O. P. GARG, J. ( 1 ) THE dispute relates to premises/shop No. 37 Martinganj, Shamli Road, Muzaffarnagar, of which admittedly the respondent No. 3, Smt. Urmila Devi is the owner of the shop in dispute while the petitioner Bata India Limited is the tenant. The application for release under Section 21 (1) (a) of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was fled by the land-lady respondent No. 3 against the petitioner in the year 1992. It was registered as P. A. Case No. 30 of 1992. The said application was allowed by the Prescribed Authority by an order dated 10. 5. 1994 holding that the need of the land lady respondent No. 3 was bona fide and genuine and that the balance of hardship tilts in her favour. Aggrieved, the tenant petitioner preferred a Rent Appeal No. 23 of 1994 under section 22 of the Act which was dismissed on 8. 12. 1995. It is in these circumstances that the petitioner tenant has come before this Court by means of this writ petition under Article 226 of constitution of India with the prayer that the order of release passed in favour of respondent No. 3 and as confirmed in appeal under Section 22 of the Act, be quashed. ( 2 ) COUNTER and rejoinder-affidavits have been exchanged. ( 3 ) HEARD Sri K. R. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Atul Dayal appearing on behalf of respondent No. 3. ( 4 ) TO begin with, it may be pointed out that the conclusion that the need of the land-lady to occupy the disputed shop is bona fide and genuine and the question of hardship are findings of fact which cannot be canvassed or challenged in writ jurisdiction. ( 4 ) TO begin with, it may be pointed out that the conclusion that the need of the land-lady to occupy the disputed shop is bona fide and genuine and the question of hardship are findings of fact which cannot be canvassed or challenged in writ jurisdiction. Sri Atul Dayal, therefore, pointed out that the order of release which has become final, cannot be disturbed by this Court in writ jurisdiction and in support of his contention he placed reliance on the decisions in the case of Kamla Sarin v. Shyam Lal and others, 1984 (2) All RC 344 ; in the case of Munni Lal and another v. Prescribed Authority and another, AIR 1978 SC 29 ; in the case of Natthu Lal v. Radhey, AIR 1974 SC 1696 ; in the case of Babhutmal Raichand v. Laxmibai, AIR 1975 SC 1296 ; in the case of Smt. Labhkumar Bhagwani Shaha v. Janardan Mahadeo Kalan, AIR 1983 sc 535 ; in the case of Ram Rakesh Pal and others v. Ist Additional District Judge and others, 1976 UPRCC 376 ; in the case of Jagan Prasad v. District Judge and others, 1976 UPRCC 342 ; in the case of Laxmi Narain v. IInd Additional District Judge and others, 1977 UPRCC 230 : in the case of Smt. Nirmala Tandon v. Xth Additional District Judge, Kanpur Nagar, 1996 (2) ARC 409 and in the case of Kamleshwar Prasad v. Pradumanju Agarwal, 1997 (1) ARC 627. ( 5 ) SRI K. R. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner made attempts to point out that certain subsequent events had occurred on account of the construction of certain new shops by the land-lady. Sri Atul Dayal pointed out that in view of the decision of Kamleshwar Prasad (supra), subsequent events cannot be taken into consideration in writ jurisdiction. In Kamleshwar prasads case (supra), it was held that the order of release as confirmed in appeal acquires the status of a final decree which cannot be disturbed by consideration of the subsequent events in the writ jurisdiction, as the rights of the parties under a final decree arc determined with reference to the facts and circumstances as obtaining by the time by which the appeal confirming the decree came into existence. ( 6 ) THE sheet anchor of the case of the petitioner as canvassed by Sri K. R. Singh is that prior to the filing of the P. A. Case No. 30 of 1992, the respondent No. 1 filed a release application under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act which was registered as P. A. Case No. 74 of 1983 and during the pendency of the said release application, the parties came to terms and on the basis of the compromise arrived at between them, a decree for eviction pursuant to the release order on the subsequent application filed in the year 1992 could not be passed. A copy of the compromise filed and verified before the Prescribed Authority in P. A. Case No. 74 of 1983 is on record. It contemplates that the petitioner shall pay enhanced amount of rent in the following manner : for the period Amount from 1. 1. 1984 to 31. 12. 1989 Rs. 950-00 per month from 1. 1. 1990 to 31. 12. 1994 Rs. 1,200-00 per month from 1. 1. 1995 to 31. 12. 1999 Rs. 1,500-00 per month and From 1. 1. 2000 to At the rale of Rs. 2,000-00 per month 31. 12. 2004 ( 7 ) THE amount of rent payable by the petitioner was to be enhanced every five-year in a graduated manner as indicated above. The compromise contemplated that the land-lady respondent No. 3 shall not evict the petitioner till 31. 12. 2004, if he pays the rent which was to be enhanced in a phased manner after every five years. ( 8 ) SRI Atul Dayal pointed out that the compromise in question could not be acted upon, as it was not registered. According to him, the registration of the compromise was compulsory in view of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Bhoop Singh v. Ram Singh Major and others, (1995) 5 SCC 709 . Sri K. R. Singh pointed out that the said decision does not apply to the facts of the present case as the law laid down in the said case with regard to the compulsory registration of a compromise decree was in the wake of the fact that certain new rights, title or interest in praesenti in immovable property of value of Rs. 100 or above were created. 100 or above were created. I have also waded through the said decision and find that it does not apply to the facts of the present case on all fours. In Sardar Iqbal Singh v. Ram Nath Chowdhary and another, AIR 1982 Raj (JB)116, it was held that a compromise decree was not required to be registered as no fresh tenancy was created. In Hari Shankar v. Durga Devi and another, AIR 1977 All 455 , the circumstances in which a compromise decree is required to be compulsory registered have been laid down. In this connection, a reference may also be made to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of S. Noordeen v. V. S. Thiru Venkita Reddiar and others, (1996) 3 SCC 289 , in which it has been laid down that a compromise decree dealing with the immovable property is required to be registered. ( 9 ) IN the instant case, undoubtedly the petitioner was the tenant of the respondent No. 3. The release petition was filed in the year 1983 treating the petitioner to be the tenant. By virtue of the compromise which was made part of the release petition, no new rights of tenancy were created in favour of the petitioner and even the genuineness and bona fide nature of the need of the land-lady was determined. A decree on the basis of the compromise cannot be said to be vitiated on account of its non-registration, which under the law, was not required. ( 10 ) SRI Atul Dayal took pains to make out a point that inspite of the compromise between the parties in earlier Release Petition No. 74 of 1983, the land-lady was not debarred from making a fresh application for release, if on account of certain circumstances she required the accommodation to satisfy her personal need. The crux of the submission made on behalf of the land-lady was that a statutory right to get the tenanted shop released, could not be defeated or nullified, merely because a compromise was earlier arrived at between the parties in release proceedings. Sri Atul Dayal fortified his submission by placing reliance on Motilal v. VIIIth additional District Judge, 1990 ACJ 84 : Haji Mohd. Amin v. VIIth Additional District Judge, 1988 (2) ARC 416 (DB) ; Smt. Nai Bibi v. Late Ram Narain and others, 1978 ARC 226 (SC) ; mohd. Sri Atul Dayal fortified his submission by placing reliance on Motilal v. VIIIth additional District Judge, 1990 ACJ 84 : Haji Mohd. Amin v. VIIth Additional District Judge, 1988 (2) ARC 416 (DB) ; Smt. Nai Bibi v. Late Ram Narain and others, 1978 ARC 226 (SC) ; mohd. Ahmad v. IIIrd Additional District Judge, 1995 (2) ARC 12 : Bakride v. IIIrd Additional district Judge, 1989 (2) ARC 261 and Ashok Kumar Sheth v. IVth Additional District Judge, 1993 (1) ARC 93. ( 11 ) I have given a thoughtful consideration to the matter and find that the land-lady may not be prevented from filing a fresh application for release by invoking the provisions of Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act, but the fact remains that the law does not permit the land-lady to both approbate and reprobate. This principle is based on the doctrine of election which postulates that no party can accept and reject the same instrument and that "a person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage. ( 12 ) THE above observation flew from the decision of the Apex Court in the case of R. N. Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir, 1993 (1) ARC 1 (SC ). In Ram Shankar Tewari v. Ram Raghubir Jaiswal and other, 1993 (2) ARC 548, this Court has taken the view that it is the duty of the Court to prevent the beneficiaries from taking undue and impermissible advantages by turning down to suit the exigencies of the case. It is an indubitable fact that the land-lady has been accepting the enhanced amount of rent as contemplated in the compromise which forms part of the order passed in release application No. 74 of 1983. After a period of every five years, she is getting the advantage of enhanced rent. This advantage was available to her under the compromise arrived at between the parties. The land-lady, therefore, cannot play loose and fast or, in the common parlance, she cannot be permitted to blow hot and cold. After a period of every five years, she is getting the advantage of enhanced rent. This advantage was available to her under the compromise arrived at between the parties. The land-lady, therefore, cannot play loose and fast or, in the common parlance, she cannot be permitted to blow hot and cold. She has to abide by the conditions contained in the compromise and the order of release passed in the subsequent P. A. Case No. 30 of 1992, which has become final, should not be implemented prior to 31. 12. 2004. On equitable consideration, she is bound to permit the petitioner-tenant to continue as a tenant in the shop in dispute till 31. 12. 2004. She is accepting the rent at enhanced rates on the condition that the tenant shall continue in possession atleast upto 31. 12. 2004. ( 13 ) IN the conspectus of the above discussion, the order of release passed on 10. 5. 1994 in P. A. Case No. 30 of 1992 and as confirmed by order dated 8. 12. 1995 in Rent Appeal No. 23 of 1994, cannot be interfered with by invoking the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution of india. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. ( 14 ) HOWEVER, the implementation of the order of release dated 10. 5. 1994 is deferred till 31. 12. 2004 in view of the compromise arrived at between the parties in P. A. Case No. 74 of 1983 pursuant to which the respondent No. 3 land-lady is accepting enhanced rent, in case the petitioner does not vacate the premises on or before 31. 12. 2004, the release order shall become enforceable according to law. .