ORDER Hari Nath Tilhari, J.— These writ petitions are directed against the order dated 3.1.1992 passed by the Common Standing Committee, Zilla Parishad, Bangalore Rural District, Bangalore, (Respondent-2 herein) and endorsement dated 20.1.1992 issued by the Chief Secretary, Zilla Parishad, Bangalore Rural District, Bangalore, (Respondent-1 herein) vide Annexures 'G' and 'H' respectively to the writ petitions. 2. The facts of the case in nutshell are: According to the Petitioners' case, by a resolution dated 28.2.1989 passed by the Nandagudi Mandal Panchayat, the Petitioners have been granted sites bearing Nos. 24, 25, 26 and 27 measuring 40' x 15' (each) formed in Sy. No. 122 situated at Chikkondahalli Village, Kasaba Hobli, Hosakote Taluk, Bangalore Rural District, Bangalore, and the plans for construction of houses were approved by the Mandal Panchayat. According to the Petitioners, hakkupatras were also issued in favour of the Petitioners vide Annexure 'C' to the writ petition. The Petitioners' case is that after getting hakkupatras and having paid the tax the Petitioners made application for licence to put up construction of residential house and the licence was granted on 18.7.1991. The Petitioners' case is that after obtaining the licence from the Mandal Panchayat, the Petitioners have started laying foundation in their respective sites. When this was the state of affairs, it appears that present Respondents 4 to 13 have filed the appeal before the Zilla Parishad, Bangalore Rural District, Bangalore, in No. SK/96/91/92 under Section 273 of the Karnataka Zilla Parishad Act, on the grounds mentioned in the memorandum of appeal. That by order dated 3.1.1992 the Samanya Sthai Committee of Respondent-1 without considering the objections filed by the Petitioners, as well as without giving opportunity of hearing to them the appellate authority passed the order cancelling the allotment of sites made in favour of the Petitioners by the Nandagudi Mandal Panchayat. Feeling aggrieved from the order dated 3.1.1992 passed by the second Respondent and the endorsement issued by the first Respondent vide Annexures 'G' and 'H' to the writ petitions the Petitioners have filed these writ petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 3. On notices being issued to the Respondents, the Respondents have filed the statement of objections/counter affidavit. 4. The learned Counsel for the Petitioners has contended that the appeals in all these cases were time barred. 3. On notices being issued to the Respondents, the Respondents have filed the statement of objections/counter affidavit. 4. The learned Counsel for the Petitioners has contended that the appeals in all these cases were time barred. He contended that sites were allotted to the Petitioners on 28.2.1989 and the appeals were filed by the Respondents 4 to 13 before the appellate authority on 21.11.1991. The learned Counsel contended that under the relevant rules the appeals could be filed within 30 days and he invited my attention to the provisions of Section 273 of the Karnataka Zilla Parishads, Taluk Panchayat Samithis, Mandal Panchayats and Nyaya Panchayats Act, 1983, as well as Rule 2 of the Karnataka Zilla Parishads, Taluk Panchayat Samithis, Mandal Panchayats and Nyaya Panchayats (Limitation for Appeals) Rules, 1985. The learned Counsel contended that the limitation prescribed for filing the appeal is only 30 days and in this case the appeal had been filed long after the expiry of the period of two and half years from the date of the allotment of sites. The learned Counsel contended that the appeal being time barred, the appellate authority had no jurisdiction to pass the order as it had no jurisdiction to entertain the time barred appeal. The learned Counsel for the Petitioners contended that when the law provided and granted a right of a party to file the appeal before the appellate authority, but subject to the conditions including the law of limitation. The intention of law is that the appeal had to be filed within the period of limitation prescribed under the Act. But it provides that by necessary implication if the appeal not been filed within the time prescribed, the appellant is to lose his right of filing the appeal and the appellate authority could not entertain the appeal. The learned Counsel contended that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to the appeals under this Act and apart from that there is nothing on record to show that the appellate authority had applied its mind to the question of limitation, nor there is nothing on record to indicate that any sufficient cause or explanation for the delay has been shown and the appellate authority condoned the delay. The learned Counsel submitted that in view of the above the impugned orders are without jurisdiction, illegal null and void and the same is liable to be quashed. The learned Counsel submitted that in view of the above the impugned orders are without jurisdiction, illegal null and void and the same is liable to be quashed. The learned Counsel submitted that no opportunity of hearing was provided to the Petitioners. The learned Counsel for the Petitioners has raised certain other contentions as well but there is no need to go into those contentions as prima facie it appears that the first contention by itself is sufficient to decide the matter. On behalf of the Respondents Smt. Suguna, Advocate, holding brief for Sri S. Channaraya Reddy, learned Counsel for Respondents 4 to 9 and 12 contended that the appellate authority when entertained the appeal and decided the same on merits it should be deemed to have condoned the delay. She further contended that the question of limitation appears to have not pressed by the other side. She contended that opportunity of hearing was given to the Petitioners and the Petitioners have filed objections to the appeal. She contended that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, no doubt, in view of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable to the present case. So, when the authority dealt with the appeal on merits, it should deemed to have been considered the question of limitation and have condoned the delay. 5. I have applied my mind to the contentions advanced by the learned Counsels appearing for the parties. 6. The law of limitation and limitation prescribed by special law or by general law of limitation has got a very purpose and when the law prescribes that the appeal has to be filed within the specified period, then by necessary implication, it means that the appeal has to be filed within the period of limitation and no appeal can be filed beyond the period of limitation by a party. No doubt, it may be subject to the other provisions which provide for condonation of delay or entertaining of the appeal beyond time such as Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. When law intends that the appeal cannot be filed beyond the limitation, then by necessary implication the appeal or proceedings cannot be initiated after the expiry of the period, but no doubt subject to the above provisions of law empowering the Court to entertain the time barred appeal such as Section 5 of Limitation Act. When law intends that the appeal cannot be filed beyond the limitation, then by necessary implication the appeal or proceedings cannot be initiated after the expiry of the period, but no doubt subject to the above provisions of law empowering the Court to entertain the time barred appeal such as Section 5 of Limitation Act. Otherwise, it has to dismiss the time barred appeal. The learned Counsel for the Respondents made reference to Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The question is whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, is applicable to the matters of appeals under Karnataka Act No. 20 of 1985. But, before I proceed with that question, I may point out that for filing the appeal under Section 273 of the Karnataka Act No. 20 of 1985 the limitation has been prescribed as 30 days. It would be appropriate at this juncture to quote Section 273 of the Karnataka Act No. 20 of 1985, which reads as under: 273. Appeals.-(1) Any person aggrieved by any original order of the Mandal Panchayat under this Act may within such period as may be prescribed appeal to the Zilla Parishad. (2) The appellate authority may after giving an opportunity to the appellant to be heard and after such inquiry as it deemed fit decide the appeal and its decision shall be final. 7. Section 273 of the Karnataka Act No. 20 of 1985 prescribes the period of limitation, by using the expression within such period as may be prescribed. The expression within such period as may be prescribed means the period as may be prescribed under the rules framed under the provisions of law. The expression 'prescribed' has been interpreted to mean as prescribed under the rules. Karnataka Zilla Parishads, Taluk Panchayat Samithis, Mandal Panchayats and Nyaya Panchayats (Limitation for Appeals) Rules, 1985 appear to have been framed under Section 284 read with Section 273(1) of the Act. Rule 2 of the aforesaid rules provides that save as otherwise provided in this Act or any rule made thereunder any person affected by an original order of the Mandal Panchayat made under the Act may within a period of thirty days from the date of such order appeal to the Zilla Parishad. Rule 2 of the aforesaid rules provides that save as otherwise provided in this Act or any rule made thereunder any person affected by an original order of the Mandal Panchayat made under the Act may within a period of thirty days from the date of such order appeal to the Zilla Parishad. It further provides that where the period specified for presentation of an appeal under Rule 2 expires on a general holiday declared by the Government, the appeal may be presented on the day next following such holiday. So, Section 273 of the Karnataka Act No. 20 of 1985 read with Rule 2 of the Karnataka Zilla Parishad, Taluk Panchayat Samithis, Mandal Panchayats and Nyaya Panchayats (Limitation for Appeals) Rules, 1985 referred to above prescribes the period of limitation to be thirty days from the date of the order. Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act provides that any appeal or any application other than an application under any of the provisions of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. A reading of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, no doubt, reveals that it is in the matter of appeal or any application other than an application, which have been excluded the Court has been empowered to admit the same even after the expiry of the period of limitation and this power can be exercised only if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. A reading of this section clearly reveals that by its own force it does not apply to the suit. The cases to which Section 5 is not applicable or may not be applicable, the Court or authority will have no power to condone the delay. In this view of the matter, it has to be examined whether Section 5 will apply to the case of the appellate authority dealing with the appeals under the Karnataka Act No. 20 of 1985. 8. The learned Counsel for the Respondents contended that Section 5 will apply to the appeals preferred under Section 273 and made reference to Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 8. The learned Counsel for the Respondents contended that Section 5 will apply to the appeals preferred under Section 273 and made reference to Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Section 29 is the saving clause. The material portion of the said section reads as under: 29. Savings.-(1)x x x (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period, of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. (3)x x x (4)x x x 9. A reading of this section provides that where any special or local law prescribes a period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application which period is different from the one prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule. It further provides that in order to determine the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 inclusive shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. No section in the Act has been pointed out which may be said to exclude either expressly or by necessary implications the application of these provisions of Sections 3 to 24 of the Limitation Act. Karnataka Act No. 20 of 1985 is a special law and the provisions under the appeal rules framed under the Act No. 20 of 1985 no doubt can come within the category of local law framed by the State and the period has been prescribed differently, so in my opinion by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, the provisions of Section 5 of the Act will apply and could be applied. The Legislature while enacting Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has made remarkable change of the section. The Legislature while enacting Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has made remarkable change of the section. Section 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (9 of 1908) provides as under: 29(1)x x x 29(2). Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefore by the First Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefore in that Schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for; any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law: (a) the provisions contained in Section 4, Sections 9 to 18 and Section 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law; and (b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply. 10. The remarkable change and the language used in old Section 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, that the provisions of Sections 3, 4, 9 to 18 and 22 were provided to apply in the matter of determination of the limitation and the remaining provisions it was clearly provided that it shall not apply which mean that Section 5 under the old Limitation Act could not be applied by or under the own force of Section 29(2)(a) and (b) of the old Act. But, Section 29(2) of the new Act i.e., Indian Limitation Act, 1963 provides that the provisions contained in Sections 14 to 24 inclusive shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. Under the new Act, the expression 'Sections 4 to 24 inclusive' includes within its scope of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and it provides in the matter of determination of the period of limitation the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 including Section 5 will apply where any special or local law provides different period of limitation for appeal or application. When I so observe I find support for my view from the decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Mukri Gopalan Vs. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker, AIR 1995 SC 2272 and in State of West Bengal and others Vs. When I so observe I find support for my view from the decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Mukri Gopalan Vs. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker, AIR 1995 SC 2272 and in State of West Bengal and others Vs. Kartick Chandra Das and others, (1996) 5 AD SC 395, and of this Court in the case of Dr. B. Shanta Ram Alva v. Commissioner, Mangalore City Corporation ILR 1999 Kar 4249. 11. The learned Counsel for the Petitioners contended that Section 5 makes use of the expression 'Court' therefore this power should be deemed to have been conferred on the Court only and not on other authorities. 12. The learned Counsel for the Respondents contended that the expression Court should be deemed to include by necessary implication the authorities even quasi judicial authorities or tribunals which have been given power to decide about the rights of the parties and not as Court in strict sense of the term. Though the learned Counsel for the Petitioners emphasised that the expression Court should be interpreted as Court forming the part of judicature in strict sense of term. If two interpretations are possible, then it is well settled principles of law that the interpretation which avoids, and resolves inconsistency should be followed and adopted. If two interpretations are possible and one which saves the provisions from becoming otiose or redundant, should be followed. If the term Court here is interpreted in the restricted sense as the learned Counsel for the Petitioners has contended then it may have the effect of rendering Section 29(2) otiose and redundant and would frustrate the purpose and the object of Section 29(2). As such when the Legislature by later enactment of Section 29(2) in changed language it intended that Sections 4 to 24, inclusive of Section 5, have to be applied in the matter of determination of limitation in cases where special or local laws prescribes limitation different from one prescribed or mentioned under the schedule. That different language has been adopted by the Legislature enacting Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 different from the language of Section 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. That different language has been adopted by the Legislature enacting Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 different from the language of Section 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. The expression Court for the purpose of the application of the section is to be interpreted in the wider sense that here the Legislature intended to include the tribunals and authorities, which apart from the Courts in strict, sense are required to determine the rights and liabilities of the parties under any special or local law. Thus, considered in my opinion Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable in the matter of appeals filed under Section 273 of Karnataka Act No. 20 of 1985 and it will also apply to the cases of appeals under Section 269 of the Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act, 1993 by virtue of the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. Under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the power to condone the delay and entertain the appeal which is time barred is subject to the conditions that the appellant or applicant furnishes sufficient cause or explanation for delay and satisfies the Court or authority or tribunal that there exists sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal in time. The Court has to apply its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and no doubt has to consider the facts and then determine if sufficient cause for delay has been shown or not, if sufficient cause is shown, then admit the appeal which is time barred, otherwise the same has to be dismissed, even if no contention has been raised by the Respondent before it, in view of Section 3 of the Limitation Act which is also applicable in view of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. In the present case, as appears from the record the authority has not applied its mind to this aspect of the matter though it is mentioned that the appeal is out of time and beyond the time. When the appeal was beyond time, it had to be dismissed unless sufficient cause has been shown and the finding is arrived at by the authorities, or appellate authority, or the tribunal. If sufficient cause has been shown by the appellant or the applicant the appellate authority or tribunal has to record its finding as to establishment of sufficient cause. When the appeal was beyond time, it had to be dismissed unless sufficient cause has been shown and the finding is arrived at by the authorities, or appellate authority, or the tribunal. If sufficient cause has been shown by the appellant or the applicant the appellate authority or tribunal has to record its finding as to establishment of sufficient cause. In the present case, though the learned Counsel for the Respondents pointed out that the application for condonation of delay had been made and objections have been filed, but the appellate authority under Section 273 of the Karnataka Act No. 20 of 1985 does not appear to have applied its mind to that question, nor has recorded any finding about sufficient cause having been established. As such, the orders of the appellate authority vide Annexures 'G' and 'H' to the writ petitions cannot be said to be within their jurisdiction and not in accordance with law and suffers from the error apparent on the face of the record as well as jurisdiction. If the impugned orders are allowed to continue in existence the Petitioners and others to whom sites have been allotted long back in 1989 would suffer irreparable loss and injustice is likely to cause them. Thus considered, in my opinion, the writ petitions deserve to be allowed and are hereby allowed. 13. The impugned order passed by the Common Standing Committee, Zilla Parishad, Bangalore Rural District, Bangalore, dated 3.1.1992 and the endorsement issued by the Chief Secretary, Zilla Parishad, Bangalore Rural District Bangalore, on 20.1.1992 vide Annexures 'G' and 'H' respectively to the writ petitions are hereby quashed. 14. Let a writ of mandamus be issued to the appellate authority which has been substituted in place of Respondents 1 and 2 to decide the matter in accordance with law after providing opportunity to both parties. 15. The parties to bear their own costs.