribunal changed its earlier view and remanded the case to the Assessing Authority by relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. [1992] 85 STC 220. The relevant extracts of that order are reproduced below : "The honourable Supreme Court has held that if a relevant and material provision of law was not brought to the notice of the court, the court would be justified to review its order.
The relevant extracts of that order are reproduced below : "The honourable Supreme Court has held that if a relevant and material provision of law was not brought to the notice of the court, the court would be justified to review its order. The counsel for the petitioner, for the question under the State Act, has relied upon the judgment of the honourable Supreme Court reported in [1992] 85 STC 220 (Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bombay v. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd.) at page 231 which reads as under : 'Turning now to the main question, we are inclined to agree with respondents' counsel that they are entitled to a set-off of the entire tax paid by them on the purchases of sulphuric acid and cotton, respectively. The only condition under the rule is that the goods purchased on payment of tax should have been used in the manufacture of taxable goods for sale. Their concurrent user for the manufacture of another item of goods which may or may not be taxable is immaterial. ..........' Obviously, the aforesaid judgment of the honourable Supreme Court which was otherwise relied upon by the Tribunal in the impugned order fully supports the case of the petitioner. I, therefore, taking matter suo motu under section 41(3) of the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973 hold that this case needs re-examination regarding rebate/refund of tax paid on wheat even if concurrently wheat was used in the manufacture of wheat bran which is tax-free commodity. In view of these detailed observations, I do not find it tenable and proper to refer the aforesaid two questions to the High Court. Instead, I decide these two questions under section 41(3) of the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973 as these are covered by the judgments of the High Court/honourable Supreme Court and remand this case to the Assessing Authority for fresh decision in view of [1992] 85 STC 220 (Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bombay v. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd.) and in view of the Hindi notification referred to above. .............." However, in the petitioner's case, the same presiding officer of the Tribunal rejected the claim for total rebate by making the following observations : "I have considered the matter carefully and have also seen the facts on record, judgments relied upon by both the parties and the authorities below.
.............." However, in the petitioner's case, the same presiding officer of the Tribunal rejected the claim for total rebate by making the following observations : "I have considered the matter carefully and have also seen the facts on record, judgments relied upon by both the parties and the authorities below. The Supreme Court judgment reported in Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bombay v. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. [1992] 85 STC 220 makes it abundantly clear that products include by-products as well. Meaning there is no distinction between the two for the purpose of taxation. For this reason, reliance by the counsel upon [1994] 94 STC 98 (P&H) (Jagraon Co-operative Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of Punjab) cannot be of any use to the appellants. In support of the contention for total rebate under rule 24-A the counsels have referred to [1998] 85 STC 220 (Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bombay v. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd.). A careful perusal of the judgment clearly reveals that Haryana provisions which were inserted in the form of rule 24-A and 24-B came much after the aforesaid judgment was delivered by the apex Court. Besides, the counsel could not establish similarity between the provisions interpreted by the honourable apex Court and those contained in Haryana General Sales Tax Rules (rule 24-A and 24-B) as stressed by the departmental representative and are absolutely clear. These will lead to conclude that if tax paid goods go into manufacture of taxable goods, relief in toto will be admissible. Such relief will not be admissible, if tax-free goods are also produced as a result of the process of manufacture. And in the event of the process resulting into production of taxable and tax-free goods, grant of proportionate relief shall be the most logical conclusion. That being the legal position under the Haryana provisions, the orders of the authorities below applying pro rata basis are fully in accordance with the provisions of law. The counsels, for the dealers have also assailed the use of department instructions by the authorities. According to them such instructions can be made use of prospectively, not retrospectively. But this contention cannot hold ground in view of clear law laid down by the Supreme Court of India in the case reported as Manickam and Co. v. State of Tamil Nadu [1977] 39 STC 12. The instructions of the department, are in the nature of an exposition or explanation.
But this contention cannot hold ground in view of clear law laid down by the Supreme Court of India in the case reported as Manickam and Co. v. State of Tamil Nadu [1977] 39 STC 12. The instructions of the department, are in the nature of an exposition or explanation. Such an exposition in the light of the judgment referred to by the departmental representative could be validly made use. This view has already been taken by the collateral Tribunal in S.T.A. Nos. 600-601 of 1998-99 decided on May 28, 1999 and a number of other cases. The judgments relied upon by the counsels are not strictly applicable to the facts of the present cases. In view of these clear facts on record and the judgments referred to above the orders of the lower authorities do not call for any interference and are accordingly upheld. The appeals are therefore, dismissed." In our opinion, the orders passed by the Tribunal in the case of Jyoti Luxman Roller Flour Mills (S.T.M. Nos. 10-11 of 1999-2000 decided on June 22, 2000) and the petitioner are ex facie contradictory and the only proper course to remove the resultant discrimination qua the petitioner is to quash the impugned order with a direction to the Tribunal to decide the petitioner's appeals afresh. We are, further of the view that the Tribunal has misread the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bombay v. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. [1992] 85 STC 220. A careful reading of that decision shows that while deciding a bunch of appeals and writ petitions, their Lordships bad held that for claiming exemption, it is not necessary for the assessee to prove that the entire raw material had been used only for manufacture of taxable goods. The relevant observations made by the Supreme Court in this respect are reproduced below : "Turning now to the main question, we are inclined to agree with respondents' counsel that they are entitled to a set-off of the entire tax paid by them on the purchases of sulphuric acid and cotton, respectively. The only condition under the rule is that the goods purchased on payment of tax should have been used in the manufacture of taxable goods for sale.
The only condition under the rule is that the goods purchased on payment of tax should have been used in the manufacture of taxable goods for sale. Their concurrent user for the manufacture of another item of goods which may or may not be taxable is immaterial though we may point out that in the Bharat Petroleum case, the kerosene was also taxable for nine months in the year and in the case of Phulgaon Cotton Mills, yarn was also manufactured and it was subject to tax. Sri Dholakia contends for an implicit principle of apportionment on the basis of turnovers of various items of goods manufactured and restriction of the quantum of set-off to a proportion based on the turnover of taxable goods to the total turnover. He cited certain decisions under the Income-tax and Sales Tax Acts in support of this contention : Anglo-French Textile Company Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1954] 25 ITR 27 (SC), Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar AIR 1963 SC 577 ; [1963] 48 ITR (SC) and Commissioner of Income-tax v. Best & Co. (Private) Ltd. [1966] 60 ITR 11 (SC). We do not think these cases are of assistance. The first two cases dealt with the question as to when profits and gains can be said to accrue or arise in a manufacturing business and the third held that when a receipt is a composite one of capital and revenue nature, it is open to the Revenue to apportion the same and bring the latter to tax. These are situations in which the taxable element is severable. Under the rules presently under consideration also, situations are conceivable where such severance is implicit. For instance, suppose the cotton purchased is utilised partly for manufacture of cloth that is taxable and partly for manufacture of cloth that is not taxable or partly for the manufacture of yarn which is taxable and is sold and partly for manufacture of cloth which is not taxable. In these instances, it is clear that only some of the cotton is utilised for the first purpose and some for the second purpose and so only the purchase tax paid in respect of the quantity utilised for the first purpose will be eligible of set-off.
In these instances, it is clear that only some of the cotton is utilised for the first purpose and some for the second purpose and so only the purchase tax paid in respect of the quantity utilised for the first purpose will be eligible of set-off. But the type of user with which we are concerned is a composite one in which it is not possible to correlate any part of the purchased goods as having gone in for the purpose of manufacture of taxable goods. The position is picturesquely brought out in the case of Bharat Petroleum. The entire sulphuric acid purchased has no doubt been used in the manufacture of kerosene though perhaps not a drop of acid clings to the kerosene manufactured. Equally, the entire sulphuric acid has gone into the composition of the acid sludge. The 3,048.760 M.T. of acid have dissolved the impurities in the crude oil and conglomerated with them to constitute 3,541.485 M.T. of acid sludge. Having regard to the nature of the interactions here, it is incontrovertible that the entire sulphuric acid purchased has gone into the manufacture of the sludge. The rules do not require that the purchased goods must have been used only for the manufacture of taxable goods for sale. In this situation, it is not possible to cut down the quantum of relief clearly outlined in the rule on the basis of some general principle claimed to underlie the provision." In view of the above discussion, we allow the writ petition and quash the impugned order with a direction to the Tribunal to decide the appeals filed by the petitioner afresh after passing a speaking order. Writ petition allowed.