JUDGMENT Arun Kumar Goel, J. (Oral):- This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the learned District Judge, Solan, in Civil Appeal No. l0-S Of 1997, dated 23rd March, 1999. While allowing the appeal filed by respondents, (hereinafter referred to as the defendants), suit filed by the appellants, (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiffs has been dismissed. Plaintiffs impugnn this decree of the appellate court below in this appeal. Appeal was admitted on substantial questions of law named at Sr. No.2 to 4 at page 7 of the appeal, which are as under:- "2. Whether the Ex.PW-1/B (Agreement) which proves Late shri Sis Ram to be the exclusive tenant, has been proved as per the Section 90 of the Evidence Act? 3. Whether the tenant and inheritance of tenancy rights defined Under Section 2(j) of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 applies to both i.e. regarding teancy of commercial and residential premises? 4. Whether the rights of inheritance with regard to commercial premises by the teant would be governed by General Law of Succession or in accordance with the provisions of Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 with regard to tenancy right ?" 2. Brief facts of the case which are necessary for deciding this appeal need to be noted. 3. Plaintiffs are owners of a double storeyed building situated in Lakkar Bazar, Solan. This property was earlier owned by one Kulwant Rai, who sold it to Smt. Sushila and from her present plaintiffs purchase it. Plaintiffs further allege that initially one Sees Ram was inducted as a tenant who executed a rent note Ex.PW-1/B. Their specific case was that Sees Ram was tenant in his individual capacity. Since his widow is no more as also he had no issue as such the defendants are trespassers. In this background they claimed possession of the property in suit. They also claimed possession of the property in suit. They also claimed Rs.500/- per month for use and occupation charges since the defendants were illegally enjoying the premises in question. So far Sees Ram was concerned, he was tenant on Rs.400/- per month as rent. He died somewhere in the month of January/February, 1986. Premises having been locked by both the defendants without any right to remain in possession, as such plaintiffs prayed for a decree of possession as well as for payment of money. 4. So far Sees Ram was concerned, he was tenant on Rs.400/- per month as rent. He died somewhere in the month of January/February, 1986. Premises having been locked by both the defendants without any right to remain in possession, as such plaintiffs prayed for a decree of possession as well as for payment of money. 4. So far defendant No. 1 is concerned, he disputed the title of the plaintiffs. Because according to him sale was in violation of Section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972. As the plaintiffs were non agriculturists. He further denied claim of the plaintiffs that teancy of the premises in question was personal to Sees Ram or that premises have been locked as alleged in the plaint. According to him, both Sees Ram and Ram Dass were real brothers being sons of Sidhu Ram. They constituted a Joint Hindu Family and were carrying on business as such in the premises in question under the name and style of M/s. Sidhu Ram Sees Ram. Though the premises were taken on rent in the name of Sees Ram, but both of them were paying the rent. 5. In this view of the matter after the death of Ram Dass in the year 1978 this Joint Hindu Family who was tenant and was also paying the rent. Another plea in the alternative was taken that both the brothers, Sees Ram and Ram Dass were co-tenants. After the death of Ram Dass, tenancy was inherited by defendant No.l, his brothers and sisters as per law as in force at that point of time. 6. Plea of both the defendants being in unlawful possession was disputed and at the same time it was pleaded that plaintiffs suit was not competent as also not maintainbable, jurisdiction of civil court was also disputed in view of Section 14 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, (hereinafter referred to as the 1987 Act). Suit being bad for non joinder of necessary parties and also defendant No.2 having been unnecessarily impleaded as defendant was also set up as a defence. Further ground urged for dismissal of the suit was, that it is not properly valued for the purposes of court fees and jurisdiction. Thus defendant No. 1 prayed for dismissal of the suit. 7. Suit being bad for non joinder of necessary parties and also defendant No.2 having been unnecessarily impleaded as defendant was also set up as a defence. Further ground urged for dismissal of the suit was, that it is not properly valued for the purposes of court fees and jurisdiction. Thus defendant No. 1 prayed for dismissal of the suit. 7. On the other hand defendant No.2 in his written statement denied that Sees Ram was inducted as tenant by Kulwant Rai in individual capacity. Rather according to him shop was given on rent from very beginning to H.U.F. of M/s. Sidhu Ram Sees Ram, which was being earlier run by two brothers. On the death of Ram Dass business was being carried by Sees Ram and two sons of Ram Dass one being defendant No.l and the other Ramesh Kumar. It was specifically pleaded by defendant No.2 that it is defendant No. 1 sn of Sees Ram, who is running the business in question. Families of Ram Dass and Sees Ram were not only joint in business but lived jointly where widow of Sees Ram also resided till her death. Claim of plaintiffs for Rs.500/- per month was denied by both the defendants. 8. In replication filed on behalf of the plaintiffs pleadings which were contrary to those of in the plaint were denied and in replication thereto facts pleaded in the plaint were reaffirmed. 9. On the basis of pleading, parties went to trial on the following issues:- 1. Whether the plaintiffs are owners of the suit land and defendants are trespassers? OPP 2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to damages of Rs.6000/- ? OPP 3. Whether the suit is not maintainable? OPD 4. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? OPD 5. Whether this court has no jurisdiction? OPD 6. Whether suit is not properly valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction? OPD 7. Whether the sale-in favour of plaintiff is hit by Section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 and is null and void? OPD 8. Relief. 10. Issue No. 1 was decided in favour of the plaintiff whereas issue No.2 was partly decided in favour of the plaintiffs. All other issues were decided in the negative. 11. Whether the sale-in favour of plaintiff is hit by Section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 and is null and void? OPD 8. Relief. 10. Issue No. 1 was decided in favour of the plaintiff whereas issue No.2 was partly decided in favour of the plaintiffs. All other issues were decided in the negative. 11. Thus it resulted in the suit being decreed and as already noted, in appeal this decree of the trial Court has been reversed. Hence this appeal at the instance of the plaintiffs. 12. Learned Senior Counsel appearing in support of this appeal submitted that suit is based on title of the plaintiffs and Sees Ram having died without leaving any heir within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the 1987 Act, his clients are entitled for a decree of possession of the suit property. 13. It was also urged that PW- 1/B the rent note, purported to be executed by Sees Ram clearly establishes beyond any shadow of doubt that tenancy was personal to him. And both under the general law as well as the Rent Law i.e. of 1987, defendant No.l is not entitled to inherit the tenancy. In this behalf another plea urged also need to be noted. That even if Section 2(j) of the 1987 Act applied to the present case, even then defendant No.l being not covered under it, a such the appellate court below has fallen into error while allowing his appeal and dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs. According to learned Senior Counsel, some provisions of Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1971, (hereinafter referred to 1971 Act), particularly Section 4 thereof, stood incorporated by necessary implication in the Act of 1987, till the appointed day as defined in Section 2(a) of 1987 Act. Per him succession of Sees Ram opened immediately on his death and could not have remained in abeyance. Therefore, under Section 4(2) of the 1971 Act supra, after the death of his wife, tenancy became extinct as such according to him decree passed by the trial Court was in accordance with law and deserved to be maintained by allowing this appeal. 14. All these pleas have been controverted on behalf of defendant No. 1 by Mr. Malhotra. According to him plaintiffs have unnecessarily complicated the case. 14. All these pleas have been controverted on behalf of defendant No. 1 by Mr. Malhotra. According to him plaintiffs have unnecessarily complicated the case. Because both the brothers Sees Ram and Ram Das being members of Joint Hindu Family were the tenants of the premises in question and after the death of Sees Ram tenancy rights devolved upon his client and his brothers and sisters, as such no exception can be taken to the impugned decree. He further pointed out that Section 4 of the 1971 Act has no applicability to the facts and circumstances of this case. Tenancy being heritable in the instant case while allowing the appeal, appellate court below has rightly dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs. 15. With reference to Article 254 (2) of the Constitution of India and its 7th Schedule, list III entry No.6, it was urged by the learned Senior Counsel that in case where a law made by the State legislature, as in the present case, i.e. 1971 Act as well as 1987 Act with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the concurrent list, if is repugnant to an earlier law made by the Parliament or existing law with respect to that matter, then the law so made by the legislature of the State shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent prevails over Central Act. Thus according to Mr. Kanwar since 1987 Act has been assented to by the President, it overrides Hindu Succession Act which deals with general law of inheritance and succession. According to him 1971 Act supra was not assented to by the President, therefore, omission if any stood rectified by necessary incorporation of Section 4 in the Act of 1987 in view of Section 2(a) thereof till the appointed day. 16. In this behalf Mr. Malhotra learned counsel for defedant No. 1 while not disputing the legal proposition based on Article 254(2) and 7th Schedule, list HI entry No.6, submitted that what was initially bad in law could not have been rectified as was urged on behalf of the plaintiffs As such no benefit can be derived by the plaintiffs from the assent of 1987 Act and/or the alleged incorporation of Section 4 of 1971 Act in terms of Section 2(a) of the Act 1987. Thus according to him it is the general law of succession that will hold the field. While buttressing this line of argument, Mr. Malhotra submitted in the alternative that even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that 1987 Act is not applicable and Section 4 of 1971 Act is taken to have been incorporated in the latter Act, still it is inapplicable because the suit out of which the present appeal has arisen was filed after the appointed day (under 1987 Act), i.e. 18th August, 1987. Thus he has prayed for upholding the impugned decree. 17. Before proceedings with the merits of the case legal plea urged on behalf of the parties regarding applicability of section 4 of the 1971 Act and is being incorporated in the 1987 Act needs to be dealt with. 18. Section 4 of the Act of 1971 was in the following terms:- "4. Right of tenancy to the widow or minors: - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, it shall be lawful after the death of a tenant for his widow to retain possession till she dies or remarries on the same terms and conditions on which the tenancy was held by her husband and all the provisions of this Act shall apply to such a case. (2) After the death or remarriage of the widow or where after the death of a tenant there is no widow, then in such a case notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, it shall be lawful for minor sons or daughters of such a tenant to retain possession of any building or rented land of a landlord till the age of the majority of the sons or till the daughters get married, on the same terms and conditions on which the tenancy was held by their father". 19. Thus Section 4 deals with right of tenancy to the widow and minors after the death of the tenant. 20. On the other hand, Section 2(1 )(j) of 1987 Act deals with the same matter. With a view to properly appreciate the respective submission, this Section also needs to be extracted. It is as under:- "2(1 )(j). 19. Thus Section 4 deals with right of tenancy to the widow and minors after the death of the tenant. 20. On the other hand, Section 2(1 )(j) of 1987 Act deals with the same matter. With a view to properly appreciate the respective submission, this Section also needs to be extracted. It is as under:- "2(1 )(j). "tenant means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building or rented land and includes a tenant continuing in possession after termination of the tenancy and in the event of the death of such person such of his heirs as are mentioned in Schedule I to this Act and who were ordinarily residing with him at the time of his death, subject to the order of succession and conditions specified, respectively in Explanation-I and Explanation-II to this clause, but does not include a person placed in occupation of a building or rented land by its tenant, except with the written consent of the landlord, or a person to whom the collection of rent of fees in a public market, cart-stand or slaughter house or of tents for shops has been framed out or leased by a municipal corporation or a municipal committee or a notified area committee or a cantonment board." "Explanation-1: The order of succession in the event of the death of the person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy shall be as follows:- (a) firstly, his surviving spouse(b) secondly, his son or daughter, or both, if there is no surviving spouse, or if the surviving spouse did not ordinarily live with the deceased person as member of his family up to the date of his death; (c) thirdly, his parent(s), if there is no surviving spouse, son or daughter of the deceased person, or if such surviving spouse, son, daughter, or any of them, did not ordinarily live in the premises as a member of the family of the deceased person up to the date of his death; and (d) fourthly, his daughter-in-law, being the widow of his pre-deceased son, if there is no surviving spouse, son, daughter or parent(s) of the deceased person or if such surviving spouse, son of daughter, or parent(s), or any of them did not ordinarily live in the premises as a member of the family of the deceased person up to the date of his death." Explanation-II:- The right of every successor, referred to in Explanation I, to continue in possession after the termination of the teancy, shall be personal to him and shall not, on the death of such successor, devolve in any of his heirs; and (k) "urban areas" means any area administered by a municipal corporation, a municipal committe, a cantonment board, or a notified area committee or any area declared by the State Government, by notification, to be an urban area for the purposes of this." 21. In addition to these two sections. What is contained in Section l(3)(iii) of 1987 Act about Sections 4 and 29 of 1971 Act reads as under:- "Provisions contained in Section 4 and section 29 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent control Act, 1971 shall be deemed to have remained in force dring the period reckoned from the on which these were substituted or inserted, as the case may be, in the said Act, till the appointed day." 22. As already noted and regarding which parties were not at variance was that the 1971 Act was not assented to by the President before its promulgation. Before the 1987 Act came into force, H.P. Urban Rent control Ordinance, 1987 was promulgated. Why necessity arose for this will be dealt with hereinafter. 23. With the death of the widow of Sis Ram general law of inheritance would come into force. Reason being that in the interim, there was no valid law enacted by the State Legislature so as to apply section 4 of 1971 Act till there appointed day as has been provided in the 1987 Act. 24. Another reason to take this view is that devolution of tenancy under 1971 Act was limited to certain classes of heirs. Whereas under the Act of 1987, the same, in my considered view, stands enlarged on other classes of persons as is evidence from examination of both the provisions extracted hereinafter. 25. Law making machinery being aware of the deficiency in law got the assent of President so far as 1987 Act was concerned. However, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that simply because the provisions of Section 4 were kept alive therefore, by necessary implication, the omissions in the 1971 act of having not been assented to by the President gets rectified, this plea is not based on any sound rule for interpretation of statutes matchless of the Constitution of India. 26. In this behalf, reference was made on behalf of the parties to a number of decisions, which will be dealt with hereinafter. 27. In Nuthia Aggarwal & Anr. v. Jahanara Begum & Ors. AIR 1967 SC 92, it was held as under:- "Two methods of approach were adopted by counsel in this appeal. One was to construe the words of the fifth section taken by themselves or in comparison with those employed in other acts of the Assam Legislature. 27. In Nuthia Aggarwal & Anr. v. Jahanara Begum & Ors. AIR 1967 SC 92, it was held as under:- "Two methods of approach were adopted by counsel in this appeal. One was to construe the words of the fifth section taken by themselves or in comparison with those employed in other acts of the Assam Legislature. The second was to compare and contrast Section 5 of the Assam Act with enactment in Rent Control acts of other States. The second method although sometimes instructive is not to be commended because similarity or variation in the laws of different States is not necessarily indicative of a Kindred or a changed intention. Enactments drafted by different hands, at different times and to satisfy different requirements of a local character, seldom afford tangible or sure aid in construction. We would, therefore put aside the Rent control Acts of Madras, Bihar, Delhi and other States, because in these "States the problem of accommodation in relation to the availability of lands and houses and the prior legislative history and experience, cannot be same as in Assam. We shall, however, refer to other Rent Control Acts of the Assam Legislature because they do not suffer from this weakness and may throw some light on how the legislature was accustomed to view such matters. But before we do so we shall consider Section 5 taken by itself." 28. With reference to this decision, learned Senior Counsel pointed out that while considering the provisions of Sections 4 and 2(j), supra, matter needs to be examined with regard to these two provisions and not by making a comparative study of the provisions regarding heritability of tenancy under Rent Law of other States. 29. This submission appears to have been made with a view to exclude this court from considering the decision of the Supreme Court in Smt. Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar & Ors. AIR 1985 SC 796. By referring to this decision he urged that even if it be assumed that it applies to the present case since there are provisions in the Acts of 1971 and 1987 regarding heritability of the tenancy, it does not improve the case of defendant No.l. 30. In Dr. M.K. Salpekar v. Sunil Kumar shamsunder Chaudhari & Ors. By referring to this decision he urged that even if it be assumed that it applies to the present case since there are provisions in the Acts of 1971 and 1987 regarding heritability of the tenancy, it does not improve the case of defendant No.l. 30. In Dr. M.K. Salpekar v. Sunil Kumar shamsunder Chaudhari & Ors. 1988(4) SCC 21, Supreme Court reiterated its earlier view that provision of similar enactment of other States cannot be considered as an aid while interpreting a particular provision of law. Reliance was placed on behalf of the appellants on paragraph No.6 which is in the following terms :- "6. Mr. Bobde referred to several other State statutes on rent Jaw to show that similar provisions corresponding to those in sub- clause(v) are limited in operation to residential buildings. It was urged that it should, in the circumstances, be assumed that the State government while making the present Control Order also intended to limit the scope of the present sub-clause (v). There is no merit in this argument either. The list of the different State Acts prepared by the learned counsel itself shows that in four of them the corresponding provisions are applicable to both the residential as well as non-residential premises. In the remaining Acts the relevant ground is restricted to residential buildings but in clear and unambiguous terms in the body of the section itself. They are, therefore, of no help to the appellant. Besides, it is a question of policy to be adopted by the different legislatures, and it cannot be legitimately suggested that since the majority of the State legislature have followed a particular policy, the same must be presumed to be the intention of the author of the control Order in question before us. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the argument of the appellant for restricting the application of sub- clause (v) of residential buildings." 31. On the basis of Smt. Gian DeviAnand v. Jeevan Kumar & Ors. (supra) it was forcefully urged that Section 4 of the Act of 1971 will govern the present case, as such the tenancy became extinct with the death of widow of Sis Ram and, therefore, the impugned decree was liable to be set-aside. In the circumstances of this case, it is felt that this decisions fully applies to the case under consideration before this Court. In the circumstances of this case, it is felt that this decisions fully applies to the case under consideration before this Court. Reason being that Section 4 of the 1971 Act in no case can be taken to be transposed/incorporated in the 1987 Act as discussed hereinabove. Therefore, general law of succession would govern the teancy prior to promulgation of the Act of 1971 and thereafter Section 2(1 )(j) supra would govern the same. 32. In M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India AIR 1979 SC 898, Supreme Court was considering a question regarding repugnancy, of law made by the State Legislature and the Parliament in the context of Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India. What was observed and is relevant for the purpose of the present appeal is as under- "Where a law passed by the State Legislature while being substantially within the scope of the entries in the State List entrenches upon any of the Entries in the Central List the constitutionality of the law may be upheld by invoking the doctrine of pith and substance if on an analysis of the provisions of the Act it appears that by and large the law falls within the four corners of the State list and entrenchment if any, is purely incidental or inconsequential". "Where, however, a law made by the State Legislate on a object covered by the Concurrent List is inconsistent with and repugnant to a previous law made by Parliament, then such a law can be protected by obtaining the asset of the President Under Article 254(2) of the Constitution. The result of obtaining the assent of the president would be that so far as the State act is concerned, it will prevail in the State and over-ride the provisions of the Central Act in their applicability to the State only. Such a state of affairs will exist only until Parliament may at any time make a law adding to or amending, varying or repealing the law made by the State Legislature under the proviso to Art. 254." 33. In U.P. Electric supply Co. Ltd. (In voluntary Liquidation) v. R.K. Shukla & Ors. AIR 1970 SC 237 in the context of U.P. Industrial disputes Act, 1947 and its Section 6-R(2) having received assent of the President, it was held as under: - "9. Competence of the State Legislature to enact Section 6-R is not denied. In U.P. Electric supply Co. Ltd. (In voluntary Liquidation) v. R.K. Shukla & Ors. AIR 1970 SC 237 in the context of U.P. Industrial disputes Act, 1947 and its Section 6-R(2) having received assent of the President, it was held as under: - "9. Competence of the State Legislature to enact Section 6-R is not denied. Act 1 of 1957 received the asset of the President and by virtue of Article 254, (2) of the constitution Section 6-R (2) of the U.P. Act prevails, notwithstanding any prior law made by the Parliament. The provisions of the U.P. Act including Section 6-R(2) therefore apply in determining the rights and obligations of the parties in respect of retrenchment compensation. The observations to the contrary made by this Court in Rohtak & Hissar District electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P., 1966-2 Lab LJ 330=(AIR 1966 SC 1471) which primarily raised a dispute relating to the validity of certain model standing orders proceeded upon a concession made at the Bar, and cannot be regarded as decision. Since the relevant provisions of the two Acts on the matter in controversy in these groups of appeals are not materially different, we do not think it necessary in this case to refer the question to a larger Bench." 34. In M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India AIR 1979 SC 898, which dealing with a question of repugnance, it was held as under:- "Where a law passed by the State legislature while being substantially within the scope of the entries in the State list entrenches upon any of the entries in the Central List the constitutionality of the law may be upheld by invoking the doctrine of pith and substance if on an analysis of the provisions of the Act it appears that by and large the law falls within the four corners of the State List and entrenchment, if any, is purely incidental or inconsequential." 35. In the context of incorporation of Section 4 by the Act of 1971 into the Act of 1987, reliance is placed on Krishana Chandra Gangopadhyaya etc. v. The Union of India & Ors. AIR 1975 SC 1389. So far legal proposition dealt with in this decision is concerned, there is no dispute about it. As such, it does not improve the case of the appellants in any manner. v. The Union of India & Ors. AIR 1975 SC 1389. So far legal proposition dealt with in this decision is concerned, there is no dispute about it. As such, it does not improve the case of the appellants in any manner. So far observations made in this case are concerned, those, in my view, do not improve the case of the appellants. Reason is that the earlier law of 1971 having not been assented to by the President, as such it would not over-ride the provisions of general law. 36. What would be the position regarding heritability of the teancy in respect of non residential premises under Rent Acts (supra), applicable in the State, matter had been attending attention of this court also. According to Mr. Kanwar, learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiffs, since what he has urged in the present appeal as well as the matter relating to Section 1 (3)(iii) of 1987 Act and applicability of Section 4 of 1971 Act was not dealt with in any of the decisions of this court, therefore, these cases do not advance case of the defendants. Reference to these decisions is being made hereinafter. 37. In Smt. lndra Vati v. Devki Devi 1989 (1) SLC 36, petition was filed under Section 14 of 1971 Act for ejectment and for arears of rent. 1987 Act came into force during the tendency of revision against eviction order. In this Act definition of tenant was altered. Tenants widow and one of his had sons filed revision petition in this court. During the tendency of the revision, landlord also died and his legal representatives were brought on record, 1987 Act replaced 1971 Act with retrospective effect. While dealing with appliability of the provisions of Section 20) of 1987 Act; revision of the tenant was allowed on consideration of provisions of Section 4 of 1971 Act and 2(j) of 1987 Act. The case was remanded back to the trial Court. 38. In Smt. Satya Devi & Ann v. Ravinder Kumar & Ors. AIR 1990 H.P. 43, facts were that tenant of premises had died when East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 was applicable. The case was remanded back to the trial Court. 38. In Smt. Satya Devi & Ann v. Ravinder Kumar & Ors. AIR 1990 H.P. 43, facts were that tenant of premises had died when East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 was applicable. Thereafter in the year 1971 Act; 1971 came into force and during the pendency of the second appeal, (arising out of the decree passed against the daughter and son-in-law of the tenant as trespassers in the shop in question, 1987 Act came into force. Matter came up before this court in the following circumstances:- "5. Satya Devi and her husband assailed the decree against them in R.S.A. No. 161 of 1981. This appeal came up for hearing before T.R. Handa, J. of this court. The learned Judge felt that the view of law expressed by the Division bench in Dewan Chand was not correct, particularly. In view of two decisions of the supreme Court. These decisions were in the case of Damadilal v. Parashram, AIR 1976 SC 2229 and Smt. Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar, AIR 1985 SC 796. He felt that the decision in Dewan Chand called for a review. As such, he directed that the papers of the case be placed before Honble the Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench for making an authoritative pronouncement on the question whether the tenancy of Mirchu Ram could be treated to be heritable or not ? This is how the matter has come up before us." 39. After consideration of the case law. It was held as under:- "22. It is not in dispute that on January 12, 1970, when Mirchu Ram died he was a statutory tenant. Upon his death, on the definition of a tenant under the East Punjab Act, is estate became heritable by his heirs, namely, the widow and the daughter. The view that Mirchu Ram had only a personal right of possession, founded upon the rule laid down by the,Division Bench in Dewan Chand, (ILR 1980 Him Pra 333) was not correct. The correct view of law is that the tenancy of a statutory tenant, like Mirchu Ram, was heritable. The view that Mirchu Ram had only a personal right of possession, founded upon the rule laid down by the,Division Bench in Dewan Chand, (ILR 1980 Him Pra 333) was not correct. The correct view of law is that the tenancy of a statutory tenant, like Mirchu Ram, was heritable. The question whether the present appellants can claim any protection now also will have to be determined in accordance with the provisions of the 1987 Act which came into effect from November 17, 1971, that is, prior to the death of the widow of Mirchu Ram. The appeal may now be listed before a learned single Judge for final disposal in the light of the answer given by us. Answer accordingly." 40. In Kanta & Ors. v. N.K. Vyas & Mehar Chand v. N.K. Vyas 1994(2) RCR 311, after noticing Section 2(j) of 1987 Act, it was held that on the death of tenant wife of deceased becomes the tenant on the same terms and conditions. To smilar effect is the decision of this court reported in Narinder Kumar & Anr. v. Ramesh Kumar & Anr. 1994(4) SLJ 2903. 41. In Vinod Kumar v. Rajesh Kumar & Ors. AND Vinod Kumar v. Smt. Darshani Devi & Ors. 1995(1) SLC 452, a learned Single Judge of this court while considering Section 2(j), held that tenancy of commercial premises shall be governed by general law of succession. What was held" in this behalf after placing reliance on Gian Devis case supra was as under:- "12. The law laid down in Smt. Gian Devi Anands case (supra) applies in the present case on all fours. Not only the definition of tenant as given in section 2(j) of the 1987 Act is similar to that found in the Delhi Rent Control Act but admittedly there is no separate provision dealing with the inheritance of tenancy of commercial premises as in the Delhi Rent control Act. There is also similarity in both the Acts so far different treatment in respect of grounds of eviction from residential and commercial premises is concerned. There is also similarity in both the Acts so far different treatment in respect of grounds of eviction from residential and commercial premises is concerned. Therefore, following the ratio in Smt. gian Devi Anands case (supra), it is safe to hold that so far commercial premises governed by the 1987 Act are concerned the inheritance of their tenancy is governed by general law of succession and not by the 1987 Act and all the legal heirs of a deceased tenant of a commercial premises have a right to inherit his estate in respect of tenancy rights and after they step into the shoes of the deceased tenant, their eviction can be sought only in accordance with the provisions of the 1987 Act." "13. This Court further finds support from the Full Bench Judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Harish chander and others v. Kirpa Ram (supra) where the learned Judges were dealing with the definition tenant as given in Haryana Act which is similar to section 2(j) of the 1987 Act, and considering the precise question whether the rights of statutory tenant in a non-residential building in the State of Haryana are not heritable under the Haryana Act. Their conclusion was that the condition and order of inheritance of tenancy given in section 2(h) of the Haryana Act are limited in their application to a residential building only. The tenancy in respect of non-residential building in the event of the death of a tenant, devolves on the heirs of the deceased tenant, in accordance with the general law of succession applicable to the tenant and the heirs, who steps into the shoes of deceased tenant, continue to enjoy the protection of the Act." 42. To similar effect is the decision in Balwant Rai v. Surjit Singh & Ors. and Balwant Rai v. Smt. Mohinder Kaur (deceased) through her L.Rs. Rajinder Singh & Ors. 1996(2) SLC 275. 43. While referring to the definition of tenant learned Senior Counsel urged that it relates to both residential as well as "non residential premises therefore, unless, it was shown that the person was ordinarily residing with the tenant, defendant No. I can by no stretch of imagination be said to be a person entitled to inherit the tenancy under 1987 Act. 44. 44. In the light of the decisions of the supreme court and of this court, referred to hereinabove, this plea cannot be accepted. Another reason not to accept this plea is that if it was intended to make Seciton 2(j) applicable to non residential premises also, then Section 2(j) would have been couched in somewhat different language. Words "who were ordinarily residing with him at the time of his death" in section 2(j) assume significance and are in the context of residential premises only thereby it was intended to cover the cases relating to residential buildings i.e. a building which is not a non residential building. That being so, the argument urged on behalf of the plaintiff to hold that Section 2(j) (supra) covers both residential and non residential building cannot be accepted. 45. In the context of the legality and constitutional validity of Section 4 of 1971 Act, CWP 265 of 1986 was filed in this Court. This writ petition was disposed of on 15.9.1987. Since this decision, in my considered view, as well as in the context of this appeal has great significance, as such it is extracted herein below .- "In this writ petition the prayer is to declare section 4 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent control Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") as unconstitutional and to direct the second respondent not to evict and dispossess the petitioner from the house proper situate in the Lower Bazar, Shimal. The Constitutional validity of the said Section was challenged substantially on the ground that the provisions thereof were in direct conflict with and repugnant to the provisions of section 8 of the Hindu succession Act, 1956 and that the Act having not received the assent of the President could not prevail in the State in view of Article 254(2) of the constitution. Notice of the petition was ordered to issue on July 29, 1986 and affidavit(s)-in-reply was directed to be filed on or before August 16, 1986. An amendment was also permitted to be carried out in the petition on the same day. An affidavit-in-reply dated September 3, 1986, was filed by and on behalf of the first respondent (State of Himachal Pradesh), after seeking extension of time. An amendment was also permitted to be carried out in the petition on the same day. An affidavit-in-reply dated September 3, 1986, was filed by and on behalf of the first respondent (State of Himachal Pradesh), after seeking extension of time. On September 20, 1986, the Court passed an order observing, inter alia, that upon a perusal of the affidavit-in-reply the mind of the authority who had sworn the affidavit did not appear to have been applied at all to the grounds raised in the petition and to the consequences which may emanate as a result of the court issuing Rule and stay proceedings in the Subordinate Court. The State Government was, therefore, directed either to make a statement, on the next day of hearing, that they were unable to assist the challenge or file an elaborate affidavit spelling out their stand on the constitutionality of the Act. A supplementary affidavit-in-reply dated November 18, 1986, was filed by and on behalf of the first respondent thereafter containing, inter alia, the following submission :-"When the H.P. Urban Rent control Act, 1971, was enacted, the High Courts of Bomaby, Nagpur and Patna were of the view that the relationship of landlord and tenant fell under entry 18 of list II (State List) and, therefore, the assent of the President was neither required nor obtained. However, the situation has now changed in the context of law laid down in the case of V. Dhanpal Chattiar v. Yesodai Amma AIR 1979,Supreme court 1745. The law now is that the Rent Control Legislation falls under entry 6 of List III (Concurrent List and thus the assent of the President is required. That being so, and as the State Government is considering amending certain provisions of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1971 on the lines of the Model Act, being prepared by the Govt. of India; the assent of the President will be obtained on the amending Act. In case the President, assents to an Amending Act, he may be deemed to have assented to the parent Act, while assenting the Amending Act as, has been held by the Honble Supreme Court in Venkatrao v. State of Bombay, AIR 1970 Supreme Court 126." Civil Misc. In case the President, assents to an Amending Act, he may be deemed to have assented to the parent Act, while assenting the Amending Act as, has been held by the Honble Supreme Court in Venkatrao v. State of Bombay, AIR 1970 Supreme Court 126." Civil Misc. Petition No.3578 of 1986 was instituted on December 3, 1986, by and on behalf of the first respondent stating, inter alia, that in order "to resolve the legal aspect of the case", the State Government was considering the amendment or re-enactment of the Act after securing the assent of the President and that the Attorney General of India was being consulted in the matter and that four months would be required "to complete the legal process". By an order passed on December 10, 1986, the first respondent was directed to place on record on or before December 22, 1986, a report regarding the future progress, if any, made in the matter. After seeking an extension of time, the first respondent ultimately submitted a report in the form of Civil Misc. Petition No. 116 o£1987, instituted on March 10, 1987 Para 3 of the said application read as follows: "That as advised by the Attorney General of India to re-enact the H.P. Rent control Act, 1971, making it retrospective from the date it was enforced, containing provisions for validating all actions and proceedings taken under it, the draft bill has been prepared afresh, and being referred to the Govt. of India for their approval required under the law and instructions." A prayer was made the time for filing "an affidavit to the writ" be further extended by three months. The application was granted by an order made on March 16,1987. Subsequently, on two occasions, extension of time for filing the affidavit was granted as requested. An affidavit dated September 10, 1987, has been filed now by and on behalf of the first respondent placing on record the fact that the Governor of Himachal Pradesh has promulgated the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Ordinance, 1987 on August 17, 1987 after obtaining the prior assent of the President and that the obtaining the prior assent of the President and that the said ordinance has been published in the Himachal Pradesh Rajpatra on August 18, 1987. It would thus appear that the State Government has now filed the affidavit, which is to be treated as a supplementary affidavit-in- reply to the petition, stating, in substance, that Section 4 of the Act, which was challenged in the present petition, has been substituted by a new provision incorporated in the Ordinacne which has received the assent of the President and that therefore, the, challenge to the constitutionality of the said provision does not survive. Against the aforesaid background, the limited issue which was before the Court in the present case, namely, the constitutional validity of Section 4 of the Act, does not survive any longer. The writ petition is thus rendered infructuous. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition does not survive and it stands disposal of accordingly. It is clarified that the prayer with respect to the second respondent being restrained from evicting the petitioner from the house property in question cannot be entertained in the present proceedings. The petitioner may take recourse to the remedy available to him under the ordinary law of the land in that regard." 46. It was in view of the filing of thus writ and legal position, that the Act of 1987 was promulgated as noted above, which was preceded by Ordinance to similar effect. 47. Thus, keeping in view the legal position and Constitutional mandate and with a view to make the State Act to over-ride the provisions of Central Act, H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 was enacted by the State Legislature and was promulgated after it was assented to by the President of India. Besides this, Section 4 of 1971 Act speaks of the person who can retain possession of the premises after the death of a tenant under that Act. Whereas Section 2(j) of the Act by an inclusive definition makes a person ordinarily residing with the tenant to succeed to the tenancy as per this Section. This is the marked j distinction in the provisions of both the Acts. Retention of possession and heritability of tenancy are not synonymous. 48. Section 4 of 1971 Act being in direct conflict even if it be assumed that it is applicable to the present case), with Central law of inheritance and succession and the former Act having not bee assented to by the President of India in accordance with Article 254 of the constitution of India. 48. Section 4 of 1971 Act being in direct conflict even if it be assumed that it is applicable to the present case), with Central law of inheritance and succession and the former Act having not bee assented to by the President of India in accordance with Article 254 of the constitution of India. It is Central Act, i.e. Hindu Succession Act that was applicable to-the tenancy in the present case. In the face of this legal position, ratio of the decision of Gian Devis case (supra) fully covers the question of inheritance of tenancy in respect of the shop in the present case. 49. Now coming to the last contention regarding Ex.PW-1/B, the rent note having been duly proved being 30 years old. Here the provisions of Section 90 of the Evidence Act need to be extracted. 90. Presumption as to documents thirty years old - Where any document, purporting or proved to be thirty years old, is produced from any custody which the court in the particular case considers proper, the court may presume that the signature and very other part of such document, which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person is in that personss handwriting, and, in the case of a document executed or attested, that it was duly executed and attested by the persons by whom, it purports to be executed and attested." 50. Before invoking the presumption under this Section it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove that document in question has come from proper custody. It is only thereafter that presumption can be raised in favour of a document. In this case document Ex.PW-1/B is alleged to have been executed by Sees Ram in his personal capacity, according to learned Senior counsel. 51. Admittedly, plaintiffs were not owners when this document is stated to have been executed; Kulwant Rai was the person in whose favour it purports to have been executed. This could only be done by producing both Kulwant Rai as well as Sushila Devi with a view to show that how the document travelled and who executed it. What transpired when PW- 1/B was executed, at least plaintiff cannot say anything in that behalf. And there is no evidence to that effect on record. 52. This could only be done by producing both Kulwant Rai as well as Sushila Devi with a view to show that how the document travelled and who executed it. What transpired when PW- 1/B was executed, at least plaintiff cannot say anything in that behalf. And there is no evidence to that effect on record. 52. In any event even if it be assumed that the presumption is there, it is only about its existence and not of contents and signatures in the present case in view of the stand of defendants. As such existence of the document unless it strictly falls within the four corners of Section 90 (supra) presumption in relation to the contents of such a document as also to signatures on it cannot be raised. Therefore, reliance placed in this behalf by the plaintiffs on A.E.G. Carapiet v. A.Y. Derderian, AIR 1961 Calcutta 359; Salekh Chand & Anr. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1960 S.C. 283, Boddu Veeraiah & Ors. v. Aripirala Venkata Laxmamma & Ors. AIR 1968 Andhra Pradesh 276 and D. Ramanatha Gupta v. S. Razaack, AIR 1982 Karnataka 314; does not in any manner improve the case of the plaintiffs. 53. In Hazura Singh & Ors. v. Mohinder Singh & Ors. AIR 1937 Lahore 599 while considering Section 90 of the Evidence Act, it was held as under: "In relation to the entries in the bahis of the priests, the presumption-under Section 90. Evidence Act, will be permissible to the courts only if evidence is led to prove the identity, signature and handwriting of the writer; otherwise it will neither be possible to determine the age of the document nor to presume that the signature and every other part of the document alleged to be in the handwriting of a particular person is in that persons handwriting. In cases where no signatures appear on the face of the document and it is not alleged who the writer is, Section 90 will not come into play at all." 54. In Ghurahu & Ors. v. Sheo Ratan & Ors. 1981 Allahabad 3, it was held as under: "3. The submission is not without merit. The extent of presumption is laid down in the section itself. It cannot be stretched beyond it. In Ghurahu & Ors. v. Sheo Ratan & Ors. 1981 Allahabad 3, it was held as under: "3. The submission is not without merit. The extent of presumption is laid down in the section itself. It cannot be stretched beyond it. If a document is twenty years old and the court is satisfied of its proper custody it may be presumed that signature and any other part of document which purports to be in handwriting of any particular person is in that persons handwriting, that the document was executed by the person by whom it purports to have been attested. In fact section 90 dispenses with proof of document as required in Sections 67 and 68 and what is required to be done is deemed to have been done by operation of law. But the proof of signature or handwriting, does not establish that whatever is stated in document is also correct., That has to be proved not only by production of document but by proving its contents as well." 55. It was submitted on behalf of defendant No.l, and in my opinion rightly, that both Kulwant Rai and Sushila Devi should have been produced to prove Ex.PW-1/B. That having not done and in the absence of any other legal evidence to prove Ex.PW-1/B, presumption under Section 90 of the Evidence Act could not be raised. 56. Here when a reference is made to the statement of plaintiff PW-1 Devki Nandan, he has not said as to how he came into possession of Ex.PW-1/B. In this context it may also be noted that when this document was exhibited, an objection was raised which fact is noted in his statement by the trial Court. On this ground also presumption of Section 90 is not available to the plaintiffs in the instant case. 57. In this behalf it may also be appropriate to point out that creation of tenancy in favour of Sees Ram in his individual capacity by the then landlord was required to be proved as a question of fact by the plaintiffs. There is no evidence to that effect. Whether Joint Hindu Family or otherwise was the tenant is purely a question of fact arrived at by the appellate court below on examination of evidence that is there on the record as also on the basis of the provisions of law governing the same. 58. There is no evidence to that effect. Whether Joint Hindu Family or otherwise was the tenant is purely a question of fact arrived at by the appellate court below on examination of evidence that is there on the record as also on the basis of the provisions of law governing the same. 58. Therefore, plea (hat on the basis of Ex.PW- I/B it be held that tenancy was personal to Sees Ram cannot be accepted. On the other hand there is over-whelming evidence that both Sees Ram and Ram Dass were carrying on joint hindu business under the name and style of Sidhu Ram Sees Ram stands duly proved. After the death of Ram Das, his sons continued to carry on this joint hindu business with Sees Ram. 59. In this behalf it may also be noted that on the material on record it can not be said that the findings recorded by the appellate court below suffer from any infirmity so as to call for an interference in this appeal under Section 100 of C.P.C. Simply because this court may take another view on the evidence, is no ground for interference in this appeal with the findings of fact recorded by the appellate court below. Besides this it cannot be said that the view taken is not possible on consideration of the evidence. Once this conclusion is arrived at, everything urged on behalf of plaintiffs to the contrary must fail. 60. At the risk of repetition, it may be appropriate to point out here that so far Act of 1971 is concerned, it was repugnant in relation to inheritance and succession under the Hindu Succession Act. In case, it was intended to be excluded, Act of 1971 was required to be assented to by the President. It is only thereafter that benefit of Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India could be availed by the appellants. This is admittedly not the situation in the present case. Barring provisions of Section l(3)(iii) of the Act of 1987 which keeps alive Sections 4 and 29 of the Act of 1971 applicable up to the appointed day, there is nothing to save the applicability of Section 4. This is admittedly not the situation in the present case. Barring provisions of Section l(3)(iii) of the Act of 1987 which keeps alive Sections 4 and 29 of the Act of 1971 applicable up to the appointed day, there is nothing to save the applicability of Section 4. In this view of the matter, both on account of applicability of general law of succession and inheritance, as well as applicability of Section 2 (i)(j) of the Act of 1987, it has been rightly held by the appellant court below that the tenancy to have devolved upon defendant No. 1. At the time of hearing learned counsel fairly stated that if the initial tenancy is held to be of Joint Hindu Family under Hindu and Hindu Succession is also held covering the present case; then defendant No.l is entitled to inherit the tenancy. This stand is also in consonance with law. This is also what emerges from the discussion hereinabove. 61. In view of the above discussion the question Nos.2 to 4 are decided against the plaintiffs. 62. No other point is urged. 63. In view of the aforesaid discussion, there is no merit in this second appeal, which is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs. -