JUDGMENT R. K. PATRA, ACJ. — In this application made under Sec. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the petitioners seek quashing of the order dated 17.7.1999 of the learned Sub-divisional Judi¬cial Magistrate, Sadar, Cuttack of (in brief ‘S.D.J.M.’) in G.R.Case No. 2228 of 1996 by which he has taken cognizance of the offences under Sec. 304-A and Sec. 304, Part-II, I.P.C. and directed issue of processes against them. 2. Opposite party No.2.presented a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Mangalabag Police Station, Cuttack on 23.12.1996 alleging that her husband Satyanarayan Bhuyan was admitted into Kailash S.N.T. Clinic for Tonsiloctomy operation on that day at 8 a.m. and the operation was done by petitioner No.1. Petitioner No.2 being the anesthesist attached to the said clinic administered general anaesthesis to the patient. At about 10 a.m. petitioner No.1 and his associates came out from the Operation Theatre. When opposite party No.3 asked them about her husband, she was told by them that operation was in progress and there would be no difficulty. One hour thereafter, petitioner No.1 told her that he was sorry that the operation on her husband could not be successful. She accordingly with her family members went to the Operation Theatre and found her husband lying dead in a pool of blood. She alleged that her husband was quite hale and hearty before he was operated upon and because of negligence of the petitioner in performing the operation, he died. The aforesaid report was registered as F.I.R. No. 309 dated 23.12.1996 under Sec. 304-A, I.P.C. On the basis of the said F.I.R., G.R.Case No. 2228 of 1996 was registered on the file of the S.D.J.M., Sadar, Cuttack. Police took up investigation. On 29.8.1997 while investigation was in progress, opposite party No. 2 filed a complaint against the petitioners in the Court of the S.D.J.M. under Secs. 304-A and 304, Part-II, I.P.C. on the self-same allegations. The complaint was registered as ICC No. 171 of 1997. On 28.10.1998 the learned S.D.J.M. passed order in the complaint case directing its closure on the ground that since in respect of the self-same occurrence police investigation was being done, there was no necessity to proceed with it. Opposite party No.2 being felt aggrieved by the closure of the complaint case moved the learned Sessions Judge, Cuttack in Criminal Revi¬sion No.118 of 1998. Opposite party No.2 being felt aggrieved by the closure of the complaint case moved the learned Sessions Judge, Cuttack in Criminal Revi¬sion No.118 of 1998. By order dated 8.3.1999, the learned Ses¬sions Judge set aside the order dated 28.10.1998 of the learned S.D.J.M. in the complaint case and directed him to consider as to whether he would prefer to await submission of final from in G.R.Case No. 2228 of 1996 and if he considered that it was not desirable to await submission of final from, he may proceed with the complaint case in accordance with law. In view of the said order, learned S.D.J.M passed order on 19.3.1999 in G.R.Case No. 2228 of 1996 directing restoration of the complaint case to file. He further directed the G.R.case to be put up on 28.6.1999 await¬ing final form. On that day itself (19.3.1999) police filed final from under Sec. 173, Cr.P.C. stating that the case is a mistake of fact under Sec. 304-A, I.P.C. The learned Magistrate also on that day directed issue of notice to the informant - opposite party No.2 on the final form. On 4.6.1999 the case record was put up before the learned Magistrate along with a protest petition filed by opposite party No.2. On 24.6.1999 the learned Magistrate heard on the protest petition filed by opposite party No.2 and pronounced the impugned order on 17.7.1999. It would be appropri¬ate to quote the relevant portion of the order : “.......Perused the case record and the order-sheet, F.I.R. dated 23.12.1996, seizure list dated 4.1.1997, inquest report in respect of the deceased........and the final opinion on the cause of death of the deceased Satyanarayan Bhuyan given by Dr. S. Acharya........are all the documents of importance for necessary consideration of the protest petition. These documents along with the case diaries and other police papers when perused carefully reflect facts which constitute offence under Sec. 304-A/304-II, I.P.C. Having found these facts prima facie I take cognizance of those offences as per the police report under Sec. 173, Cr.P.C. in accordance with the provision enumerated in Sec. 190 (i) (b). Since it is apparent from the case record that prima facie the offences are committed by Dr. Gangadhar Behera of Kailash ENT, Friends Colony, Cuttack and Dr. Since it is apparent from the case record that prima facie the offences are committed by Dr. Gangadhar Behera of Kailash ENT, Friends Colony, Cuttack and Dr. H.K.Ray, Anaesthesist in the same clinic, process be issued..........” Counsel for the petitioners has raised three points in support of the application which have been reiterated in his note of submis¬sion dated 18.2.2000. They are as follows : (i) The learned Magistrate having accepted the final form sub¬mitted under Sec. 173, Cr.P.C. and having issued notice to inform¬ant to file protest petition, it was obligatory on his part to examine witnesses under Sec. 202, Cr.P.C. before taking cogni¬zance; (ii) The order taking cognizance is vitiated because the learned Magistrate did not follow the mandatory provision contained in the proviso to Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 202, Cr.P. C. when the offence complained of (Sec. 304, Part-II, IPC) is triable exclu¬sively by the Court of Session; and (iii) Accepting the entire prosecution story, no case has been made out under Sec. 304-A and Sec. 304, Part-II, I.P.C. The learned counsel appearing for the informant opposite party No.2 has refuted all the points urged on behalf of the petitioners. 4. Let me now proceed to examine the contentions of the petitioners in seriatim; Point Nos. (i) and (ii); Points Nos. (i) and (ii) being connected are taken up to¬gether for discussion. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the learned Magistrate accepted the final form submitted by the police under Sec. 173, Cr.P.C. is not factually correct. As already indicated, on 19.3.1999 after restoring the complaint case (ICC No. 171/1997) to filed, he passed orders to await submis¬sion of final form in the connected G.R.case. Later, it appears, final form was received in the Court with the case diary. When it was placed before the learned Magistrate, he passed further order on that day (19.3.1999) which reads as follows : “FMMP under Sec. 304 (A), IPC received along with CDs. Issue notice to the informant. Put up after receipt of the S.M’’. Pursuant to the notice, informant-opposite party No. 2 filed protest petition on 4.6.1999. The learned Magistrate directed the copy of the protest petition to be served on the Assistant Public Prosecutor and adjourned the case to 24.6.1999 on which day he heard on the protest petition and reserved for order and pro¬nounced the same on 17.7.1999. Pursuant to the notice, informant-opposite party No. 2 filed protest petition on 4.6.1999. The learned Magistrate directed the copy of the protest petition to be served on the Assistant Public Prosecutor and adjourned the case to 24.6.1999 on which day he heard on the protest petition and reserved for order and pro¬nounced the same on 17.7.1999. The aforesaid order passed by the learned Magistrate clearly indicates that when final form was received on 19.3.1999 in the Court, he merely directed issue of notice to the informant and after protest petition was filed, he heard the matter and pronounced the impugned order on 17.7.1999. With regard to the power of the learned Magistrate on the police report under Sec. 173, Cr.P.C., a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in M/s. India Carat Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1989 SC 885 , after critically analysing the provi¬sions in Chapters XII, XIV, XV and XVI of the Cr.P.C. and consid¬ering the decisions in Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra, AIR 1968 SC 117 and R. S. Bains v. State, AIR 1980 SC 1883 held that upon receipt of a police report under Sec. 173 (2), Cr.P.C. any Magistrate is entitled to take cognizance of any offence under Sec. 190 (1) (b) of the Cr.P.C. even if the police report is to the effect that no case is made out against the accused. The Magistrate can take into account the statement of witnesses examined by the police during investigation and take cognizance of the offence complained of and order issue of process to the accused. Sec. 190 (1) (b) does not lay down that Magistrate can take cognizance of offence only if the Investigating Agency gives an opinion that the investigation has made out a case. The Magistrate can ignore the conclusion arrived at by the Investi¬gating Agency and independently apply his mind to the facts emerging from the investigation and take cognizance of the case, if he thinks fit, in exercise of power under Sec. 190 (1) (b) and direct issue of process to the accused. The Magistrate is not bound in such a situation to follow the procedure laid down in Secs. 200 and 202 of the Code for taking cognizance of a case under Sec. 190 (1) (a) though it is open to him to act under Sec. 200 or Sec. 202 also. The Magistrate is not bound in such a situation to follow the procedure laid down in Secs. 200 and 202 of the Code for taking cognizance of a case under Sec. 190 (1) (a) though it is open to him to act under Sec. 200 or Sec. 202 also. The aforesaid being the legal position, no fault can be found with the learned Magistrate when after rejecting the final form he took cognizance of the offence on perusal of the materi¬als available on record. 5. Under Sec. 190 (1) (b), Cr.P.C. the scope of the provi¬so contained in Sub-sec. (2) of the Sec. 202, Cr.P.C. and the effect of its non-compliance and the stage at which the grievance of such non-compliance can be raised came up for con¬sideration recently before the Supreme Court in Rosy v. State of Kerala, AIR 2000 SC 637 . What happened in that case was that the Excise Inspector filed a complaint against the accused before the Judicial Magistrate of the Second Class alleging certain offences punishable under the Kerala Akhari Act. Those offences were exclusively triable by the Court of Session. The learned Magis¬trate without examining any witness committed the case to the Court of Session. After framing of the charge, trial before the Court of Session commenced, the prosecution closed examination of its witnesses and thereafter the accused was questioned under Sec. 213, Cr.P.C. The accused also examined defence witnesses. In course of argument a point was raised on behalf of the accused that the Magistrate having not followed the procedure prescribed in the proviso to Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 202, Cr.P.C., the committal order was vitiated. Hon’ble K.T.Thomas, J. in his opinion held that the accused having not raised objection on the ground of omission to examine witnesses before the process was issued by the Magistrate, it must be taken that he had no griev¬ance that such omission had occasioned failure of justice. Hon’¬ble M.R.Shah, J. in his separate opinion also observed that person complaining of non-compliance of the proviso to Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 202 should raise objection at the earliest stage and should point out the prejudice caused or likely to be caused by not following the proviso. If he fails to raise objec¬tion at the earliest stage, he is precluded from raising it later. (2) of Sec. 202 should raise objection at the earliest stage and should point out the prejudice caused or likely to be caused by not following the proviso. If he fails to raise objec¬tion at the earliest stage, he is precluded from raising it later. With regard to the offence triable exclusive by the Court of Session, Hon’ble Thomas, J. held that the proviso incorporated in Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 202, Cr.P.C. is not merely to confer a discretion on the Magistrate, but a compelling duty on him to perform in such cases. The Magistrate, however, insuch a situation is not obliged to examine witnesses who could not be produced by the complainant when asked to produce such witnesses. If the complainant requires the help of the Court to summon such witness¬es, it is open to the Magistrate to issue such summons. His Lordship again reiterated that if the Magistrate omits to comply with the above requirement, that would not by itself vitiate the proceedings, Hon’ble N.B.Shah, J. inter alia held that where it appears to the Magistrate that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, the direction to the police to make investigation is not permissible and he is re¬quired to hold inquiry by himself. During that inquiry, he may decide to examine the witnesses on oath. At that stage the provi¬so further gives mandatory directions that he shall call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath. The reason is that in a private complaint, which is required to be committed to the Court of Session for trial, it would safe¬guard the interest of the accused and he would not be taken by surprise at the time of trial and it would reveal the version of the witnesses whose list is required to be filed by complainant under Sec. 204 (2), Cr.P.C. before issuance of the process. 6. On careful reading of the judgment, it appears to me that if the learned Magistrate decides to follow Sec. 202, Cr.P.C. proviso to Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 202 would come into opera¬tion which makes it obligatory for the Magistrate to call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath. 6. On careful reading of the judgment, it appears to me that if the learned Magistrate decides to follow Sec. 202, Cr.P.C. proviso to Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 202 would come into opera¬tion which makes it obligatory for the Magistrate to call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath. In view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in India Carat and Rosy (supra), there is no point in referring to the other ¬cases cited by the counsel for parties. 7. In the case at hand, it may be seen that the learned Magistrate has not decided to follow the procedure contained in Sec. 202, Cr.P.C. Therefore, question of complying with the proviso to Sub-sec. (2) of that section does not arise. For the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any illegality committed by the learned Magistrate in taking cognizance under Sec. 190 (1) (b), Cr.P.C. and issuing process to the petitioners. 8. Now coming to the last point, it may be examined if on the basis of materials available offences under Secs. 304-A and 304, Part-II, I.P.C. have been made out. So far as offence under Sec. 304, Part-II, I.P.C. is concerned, learned counsel appearing for the opposite party No.2 could not show how an offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Sec. 304, Part-II, I.P.C. has been made out. The petition¬ers had no motive to kill the patient. They had also no intention to do so or cause such bodily injury as was likely to cause the death. There is also nothing on record to suggest that the peti¬tioner operated the patient with the knowledge that it was likely to cause death. In the circumstances, since no case under Sec. 304, Part-II, I.P.C. has been made out, the order of the learned Magistrate taking cognizance of offence under Sec. 304, Part-II, I.P.C. is vulnerable. The same is accordingly set aside. 9. So far as the order taking cognizance of offences under Sec. 304-A, I.P.C. is concerned, it may be stated that in a case under the aforesaid section, the prosecution is obliged to establish the following: (a) the death of the person in question; (b) that the accused caused the death; and (c) that such act of the accused was rash or negligent. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has not been able to point out that on the materials as available, no case under Sec. 304-A, I.P.C. has been made out. I am, therefore, not inclined to interfere with that part of the impugned order. 10. In the result, this application is allowed in part. The learned Magistrate is directed to conclude the trial as expedi¬tiously as possible preferably by the end of June, 2001. Application allowed in part.