Judgment :- V.S. SIRPURKAR, J. Appellant/petitioner, an association of teachers in the Tamil Nadu Agricultural University (hereinafter referred to as "the University"), challenges the dismissal of the two writ petitions by the learned single Judge of this Court. Consequently, the two appeals, viz. W.A. Nos. 329 and 330 of 1998 would be governed by this judgment. Members of the appellant association are the teachers in the Agricultural University, working in various posts like Lecturers, Assistant Professors, Associate Professors, Professors, etc. This University was constituted on 1-6-1971 under the Tamil Nadu Agricultural University Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). Under Sec. 38 of the Act, the authorities in the University are empowered to frame "regulations" for various matters. Under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of that section, the regulations cover the subjects of "appointment", "procedure for selection"," pay and allowances"as also the" other conditions of service" of officers, teachers and other employees of the University. Admittedly, such regulations have been framed. Chapter IV of the Regulations provides the "Service Conditions"," Leave Rules"," Travelling Allowance", etc. Regulation 10 provides for" Fixation of Pay". Regulation 10(2) runs as under : " Every employee of the University selected for appointment/promotion by transfer to a higher post involving higher duties and responsibilities shall have his pay fixed at the minimum of the time scale applicable to such higher post or at the stage in the said time scale next above the pay nationally arrived at by increasing his pay in the lower post by one increment whichever is higher. The minimum monetary benefit shall be 5% over the pay drawn in the lower post. If the minimum increase falls short of 5%, the pay shall be fixed at the next higher stage if there is no corresponding stage in the scale of pay of higher post." One Government Order, G.O.Ms. No. 208, Agriculture (AU) Dept., dated 27-3-1989 came to be passed by the Government of Tamil Nadu which provided for the revision of pay scales for the college and university teachers on the basis of the recommendation made by Mehrotra Committee, which was appointed by the Government of India and which was accepted by the University Grants Commission. No. 208, Agriculture (AU) Dept., dated 27-3-1989 came to be passed by the Government of Tamil Nadu which provided for the revision of pay scales for the college and university teachers on the basis of the recommendation made by Mehrotra Committee, which was appointed by the Government of India and which was accepted by the University Grants Commission. The revision of pay was to take effect from 1st of January, 1986 and for that purpose the State Governments were to be offered financial assistance up to 31st March, 1990 whereafter, the State Governments were to take up the responsibility for continuing with the revised scales of pay. This scheme of revision of pay scales was to apply to all "the teaching staff" of the University and its constituent Research Units and Colleges. The scheme also provided for the principles on the basis of which the pay revision was to be granted and the pay scales to be fixed. It also provided for the recruitment and qualification rules. The scheme also provided another aspect, i.e. "Career Advancement". Under Clause (xiv), every Assistant Professor was to be placed in the senior scale of Rs. 3000-5000 provided he fulfilled the conditions regarding the length of service, academic activities as also about the clean record. Thus the Assistant Professor was to get the advantage of the increased pay only in the sense that from the junior scale of pay such Assistant Professor was to be placed in the senior scale of pay. However, Clause (xv) of the scheme provided that every Assistant Professor, who was already in the senior pay scale, would be eligible for appointment to the post of "Associate Professor" in the scale of Rs. 3700-5700 provided, he complied with the five conditions therefor, including the length of service, academic qualifications, academic excellence, good record, etc. Similarly under Clause (xix) every Associate Professor was to be eligible for appointment to the post of "Professor" in the scale of 4500-7300 provided, he complied with the conditions regarding the length of service and the qualifications, etc. This Career Advancement Scheme, therefore, was nothing but in effort to avoid stagnation of the teachers and to give them a better deal. Accordingly, the members of the appellant association were promoted. This Career Advancement Scheme, therefore, was nothing but in effort to avoid stagnation of the teachers and to give them a better deal. Accordingly, the members of the appellant association were promoted. Those who were the Assistant Professors got the senior pay scale while those who were already having the senior pay scale as the Assistant Professors became Associate Professors and the Associate Professors became the Professors. After these promotions were granted and their pay scales were raised, they started getting their salary with effect from 1-1-1986.At this stage, however, the Government issued a letter No. 6654/AU/94-3, dated 25-7-1994, informing the Registrar of the University that there was no justification to allow 5% benefit on the movement of these teachers to the higher pay if that was done under the Career Advancement Scheme. The Government informed that this question was examined in the light of the request made for such 5% minimum benefit to the teachers, who were upgraded and since a view was taken that such upgradation merely amounted to the movement of such teachers to the "select grade", the request for such benefit was being rejected. The appellant association immediately came out with a writ petition (W.P. No. 20038 of 1994) challenging the order dated 25-7-1994. It was their contention that every such teacher, who was selected for appointment or promotion to a higher post involving higher duties and responsibilities, has a right of having his pay fixed at the minimum time scale applicable to such higher post or at the stage in the said time scale next above the pay notionally arrived at by increasing his pay in the lower post by increment whichever is higher. The appellant further reiterated that the minimum monetary benefit while fixing the pay would be 5% over the pay drawn in the lower post and if the minimum increase fell short of 5%, the pay should be fixed at the next higher stage if there is no corresponding stage in the scale of pay of the higher post. Previously, the Government had taken the view that by making applicable G.O. Ms. No. 208 and by giving the advantages to the teachers, they were merely given the higher grade or as the case may be the "select grade" and that did not amount to their promotion and as such Regulation 10(2) was not applicable to them at all. Previously, the Government had taken the view that by making applicable G.O. Ms. No. 208 and by giving the advantages to the teachers, they were merely given the higher grade or as the case may be the "select grade" and that did not amount to their promotion and as such Regulation 10(2) was not applicable to them at all. During the pendency of this petition, further order came to be passed on 25-5-1997. In this order, the Government reiterated its earlier position that the pay of such teachers, who were beneficiaries of the Career Advancement Scheme could not be fixed under Fundamental Rules 22(B). (It is significant to note here that Fundamental Rules 22(B) is identical with the Regulation 10(2)). The Government further reiterated its stand taken in the earlier referred letter dated 25-7-1994. It also noted the interim orders of this Court in W.P. No. 20038 of 1994, restraining the Government from effecting any recovery of the amount which was wrongly given on the basis of Regulation 10(2) from the Teachers. It then referred to the fact that this time even the Board of Management of the University had accepted the decision of the Government though it had previously supported the say of the teachers. The Government therefore issued three orders. They were :(i) To revise the pay of all the teaching staff who were placed/appointed under the Career Advancement Scheme giving the benefit under F.R. 22; (ii) To recover the amount accrued on or from 7-12-1994 in easy instalments in respect of the employees continuing in service; (iii) To disburse the CRB in respect of the retiring employees, duly withholding the excess amount till the verdict of the same. This order gave rise to the second petition being W.P. No. 8197 of 1997. The learned single Judge has dismissed both the petitions by a common judgment. Before the learned single Judge, the petitioner/appellant wholly relied on Regulation 10(2) and contended that since the University had granted promotions to the members of the appellant association, these promotions could not be viewed separately and differently from the regular promotions given and in every promotion, the promotee was entitled to get the benefit of minimum 5% difference envisaged in Regulation 10(2). The respondents, viz. The respondents, viz. the Government and the University, however, took the stand that any movement under "Career Advancement Scheme" of the teachers did not amount to a "promotion" and it was only a "placement in the select grade" and as such, there was no question of such a teacher having any right of fixation of pay with the benefit envisaged in Regulation 10(2). The respondents also reiterated that since the University had wrongly fixed the pay of the teachers, relying on Regulation 10(2), which was not in fact available, the teachers were paid in excess of what they were actually entitled to be paid and as such, such excess amount was bound to be recovered. The University also pleaded that there is Government control over the University as the whole finance comes from the Government for meeting the administrative overheads such as salaries for the teachers, and other employees of the University and as such, the Government has a total control over the University.The learned single Judge took the view that any movement of the teachers under the "Career Advancement Scheme" amounted only to the placement of such a teacher in "selection grade" and did not amount to a "promotion" though, in fact, such teacher, in some cases, was elevated to the higher post. In taking this view, the learned Judge has relied upon the Supreme Court decision reported in (1995 Lab IC 2041). (Dr. Rashmi Srivastava v. Vikram University), and more particularly on the observations made in Paragraph 44 thereof. The learned Judge has also quoted the "seven distinct characteristics" shown by the Supreme Court in the said judgment and has taken a view ultimately that such Professors and Readers, who take the advantage of the Career Advancement Scheme, form a distinct class and they are not comparable to the directly recruited teachers or even the regularly promoted teachers. It is on the basis of this ratio alone in the aforementioned decision, the learned single Judge has chosen to dismiss the writ petition. The learned senior counsel, Mr. Muthumani Doraisami, appearing on behalf of the appellant association argues that the learned single Judge has not appreciated the ratio in the aforementioned case properly and has ignored that the observations made in that case were totally in different context. The learned senior counsel, Mr. Muthumani Doraisami, appearing on behalf of the appellant association argues that the learned single Judge has not appreciated the ratio in the aforementioned case properly and has ignored that the observations made in that case were totally in different context. The learned counsel further suggests that in fact some observations made in that case were helpful to the members of the appellant association. Besides this, the learned counsel also argues that even otherwise, where a teacher was clearly promoted, though under the "Career Advancement Scheme", it cannot be said that he was merely put in the "selection grade" by such promotion because the said teacher, after his promotion, was working in entirely different post, which was higher post and faced increased responsibilities and burden of work. He, therefore, contended that a view cannot be taken that such a promotion amounted only to the placement of such a teacher in "selection grade". The learned senior counsel has taken us extensively through the scheme as also to the provisions of the Act.The learned senior counsel also haltingly suggested that the power to alter, amend or fix the conditions of service including the pay, etc. of the teachers of the University remains with the Board of Management of the University and the Government had nothing to do in the matter. Perhaps, it was tried to be suggested that since the University had acted on the basis of the directions by the Government and had chosen to agree to comply with the directions given by the Government, the action on the part of the University was entirely wrong. At the out set, we must say that the last contention of the learned senior counsel does not appeal to us at all. In the first place, the impugned action or the denial of the benefit of fixation under Regulation 10(2) and the recovery of the excess amount paid to the teachers is not only taken by the Government but, the record shows that ultimately, the Board of Management has also adopted the same line and has chosen to recommend the re-fixation of the pay ignoring the benefit under Regulation 10(2) and also the recovery of the excess amount paid to the teachers in pursuance of the fixation. It is true that though the University was initially favouring the case of the teachers by recommending the giving of the benefit under Regulation 10(2) to them while fixing their pay, it did not continue with that stance and ultimately chose to agree with the Government. In this behalf it is liable to be seen that the first objection to such an advantage being extended came not from the Government but, it was the Local Fund Auditor of the University who had raised the objection that the payment of higher pay was not justified. We have seen the provisions of the Act thoroughly and we are convinced that the Government cannot be treated to be an "alien agency" in the matter of the administration of the University. Under Sec. 49(2) of the Act, the Board of Management has to forward a copy of its Annual Report to the Government. A glance at Sec. 28(1)(b) and Sec. 28(3) as also Sec. 31 and Sec. 33(3) speaks of the role of the Government. Sec. 32 speaks about the Finance Committee and the Secretaries to the Government of the Agricultural Department and Finance Department are the members of such Finance Committee. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Government had nothing to do in the matter of fixation of salaries of the teachers, which subject was connected with the financial aspect of the University. Again, it cannot be forgotten that ultimately, the Board of Management has itself accepted the Government Order and has chosen to order an action under it of fixation of salaries of the teachers and recoveries, if necessary. The learned senior counsel tried to rely on a decision of the learned single Judge (S. Ramalingam, J.) of this Court reported in 1991 WLR 621, Dr. The learned senior counsel tried to rely on a decision of the learned single Judge (S. Ramalingam, J.) of this Court reported in 1991 WLR 621, Dr. R. Ayaavoo v. The Director of Extension Education, Tamil Nadu Agricultural University, Coimbatore wherein the learned Judge has held that it was only the Board of Management, who by reason of Sec. 38 and Sec. 19 of the Act, had the power to make regulations governing the conditions of service of the teachers and other employees of the University and if it had raised the age of retirement from 58 to 60 in pursuance of that sections and the regulations made thereunder, the Government or the Chancellor had nothing to do with the matter and the Government or the Chancellor could not interfere in the matter. The learned senior counsel tries to rely on this judgment which, in our opinion, is not opposite to the controversy in question. We cannot forget that in the present case, the Board of Management itself ultimately accepted the action suggested by the Government. This is besides the point that this question was not even argued before the learned single Judge. However, coming to the merits of the matter, it has to be seen as to whether the view taken by the learned single Judge that the teachers, who were benefited under the "Career Advancement Scheme" were not entitled to the benefit of Regulation 10(2) (in terms of F.R. 22) can be upheld. As has been clarified by us, the reliance is only on Dr. Rashmi Srivastava case, cited supra. It will, therefore, be our endeavour to see whether the learned Judge was justified in wholly relying upon that case and decide the present controversy. It will be better to see the facts of Rashmi Srivastava's case.The appellant Dr. Rashmi Srivastava was promoted to the cadre of Reader on 29th June, 1985. As against this, respondent No. 4 was appointed as Reader in the Department of Political Science on 13th March, 1986 as a direct recruit. He was confirmed after the period of two years. In the seniority list published by the University for the years 1986-87 and 1987-88, the appellant Dr. Rashmi Srivastava was shown as senior to the respondent No. 4 and was placed at Sr. No. 14 as against the respondent No. 4 at Sr. No. 33. He was confirmed after the period of two years. In the seniority list published by the University for the years 1986-87 and 1987-88, the appellant Dr. Rashmi Srivastava was shown as senior to the respondent No. 4 and was placed at Sr. No. 14 as against the respondent No. 4 at Sr. No. 33. The respondent challenged this placement by way of a writ petition wherein he prayed that the name of the appellant should be deleted from the seniority list of the Reader and also from the Board of Studies in the Political Science and the University should be directed to determine the seniority of the Readers in accordance with Statute 16 and hold the petitioner/4th respondent to be senior. The High Court had accepted this contention. It must be remembered that the appellant was "promoted" under the "Merit Promotion Scheme" floated in terms of the recommendations by the University Grants Commission while the 4th respondent was a direct recruit meaning thereby, that he was not the recipient of the benefit under the "Merit Promotion Scheme". There were other civil appeals also, the facts of which are not necessary to be stated here. The Apex Court has taken a complete resume of the statutory provisions and has taken a note of the various provisions of Madhya Pradesh Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam, 1973 under which, the respondent-University was constituted and functioning. After considering the various statutes and the sections of that Act, in Paragraphs 20 and 21, the Supreme Court has taken the note of the "Merit Promotion Scheme" for University appointed teachers in the Universities as also the college appointed teachers. It noted the three basic objectives of the scheme. They being :(i) Recognition of the outstanding work by the University teachers; (ii) objective evaluation of the work by experts in the subject areas concerned; and (iii) providing the reasonable opportunities for professional advancement to such teachers, who merit academic recognition, on a competitive basis. The Supreme Court then referred to the fact that this very Merit Promotion Scheme was adopted by all the statutory Universities and also noted the fact that the University Grants Commission had left the question of inter se seniority between the promotees under the Merit Promotion Scheme and the direct recruits to be determined by the respective Universities. The Supreme Court then referred to the fact that this very Merit Promotion Scheme was adopted by all the statutory Universities and also noted the fact that the University Grants Commission had left the question of inter se seniority between the promotees under the Merit Promotion Scheme and the direct recruits to be determined by the respective Universities. The Supreme Court also noted the fact that the University had taken the view that all the incumbents, i.e. the beneficiaries under the Merit Promotion Scheme and the direct recruits should be at par and their inter se seniority should be determined on the basis of their continuous officiation in the concerned posts. The Supreme Court then in Paragraph 25 made a reference to the present scheme with which we are concerned, the part of which is "Career Advancement Scheme". The Supreme Court also noted the fact that since the "Career Advancement Scheme" was introduced with effect from 1-1-1986, the erstwhile "Merit Promotion Scheme" providing for uniform pay scale available to the directly recruited Readers and Professors as also to the beneficiaries under the Merit Promotion Scheme was given a go-by and though under the newly introduced Career Advancement Scheme uniform revised pay scales were provided for Readers and Professors, there was a rider that those existing teachers in the Universities and Colleges, who gave in writing to be governed by the Merit Promotion Scheme, would get the benefits of that scheme for being promoted to the posts of Professors and Readers as the case may be but, their pay scales would be lesser as compared to the pay scales of directly recruited Professors and Readers. Thus, if any existing Reader wanted to take the benefit of the Merit Promotion Scheme only after his promotion under that scheme his pay scale would have remained lesser as compared to the directly recruited Reader. Similar would have been the case of the Merit Promoted Professor and his salary would also have remained lesser than the directly recruited Professor.From Paragraph 27, where the Supreme Court has noted the contention raised by the appellant Rashmi Srivastava, it will be clear that the basic question in that case was regarding the question of seniority in between the "merit promoted teachers" and the "direct recruits". It must be noted, in these cases the University had fixed the inter se seniority of the teachers in these two categories on the basis of their continuous officiation on that posts. It was precisely this question which had fallen for consideration before the Apex Court. In Paragraph 37, things have been made very clear by the Apex Court by noting the points of consideration. They are : "(i) Whether a merit promotee Reader or Professor as the case may be in the service of Respondent 1 University can be treated on par with directly recruited Reader or Professor for the purpose of fixing their inter se seniority ? (ii) If the answer to the first point is in the negative whether such merit promotee Readers and Professors cannot be considered as Professors and Readers for fixing inter se seniority of such promotee Readers and Professors and their seniority should be shown only in the cadre of lecturer or Reader from which they are promoted ? (iii) Whether Respondent 1 University is liable to pay any compensation to Respondent 4 in Civil Appeal No. 6002 of 1994 ? (iv) Whether the pay scales of Professors available to the appellants in C.A. No. 6002 of 1994 should be reduced ? (v) What is final order ?" The first two questions only are relevant for the purposes of the present controversy involved herein. The Supreme Court examined these questions and came to the conclusion that the two cadres cannot be equated and cannot be treated at par. The Apex Court held in Paragraph 40 that even after the promotions of the merit promoted teachers, the original cadre remained unextended and in the absence of any provision having been made in the concerned Act applicable to the University, the said cadre could not be extended. The Supreme Court then upheld the reasoning by the High Court to the effect that the Readers and Professors promoted under the Merit Promotion Scheme were not entitled to be included in the seniority list or the directly recruited Readers and Professors. The same note has been played by the Apex Court in Paragraph 41 wherein the Supreme Court has given "seven distinct characteristics" between these two classes. We find that the learned single Judge has very heavily relied upon these "distinct characteristics" given by the Apex Court in Paragraph 41. The same note has been played by the Apex Court in Paragraph 41 wherein the Supreme Court has given "seven distinct characteristics" between these two classes. We find that the learned single Judge has very heavily relied upon these "distinct characteristics" given by the Apex Court in Paragraph 41. In Paragraph 42, the Apex Court has finally upheld the decision of the High Court to the effect that the two classes were not comparable and the merit promoted teachers should not claim any place in the cadre or in the seniority list of the directly recruited teachers. We would only quote a few lines from Paragraph 42 which, according to us, is a final verdict given in that case : "The aforesaid distinguishing features clearly indicate that merit promotes Professors and Readers for a distinct class of ex cadre or supernumerary appointees as compared to cadre employees, namely, directly recruited Readers and Professors. They are unequals not only because of the source of their appointment but also because of the nature and character of their appointment and of the nature of the posts which they hold. They cannot be treated equally for all purposes and particularly for seniority and promotion if any. For this purpose the nature of work they do is irrelevant. The competition for seniority can only be amongst those who are in the cadre posts. Otherwise the mandate of Articles 14 and 16(1) would get violated. .................... Any decision rendered by the University concerned not to discriminate between them in the matter of inter se seniority would be invalid in the absence of any statutory creation of a distinct source of recruitment by promotion by way of amending the parent Act. ............." The abovementioned portions will clearly bring out the real nature of controversy decided by the Supreme Court in this case. The Supreme Court was essentially dealing with the rival claims of the 'direct recruits' vis-a-vis beneficiaries under the "Merit Promotion Scheme". The Supreme Court has undoubtedly held that the two classes are "distinct" and "not comparable". There can also be no dispute that the merit promoted teachers cannot claim caderisation with the regularly appointed teachers of regularly promoted teachers. However, we are of the clearest opinion that that was not the question involved in the writ petitions or in the present writ appeals. Unfortunately, the real question involved was missed totally. There can also be no dispute that the merit promoted teachers cannot claim caderisation with the regularly appointed teachers of regularly promoted teachers. However, we are of the clearest opinion that that was not the question involved in the writ petitions or in the present writ appeals. Unfortunately, the real question involved was missed totally. The real question involved in the present controversy is as to whether a teacher who has actually been promoted, though with the aid of "Career Advancement Scheme", can be said to have been promoted in terms of Regulation 10(2). Regulation 10(2) has got no connection with the entitlement of the teachers to be promoted. That regulation only guides as to now a teacher, who has earned promotion, should get his pay fixed and in that, it provides that any such teacher, who is appointed or promoted to the higher post should get the advantage of the minimum 5% difference and his pay should be fixed giving the advantage of that difference. The only question involved in the writ petitions before the learned single Judge was whether the promoted teachers were entitled to this benefit under Regulation 10(2). The view taken by the Government as well as the University, which was challenged in the writ petition, was that there was no notion of promotion "involved because of the application of the Career Advancement Scheme and that it only amounted to an movement of the said teachers in the "selection grade". The learned single Judge relying on the aforementioned Supreme Court decision came to the conclusion that the concerned teachers who were the beneficiaries under the "Merit Promotion Scheme" or as the case may be "Career Advancement Scheme" were not actually promoted. We cannot agree with this. All that the Supreme Court has stated in this case is that such a teacher, who was benefited by the "Merit Promotion Scheme", cannot be deemed to be in the regular cadre of the promoted post to the detriment of the persons who were already the part of that cadre. It has to be, therefore, kept in mind that the Supreme Court has not held that the concerned teacher who is benefited by the "Merit Promotion Scheme" has not actually been promoted. It has to be, therefore, kept in mind that the Supreme Court has not held that the concerned teacher who is benefited by the "Merit Promotion Scheme" has not actually been promoted. The Supreme Court only holds that such promotion cannot have an adverse effect on the persons who are part of the original cadre and the beneficiaries of the Merit Promotion Scheme cannot stake the claim of seniority vis-a-vis the regularly promoted teachers. The Supreme Court goes only to that extent. At no point of time and nowhere in the Judgment has the Supreme Court stated that the promotion of a merit promoted teacher does not amount to promotion whereas the learned single Judge has deduced from the judgment that the promotion of beneficiaries of the Career Advancement Scheme amounts to "no promotion". We are unable to agree with the learned single Judge because we do not find any such proposition and, according to us, the ratio covered in the Supreme Court judgment is "slightly overstated" by the learned single Judge. On the other hand, the Supreme Court in paragraph 46 of its judgment holds as under :It cannot be disputed that with a view to avoid stagnation amongst university teachers the Commission recommended a scheme of merit promotion. The very preamble of the scheme shows that it is necessary to give reasonable opportunity for career advancement and recognition of merits and it is on the basis of competitive test for recognising outstanding work and merit that such merit promotions were given. Once a Lecturer is promoted on merit as Reader or a Reader as Professor even though the promotion may be personal to him he can certainly continue to work as promotee Reader or Professor till he retires or otherwise ceases to be an employee of the university or till he is reverted for some valid reasons. There is no question of such a merit promotee being reverted otherwise to the lower cadre from which he came. He has to work as a Reader or Professor as the case may be and share the work load with the cadre employees. In fact as there is no vacancy created in the lower cadre from which he came on account of his promotion, he has also to share the burden on work load of the lower post. He has to work as a Reader or Professor as the case may be and share the work load with the cadre employees. In fact as there is no vacancy created in the lower cadre from which he came on account of his promotion, he has also to share the burden on work load of the lower post. Consequently it cannot be said that such a merit promotee is not the Reader or Professor so far as his work as Reader or Professor is concerned. He cannot claim to be fitted in the inter se seniority list and may remain outside the cadre of Reader or Professor as the case may be. However, for all other purposes like pay, work and status he is a Reader or Professor as the case may be. Though the learned single Judge had made a fleeting reference to these observations, they were not acted upon by the learned Judge. In our considered opinion, the remarks are applicable on all fours to the present case. If a teacher is promoted under "Career Advancement Scheme from the post of" Assistant Professor" to Associate Professor or if an "Associate Professor" is promoted as professor "on the basis of the conditions given in the Scheme Regarding the good performance, length of service and the qualifications then, as per the dictum of the Supreme Court, he has to be treated as a promoted person" and he shall be treated as holding the promoted post for the purposes like pay, work and status, etc. Thus, there is no reason why his promotion should not be viewed as a "promotion". The only difference is that he shall not be treated to have stepped into the cadre of the promoted post vis-a-vis the persons who are there not on account of the "Career Advancement Scheme" but in the regular manner.The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the University tried to suggest on the basis of the language of Regulation 10(2) that the pay fixation benefit contemplated in that regulation would be available only to the person who is appointed or promoted to a higher post only in the regular manner and not by way of Career Advancement Scheme ". We do not agree. We do not agree. After all, even under the "Career Advancement Scheme" in so far as the clauses (xv) and (xix) are concerned, they definitely amount to a promotion"because it is not as if every person who is serving as" Assistant Professor" or Associate Professor would be promoted to the next higher post. There has to be a "selection" for that also in terms of the conditions laid down for such promotions. Therefore, if a teacher is promoted in terms of clause (xv) or clause (xix) of the Scheme, it would certainly be an appointment "or "promotion" as covered by Regulation 10(2) and the minimum monetary benefit would be available to him, however, it only revised pay scale is conferred not resulting in his promotion to a higher post then, such an advantage would not be available because there, the person will get only the" better pay scale which would be comparable to the "selection grade" without changing his responsibilities or duties whatsoever. In all the other cases, excepting the above one, it will be a clear case of promotion, sharing of the additional duties and responsibilities and getting the same status of the promoted post. We, therefore, are unable to agree with the learned single Judge, who dismissed the writ petitions. In our view, therefore, such teachers who actually got promoted from their existing posts to the higher posts would be entitled to get their pay fixed in terms of Regulation 10(2) and would be entitled to the benefits thereunder. The contrary view expressed in the impugned communications is not correct and the impugned communications to the extent will have to be quashed. The writ appeals are allowed and the judgment of the learned single Judge is set aside and the writ petitions are allowed to the extent indicated in this judgment. Under the circumstances, there shall be no order as to the costs. Connected C.M.P. Nos. 3351 and 3352 of 1998 are closed.