S. B. SEVHA, CJ. ( 1 ) "there is no surer way to misread a document than to read it literally", said Justice frankfurter in Massachusetta B. and Ins. Company v. United States, 1956 352 US 128 : ( 2 ) AFOREMENTIONED dicta, as would appear from the discussions made hereinafter squarely apply to the facts of these cases. ( 3 ) THE parties herein were fighting lis before the 1st respondent herein in I. D. No. 383 of 1988. In the said proceedings, a joint memo dated September 25, 1990 was filed requesting the Labour Court to pass an award in terms of the compromise which is in the following terms:"the petitioners and the opposite party jointly filed this memo for consideration of the Tribunal. 1. Both the parties agreed for thirty per cent increase in the existing wages as on the date of the raising of this industrial dispute. 2. It is agreed that each employee who works for morning show shall be paid one hour s time wage if he completes duty of other shows (three ). 3. It is further agreed to make payment of rs. 35/- (thirty five only) to each employee per month towards medical allowance who is not covered under the scheme of ESI Act, 1948. The award may be passed accordingly with effect from September 1, 1990. " ( 4 ) THE dispute between the parties is with regard to the interpretation of the first clause of the settlement vis-a- vis the date of passing of the award. ( 5 ) FOR interpretation of the said consent order, an application under Section 33-C (2) was filed. Three separate miscellaneous petitions being Nos. 53, 52 and 51 of 1991 respectively were filed by the workmen of three cinema theatres under Section 33- C (2) of the industrial Disputes Act (for short the Act ). The Labour Court, by separate orders dated january31, 1990, on a consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced on record, arrived at a conclusion, interpreting the said consent award, that the workmen are entitled to increase in the wages from the date of their demand and not from September 1,1990. ( 6 ) A document as is well known must be read in its entirety and every effort should be made to give effect to the intention of the makers thereof. ( 6 ) A document as is well known must be read in its entirety and every effort should be made to give effect to the intention of the makers thereof. ( 7 ) FOR the aforementioned purpose, the situation obtaining at the time when the compromise was entered into and the subject-matter of the dispute may also be taken into consideration. ( 8 ) THE workmen in all the three cases are working in three cinema theatres in Warangal town under the management of the same employer. The employees demanded enhancement of wages as per the draft notification dated March 21, 1990 published under the Minimum Wages Act which was not acceptable to the appellant herein. According to the appellant, the wages of the employees were revised by 25% upward through several revisions occasioned from the date of dispute to thedate of compromise i. e. , September 25, 1990. ( 9 ) IN a situation of this nature, the award of the Labour Court is required to be construed. In terms of Section 17-A (4) of the Act, an award comes into operation with effect from such date as may be specified therein, but, where no date is so specified, it would come into operation from the date when the award becomes enforceable under sub-section (1) or sub-section (3), as the case may be. ( 10 ) THE effect of the award that it shall come into force from January 1, 1990 is required to be construed. Is the enforceability of the award from the said date in terms of the said provisions manifested the intention of the parties or was it there an intention that the enhance wages shall be payable from January 1, 1990 only. ( 11 ) THE award becomes enforceable by reason of the operation of the statute. It cannot be made enforceable from a date as agreed to by the parties to a lis. The learned Labour Court and the learned single Judge, with utmost respect, appear to have fallen into an error in giving literal interpretation to the word "award" vis-a-vis its enforceability. It is not used in any technical sense by the parties while entering into a compromise. An award is a final adjudication of the lis between the parties. It has to be distinguished from the word decree . It is not used in any technical sense by the parties while entering into a compromise. An award is a final adjudication of the lis between the parties. It has to be distinguished from the word decree . ( 12 ) IN Kedarnath Jute Manufacturing company Limited, v. Commercial Tax Officer, air 1966 SC 12 , the Apex Court held:"the effect of an excepting or qualifying proviso, according to the ordinary rules of construction, is to except out of the preceding portion of the enactment, or to qualify something enacted therein, which but for the proviso would be within it. " ( 13 ) SETTLEMENT of an industrial dispute by way of compromise, having regard to the doctrine that an effort should be made to maintain industrial peace, is always a welcome step. A consent award is really an agreement between the parties and not an adjudication of the lis. It is thus wholly unnecessary for the learned Labour Court to address itself to the question as to whether a Tribunal has no jurisdiction to give its award with retrospective operation. The power of the Court under section 33- C (2) of the Act is very limited. As an executing Court, the Labour Court can exercise its jurisdiction only when a legal right clearly exists and not in a case where such right is required to be established. Interpretation of an award, normally, would be within the domain of the Central Government having regard to the provisions of Section 36-A of the act. Such a disputed question could not have been adjudicated upon in a proceeding under section 33-C (2) of the Act. ( 14 ) HOWEVER, as the questions have been raised and answered in our opinion, it is necessary to express our opinion on the subject. In State Bank of India v. Ram Chandra dubey, 2000-II-LLJ-1660, the Supreme Court held at p. 1663 of LLJ:"8. . . . . . . . . To state that merely upon reinstatements, a workman would be entitled, under the terms of award, to all his arrears of pay and allowances would be incorrect because several factors will have to be considered, as stated earlier, to find out whether the workman is entitled to back wages at all and to what extent. . . . . . To state that merely upon reinstatements, a workman would be entitled, under the terms of award, to all his arrears of pay and allowances would be incorrect because several factors will have to be considered, as stated earlier, to find out whether the workman is entitled to back wages at all and to what extent. Therefore, we are of the view that the High Court ought not to have presumed that the award of the labour Court for grant of back wages is implied in the relief of reinstatement or that the award of reinstatement itself conferred right for claim of back wages. " ( 15 ) THE question as to what should be the interpretation of the word, "entitlement" had fallen for consideration before the Apex Court in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation limited v. Workers, reported in AIR 1974 SC 1604 : 1974 (4) SCC 696 East India Coal company v. Rameskwar, 1968-I-LLJ-6 (SC), punjab Beverages v. Suresh Chand AIR 1978 SC 995 : 1978 (2) SCC 144 : 1978-II-LLJ-1, municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ganesh razak and another, 1995 (1) SCC 235 : 1995-I-LLJ-395; Union of India v, Gurbachan singh, 1997 (5) SCC 59 Fabril Gasosa v. Labour commissioner 1997 AIR SC 254 : 1997-I-LLJ-872 Chief Superintendent, government Farm, Hissar v. Ramesh Kumar 1977 (11) SCC 363 : 1998-III-LLJ (Suppl)-187 and Tara and others v. Director, Social Welfare and others, 1998 (8) SCC 671 : 1998-II-LLJ-632. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High court of which one of us (S. B. Sinha, CJ. , was a member) in Burn Standard Company v. State of West Bengal, 2000-II-LLJ-926 noticed: it is not disputed that an application under section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes act would be maintainable provided the same is based upon a pre-existing right. A proceeding under Section 33-C (2) is in the nature of an execution proceeding. Where rights and obligations of the parties are required to be adjudicated upon, an industrial dispute has to be raised and such rights and obligations of the parties cannot be adjudicated in a proceeding under section 33-C (2) of the Act. A proceeding under Section 33-C (2) is in the nature of an execution proceeding. Where rights and obligations of the parties are required to be adjudicated upon, an industrial dispute has to be raised and such rights and obligations of the parties cannot be adjudicated in a proceeding under section 33-C (2) of the Act. The plea raised by the respondent No. 3 before us that he being a single workman could not have raised any industrial dispute is correct but for the said purpose, in view of the order passed by this Court, the Union could have raised an industrial dispute. In view of the order passed by B. P. BANErjee, j. , it was obligatory on the part of the concerned workman to take recourse to the collective bargaining by raising an industrial dispute as this Court itself used the word adjudication it must be held to be aware of the implication thereof and, thus, the respondent No. 3 could not have asked the labour Court to adjudicate upon the dispute in a proceedings under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act indirectly which it could not do directly. ( 16 ) IN the present case, Clause (1) of the award and the note that the award may be passed accordingly with effect from January 1,1990 must be read together. The parties had agreed for 30% increase in the existing wages. Such increase must be on the wages existing as on the date of raising of the industrial dispute as the demand was made on and from that date. Had the intention of the parties been that the 30% increase in wages should take effect from the date of raising the dispute, they could have said so expressly. The very fact that the parties had agreed that the award may be passed with effect from January 1, 1990 is significant. ( 17 ) WHETHER the respondents-workmen herein entered into the aforementioned settlement on misrepresentation or otherwise would itself be a question and only on adjudication of the lis their entitlement can be known. ( 18 ) IT appears that the joint memo was not prepared by experts as it would appear that even a past tense was used while referring to the filing of the memo by the petitioners and opposite party for consideration of the Labour court. ( 18 ) IT appears that the joint memo was not prepared by experts as it would appear that even a past tense was used while referring to the filing of the memo by the petitioners and opposite party for consideration of the Labour court. Even some grammatical mistakes have occurred in the other portions of the said joint memo. In Digambar Jain v. Sub-Registrar, stamps, Indore, AIR 1970 MP 23 , it has been held that it is the duty of the Court to give expression of a document its true meaning. It was held that it is competent for a Court to disregard the literal meaning of the words used in a document and to give to them their real meaning if they were sufficiently flexible to bear that interpretation. In T. A. V. Trust, alleppey v. Commissioner of Income Tax, kerala, the Supreme Court observed:"reliance was also placed on a judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in digambar Jain v. Sub-Registrar Stamps, indore. It was stated there that it was the duty of the Court to give to the expression of a document its true meaning. It was competent for a Court to disregard the literal meaning of the words used in a document and to give to them their real meaning if they were sufficiently flexible to bear that interpretation. " ( 19 ) HAVING regard to the nature of dispute and the fact that the employees are working in cinema theatres and the other circumstances attending thereto, we are of the opinion that the parties agreed to 30% increase in the wages as on the date of raising of the industrial dispute but they did not agree that such enhanced wages shall be paid with effect from the date of raising thereof. ( 20 ) FOR the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the learned Labour Court committed a serious jurisdictional error in entertaining the applications and passing the orders. Therefore, the orders of the Labour court and the impugned orders passed by the learned single Judge are liable to be set aside which are accordingly set aside. The writ appeals are allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.