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2001 DIGILAW 381 (JHR)

Laxmi Business And Cement Co. v. B. S. E. Board

2001-06-15

M.Y.EQBAL

body2001
ORDER M.Y. Eqbal, J. 1. In all these writ applications common question of law and facts are involved and therefore the same have been heard and disposed of by this common judgment 2. Petitioners have challenged the validity of notification No. 810 dated 29.7.1994 issued by the secretary, Bihar State Electricity Board under Section 79 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 and also the clari-ficatory letter No. 1074 dated 13.7.1996 issued by the Board. Petitioner M/s Rishi Cement Co. Ltd. have also challenged the Impugned order dated 5.1.1999 passed by the General Manager-cum-Chief Engineer. Dhanbad Area Electricity Board, Dhanbad who refused to entertain the claim of the petitioner under Clause 13 of the H.T. agreement for the different financial years. 3. The facts of the case lie in a narrow compass. Petitioners are High Tension consumers. The respondent-Board under the agreement agreed to supply Electricity in the premises of the petitioners for running their factories. Petitioners case is that during the relevant financial years Board was not able to supply Electrical energy continuously and constantly and there has been interruption for many hours as per the record maintained by the petitioners. However, the respondent-Board raised bills in which no proportionate reduction/deduction was made by the Board on account of inability to supply Electrical energy constantly and continuously. Petitioners therefore filed their Claim under Clause 13 of the agreement for the proportionate reduction in the minimum guarantee charges. The Claims made by the petitioners have been rejected as not entertainable on the ground that the same has been filed after expiry of the period as prescribed in Boards Notification No. 810 dated 29.7.1994 and the clarificatory letter dated 13.7.1996 issued by the Secretary. Bihar State Electricity Board, Patna. 4. I have heard Mr. Biren Poddar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. V.P. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the Board. 5. Assailing the impugned notification dated 29.7.1994 learned counsels firstly submitted that the impugned notification is inconsistent with the provisions of Section 79 of the Electricity (Supply) Act and the rules made thereunder. Section 79 of the Act empowers the Board to make regulation with regard to its internal functioning and not for the purpose of making rules and regulations. It is contended that the Board has in fact exercised Legislative functions by issuing notification which is wholly illegal and without jurisdiction. Section 79 of the Act empowers the Board to make regulation with regard to its internal functioning and not for the purpose of making rules and regulations. It is contended that the Board has in fact exercised Legislative functions by issuing notification which is wholly illegal and without jurisdiction. Learned counsel then submitted that for the purpose of filing Claim under Clause 13 of the H.T. agreement the limitation has not been prescribed either in clause 13 of the agreement or in the Electricity Supply Act or the rules made thereunder and in that view of the matter the period of limitation for filing claim under Clause 13 of the agreement shall be three years under the-general law i.e. Indian Limitation Act, 1963. In this connection learned counsel relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of P.C. Sarathi v. State Bank of India, 2000 (5) SCC 355 . Learned counsel then submitted that consumers are having substantive right to file their Claim under Clause 13 of the H.T. agreement within a period of three years and the said period of three years can not be taken away or curtailed by the Board which has got no Legislative power. It is further contended that even if the Board can prescribed limitation, the said notification cannot stand as the same does not make any provision to condone the delay In filing Claim under Clause 13 of the agreement. So far as the time limit fixed by the Board for allowing proportionate remission In AMG and MD charges are concerned learned counsel submitted that fixation of such limited hours and minutes for allowing proportionate remission is also illegal and wholly without jurisdiction. It is contended that the consumers, as a matter of right, would be entitled to proportionate remission of annual minimum guarantee or maximum demand charges for every minute of interruption. Learned counsels the submitted that the provisions made by the Board for deposit of 50% of the demand as condition precedent for making claim under Clause 13 of the agreement is also directly in conflict with and contrary to the provisions of the Act and the law laid down by the Supreme Court. Learned counsel relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bihar State Electricity Board v. Dhanwant Rice and Oil Mills, AIR 1989 SC 1030 . Learned counsel relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bihar State Electricity Board v. Dhanwant Rice and Oil Mills, AIR 1989 SC 1030 . Learned counsel further submitted that under the H.T. Agreement the Board is required to grant suo motu remission in AMG and MD Charges on the basis of record maintained by it for the hours of interruption in the supply of Electricity. 6. On the other hand Mr. V.P. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Board firstly submitted that the Board has been fully empowered to make rules and regulations under Clause 79 (J) of the Act for the purpose of deciding the claims made by the consumers. Learned counsel submitted that Section 79 shall always be read with Section 49 of the Act. Learned counsel then submitted that limitation of 90 days fixed by the Board for the purpose of filing claims under Clause 13 of the H.T. Agreement is rational and fully within the jurisdiction of the Board. In this connection learned counsel relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Sakuru v. Tanaji, AIR 1985 SC 1279 . Learned counsel lastly submitted that the provision for deposit of 50% of the demand alongwith Claim under Clause 13 of the agreement has been up-held by this Court in the Judgment dated 5.7.2000 passed in CWJC No. 1715/2000. 7. In the light of the submissions made by the counsels the following issues falls for consideration before this Court : (1) Whether notification dated 29.7.1994 issued by the Board under Section 79 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1984 and the clarificatory letter dated 13.7.1996 are valid and binding on the consumers ? (2) Whether by the notification and the clarificatory letter dated 13.7.1996 the Board is empowered to fix time limit for filing Claim under Clause 13 of the H.T. Agreement. (3) Whether non allowing proportionate remission in AMG and MD Charges for interruption, non supply below 30 minutes is justified. 8. (2) Whether by the notification and the clarificatory letter dated 13.7.1996 the Board is empowered to fix time limit for filing Claim under Clause 13 of the H.T. Agreement. (3) Whether non allowing proportionate remission in AMG and MD Charges for interruption, non supply below 30 minutes is justified. 8. Before appreciating the rival submission made by the counsels appearing for the parties it would be useful to first quote Clause 13 of the agreement which is reproduced herein below : "If at any time the consumer is prevented from receiving or using the electrical energy to be supplied under this agreement either in whole or in part due to strikes, riots, fire, floods, explosions, act of God or any other cause reasonably beyond control or if the Board is prevented from supply in or unable to supply such electrical energy owing to any or all of the cause mentioned above then the demand charge and guaranteed energy charge set out in the Schedule shall be reduced in proportion to the ability of the consumer to take or the Board to supply such power and the decision of the Chief Engineer, Bihar State Electricity Board, in this respect shall be final. Note--The term Chief Engineer includes Additional Chief Engineer for the area concerned. 9. In 1994 the Board in its resolution approved Certain guidelines for settlement of Claim under Clause 13 of the H.T. Agreement. This regulation/guidelines was issued by the Board in exercise of power conferred by Section 79 of the Electricity (Supply) Act. The relevant portion of the guidelines reads as under :-- 1. Remission under Clause 13 will be allowable only when AMG has been charged and the maximum amount of remission would not be more than the shortfall in AMG charges. 2. The relief is allowable both for demand charge and guaranteed energy charge as per Clause 13 of the H.T. agreement. However, the remission under Clause 13 should be granted in proportion to the ability of the consumer to take or the Board to supply such power as provided in the said Clause. The inability to take supply of electrical energy by the consumers for non-availability of raw materials, labour unrest without supporting documents or arising out due to Sundays and other holidays would not attract Clause 13 of the H.T. Agreement. 3. The inability to take supply of electrical energy by the consumers for non-availability of raw materials, labour unrest without supporting documents or arising out due to Sundays and other holidays would not attract Clause 13 of the H.T. Agreement. 3. Stoppage of supply can be cither due to load- shedding or system failure for reasons beyond Boards control. Hence after careful consideration it has been decided to grant proportionate relief for interruption of duration of 30 minutes and above. 4(a) Two separate bills, one for the month of March and the other for the short fall in AMG charges (sic) (sic) (sic) the consumer in month of April. (b) The bill, served for the full amount of" shortfall in AMG charges shall contain a Clause that "if the consumer challenges the demand made, he may submit a Claim, under appropriate Clause of agreement within a period of three months (90 days) after the due date of the bill with details on the basis of which relief had been claimed in Boards prescribed proforma. (c) If the consumer deposits amount representing 50% (fifty) of the amount in the bill for the shortfall in the AMG charges, within due date and informs that he intends to file claim for remission then his Electric line will not be disconnected for the dues relating to this bill. But interest/DPS will be charged for the balance payable amount as settled under the Clause. 5. For the earlier years, if a consumer filed claim under appropriate clause of the agreement after three years, it can not be entertained, except the claim pertaining to the year 1991-92 to 1993-94 which can be entertained if the same is filed by a consumer within six months from the date of this notification in the gazette or in news paper. 6(a) Claim made Clause 13 of the H.T. Agreement in respect of current year will be disposed of within a period of 4 months by the competent authority of the Board from the date of filing of claim. (b) No claim under Clause 13 of the H.T. Agreement in respect of current financial year (1994-95) filed after 90 days from the date of issue of the AMG bill, would be entertained. 7. Proportionate rebate, as per Tariff will be allowed in the AMG bill issued to the consumer for the amount paid within specified due date. 8. (b) No claim under Clause 13 of the H.T. Agreement in respect of current financial year (1994-95) filed after 90 days from the date of issue of the AMG bill, would be entertained. 7. Proportionate rebate, as per Tariff will be allowed in the AMG bill issued to the consumer for the amount paid within specified due date. 8. For speedy disposal of the Claim, it would be necessary to have the interruption reports in respect of the feeders giving power supply to the H.T. Consumers concerned. Hence the Electrical Executive Engineers of the respective Supply Divisions will send feederwise interruption report duly verified for each financial year within one month after the close of the financial year to the concerned General Manager-cum-Chief Engineer under intimation of Electrical Superintending Engineer. This interruption report will incorporate all interruption with ression in the feeder (sic) (sic) month separately." 10. The respondent-Board then came with clarification by letter dated 13.7.1996 regarding aforesaid guidelines for settlement of claim under Clause 13 of the H.T. Agreement. In the said letter dated 13.7.1996 the following clarification has been made in the earlier Notification : "(i) All Claims under Clause 13 of the agreement placed before the General Manager-cum-Chief Engineer, pertaining to the period from 1.4.1991 to 6.9.1995 i.e. upto the date of publication of the notification on the Bihar Gazettee. be entertained by the concerned officials for disposal, provided they were filed within the prescribed period of six months from the date of the said notification i.e. were filed on or before 5.3.1996. (ii) All Claims filed after 6.9.1995 will be entertained only if they have been filed within 90 days of the period to which the Claim pertains and shall be disposed of as prescribed under the relevant rules." 11. Learned counsels for the petitioners mainly relied upon the judgment dated 29.4.2001 passed by a learned single Judge of this Court in CWJC No. 2413/99R, and submitted that these issues have been decided by this Court in favour of the consumers. It is therefore necessary to look into the judgment aforesaid in order to find out whether these issues have been decided so that there may not be any judicial indiscipline. It is therefore necessary to look into the judgment aforesaid in order to find out whether these issues have been decided so that there may not be any judicial indiscipline. Para 5 of the judgment passed by the learned single Judge reads as under :-- "There are two main issues to be determined in the present case, namely, (a) whether a Claim under Clause 13 of the H.T. Agreement can be rejected without deciding the same on merit, if filed after 90 days from the date of issue of AMG bill and (b) Whether while making claim under Clause 13 of the H.T. Agreement, an applicant has to pay 50% of the amount of disputed AMG bill or not? 12. So far the validity of the Notification dated 29.7.1994 is concerned, the Court held as under :-- "One may doubt the jurisdiction of the Board to frame regulations under Section 79 of the Act in respect to remission of AMG charges. Though the petitioner prayed to declare the aforesaid Notification No. 810 dated 29th July, 1994, as misconceived and cannot be relied upon to reject the petitioners claim, no specific challenge having made and no pleading having advanced, this Court is not deciding the legality and propriety of the impugned Notification No. 810 dated 29th July. 1994. 13. So far the question fixing time limit in filing claim under Clause 13 of the H.T. Agreement is concerned the learned single Judge observed as under :-- "It will be evident from Notification dated 29th July, 1994 that the officials were asked to insert a Clause in the bill that the consumer if challenges the demand, is to submit claim under appropriate Clause of agreement within a period of three months after due date of bill with details and basis to claim relief in prescribed proforma. Thus, if any such stipulation/Clause made in the AMG bill prescribing limitation of 90 days, any claim under Clause 13 of the H.T. Agreement....beyond the period of limitation is liable to be rejected, subjected to any specific direction given by the Board or a Court of competent jurisdiction." There is nothing on the record to suggest that the Board made any guidelines to deposit 50% of the disputed AMG bill as precondition for determination of a claim made under Clause 13 of the H.T. Agreement. Admittedly, no such stipulation made in the agreement nor in the Notification No. 810 dated 29th July, 1994. Clause-C of para 4 of the Notification No. 810 dated 29th July, 1994 relates to disconnection of electric line, wherein specific stipulation made not to disconnect the electric line if the consumer deposits 50% of the amount of AMG bill within due date and informs its intention to file claim for remission." 14. From reading of the aforesaid Judgment it is therefore, clear that the learned single Judge has disposed of the writ application on the basis of facts pleaded by the parties and has not decided the issues involved in this writ application. I am therefore of the view that the Issues involved need decision by this Court. 15. Re. 1.-- The first question falls for consideration is whether the impugned Notification dated 29.7.1994 is valid in law and whether the Board was within its competency issued such notification prescribing the procedure and mode for settlement of claim under Clause 13 of the H.T. Agreement. 15. Re. 1.-- The first question falls for consideration is whether the impugned Notification dated 29.7.1994 is valid in law and whether the Board was within its competency issued such notification prescribing the procedure and mode for settlement of claim under Clause 13 of the H.T. Agreement. This Notification has been issued in purported exercise of power under Section 79 of the Electricity (Supply) Act (in short supply Act.) Section 79 of the supply Act reads as under :-- "Power to make regulations: The Board may, by notification in the Official Gazette not inconsistent with this Act and the rules made thereunder to provide for all or any of the following matters, namely- (a) the administration of the funds and other property of the Board and the maintenance of its accounts : (b) the summoning and holding of meetings of the Board, the times and places at which such meetings shall be held, the conduct of business threat and the number of members necessary to constitute a quorum; (c) the duties of officers and other employees of the Board, and their salaries, allowances and other conditions of service; (d) all matters necessary or expedient for regulating the operations of the Board under Section 20; (e) the making of advances to licensees by the Board under Section 23 and the manner of repayment of such advances; (f) the making of contributions by the Board under Section 24; (g) the procedure to be followed by the Board in inviting, considering and accepting tenders; (h) principles governing the fixing the Grid Tariffs; (i) principles governing the making or arrangements with licenseed under Section 47; (j) principles governing the supply of electricity by the Board to persons other than licensees under Section 49. (jj) expending sum not included In statement submitted under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (5) of Section 61. under Sub-section (2) of Section 62; (k) any other matter arising out of the Boards functions under this Act for which it is necessary or expedient to make regulations : Provided that regulations under Clauses (a), (d) and (jj) shall be made only with the previous approval of the State Government and regulations under Clauses (h) and (i) shall be made with the concurrence of the Authority." 16. From bare perusal of the aforesaid provisions it is clear that Clause (a) to (i) of Section 79 empowers the Board to make regulations with regard to its Internal functioning such as administration of funds and other properties, maintenance of account, summoning and holding of meeting, duties of officers and other employees and their salaries etc. Clause (j) empowers the Board to make regulations with regard to mode of supply of electricity to the persons other than licensees under Section 49 of the said Act. 17. Section 49 of the Supply Act is also most relevant provisions in this connection which inter alia empowers the Board "to supply electricity to any person not being licensees upon such terms and conditions as the Board thinks fit and may for the said purpose frame uniform tariff. Section 49 of the Supply Act reads as under : "Provision for the sale of electricity by the Board to persons other than licensees (1) Subject to the provisions of this, Act and of regulations, if any, made in this behalf, the Board may supply electricity to any person not being a licensee upon such terms and conditions as the Board thinks fit and may for the purposes of such supply frame uniform tariffs. (2) In fixing the uniform tariffs, the Board shall have regard to all or any of the following factors, namely- (a) the nature of the supply and the purposes for which it is required; (b) the coordinated development of the supply and distribution of electricity within the State in the most efficient and economical manner, with particular reference to such development in areas not for the time being served or adequately served by the licensee; (c) the simplification and standardisation of methods and rates of charges for such supplies ; (d) the extension and cheapening of supplies of electricity to sparsely developed areas, (3) Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this section shall derogate from the powers of the Board, if it considers it necessary of expedient to fix different tariffs for the supply of electricity to any person not being a licensee, having regard to the geographical position of any area, the nature of the supply and purpose for which supply is required and any other relevant factors, (4). In fixing the tariff and terms and conditions for the supply of electricity, the Board shall not show undue preference to any persons. 18. Reading both the provisions it is manifest that Section 79 empowers the Board to make regulations not inconsistent with the Act and the rules made thereunder to provide for all or any of the matter set out therein. One of them is Clause (j) providing principles of governing the supply electricity by the Board to the persons other than licensees under Section 49, It is therefore clear that the Board is empowered to formulate such conditions in order to safeguards its interest and also to provide mode of disposal of claims. Such regulations issued by the Board in exercise of power under Section 49 and 79 of the Supply Act is binding on the consumers, 19. In the case of Hyderabad Vanaspathi Ltd. v. A.P. State Electricity Board and Ors., (1998) 4 SCC 470 , the Apex Court while considering the power of the Board to make regulations has observed :-- We have already seen that Section 49 of the supply Act empowers the Board to prescribe such terms and conditions as it thinks fit for supplying electricity to any person other than a licensee. The Section empowers the Board also to frame uniform tariff for such supply. Under Section 79(j) the Board could have made regulation therefore but admittedly no regulation has so far been made by the Board. The Terms and Conditions of Supply were notified in BPMs No. 690 dated 17.9.1975 in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 49 of the Supply Act. They came into effect from 20.10.1975. They were made applicable to all consumers availing supply of electricity from the Board. The section in the Act does not require the Board to enter into a contract with individual consumer. Even in the absence of an individual contract, the Terms and Conditions of Supply notified by the Board will be applicable to the consumer and he will be bound by them. Probably in order to avoid any possible plea by the consumer that he had no knowledge of the Terms and Conditions of supply, agreements in writing are entered into with each consumer. That will not make the terms purely contractual. Probably in order to avoid any possible plea by the consumer that he had no knowledge of the Terms and Conditions of supply, agreements in writing are entered into with each consumer. That will not make the terms purely contractual. The Board in performance of a statutory duty supplied energy on certain specific terms and conditions framed in exercise of a statutory power. Undoubtedly the terms and conditions are statutory in character and they cannot be said to be purely contractual." 20. Admittedly, the petitioners are making their claims under Clause 13 of the H.T. Agreement. Under the said agreement right and obligation has been created by and between the consumers and the Board. No consumer can be allowed to back-out from the promises and obligations made or created in the said agreement. Clause 11 of the said agreement reads as under :-- "11. This agreement shall be read and construed as subject in all respects to the provisions of the Indian Electricity Act. 1910. rules framed thereunder and the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 together with rules, regulations (if any), tariffs and terms and conditions for supply of electricity framed and issued thereunder and for the time being in force as far as the same may respectively be applicable and all such provisions shall prevail in case of any conflict or inconsistency between them and the terms and conditions of this agreement." 21. It is, therefore, manifest from Clause 11 of the H.T. Agreement that the petitioners, in an unequivocal term, agreed that the rules and regulations that may be made under the Electricity Act, 1910 and the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 shall be binding on the consumer and shall always prevail over the agreement. 22. Having regard to the facts and law discussed hereinabove, I, therefore, hold that the Notification dated 29.7.1994 and the clarificatory letter dated 13.7.1996 issued by the Board is perfectly legal and valid and binding on the consumers including the petitioners. 23. The next question, which falls for consideration is whether the Board, by issuing regulations and guidelines, can fix a time limit for filing claim under Clause 13 of the Agreement. 23. The next question, which falls for consideration is whether the Board, by issuing regulations and guidelines, can fix a time limit for filing claim under Clause 13 of the Agreement. As noticed above, Clause 13 provides that if the consumer is prevented at any time from receiving or using the electrical energy or in the event the Board is prevented from supplying or unable to supply such electrical energy for any reason then the demand charge and guaranteed energy charge shall be proportionately reduced and for that purpose the Chief Engineer of the Board shall take necessary decision for giving proportionate remission in payment of demand charges and guaranteed energy charges to the consumers. Under Clause 13 the consumers files their claim for proportionate remission in the payment of MD arid AMG charges before the General Manager-cum-Chief Engineer. By virtue of the impugned regulation/guidelines dated 29.7.1994 and 13.7.1996 the Board has fixed certain time limit for making such claim under Clause 13 of the Agreement. Clause 5 of the said Regulation dated 29.7.1994 as quoted hereinabove, provides that if a consumer files claim for the year prior to the Notification then such claim shall be entertained, if it is filed within six months from the date of Notification. It further provides that no claim under Clause 13 of the H.T. agreement in respect of current financial year (1994-95) filed after 90 days from the date of issue of the AMG bill would be entertained. By clariflcatory letter dated 13.7.1997, the Board further issued necessary guidelines to the effect that all claim under Clause 13 of the Agreement pertaining to the period from 1.4.1991 and 6.9.1995 shall be maintained provided they were filed within the prescribed period of six months from the date of Notification i.e. 5.3.1996. It further provides that all claims filed after 6.9.1996 will be entertained only if they have been filed within 90 days of the period to which the claim pertains. 24. Mr. Biren Poddar mainly contended that the Board has no jurisdiction to fix a time limit in the matter of filing claim under Clause 13 of the Agreement. According to the learned counsel, the limitation for filing claim under Clause 13 of the Agreement shall be three years under the general law i.e. Indian Limitation Act. 24. Mr. Biren Poddar mainly contended that the Board has no jurisdiction to fix a time limit in the matter of filing claim under Clause 13 of the Agreement. According to the learned counsel, the limitation for filing claim under Clause 13 of the Agreement shall be three years under the general law i.e. Indian Limitation Act. 1963 and further that a consumer has a substantive right to file his claim under Clause 13 of the Agreement within three years from the date of raising of the bill for MD and AMG charges. In support of his contention Mr. Poddar put heavy reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of P. Sarathy v. State Bank of India, 2000 (5) SCC 355 (supra). 25. I am unable to accept the submission made by the learned counsel. As noticed above. Clause 13 of the agreement simply empowers the General Manager- cum-Chief Engineer to take decision in the matter of grant of proportionate remission in the bill of MD and AMG charges in case there is interruption in the constant supply of electricity by the Board. The Chief Engineer either suo motu or on the basis of claim made by the consumer grant proportionate remission if it is found from the record that there has been interruption in the constant supply of electricity by the Board. Such a claim made by the consumer can not and shall not be treated as a Civil proceeding pending before a tribunal or the authority having the trapping of a Court. 26. In the case of P. Sarathy v. State Bank of India, (supra), the question falls for consideration was whether the Deputy Commissioner of Labour (Appeals), which was a authority constituted under Section 41(2) of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishment Act. 1947 to hear and decide the appeals as a Court within the meaning of Section 14 of-the Limitation Act and the proceeding pending before him were Civil proceedings. The fact of the case was that the appellant P.Sarathy, a Branch Manager of the respondent-Bank was removed from service after departmental Inquiry. He filed an appeal before the Local Board of the Bank, which was dismissed. Thereafter he filed appeal before the Deputy Commissioner of Labour (Appeals) which was dismissed on the ground of inapplicability of the Act to Nationalised Bank. He filed an appeal before the Local Board of the Bank, which was dismissed. Thereafter he filed appeal before the Deputy Commissioner of Labour (Appeals) which was dismissed on the ground of inapplicability of the Act to Nationalised Bank. The appellant thereafter instituted a suit in the Civil Court challenging the order of his removal. The appellant claimed benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act on the ground that he had filed a departmental appeal and thereafter an appeal under Section 41(2) of that Act. In the facts of the case the Apex Court held that the Deputy Commissioner of Labour (Appeals) which is authority constituted under the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishment Act, 1947 has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon an order by which services of an employee is terminated. Under Section 14(3) the order passed by him is binding on the employer as also 6n the employee. Thus the Deputy Commissioner of Labour (Appeals) may not be a "Civil Court" within the meaning of the Civil Procedure but it is definitely a "Court". 27. It is well settled that in order to constitute a court in the strict sense of the term, an essential condition is that the court should have, apart from having some of the trappings of a Judicial Tribunal, power to give a decision or a definite judgment which has finality and authoritativeness which are the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement. In the Instant case Clause 13 of the agreement simply provides grant of proportionate remission in the event of interruption in constant supply of electricity on the basis of total hours of interruption and such decision shall be taken by the Chief Engineer. The decision of the Chief Engineer either allowing or disallowing proportionate remission can not be said to a judicial pronouncement. 28. Be that as it may, the time limit fixed under the impugned regulation for filing claim under Clause 13 of the "Agreement is neither arbitrary nor irrational. The regulation was made effective by issuance of Notification which was published in the Bihar Gazette on 6.9.1995. 28. Be that as it may, the time limit fixed under the impugned regulation for filing claim under Clause 13 of the "Agreement is neither arbitrary nor irrational. The regulation was made effective by issuance of Notification which was published in the Bihar Gazette on 6.9.1995. The conjoined reading of the impugned regulation and clarification it is clear that the Board has prescribed a period of 90 days from the date of the bill as the period of limitation for filing claim of remission or shortfall in AMG charges and has further prescribed a period of Six months from the date of notification i.e. 6.9.1995 for filing claim for remission on account of shortfall in AMG charges for the period 1.4.1991 to 6.9.1995. In other words every consumer has a right to file a claim for remission within 90 days from the date of the bill in respect of a period after the notification and for claiming remission for the period prior to notification a consumer can file a claim within Six months from the date of notification. In View of the period prescribed under the regulation for filing claim under Clause 13 of the agreement, the question of application of Article 137 of the Limitation Act which prescribes period of three years is not at all applicable and the submission of learned council is wholly misconceived. I therefore, hold that the time limit fixed under the impugned Regulation dated 29.7.1994 and the clarificatory letter dated 13.7.96 is fully justified and in accordance with law. 29. Next and the last question which needs consideration is whether not allowing proportionate remission in AMG and MD charges for Interruption and non supply of electricity below 30 minutes is justified. This question Is no longer res integra. 30. Before issuance of impugned notification the respondent- Board had taken decision that trippings beyond 59 minutes only would be taken into consideration for grant of remission under Clause 13 of the H.T. Agreement. The said decision of the Board was considered by a Division Bench of Patna High Court in the case of Suprabhat Steel Ltd. v. B.S.E. Board, 1994 (1) BBCJ 369. The Division Bench after considering series of decisions of the Apex Court and other High Court have held as under : "Clause 13 of the Agreement cannot be interpreted in a restrictive manner as was argued by Mr. Chatterjee. The Division Bench after considering series of decisions of the Apex Court and other High Court have held as under : "Clause 13 of the Agreement cannot be interpreted in a restrictive manner as was argued by Mr. Chatterjee. Clause 13 as noticed hereinbefore, on the other hand, must be construed liberally. The Board is bound to grant remission for any duration if a case therefore, is made out We fail to understand as to why tripping upto 59 minutes is considered to be tripping for short duration or for that matter in connection of business of supply of electrical energy. Trippings, load sheddings or power cuts in whatever form, distruption in supply of electrical energy takes place on once or the other factors enumerated in Clause 13, a consumer as matter of right would be entitled to proportionate remission of annual minimum guarantee or maximum demand charges. In such a case it may be open to the Board to show that trippings or power cuts etc., would not come within the purview of Clause 13 of the Agreement but when, if any trippings, power cuts or load shedding etc. make the consumer would become entitled invoke the provisions of Clause 13. subject to the condition laid down therein. In a case, however, where the consumer invokes Clause 13 of the agreement on the ground that he was prevented from taking supply of electrical energy, the burden of proof shall be on him." 31. This question was again considered by me In the case of Jamshedpur Roller Flour Mills (P.) Ltd. v. B.S.E. Board and Ors. 2000 (1) All PLR 231. and it was held that on the plain reading of Clause 13 of the H.T. Agreement consumer is entitled to remission proportionate to the Boards inability to supply electrical energy irrespective of the duration. 1 therefore, hold that prescribing period of 30 minutes interruption in the supply of electricity only will be considered for the grant of remission is wholly unjustified and against the law laid down by this Court referred to herein above and other decisions. Reference may be made to the decisions reported in 1995 (2) All ER 920, 1999 (2) All PLR 105. 32. Reference may be made to the decisions reported in 1995 (2) All ER 920, 1999 (2) All PLR 105. 32. Petitioners have also questioned the legality and validity of Clause (c) of the impugned notification dated 29.7.1994 which provides deposit of 50% of the bill relating to AMG charges in order to avoid disconnection of supply of electricity. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that putting condition of deposit of 50% of the bill amount by the due date of the impugned bill for the purpose of consideration of claim under Clause 13 is contrary to the Agreement and also contrary to the Act and the rules made therein. 33. Clause (c) of the Regulation as contained in the notification dated 29.7.1994 reads as under.:-- "If the consumer deposits amount rep-resenting 50% (fifty) of the amount in the bill for the shortfall in the AMG charges, within due date and informs that he intends to file claim for remission then his electric line will not be disconnected for the dues relating to this bill. But interest/ D.P.S. will be charged for the balance payable amount as settled under the Clause." 34. The submission made by Mr. Biren Poddar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners is that when a consumer is claiming remission in the payment of AMG and MD charges on account of non supply of electricity by the Board then the question of deposit of 50% of the AMG bill while making a claim under Clause 13 of the agreement does not arise. Learned counsel in this regard relied upon the decision of Patna High Court in the case of Rajeshwar Singh and Ors. v. State of Bihar, 1983 BLJ 508 , I do not find any force in the submissions of the learned counsel in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court. 35. In the case of Bihar State Electricity Board v. M/s. Green Rubber Industries, similar question came for consideration before the Apex Court as to whether AMG charges would be payable by the consumer for the period when there was no supply of electricity by the Board in the premises of the petitioner. Their Lordship after consideration of various Clauses of the agreement observed that : "It is true that the agreement is in a standard form of contract. Their Lordship after consideration of various Clauses of the agreement observed that : "It is true that the agreement is in a standard form of contract. The standard Clauses of this contract have been settled over the years and have been widely adopted because experience shows that they facilitate the supply of electric energy. Lord Diplock has observed : If fairness or reasonableness were relevant (sic) their enforceability the fact that they are widely used by parties whose bargaining power is fairly matched would raise a strong presumption that their terms are fair and reasonable. A Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd v Macaulay. (1974) 3 All ER 616 (624). In such contracts a standard form enables the supplier to say : "If you want these goods or services at all, these are the only terms on which they are available. Take it or leave it." It is a type of contract on which the conditions are fixed by one of the parties in advance and are open to acceptance by anyone. The contract, which frequently contains many conditions is presented for acceptance and is not open to discussion. It is settled law that a person who sings a document which contains contractual terms is normally bound by them even though he has not read them, even though he is ignorant of the precise legal effect. In view of Clause 4 having formed one of the stipulations in the contract alongwith others it cannot be said to be nudum pactum and the maxim nudum pactum ex quo non oritur actio does not apply. Considered by the test of reasonableness it cannot be said to be unreasonable inasmuch as the supply of electricity to a consumer involves incurring of overhead installation expenses by the Board which do not vary with the quantity of electricity consumed and the installation has to be continued irrespective of whether the energy is consumed or until the agreement comes to an end. Every contract is to be considered with reference to its object and the whole of Its terms and accordingly the whole context must be considered in endeavouring to collect the intention of the parties, even though the immediate object of enquiry is the meaning of an isolated Clause. Every contract is to be considered with reference to its object and the whole of Its terms and accordingly the whole context must be considered in endeavouring to collect the intention of the parties, even though the immediate object of enquiry is the meaning of an isolated Clause. This agreement with the stipulation of minimum guaranteed charges can not be held to be ultra vires on the ground that it is incompatible with the statutory duty. Difference between this contractual element arid the statutory duty have to be observed. A supply agreement to a consumer make his relation with the Board mainly contractual, where the basis of supply is held to be statutory rather than contractual. In cases where such agreements are made the terms are supposed to have been negotiated between the consumer and the Board, and unless specifically as-. signed, the agreement normally would have affected the consumer with whom it is made, as was held in Northern Ontario Power Go. Ltd. v. La Roche Mines Ltd., 1983 All ER 755." 36. The decision rendered by the Division Bench of Patna High Court In Rajeshwar Singhs case (supra) has been set aside by the Supreme Court in the Appeal filed by the Electricity Board in Civil Appeal No. 221/87. The Supreme Court while setting aside the judgment observed as under : "The first question, therefore, is whether the firm was liable to pay the minimum guaranteed charges for the period during which the supply remained disconnected. In Civil Appeal No. 220 of 1987 (reported in AIR 1990 SC 699 ), we have held that the firm would be liable to pay the minimum guaranteed charges unless it could be shown that the contract itself was terminated. The mere disconnection of the electricity supply would not amount to termination. If there was no application for restoration within 7 days of disconnection that would be deemed to be a notice for termination and the contract would be terminated either at the end of this period of notice or the tenure of the agreement whichever was longer. In the instant case the fresh agreement was entered into on 30.5.1977. and connection was restored on 15.6.1977. Earlier the connection given on execution of the agreement was on 12.8.1974 and supply was disconnected on 16.10.1975. In the instant case the fresh agreement was entered into on 30.5.1977. and connection was restored on 15.6.1977. Earlier the connection given on execution of the agreement was on 12.8.1974 and supply was disconnected on 16.10.1975. The earlier agreement must be deemed to have cone to an end on execution of the fresh agreement and restoration of connection if it did not terminate earlier under the terms of the agreement. The firms liability has therefore to be determined on that basis in view of what has just been held in the Judgment in Civil Appeal No. 220 of 1987." 37 This question whether a consumer is liable to deposit 50% of the bill relating to AMG charges before making a claim under Clause 13 of the agreement in order to avoid disconnection of supply of electricity came for consideration in the case of Rishi Cement Company Ltd. v. Bihar State Electricity Board and Ors., CWJC No. 1751/2000 (R). This Court in the judgment dated 5th July, 2000 held that "if petitioners want to make claim under Clause 13 of the H.T. Agreement It has to deposit 50% of the disputed amount alongwith the claim that may be made by it. The said judgment rendered by me in CWJC No. 1751/2000R was challenged by the consumer by filing Letters Patent Appeal being LPA No. 274/2000R The Division Bench of the Patna High Court while dismissing the said appeal and affirming the Judgment of learned single Judge has observed : "As would appear from the impugned judgment that taking into consideration the relevant provisions of the H.T. Agreement as well as the views expressed by the Apex Court in the abovementioned cases, submission made on behalf of the respondent Board was held good for the purposes of a adjudication of the issue in question. It was also noticed that the decision of this Court rendered in the case of Rajeshwar Singh and others, (supra) was in fact not approved by the Apex Court vide its judgment reported in AIR 1990 SC 706 (supra). Apart from the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court in the case of Rajeshwar Singh and others, similar question had also come for consideration in the case of Bihar State. Electricity Board, Patna and Ors. Apart from the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court in the case of Rajeshwar Singh and others, similar question had also come for consideration in the case of Bihar State. Electricity Board, Patna and Ors. v. Green Rubber Industries and Ors., (supra) as to whether AMG charges would be payable by the consumer for the period when there was no supply of the electricity by the respondent Electricity Board, in the premises in question. It was held that the firm would be liable to pay the minimum guarantee charges unless it could be shown that the contract itself was terminated. The mere disconnection of the electricity supply would not amount to termination. In fact it is a type of contract on which the conditions are fixed by one of the parties in advance and are open to acceptance by anyone. It was held that a supply agreement to a consumer make his relation with the Board mainly contractual where the basis of supply is held to be statutory rather than contractual. In a case where such agreements are made the terms are supposed to have been negotiated between the consumer and the Board and unless specifically assigned, the agreement normally would have affected the consumer with whom it is made. Taking into consideration the aforesaid views expressed by the Supreme Court In the case of Rajeshwar Singh and other (supra) also it was held that unless and until, there is termination of the agreement, the liability for payment of minimum guarantee charges would continue against the consumer The mere disconnection of electricity supply, therefore, would not amount to termination. Thus keeping in mind the aforesaid views ex-pressed by the Apex Court, it appears difficult for us to interfere with the impugned order. With regard to the grievance of the appellant regarding illegal and mala fide disconnection of the electricity supply, admittedly, one has to take into consideration various facts which would certainly not be possible for a Writ Court to do unless and until they are adjudicated by the competent authority of the Board. Therefore, being alive with such a situation, the Writ Court has rightly held that in case representation is made by the appellant or if already made, under Clause 13 of the agreement on payment of 50% of the dues, the respondent-authority must disposed of the same after lull opportunity by a reasoned order ." 38. Therefore, being alive with such a situation, the Writ Court has rightly held that in case representation is made by the appellant or if already made, under Clause 13 of the agreement on payment of 50% of the dues, the respondent-authority must disposed of the same after lull opportunity by a reasoned order ." 38. In the light of the aforesaid judgment, I have no hesitation in holding that a consumer while making claim under Clause 13 of the agreement for proportionate remission in the payment of MD and AMG charges has to deposit 50% of the dues alongwith the claim that may be made by the consumer. 39. From perusal of the orders passed by the General Manager- cum-Chief Engineer of the Board which is also impugned in these writ applications, I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the said decision in as much as all claims have been disposed of in accordance with law. 40. For the reasons aforesaid there is no merit in these writ applications and the same are accordingly dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. 41. Applications dismissed.