JUDGMENT 1. :- The present petition under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, is preferred by M/s. Dutch Ophthalmic Research Centre International b.v., a Dutch Company, registered under the laws of the Neterlands and having its principal office at Qude Singel 2, 3211 BA Geervliet, Holland, against the summoning order dated 22.2.95, passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate No.2, Jaipur City, Jaipur, under Section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. From perusal of the aforesaid summoning order passed by the learned Magistrate it is revealed that it has been passed against five accused persons, summoning them, under Sections 406 and 420, Indian Penal Code, but four accused persons, namely, Frank Ruseler, G. Vijfvinkel, K.K. Gupta and G.S. Shastri, had submitted to the order impugned. The aforesaid accused persons are arrayed as the respondent Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5, in the array of respondents, in the present petition. The respondent No.2, Frank Ruseler was working as Sales & Marketing Manager of M/s. Dutch Ophthalmic Research Centre International b.v., Holland, whereas, the respondent No.3, G. Vijfvinkel was working as its President, on the relevant date. The respondent No.4 was working as Chief Manager, Union Bank of India, Johari Bazar, Jaipur, and the respondent No.5 was working as Chief Manager, Union Bank of India, SDM Hospital Premises, Bhawani Singh Road, Bapu Nagar, Jaipur. 3. A close scrutiny ofpthe present petition further reveals that it is not filed by petitioner company, through its Managing Director, authorising him, by a resolution, to file it. It is true that the ppetitioner company has juristic personality of its own, but it can sue and can be sued only through its Managing Director. In the present petition, neither relief is sought to quash the impugned summoning order dated 22.2.95, nor a copy of the impugned order is annexed. It is amazing to note that the petitioner company has prayed for quashing and setting aside the consequential process issued against it, in pursuant to the summoning order dated 22.2.95, without challenging the legality and validity of the summoning order. 4. It is amazing to note that the petitioner company has prayed for quashing and setting aside the consequential process issued against it, in pursuant to the summoning order dated 22.2.95, without challenging the legality and validity of the summoning order. 4. Although, the present petition deserves to be thrown at the threshold, on the aforesaid grounds, but since the petitioner company is not summoned in impugned summoning order dated 22.2.95, through its Managing Director, therefore, instead of dismissing the present petition on technical grounds, I propose to decide it on merits, keeping in view that mere techicalities and irregularities, which do not occasion failure of justice, should not be allowed to defeat the ends of justice. To my mind, in the present case, legality of summoning the petitioner company, deserves to be ironed out, within the scope of section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, on merits, under the given circumstances. 5. The brief facts, which are necessary for disposal of the present petition, are that Ultramed Pvt. Ltd. filed a complaint against five persons, named hereinabove, under Section 120-B, 206, 406, 409, 420 and 424, Indian Penal Code, before the court of ACJM No.2, Jaipur City, Jaipur. The complainant examined himself and one Vatsalya Garg, who has corroborated the statement of the complainant, on all material particulars. 6. The complaint is based on the facts that the complainant purchased Ophthalmic equipments from accused Nos. 1 to 3 and payment for the same was to be made by the complainant, to them, through accused No.4 and 5. In case, there was no complaint of any nature, regarding those equipments, payment could be made after expiry of six months. It is borne out from the allegations made in the complaint that the equipments did not work properly, within the stipulated period of six months and the accused Nos. 4 and 5, in spite of instructions of the complainant not to make payment, deliberately and wilfully, in conspiracy with accused Nos. 1 to 3, made the payment for those equipments, to respondent Nos. 1 to 3, before the expiry of the period of six months. It is alleged in the complaint, with graphic details, about acts, omissions and commissions of the accused persons, which bring the case, against each one of the accused, within the four corners of offences, under Sections 406 and 420, Indian Penal Code. 7. 1 to 3, before the expiry of the period of six months. It is alleged in the complaint, with graphic details, about acts, omissions and commissions of the accused persons, which bring the case, against each one of the accused, within the four corners of offences, under Sections 406 and 420, Indian Penal Code. 7. The learned Magistrate, after carefully taking into account, the allegations made in the complaint, the documents produced and also going through the statement of the complainant, recorded on oath, which was corroborated by the statement of his witness, Vatsalaya Garg, on oath, arrived at a conclusion that the facts alleged in the complaint, are verified from the statements of the complainant and his witness, Vatsalya Garg. After taking into account, the aforesaid facts, alleged in the complaint, corroborated by the statements of the complainant and his witness, Vatsalya Garg, the learned Magistrate reached at a conclusion that a prima facie case for offences under Sections 406 and 420, Indian Penal Code, is made out against all the accused persons. 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri A.K. Gupta and Shri G.G. Sharma, Senior Advocate, assisted by Shri V.K. Sharma, and perused the materials available on record. 9. Shri A.K. Gupta, appearing on behalf of the accused petitioner, vehemently urged that in the present case, from the allegations made in the complaint and from the statements made by the complainant and his witness, Vatsalya Garg, the ingredients of Sections 406 and 420, Indian Penal Code, are not established, therefore, the present proceedings deserve to be quashed under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code. In support of his aforesaid contention, he has placed reliance on decisions, rendered by Supreme Court, in cases of Alpic Finance Ltd. Vs. Sadasivan and another, reported in JT 2000(2) SC 588 ; Mr. K. Ramakrishna and others v. State of Bihar and another, reported in JT 2000 (Suppl.1) SC 53 ; G. Sagar Suri and another v. State of U.P. and others, reported in JT 2000(1) SC 360 ; Shri Ashim K. Roy v. Bipinbhai Vadilal Mehta and others, reported in JT 1997(8) SC 392 ; Ashok Chaturvedi and others v. Shitul H. Chanchani and another, reported in JT 1998(5) SC 452 ; and M/s. Pepsi Foods Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others, reported in JT 1997(8) SC 705 . 10. 10. It is urged by the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 that the accused petitioner had a right to put forth this argument at the time of framing of charges and, therefore, this Court should not interfere with the order of the learned Magistrate taking cognizance, at this stage, in a proceeding under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, which is to be exercised sparingly, only in rarest of rare cases. In support of his aforesaid contention, he placed reliance on a decision, rendered by Supreme Court, in case of State of Haryana and others v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, reported in AIR 1992 Supreme Court 604 ; and on a decision, rendered by Supreme Court, in case of Rupan Deol Bajaj (Mrs.) and another Vs. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill and another, reported in (1995) 6 SCC 194 . It is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 that the present complaint cannot be quashed merely because it does not disclose all the ingredients, constituting offences under Sections 406 and 420, Indian Penal Code. In support of his aforesaid argument, he placed reliance on a decision, rendered by Apex Court, in case of State of U.P. Vs. O.P. Sharma, reported in AIR 1996 Supreme Court 2983 . 11. I have given my thoughtful anxious consideration to the rival contentions, raised at the Bar. 12. Before going into the merits of the case on hand, I would like to deal with the inherent limitation of this Court, while exercising power under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, where it is called upon to quash an FIR, or a complaint. 13. An identical question came up for consideration before the Supreme Court, in case of Bhajanlal (supra), wherein, the Supreme Court, in its classical judgment, enumerated certain categories of cases, by way of illustrations, wherein, power under Article 226 of the Constitution or under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, could be exercised, to quash an FIR, or a complaint. 13. An identical question came up for consideration before the Supreme Court, in case of Bhajanlal (supra), wherein, the Supreme Court, in its classical judgment, enumerated certain categories of cases, by way of illustrations, wherein, power under Article 226 of the Constitution or under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, could be exercised, to quash an FIR, or a complaint. After surveying its previous judgments on the subject, with reference to all the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Constitution of India, their Lordships of the Supreme Court, in the backdrop of interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and Chapter-XIV and the principles of law, enunciated by it, in a series of decisions, relating to exercise of extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Cosntitution, or inherent powers under Section 4ts2, Criminal Procedure Code, enumerated the following categories of cases, by way of illustrations, where such power, either to prevent abuse of the process of the court or otherwise, to secure the ends of justice could be exercised. A note of caution is added by their Lordships, in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra), that it may not be posisble to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases, wherein such power should be exercised. The seven categories of cases, enumerated by way of illustrations, by their Lordships, in para-108 of the said decision, are quoted hereinbelow: "1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investiation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR of complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR of complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. Where the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable but constitute a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. 5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 14. The aforesaid question again came up for consideration before the Supreme Court, in case of Rupan Deol (supra), wherein, out of the seven categories, enumerated by their Lordships, by way of illustrations, in case of Bhajan Lal's case (supra), Categories Nos. 1, 3 and 5 were discussed and reiterated. 15. The aforesaid question about the ambit of the power, conferred under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, came up for consideration before the Apex Court, in case of O.P. Sharma (supra), wherein, it is ruled that when the Court exercises its inherent power under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, the prime consideration should only be whether the exercise of the power would advance the cause of justice or it would be an abuse of the process of the Court. It is held that at the stage of summoning accused persons, it is not the function of the Court to weigh the pros and cons of the prosecution case, or to consider necessity of strict compliance of the provisions, which are considered mandatory and its effect of non-compliance. It is held that at the stage of summoning accused persons, it is not the function of the Court to weigh the pros and cons of the prosecution case, or to consider necessity of strict compliance of the provisions, which are considered mandatory and its effect of non-compliance. At the stage of summoning, the ingredients of section, under which the accused is summoned, is not to be meticulously examined. In case of Om Prakash Sharma (supra), it is held that only in exceptional cases of mala fide intention of proceeding, to wreak private vengeance, process of criminal proceedings should be interfered at summoning stage, to prevent either abuse of the process of the court, or to secure the ends of justice. 16. The decisions, cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, in pith and substance, are in consonance with proposition of law, laid down in case of Bhajan Lal (supra) and Om Prakash Sharma (supra), by their Lordships of Supreme Court, therefore, I do not consider it expedient, to dicuss these decisions in thread-bare, to maintain brevity. 17. With the aforesaid introspection, I have carefully examined the complaint, which is filed by the respondent company, a copy whereof is annexed and marked as Exhibit-B to the petition and I have also gone through the statements of the complainant as well as his witness, Vatsalya Garg, recorded on oath before the learned Magistrate. From the reading of the complaint as well as the statement of the complainant, corroborated by the statement of his witness, Vatsalya Garg, I am satisfied that the learned Magistrate has committed no error in summoning the respondent Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5, for offences under Sections 406 and 420, Indian Penal Code, but he has committed manifest error, in summoning the petitioner company, which is destitute of life, as no accusations are made against it, through its Managing Director. It is true that accusations against the petitioner company can be made against it, as it possesses juristic personality of its own, provided, a complaint is filed against it, through its Managing Director and such allegations against the Managing Director, are corroborated from the statements of the complainant and his witness, Vatsalya Garg. 18. It is true that accusations against the petitioner company can be made against it, as it possesses juristic personality of its own, provided, a complaint is filed against it, through its Managing Director and such allegations against the Managing Director, are corroborated from the statements of the complainant and his witness, Vatsalya Garg. 18. I have no hesitation to hold that accusations made in the complaint against the petitioner company and reiterated by the complainant and his witness, Vatsalya Garg, in their depositions before the learned Magistrate, under Sections 200 and 202, Criminal Procedure Code, respectively, which is an inanimate entity, without making any allegation against its Managing Director, or any other human agency, through which, it functions and assumes its juristic personality, are so absurd and inherently improbable, on the basis of which, no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for summoning it, under Section 204 of Criminal Procedure Code. I am of the view that even if the allegations made in the complaint and statements of the complainant and his witness are accepted in entirety, do not prima facie constitute offences under Sections 406 and 420, Indian Penal Code against the petitioner company, which is an inanimate entity. It is to be imbibed by all of us that offences under Sections 406 and 420, Indian Penal Code are committed either by human beings, individually, or collectively, or by a company having juristic personality of its own, provided, such accusations are made against its authorities or officers, through whom, it functions. 19. There is yet another reason to modify the summoning order dated 22.2.95, against the petitioner company, passed by the learned Magistrate. Summoning of the petitioner company, without impleading it through its Managing Director, or some other authority, tantamounts to abuse of the process of the court. It is practically impossible to summon the petitioner company, which is indisputably an inanimate entity. The summoning order against the petitioner company, under Sections 406 and 420, Indian Penal Code, amounts to stalling the conclusion of trial of the complainant, against other accused persons, namely, the respondents Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5. It is practically impossible to summon the petitioner company, which is indisputably an inanimate entity. The summoning order against the petitioner company, under Sections 406 and 420, Indian Penal Code, amounts to stalling the conclusion of trial of the complainant, against other accused persons, namely, the respondents Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5. Neither the complainant, nor the accused persons have vested right to stall the conclusion of trial, by the learned Magistrate, expeditiously.As a result of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned summoning order dated 22.2.95, is hereby modified and quashed the petitioner company, with a direction to the learned Magistrate, under section 483, Criminal Procedure Code, to proceed and conclude the trial against the respondent Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5, expeditiously.Petition disposed of *******