LAKSHMI BIHARI, J. ( 1 ) HEARD Shri Vinay Malviya, the learned standing counsel representing the petitioners and Shri k. P. Agrawal, learned senior advocate representing respondent No. 2. ( 2 ) THE petitioner-State of U. P. has filed the instant petition praying for issuing a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the order of the Tribunal dated 4. 2. 1980 and has further prayed for issuing a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents not to give effect to the order dated 4. 2. 1980. ( 3 ) THE respondent No. 2 was appointed on the post of Taqavi Accounts Clerk by an order dated 9th July, 1963 a copy whereof is Annexure-3 to the writ petition. The relevant portion of the said order runs as follows : "the following candidates who appeared for the Competitive Test for the post of Taqavi accounts Clerk, in the scale 60-3-72-EB-3-87-EB-3-90-4-110, are posted in the blocks noted against them. They should report for duty to the B. D. Os. concerned within 7 days. The appointment is purely temporary they will remain on probation for six months during which the services can be terminated at any time without notice. . . . . " ( 4 ) IT is the admitted case of the parties that on the completion of the period of probation, no order either confirming the respondent No. 2 or terminating his services was passed and the respondent No. 2 was allowed to continue on the post of Taqavi Accounts Clerk, but his services were terminated after about four and a half years by an order dated 6th February, 1968, a copy whereof is Annexure-k. It runs as follows ; "shri Rama Kant Agnihotri. Taqavi Accounts Clerk of Biock Derapur is hereby given one months notice for termination of his services with effect from the date of issue of this notice. " ( 5 ) ACCORDING to the petition, the respondent No. 2 challenged the said order of termination dated 6. 2. 1968 in the court of Munsif, Kanpur, being Suit No. 718 of 1971, but on the enforcement of the U. P. Public Service Tribunal Act, 1976, it was transferred to the U. P. Public Service tribunal, III, Lucknow, being Reference Case No. 677 (T) III/1978. The Tribunal by its impugned Judgment dated 4. 2. 2. 1968 in the court of Munsif, Kanpur, being Suit No. 718 of 1971, but on the enforcement of the U. P. Public Service Tribunal Act, 1976, it was transferred to the U. P. Public Service tribunal, III, Lucknow, being Reference Case No. 677 (T) III/1978. The Tribunal by its impugned Judgment dated 4. 2. 1980 has allowed the claim petition, set aside the order of termination and declared that the claimant will be deemed to have continued in service and will be entitled to the benefit of continuous service. Aggrieved, the State of U. P. has filed the instant petition challenging the said judgment of the Tribunal. ( 6 ) A perusal of the impugned judgment shows that the Tribunal has allowed the claim petition holding that the claimant will be deemed to have been confirmed on his post after the expiry of the period of probation. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel, for the petitioner has contended that the respondent No. 2 could not be said to be confirmed on the expiry of the period of probation and the view taken to the contrary by the Tribunal is illegal and liable to be set aside. His contention is that the appointment of respondent No. 2 was purely temporary and he continued to be a temporary Government servant whose services could be terminated by giving one months notice. He has placed reliance on the judgments of Honble Supreme Court rendered in Wasim Beg v. State of V. P. and others. (1998)3 SCC 321 and State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1210 . ( 8 ) ON the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 has contended that the appointment of the respondent No. 2 was on probation and was not merely a temporary appointment and since there was no stipulation in the order of appointment that his services were liable to be terminated on giving one months notice, the order of termination dated 6. 2. 1968 terminating his services on giving one months notice was illegal and that the Tribunal has rightly set aside the same. His contention is that the view taken by the Tribunal that the claimant (respondent No. 2 herein) will be deemed to have been confirmed after the expiry of the period of probation. Is perfectly justified and needs no interference. 1968 terminating his services on giving one months notice was illegal and that the Tribunal has rightly set aside the same. His contention is that the view taken by the Tribunal that the claimant (respondent No. 2 herein) will be deemed to have been confirmed after the expiry of the period of probation. Is perfectly justified and needs no interference. In support of his contention the learned counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of the Honbte Supreme Court rendered in state of Punjab v. Dharam Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1210 ; Om Prakash v. U. P. Co-operative Sugar factories Federation Lucknow and others , AIR 1986 SC 1844 and M. K. Agarwal v. Gurgaon gramin Bank and others, AIR 1988 SC 286 . ( 9 ) A perusal of the order of appointment dated 9. 7. 1963 shows that the respondent No. 2 was appointed on the post of Taqavi Accounts Clerk after the competitive test in the pay-scale of Rs. 60-3-72- EB-3-87-EB-3-90-4-1 10 and it was mentioned therein that the appointment was purely temporary and they will remain on probation for six months during which the services could be terminated at any time without notice. Admittedly, no order either confirming him or terminating his services or extending the period of probation was passed during the period of probation or at the completion of the said period of probation. ( 10 ) THE question to be determined is as to whether the respondent No. 2 would be deemed to have been confirmed after the expiry of the period of probation as no order whatsoever was passed on the completion of the period of probation. It is significant to point out here that the petitioner has not placed before the Court any statutory rule or executive instruction governing the service conditions of the post of Taqavi Accounts Clerk, rather it is admitted by the petitioner that there are no such rules. Therefore, in the absence of any statutory rule or executive instruction in that behalf, the service conditions of Taqavi Accounts Clerks shall be governed by the general Law of Contract and stipulations therein. Admittedly, as pointed out above, there is neither any statutory rule nor executive instruction governing the post of Taqavi Accounts Clerk. Therefore, in the absence of any statutory rule or executive instruction in that behalf, the service conditions of Taqavi Accounts Clerks shall be governed by the general Law of Contract and stipulations therein. Admittedly, as pointed out above, there is neither any statutory rule nor executive instruction governing the post of Taqavi Accounts Clerk. Thus, the contract emerging from the order of appointment which was accepted by the petitioner shows that the appointment was purely temporary, that the petitioner was to remain on probation for six months, and that during the period of probation his services could be terminated at any time without notice. No other agreement, apart from what has been mentioned in the said appointment letter has been placed on record by the parties. ( 11 ) A perusal of the order of appointment as quoted above, shows that the appointment of the candidates, whose names have been mentioned therein, was purely temporary. They were allowed to remain on probation for six months during which the services could be terminated at any time without notice. It is significant to note that there was no stipulation that on the completion of the period of probation, the authority concerned may confirm them in the service or if the work and conduct during the period of probation was found to be unsatisfactory, their services may be dispensed with. It was also not mentioned therein that the period of probation may be extended by such period as may be deemed fit. There was also no stipulation forbidding extension of the period of probation beyond six months. ( 12 ) THE Honble Supreme Court in the judgment rendered in State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh, air 1968 SC 1210 has, in paragraph 3, observed as follows : " (3) This Court has consistently held that when a first appointment or promotion is made on probation for a specific period and the employee is allowed to continue in the post after the expiry of the period without any specific order of confirmation, he should be deemed to continue in his post as a probationer only, in the absence of any indication to the contrary in the original order of appointment or promotion or the service rules. In such a case, an express order of confirmation is necessary to give the employee a substantive right to the post and from the mere fact that he is allowed to continue in the post after the expiry of the specified period of probation it is not possible to hold that he should be deemed to have been confirmed. This view was taken in Sukhbans Singh v. State of Punjab, 1963-1 SCR 416 at pp. 424-426 : AIR 1962 SC 1711 at pp. 1714-1715 ; G. S. Ramaswamy v. Inspector General of Police Mysore State Bangalore, (1964) 6 SCR 279 at pp. 288-289 : (AIR 1966sc 175 at pp. 179-180; Accountant General madhya Pradesh, Gwalior v. Bent Prasad Bhatnagar Civil Appeal No. 548 of 1962 Dated 23-1-1964 (SC) D. A. Lyall v. Chief Conservator of Forests U. P. Civil Appeal No. 259 of 1963. Dated 24. 2. 1965 (SC) and State of U. P. v. Akbar AH. (1966) 3 SCR 821 at pp. 825-826 : AIR 1966 SC 1842 ai p. 1845. The reason for this conclusion is that where on the completion of the specified period of probation the employee is allowed to continue in the post without an order of confirmation the only possible view to take in the absence of anything to the contrary in the original order of appointment or promotion or the service rules, is that the initial period of probation has been extended by necessary implications. In all these cases, the conditions of service of the employee permitted extension of the probationary period for an indefinite time and there was no service rule forbidding its extension beyond a certain maximum period. " ( 13 ) THE Honble Supreme Court. In the aforesaid case, while interpreting the relevant rules as applicable in that case, observed in paragraph 5 as follows : " (5) in the present case, Rule 6 (3) forbids extension of the period of probation beyond three years. Where as in the presen! case, the service rules fix a certain period of time beyond which the probationary period cannot be extended, and an employee appointed or promoted to a post on probation is allowed to continue in that post after completion of the maximum period of probation without an express order of confirmation, he cannot be deemed to continue in that post as a probationer by implication. The reason is that such an implication is negatived by the service rule forbidding extention of the probationary period beyond the maximum period fixed by it. In such a case, it is permissible to draw the Inference that the employee allowed to continue in the post on completion of the maximum period of probation has been confirmed in the post by implication. " ( 14 ) IN the judgment rendered in Wasim Beg v. State of U. P. and others, (1998) 3 SCC 321 the honble Supreme Court observed in paragraph 15 as follows : "15. . . . . There are broadly two sets of authorities of this Court dealing with this question. In those cases where the Rules provide for a maximum period of probation beyond which probation cannot be extended, this Court has held that at the end of the maximum probationary period there will be a deemed confirmation of the employee unless Rules provide to the contrary. . . . . " ( 15 ) IN Paragraph 17, the Honble Supreme Court observed as follows : "17. The other line of cases deals with Rules where there is no maximum period prescribed for probation and either there is a Rule providing for extension of probation or there is a Rule which requires a specific act on the part of the employer (either by issuing an order of confirmation or any similar act) which would result in confirmation of the employee. In these cases, unless there is such an order of confirmation, the period of probation would continue and there would be no deemed confirmation at the end of the prescribed probationary period. . . . . " ( 16 ) FROM the observations made by Honble Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases, it is clear that where the service rules or stipulation forbid or prohibit the extension of the period of probation beyond a specificed period, the employee would be deemed to be confirmed if allowed to continue on the completion of specified period of probation. And in cases where there are no such rules or stipulation, the employee cannot be deemed to be confirmed and be deemed to continue as a probationer only. And in cases where there are no such rules or stipulation, the employee cannot be deemed to be confirmed and be deemed to continue as a probationer only. ( 17 ) IN the instant case as mentioned above, there are no rules governing the appointment to the post of Taqavi Accounts Clerk and there was no stipulation prohibiting the extension of the period of probation beyond six months. In this view of the matter, the view taken by the Honble supreme Court in paragraph 3 of the case of Dharam Singh (supra) will apply and it must be held that the respondent No. 2 could not be deemed to have been confirmed. The view expressed by the Honble Supreme Court in paragraph 5 of the said case, will apply to cases where the rules provide otherwise. ( 18 ) IN the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court rendered in Om Prakash Maurya v. U. P. Cooperative Sugar Factories Federation, AIR 1986 SC 1844 and M. K. Agrawal v. Gurgaon cramin Bank and others, AIR 1988 SC 286 on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 there were rules/regulations which provide for recruitment, probation and confirmation etc. In the case of Om Prakash Maurya (supra ). Regulation 17 provided that all persons on appointment against regular vacancies shall be placed on probation for a period of one year, and under the proviso to the said Regulation, the appointing authority may, in individual cases extend the period of probation in writing for further period not exceeding one year, as it may deem fit. The Honble Supreme Court observed that the proviso to regulation 17 restricted the power of the appointing authority in extending period of probation beyond the period of one year. Interpreting Regulations 17 and 18 and placing reliance on the cases of State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh (supra) the Honble Supreme Court held in Paragraph 4 that on the expiry of the maximum probationary period of two years, the appellant could not be deemed to continue on probation , instead he stood confirmed in the post by implication. ( 19 ) SIMILARLY in the case of M, K. Agarwal v. Gurgaon Gramin Bank and others (supra) the honble Supreme Court observed in Paragraph 4 as follows : " (4 ). . . . ( 19 ) SIMILARLY in the case of M, K. Agarwal v. Gurgaon Gramin Bank and others (supra) the honble Supreme Court observed in Paragraph 4 as follows : " (4 ). . . . The period of the probation was one year in the first instance. The employer could extend it only for a further period of six more months. The limitation on the power of the employer to extend the probation beyond 18 months coupled with the further requirement that at the end of it the services of the probationer should either be confirmed or discharged render the inference inescapable that if the probationer was not discharged at or before the expiry of the maximum -period of probation, then there would be an implied confirmation as there was no statutory indication as to what should follow in the absence of express confirmation at the end of even the maximum permissible period of probation. . . . " ( 20 ) THUS, the judgments of the Honble Supreme Court rendered in Om Prakash Maurya v. U. P. Cooperative Sugar Factories Federation (supra) and M. K. Agrawal v. Gurgaon Gramin Bank and others (supra) are distinguishable on facts and are of no help to the respondent No. 2. ( 21 ) NOW comes the question whether the services of a temporary Government servant could be terminated by giving one months notice. In this connection, it is relevant to refer to the general rule regarding termination of services of a temporary Government Servant, which was made by the Governor of U. P. In exercise of powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the constitution of India, and published with Notification No. 230/ii-B-1953, dated January 30, 1953. It runs as follows : "in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India the Governor of U. P. is pleased to make the following general rule regulating the termination of services of temporary Government servants : " (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any existing rules and orders on the subject, the service of a government servant in temporary service shall be liable to termination at any time by notice in writing given either by government servant to the appointing authority, or by the appointing authority to the Government servant. (2) The period of such notice shall be one month given either by the appointing authority to the government servant, or by the government servant to the appointing authority, provided that in the case of notice by the appointing authority, the latter may substitute for the whole or part of this period of notice, pay in lieu thereof, provided further that it shall be open to the appointing authority to relieve a Government servant without any notice or accept notice for a shorter period, without requiring the Government servant to pay any penalty in lieu of notice. (3) This rule shall take immediate effect and shall apply to all persons who are appointed hereafter in a civil post in connection with the affairs of Uttar Pradesh and who are under the rule-making control of the Governor but who do not hold a lien on any permanent Government post. (4) In this rule, temporary service means officiating and substantive service in a temporary post and officiating service in a permanent post, under the U. P. Government. (5) Nothing in this rule shall apply to : (a) Government servants engaged on contract : (b) Government servants not in whole-time employment ; (c) Government servants paid out of contingencies ; and (d) persons employed in work-charged establishments. " ( 22 ) THE aforesaid Rule provides that the services of a Government servant in temporary service shall be liable to termination at any time by notice in writing given either by the Government servant to the appointing authority, or by the appointing authority to the Government servant. Under Paragraph 2, it is provided that the period of such notice shall be one month. This makes it clear that the services of a temporary Government servant could be terminated at any time by giving one months notice to the Government servant. ( 23 ) IN view of the discussions made above. It is clear that the petitioners could terminate the services of the respondent No. 2 by giving one months notice and the order of termination dated 6th February, 1968 was perfectly valid and legal. The Tribunal has committed an error in allowing the claim petition filed by the respondent No. 2 and setting aside the said order of termination. Therefore, the impugned judgment dated 4. 2. 1980 passed by the Tribunal is liable to be quashed. The Tribunal has committed an error in allowing the claim petition filed by the respondent No. 2 and setting aside the said order of termination. Therefore, the impugned judgment dated 4. 2. 1980 passed by the Tribunal is liable to be quashed. ( 24 ) IN the result the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned judgment dated 4. 2. 1980 is quashed. .