Judgment :- V. KANAGARAJ, J. This appeal suit is directed against the judgment and decree dated 12.8.1985 rendered in O.S. No. 5905 of 1981 by the 9th assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras. Tracing the history of the above appeal it comes to be known that it is the appellant who filed the suit for recovery of a sum of Rs. 32, 610.07 together with interest at the rate of 24% p.a. on Rs. 28, 900.17 and for costs, on pleadings such as that the plaintiff is a partnership firm registered under the Indian Partnership Act; that the defendants are a company registered under the Companies Act; that the plaintiffs are one of the major and leading furnishers in the Madras City, that in response to the invitation of the defendants for quotations for furnishing their office at Madras, the plaintiffs submitted their detailed quotations by letter dated 19.2.1980 further confirming the same by another letter dated 16.5.1980 with the terms and conditions indicated therein; that the defendants by their letter dated 18.6.1980 accepted the quotations of the plaintiffs and placed orders for various items of furniture mentioned in the letter. The further averments of the plaintiffs, as pleaded in the plaint, are that the defendants wanted the work to be executed by the plaintiffs under the supervision of their Architects M/s. NGOR, Bombay and required the plaintiffs to commence the work only after Mr. The further averments of the plaintiffs, as pleaded in the plaint, are that the defendants wanted the work to be executed by the plaintiffs under the supervision of their Architects M/s. NGOR, Bombay and required the plaintiffs to commence the work only after Mr. Dinesh Kale of M/s. NGOR gave the necessary instructions; that the respondents had agreed to the payment of the amount as stipulated in the plaintiffs letters that the plaintiffs by their letter dated 2.7.1980 informed the defendants that the quotations submitted by them on 19.7.1980 was valid only for 30 days therefrom : that the defendants accepted the quotations only on 8.6.1980; that in the intervening period the cost of the raw materials have gone up by 20% and requested for an increase of 15% of the prices already quoted; that the defendants agreed to the said request of an increase of 15% in accordance with which the plaintiffs purchased the raw materials and carried on with the work after due inspection by the defendants architect and approval.The other averments of the plaint are that the plaintiffs on account of some operational problems could not complete the work within the stipulated time and by letter dated 6.10.1980 sought for an extension of time till 30.11.1980 which was granted by the defendants; that though all the items of furniture except the storage units were ready by 18.11.1980, the plaintiffs could not proceed with the work of storage racks and table furnishing in the absence of clarification by Mr. Dinesh Kale and hence they informed the same to the defendants by a telegram dated 22.11.1980 and inspite of that the said Dinesh Kale did not come for inspection. While so, two bills dated 10.2.1980 for a sum of Rs. 43, 470.23 and Rs. 60, 086.12 were raised by the plaintiffs for the work executed. But in the letter dated 31.1.1980 from the defendants, they were informed that the order stood cancelled since the work was not completed within the stipulated period besides complaining of substandard workmanship of the work already carried out. Denying these allegations, by many letters such as on 30.12.1980 and 3.1.1981 etc. But in the letter dated 31.1.1980 from the defendants, they were informed that the order stood cancelled since the work was not completed within the stipulated period besides complaining of substandard workmanship of the work already carried out. Denying these allegations, by many letters such as on 30.12.1980 and 3.1.1981 etc. wherein, on the part of the defendants, they repudiated even the 15% increase in the cost of materials, further the plaintiffs persisted the payment as agreed to by the defendants but the defendants justified the cancellation of the contract since the work was not completed within the stipulated period of 12 weeks from June, 1980 further stating that a sum of Rs. 7, 500 would be paid to the plaintiffs on the completion of the work, complaining that the defendants have broken the terms and conditions of the contract without any justification whatsoever and refused to pay the sum due to them under the contract; that they were constrained to issue the notice dated 3.4.1981 through their counsel for which the defendants replied on 15.4.1981 repudiating their liability on untenable grounds and that ultimately the plaintiffs would file the suit with the prayers stated supra.In the written statement filed by the defendants, besides generally denying all the allegations and having narrated the facts regarding the contract that was entered into between the plaintiffs and the defendants, it would be particularly pointed out that the plaintiffs have to proceed with the work in accordance with the specifications given by the defendants Architect; that the demand of 15% increase even though accepted by the defendants by the letter dated 31.7.1980, it is only subject to the condition that the plaintiffs completed the entire work as per the defendants's order and within the time stipulated and since the plaintiffs did not complete the work on the agreed terms, they are not entitled to claim the 15% increase in the price quoted by them; that in spite of having given all the necessary instructions through the Architect the plaintiffs did not complete the work as agreed upon and denying all such allegations of the plaint, the defendants would ultimately pray for dismissal of the suit with costs. The trial Court, based on these averments would frame four specific issues viz., (1) Whether the plaintiffs are responsible for the delay ? (2) Whether the time is the essence of the contract ? The trial Court, based on these averments would frame four specific issues viz., (1) Whether the plaintiffs are responsible for the delay ? (2) Whether the time is the essence of the contract ? (3) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the reliefs sought for ? and (4) Whether other reliefs, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled to ? And would conduct the full trial during which the partner of the plaintiffs company C. S. Sivanandan would examine himself as P.W. 1 in favour of the plaintiffs case and the Dinesh Kale would be examined on the side of the defendants as D.W. 1 for oral evidence. So far as the documentary evidence is concerned, on the part of the plaintiffs 45 documents would be marked as Exs. A1 to A43 and on the part of the defendants two documents would be marked as Exs. B1 and B2. All the documents marked on the part of the plaintiffs are letters written to the defendants, the replies, the receipts on various dates, the notices exchanged in between the parties through the respective lawyers. The two documents marked on the part of the defendants are also the letters respectively dated 9.7.1980 and 21.2.1981.The trial Court in consideration of the evidence placed on records, further having discussed the facts and circumstances pleaded, has dealt with all the four issues framed at a stretch and discussing the merits of the evidence on the documents while appreciating the same in its proper perspective would arrive at the conclusion to allow the suit in part and would ultimately pass the decree for an amount of Rs. 7, 500 with interest at 24% p.a. and with proportionate costs. Aggrieved, the plaintiffs have preferred the above appeal suit on grounds such as : (i) that the learned Judge failed to note that excepting D.W. 1, the defendant's Architect, no other representative of the defendants has been examined to prove their case, (ii) that the learned Judge failed to note that the defendants agreed to the 15% increase by Ex. A7 on receipt from declining to give same, (iii) that the learned Judge having held that the time was not the essence of the contract, erred in rejecting the claim for 15% of the increase in prices especially having regard to Ex. A7 on receipt from declining to give same, (iii) that the learned Judge having held that the time was not the essence of the contract, erred in rejecting the claim for 15% of the increase in prices especially having regard to Ex. A7, (iv) that the learned Judge erred in holding that the plaintiffs have not objected to the defendants withholding a sum of Rs. 1, 250, (iv) that the learned Judge having negatived the contention of the defendants that the quality of the work done by the plaintiffs was poor, erred in rejecting the claim of the plaintiffs under this head. On the part of the defendants, they would also file a cross objection to the above appeal suit seeking to set aside the judgment and decree dated 12.8.1995 passed by the Court below so far it is against the cross-objector on grounds such as : (i) that the learned Judge erred in decreeing the suit for a sum of Rs. 7, 500 in favour of the respondents; (ii) that the learned Judge failed to note that a sum of Rs. 7, 500 was incurred by the cross-objector on account of non-completion of certain items of work such as painting and polishing; (iii) that the learned Judge has failed to note that a further sum of Rs. 7, 500 was incurred by the cross-objector towards the cost of materials, labour etc. and it is not amount of profit which the respondent would have earned even if the respondent had completed the work; (iv) that the learned Judge has not appreciated the fact that the deduction of Rs. 7, 500 was accepted by the appellant; (v) that the learned judge has erred in holding that the cross-objector and the architect are also responsible for the delay; (vi) that the learned Judge has further erred in holding that the presence of the Architect was required for completion of the work; and (vii) that the learned Judge also erred in decreeing the proportionate costs to the respondents.In consideration of the pleadings by parties, in having regard to the materials placed on record and upon hearing the learned counsel for both what comes to be known is that it is the suit for recovery of a sum of Rs. 52, 619.07 wherein the principal amount is only Rs. 52, 619.07 wherein the principal amount is only Rs. 22, 970.70 and the rest is the interest; that the plaintiffs case is that the amounts illegally withheld by the defendants are (a) for the satisfactory completion of the plaintiffs polishing and fixing the doors Rs. 7, 500 towards the cost incurred in completing these items Rs. 1, 250 (c) the penalty levied for the delay Rs. 6, 642.85 and (d) 15% increase in the process as agreed under Exs. A5 and A7 Rs. 13, 507.48. The plaintiffs would point out that items (a) to (c) shown above are prove under Ex. A34 and the amount shown in Column No. 'd' above is proved under Exs. A5 and A7. The next submission of the plaintiffs is the second issue raised by the lower Court i.e. whether the time is the essence of the contract ? Regarding the contract in the case on hand, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs appellants would point out that the finding of the lower Court in this issue is contrary to the evidence on record; that as per the terms of the agreement dated 16.5.1980 under Ex. A2 and 18.6.1980 under Ex. A3, the time specified for the contract was 12 weeks from the date of placing the order and the advance was to be paid along with the order under Ex. A3; that the quotation was, however, valid only for 30 days from the date of Ex. A1 i.e. from 19.2.1980; that since the respondents placed orders on 18.6.1980 under Ex. A3 that is after expiry of 30 days after Ex. A1 and therefore, the quotations were no longer binding on the plaintiffs; that no advance was also paid along with Ex. A3; that the advance of Rs. 54, 800 was paid only on 6.8.1980; that it was agreed that time would start only from the date of payment of the advance; that since the original terms and conditions have not been adhered to by the defendants, they again rely on those terms which were not followed by them and hence time cannot be construed to be the essence of the contract.At this juncture, the learned counsel for the appellant would cite the judgment delivered in Arosan Enterprises Ltd. vs. Union of India 1999 (3) Arb. LR 310 (SC)), wherein it is held that "contract for supply of sugar from foreign country to Indian Port within specified time - Time stated to be essence of the contract but contract also providing for extension of time - Effect of such extension clause - Conduct of the parties - Reciprocal obligations of the parties provided in the contract and in case of non-fulfilment of some of them, strict adherence of the time schedule was not possible - Buyer not fulfilling some of his obligations in terms of the agreement"........." Mere fixation of a time for delivery of the goods will not make time the essence of the contract." Coming to the delay and to the issue whether the plaintiffs are responsible for the delay that has occurred in completion of the contractual obligations, the learned counsel for the appellant would point out that the contract of the defendants would clearly show that time can never be held as essence of the contract, as is evident from the documents marked as Exs. A3, A7, A11, A14 to A16, A18 and A27; that it is the case of the defendants that at every stage they requested the plaintiffs to do everything in consultation with D.W. 1 and categorically stating that no work should be proceeded with, without having consulted D.W. 1; that under Ex. A8, it is seen that D.W. 1 requested the plaintiffs to prepare the samples without the approval of D.W. 1, the items cannot be manufactured on the required scales which fact has been admitted by the D.W. 1; that laminated sheets were part of the raw materials which would be approved by D.W. 1; that there is no iota of evidence to the fact that the plaintiffs were given free hand to proceed with the work without consulting D.W. 1; that under Ex. A30, it is revealed that the defendants wanted the plaintiffs to get in touch with D.W. 1 knowing fully well that it was likely to prolong the completion of the work thereby showing that the contract itself could not be completed by them within the stipulated time; that the extension of time till 30.11.1980 is admitted in para 7 of the plaint and paras 10 and 11 of the written statement but denied in the oral evidence by D.W. 1 that there is nothing to show that the time is held to be the essence of the contract; that there ahead been variations in the order since items 7, 8 and 9 were not part of the original order under Ex. A3, that would be seen only in Ex. A27, and in such event the time cannot be construed to be the essence of the contract at all; that the items have been taken delivery without any demur as seen from Exs. A20, A21, A23 and A26; that it is fundamental that delivery and payment are simultaneous thus giving effect to Sections 32 and 37(1) of Sale of Goods Act, 1930 and Section 55 of Contract Act; that acceptance of the part of materials would bind the defendants to pay the contract price including 15% increase; that it is well settled that even if a penalty was invoked, time cannot be construed as the essence of the contract.In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the appellant would rely on the decision reported in Hind Construction, Contractors vs. State of Maharashtra, wherein it is held that "the question whether or not the essence of the contract would essentially be a question of the intention of the parties to be gathered from the terms of the contract. - Where time has not been made the essence of the contract or by reason of waiver the time fixed has ceased to be applicable, the employer may by notice fix a reasonable time for the completion of the work and dismiss the contractor on a failure to complete by the date so fixed". - Where time has not been made the essence of the contract or by reason of waiver the time fixed has ceased to be applicable, the employer may by notice fix a reasonable time for the completion of the work and dismiss the contractor on a failure to complete by the date so fixed". On the contrary, the defendants neither pleaded nor let in any evidence to show as to why the time should be construed as the essence of the contractor even the loss of damages suffered by them; that on the other hand, by allowing the plaintiffs even after the termination of the contract would clearly indicate that time was not considered as the essence of the contract; that the charge is that the materials are substandard quality but they have not been raised in any of the documents and only after taking delivery of the goods for the first time this question was raised; that only after supervision by D.W. 1. The delivery of the items were made under Exs. A2 and A21; that this defence had been taken only to deny the legitimate claim of the plaintiffs; that once time is held as not the essence of the contract, then there was no reason to terminate the contract and therefore the defendants are liable to pay a sum of Rs. 15, 392.85. The defendants have not proved how they are entitled to claim the penalty. At this juncture, the learned counsel for the appellant would refer Section 75 of the Contract Act and the judgments reported in Citing Section 75 of the Contract Act, the learned counsel would point out that rescinding with the contract must have been done rightfully. If one party to contract wrongfully repudiates it and the other party does not accept the repudiation the contract survival and the rights of the innocent parties are preserved and accordingly he can perform his part and can recover on that footing. 1963 AIR(AP) 370. If one party to contract wrongfully repudiates it and the other party does not accept the repudiation the contract survival and the rights of the innocent parties are preserved and accordingly he can perform his part and can recover on that footing. 1963 AIR(AP) 370. From out of the other two judgments cited on the part of the appellant herein, in the first judgment reported in, it is held : "Where the plaintiff/contractor had not finished the work by the date fixed in the agreement and the defendant allowed him to continue and complete it and final bill was prepared without imposing any penalty in terms of contract soon after plaintiffs failure to complete by fixed date of rescinding the contract or getting work completed by other contractors, the defendant is not entitled to compensation as it must be deemed to have waived its right to fix it and recover the same from plaintiff." In the second judgment reported in, it is held : "Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act is clearly an attempt to eliminate the somewhat elaborate refinements made under the English common law in distinguishing between stipulations providing for payment of liquidated damages and stipulations in the nature of penalty. Under the common law a genuine pre-estimate of damages by mutual agreements is regarded as a stipulation naming liquidated damages and binding between the parties; a stipulation in a contract in terrorem is a penalty and the Court refuses to enforce it, awarding to the aggrieved party only reasonable compensation. Under the common law a genuine pre-estimate of damages by mutual agreements is regarded as a stipulation naming liquidated damages and binding between the parties; a stipulation in a contract in terrorem is a penalty and the Court refuses to enforce it, awarding to the aggrieved party only reasonable compensation. The Indian Legislature has sought to cut across the web of rules and presumptions under the English common law, by enacting a uniform principle applicable to all stipulations naming amounts to be paid in case of breach and stipulations by way of penalty." On the part of the respondent, learned counsel appearing on their behalf submits that the respondents in their letter dated 18.6.1980 accepted the quotation of the plaintiff and placed orders for the various items of furniture mentioned in the letter and it is admitted on their part that due to certain operational problems faced by them, they could not complete the work within the stipulated time and therefore they sought for extension of time which was granted by the defendants, but in spite of all required instructions imparted and various designs and specifications supplied through their architects, the plaintiffs did not proceed with the work and finish the same as per the terms and conditions to the approval of the defendants/architects stage by stage but with the lame excuse that they had to proceed with the work only after getting the approval of the Architects and in the said process, it was delayed, they did not complete the work within 12 weeks which is the essence of the contract and in spite of extension granted upto 30.11.1980 at their request, there had been marked indifference by the plaintiffs to complete the contract in the schedule time or with the acceptable quality; that from the letters of their Architects Mr. Dinesh Kale addressed to the defendants respectively dated 18.8.1980 (Ex. Dinesh Kale addressed to the defendants respectively dated 18.8.1980 (Ex. A.8) and 21.10.1980 not only the specifications were made available but also the materials were supplied properly besides insisting the quality of workmanship of the work within the stipulated time and no work was undertaken till 9.10.1980 and the quality of workmanship and the time schedule was also not observed and for no reason, they stopped the work when they should have proceeded with and complete the same in accordance with terms of contract and that the delay is completely attributable to the plaintiffs only.The further arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent are that admittedly as early as on 6.8.1980 itself, in amount of Rs. 54, 800 had been received by the plaintiff by bank draft for the purchase of the materials; that Exs. A.7 to A.12, A.27 and A.39 would reveal that the delay in the execution of the contract was only due to the plaintiff; that in Ex. A.10 praying for the extension of time, the extreme co-operation rendered by Mr. Dinesh Kale has also been appreciated by the plaintiff which factor has also been confirmed at various places in the evidence of P.W. 1 : that it was unfortunate that in these circumstances, the trial Court has arrived at the conclusion that both the plaintiff and the defendant are responsible for the delay. The learned counsel then citing the evidence of P.W. 1 and certain exhibits such as Exs. A.2 and A.33 would point out that the plaintiffs have agreed for penalty at Rs. 1, 500 per week and for withholding Rs. 7, 500 that as per Section 74 of the Contract Act, if the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty the party complaining of the breech is entitled whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have been abused thereby. The learned counsel at this juncture would point out that the tenor of the language employed in the section and the evidence of P.W. 1 admitting the liability would prove that this defendant is entitled to a penalty of Rs. 6, 642.85 and citing the judgment of the Apex Court delivered in M/s. Hind Construction, Contractors by its Sole Proprietor Bhikamchand Mulchand Jain (Dead) by L.Rs. vs. State of Maharashtra (supra), the learned counsel would point out that their Lordships have justified the rescission of the contract as legal. 6, 642.85 and citing the judgment of the Apex Court delivered in M/s. Hind Construction, Contractors by its Sole Proprietor Bhikamchand Mulchand Jain (Dead) by L.Rs. vs. State of Maharashtra (supra), the learned counsel would point out that their Lordships have justified the rescission of the contract as legal. To quote from the judgment : "Where time has not been made of the essence of the contract or, by reason of waiver, the time fixed has ceased to be applicable, the employer may by notice fix a reasonable time for the completion of the work and dismiss the contractor on a failure to complete by the date so fixed." Citing the above proportion held, the learned counsel would point out that in the instant case also, since the plaintiff was not able to work on 30.11.1980, the defendant rightly cancelled the contract on 31.12.1980 under Ex. A.27 and the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief sought for since solely responsible for the dealing. In the last phase of the arguments, the learned counsel would point that the learned trial Judge has not discussed about Ex. A.37 telegram dated 11.4.1981 issued by Mr. Dinesh Kale and would lament that inspite of having revealed that the defendant's office is not amenable for the work on the Tamil New Year Day, the plaintiff sent the workers to the office, which is meaningless : that this Ex. A.37 telegram is the answer for Exs. A.40 and A.42, which were highlighted during the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant. Laying emphasis on Ex. A.35, dated 17.3.1981 wherein the plaintiff has admitted in more clear terms that they have no objection in withholding of Rs. 7, 500 provided the said amount be dispatched on the completion of the painting, polishing and fixation of doors to the furniture, items supplied to them, but till the filing of the suit, the plaintiff has not completed these works and hence the plaintiff is not entitled to the decree for the amount of Rs. 7, 500 provided the said amount be dispatched on the completion of the painting, polishing and fixation of doors to the furniture, items supplied to them, but till the filing of the suit, the plaintiff has not completed these works and hence the plaintiff is not entitled to the decree for the amount of Rs. 7, 500 as ordered by the trial Court : that the learned trial Judge erred in decreeing the suit with interest at 24% p.a. when there is no provision in the contract for such an interest to be granted : that the Sale of Goods Act is not applicable to the facts of the case as it is wrongly argued on the part of the plaintiffs since in the instant case there is no contract for sale of goods but only for the work ordered on payment of advance to the tune of 40% of the total amount for the purchase of the materials and the balance to be paid on the delivery of all items of work undertaken. On such arguments, the learned counsel for the respondent would pray to allow the memorandum of cross-objection dismissing the suit filed by the plaintiff with costs of the defendant.In consideration of the pleadings by parties, having regard to the materials placed on record and upon hearing the learned counsel for both, the point that arises for consideration and determination by this Court is whether the lower Court is right in its decision that the plaintiffs are entitled to only for a decree of an amount of Rs. 7, 500 with interest at 24% p.a. from the date of suit till the date of realisation and with proportionate costs and what other reliefs, if any, the appellant or the cross-objector is entitled to ? A deep into the judgment of the trial Court would clearly indicate that the learned trial Judge has elaborately and properly considered the pleadings by both parties without missing even the minute details. It further comes to be known that the lower Court has also framed proper issues based on the pleadings by parties numbering four, mainly determining the two vital questions involved in the whole of the suit (i) whether the time is the essence of the contract concerned with the suit ? and (ii) whether the plaintiffs are responsible for the delay ? and (ii) whether the plaintiffs are responsible for the delay ? and would answer for the first point that time has not been considered to be the essence of the contract and would answer the point No. 2 holding that both the plaintiff and the defendant are responsible for the delay occasioned in consummation of the contract. On the part of the appellants, their grievance is that the learned Judge having held that the time was not the essence of the contract should not have rejected the claim of 15% on account of increase in prices having regard to Ex. A.7 wherein the defendants have granted the said increase being convinced of the circumstances explained in the letter of the plaintiffs on the prices indicated in their order. The further claim of the appellants is that the learned Judge having negatived the contention of the defendants that the quality of the work done by the plaintiff was poor, erred in rejecting the claim of the plaintiff withholding a sum of Rs. 1, 250. No doubt, so far as the learned Judge in arriving at the conclusion that the time has not been considered the essence of the contract on fruitful discussions had in the context of the facts and circumstances pleaded and the oral and documentary evidence placed on record and the conduct of parties in the fructification of the contract, has ultimately arrived at the conclusion to hold that the time has not been considered the essence of the contract in appreciation of the totality of the circumstances and it should be mentioned that the learned Judge has arrived at the right conclusion since the delay was contributory on both sides.The vital question raised on the part of the appellants at this juncture is that the learned Judge having been fully appraised of the fact of the defendants having agreed to the 15% increase by Ex. A.7 and in further view of the fact that in evidence it came to be established that time was not the essence of the contract and having been convinced of these situations, has erred in rejecting the claim for 15% of the increase in prices. A.7 and in further view of the fact that in evidence it came to be established that time was not the essence of the contract and having been convinced of these situations, has erred in rejecting the claim for 15% of the increase in prices. On the part of the respondent/cross-objector it would be argued that the granting of the increase of 15% on the prices indicated was only subject to the condition that the increase would be given only on completion of the entire work as per their order as it comes to be glaringly seen from Ex. A.7. The terms employed herein at the close of second paragraph of Ex. A.7 are "on your completing the entire work as per order", which of course, lays emphasis on the time that was insisted in the order by the respondents within which the work had to be completed on the part of the appellant. But, this emphasis insisted under Ex. A.7 by the cross-objector on the time element, the lower Court did not at all agree and on dissection of this aspect of the case, under different angles, on proper issues framed, has ultimately and rightly held that (i) time was not considered the essence of the contract, and (ii) that both the plaintiff and the defendant are responsible for the delay. Again so far as the insistence of the defendant regarding the plaintiff completing the entire work as per the defendants order, apart from the completion of the work in a time bound manner (which has not been accepted by the lower Court), the other emphasis that is laid is on the satisfactory completion of work with good workmanship. It could be seen from the pleadings that for a satisfactory completion of the painting, polishing and fixing the doors, Rs. 7, 500 have been claimed on the part of the plaintiff and agreeing with the satisfactory completion of these works, the lower Court has decreed this amount of Rs. 7, 500 in favour of the plaintiff and it has declined only the cost incurred for the completion of these works i.e. an amount of Rs. 1, 250 in decreeing the amount of Rs. 7, 500 in favour of the plaintiff and it has declined only the cost incurred for the completion of these works i.e. an amount of Rs. 1, 250 in decreeing the amount of Rs. 7, 500 claimed under the head satisfactory completion of the painting, polishing and fixing doors it goes without saying that the second condition contemplated in the contract regarding the qualitative workmanship has also been upheld by the lower Court and therefore giving effect to the crucial document Ex. A.7, it would he safely concluded that the condition imposed at the time of granting the increase of 15% on the prices indicated in the order of the defendant the plaintiffs have complied with and therefore the plaintiffs have not been in error and the same having been accepted by the lower Court it should have held that since the plaintiffs have completed the entire work satisfactorily to the order especially in view of the conclusions arrived at by the lower Court that the time has not been considered the essence of the contract and the admitted delay was contributory by both parties there is no point in denying the plaintiff the amount of Rs. 13, 507.32 ps. claimed under the head of "15% increase in terms of the price as agreed under Exs. A.5 and A.7". Therefore, this Court, is in full agreement of the conclusions arrived at by the lower Court for the main issues whether time was the essence of the contract in the case in hand ? and who is responsible for the delay ? holding that the time is not the essence of the contract and the delay caused in completion of the work as contributory by both, the agreed increase of the 15% on the prices indicated in the order of the defendant the plaintiff's would become entitled to. The lower Court on its won conclusions should have decreed the amount of Rs. 13, 507.32 ps. claimed under the head of the increase of 15% on the prices, which was agreed by the defendants under Ex. The lower Court on its won conclusions should have decreed the amount of Rs. 13, 507.32 ps. claimed under the head of the increase of 15% on the prices, which was agreed by the defendants under Ex. A.7.On a careful consideration of the entire evidence placed on record, it would be found that only the Architect of the defendant M/s. Dinesh Kale has been examined on their side and no other oral evidence even in confirmation of those recitals in the documents placed on record has been let in the active consideration and hence the lower Court insofar as the vital issues are concerned has rightly arrived at the conclusion to hold that time was not the essence of the contract and that the delay was contributory by both and hence having held so, the snag created by imposing of the condition in Ex. A.7 having been lifted in the finding of the lower Court, the plaintiff would automatically become entitled to the increase agreed upon and therefore in addition to what has been granted by the lower Court, under one head, the plaintiffs would become entitled to get the amount claimed on their part at Rs. 13, 507.32 ps. under the head "15% increase in the price as agreed". Hence, this Court is of the view that the plaintiff is definitely entitled to this amount of 15% increase in the prices agreed by the defendant and pass the decree to that effect. Barring this, no other vital point needs discussion since it is held that all other conclusions arrived at by the lower Court are on the right line and based on the evidence made available on record and in full appreciation of the same and they need no interference by this Court at all. In result, (i) the appeal in A.S. No. 238 of 1987 is allowed in part decreeing the suit for further amount of Rs. 13, 507.32 ps. with interest at 12% p.a. from the date of suit till the date of realisation under the head "15% increase in the price as agreed under Ex. A.7" apart from the relief already granted by the lower Court. (ii) the cross-objection filed by the respondent/cross-objector deserves no consideration and the same is dismissed.However, in the circumstances of the case, parties are to bear their own costs.