Judgment : This civil revision petition is directed against the judgment and decree dated 20.4.1994 rendered in R.C.A.No.705 of 1992 by the Rent Control Appellate Authority and the IV Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras thereby reversing the order of eviction dated 29.4.1992 passed by the Rent Controller and the XII Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras made in R.C.O.P.No.1111 of 1990. 2. Tracing the history of the above civil revision petition having come to be filed before this Court, what comes to be known is that the petitioner herein has filed an application before the Rent Controller and the XII Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras under Sec.10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) seeking eviction of the tenant, the respondent herein, from the premises for his own occupation wherein the subject matter is the building located at Door No.65/2, Thambayya Reddy Street, West Mambalam,Chennai-33 on grounds such as that the petitioner is the lawful owner of the said premises, a portion of which has been let out for a monthly rent of Rs.550 for commercial purposes; that the petitioner himself is the tenant in anothers building at Door No.117, Rangarajapuram Road, Kodambakkam,Chennai-24 and he is running a flour mill there and the landlord of the said premises is pestering the petitioner to vacate the premises and also filed R.C.O.P.No.758 of 1999 against the petitioner, which is pending; that at any moment, he might be asked to vacate the premises, in which event, he will have no place to run his flour mill and hence the subject matter of the petition being his own, is required for such purpose of shifting his flour mill to the premises in question in this petition; that on account of such necessity, the petitioner required the premises to be vacated by the respondent, but since he did not comply with, issuing the necessary notice, the petitioner has come forward to institute the R.C.O.P. proceedings before the Rent Controller. 3. On the contrary on the part of the respondent/ tenant though it is admitted that the petitioner is the landlord of the premises. 3. On the contrary on the part of the respondent/ tenant though it is admitted that the petitioner is the landlord of the premises. It would be submitted that the premises is a small portion measuring 12 feet × 7 feet, for which the respondent is paying a monthly rent of Rs.550 with an advance amount of Rs.10,000 already paid, in spite of this, from January, 1990 onwards, the petitioner sought for an enhanced rent of Rs.650 per month for which the respondent did not accede and only because of this reason, the eviction petition has been filed by the petitioner/ landlord under a false pretext of having been required for his personal use and occupation; that the petitioner is giving many troubles to the respondent; that it is false to allege that he is running a flour mill in some other premises; that the R.C.O.P.No.758 of 1989 alleged to have been filed by the landlord of the petitioner is a drama collusively enacted by the petitioner and the owner of the said premises and there is no truth attached to the same; that there are other portions in the premises which have been let out to third parties; that if the averments of the petition are true the petitioner could have occupied the other portion of the premises which was vacant in January, 1989, but he leased out the same to a Pawn Broker thereby proving that the ground alleged in the petition is a fabricated one without any truth attached to the same and that there is no bona fide attached to the petition. 4. The Rent Controller, based on the above pleadings by parities, having framed one point viz., whether the premises is really required for running the flour mill of the petitioner and whether the same is an acceptable one? would conduct enquiry into the matter wherein for oral evidence, both the petitioner and the respondent examined themselves as P.W.1 and R.W.1 respectively and would adduce evidence in support of their respective claims. Besides this, for documentary evidence, three documents would be marked on the part of the petitioner as Exs.P-1 to P-3. Ex.P-1 dated 24.2.1990 is the notice issued by the petitioner to the respondent, Ex.P-2 is the acknowledgment for the Ex.P-1 and Ex.P-3 is the copy of the petition in R.C.O.P.No.758 of 1989. 5. Besides this, for documentary evidence, three documents would be marked on the part of the petitioner as Exs.P-1 to P-3. Ex.P-1 dated 24.2.1990 is the notice issued by the petitioner to the respondent, Ex.P-2 is the acknowledgment for the Ex.P-1 and Ex.P-3 is the copy of the petition in R.C.O.P.No.758 of 1989. 5. On the part of the respondent, he would mark seven documents as Exs.R-1 to R-7. Ex.R-1 dated 6.8.1990 is the reply sent to Ex.P-1 notice. Ex.R-2 is the electricity receipt. Ex.R-3 dated 19.5.1990 is the copy of the complaint lodged with police by the respondent. Ex.R-4 is the receipt issued by the police on receipt of Ex.R-3 and Exs.R-5 to R-7 are the photographs and the negatives. 6. Having regard to this evidence placed on record by parties and appreciating the same in its own way the Rent Controller remarking that the petitioner/ landlord is running a flour mill in another persons premises and the owner of the said premises filed a case against the petitioner for eviction, which comes to be known from Ex.P-3 and from the said premises, the petitioner may be evicted at any moment and therefore it is quite natural that he has sought for his own premises for his personal use and occupation from the respondent, that it seems Ex.P-3 case has been registered as early as in February, 1989 itself, whereas the case in hand has been filed only on 2.5.1990 and therefore there is no point in doubting the genuineness of the case filed by the landlord of the petitioner against him and in the absence of any other reliable evidence placed on record for the other allegations of the respondent, ultimately the Rent Controller would arrive at a conclusion to accept the case of the petitioner and ordered eviction of the respondent from the premises, further giving a time of two months for the respondent/ tenant to evict the premises. 7. Aggrieved, the respondent has preferred an appeal against the said order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller before the Rent Control Appellate Authority, who had conducted his own enquiry into the matter, wherein the petitioner and the respondent were recalled and examined. Further, the petitioner marked five more documents on his side as Exs.P-4 to P-8. 7. Aggrieved, the respondent has preferred an appeal against the said order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller before the Rent Control Appellate Authority, who had conducted his own enquiry into the matter, wherein the petitioner and the respondent were recalled and examined. Further, the petitioner marked five more documents on his side as Exs.P-4 to P-8. Ex.P-4 dated 4.9.1991 is a receipt for having received Rs.3,000 and Exs.P-5 to P-8 are the rental receipts issued on different dates of the year 1993. 8. Likewise on the part of the respondent also, five more documents would be marked as Exs.R-8 to R-12. Ex.R-8, dated 18.10.1991 is the re-settlement, Ex.R-9 dated 18.9.1992 is the official communication from the Rural Development Office. Ex.R-10 is the notice dated 27.11.1993 sent by the petitioner to one Damodaran. Ex.R-11 is the reply dated 30.11.1993 to Ex.R-10 and Ex.R-12 is the photograph. 9. Having regard to the evidence placed on record before the Rent Controller and the additional evidence placed before him, upon hearing the learned counsel for both and having framed one point viz., whether the premises has been required to the landlord genuinely as pleaded? would remark that only in the further evidence adduced before the appellate authority, the petitioner revealed that he was not running one flour mill but two, that after Ex.R-9 being marked though which it came to be known that he was running yet another flour mill in Door No.162-B, Kamaraj Road,Ramakrishna Nagar, which is a deliberate suppression of fact; that however, it came to be known that he was running a flour mill only in a rented building; that it came to be established in evidence that even after filing of the Rent Control proceedings in this matter, from out of the three shops owned by the petitioner, one is used by the tenant and on 18.10.1991, under Ex.R-8, the landlord let out another premises in the same building in favour of one Gopalakrishnan. Further dissecting the case in various angles and the reasons assigned on the part of the landlord being untenable, distrusting the genuineness of the landlord in seeking the premises being evicted for his own use and occupation, the Rent Control Appellate Authority would ultimately arrive at the conclusion to hold that the ground under which the eviction is sought for on the part of the landlord is not bona fide and therefore, would ultimately allow the appeal setting aside the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller. 10. Aggrieved against the judgment and decree dated 20.4.1994, the landlord has come forward to file the above civil revision petition on certain grounds as brought forth in the grounds of civil revision petition. 11. During arguments, the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner/ landlord would narrate the facts of the case such as that the respondent became his tenant in April, 1984 on a monthly rent of Rs.550 relating to the portion of the building bearing Door No.65/2, Tambaiah Reddy Street, West Mambalam,Chennai-33 for non-residential purposes, wherein he was carrying on the business of T.V. Video and other electronics repair works; that the petitioner himself was running the flour mill at No.17, Rangarajapuram Road, Kodambakkam,Madras-24 on a monthly rent of Rs.200 and that his landlord filed R.C.O.P.No.758 of 1989 for evicting the petitioner before the Rent Controller and the XI Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras and hence the petitioner is left with no option to file the present petition for eviction of his tenant, the respondent herein, on ground of owners occupation in order to shift his flour mill business in the petitioner premises. 12. 12. Then the learned counsel for the petitioner having given the list of materials placed on record before the Rent Controller and the Rent Control Appellate Authority would submit that the Rent Controller held that the requirement of the petitioner was bona fide and true and ordered eviction of the tenant mainly based on the tenants admission in his cross-examination that the petitioner was running his flour mill in a rented premises and that the landlord of the said premises had filed R.C.O.P.No.758 of 1989 to evict the petitioner from there but the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority, who held further enquiry wherein Exs.P-4 to P-8 have been marked as additional documents on the side of the petitioner and Exs.R-8 to R-12 on the part of the tenant, in consideration of the additional materials placed on record and further taking into account the admission of P.W.1 that he was owning two flour mills and remarking that the petitioner had suppressed this fact and in further consideration of another portion having been let out to one Gopalakrishnan even prior to the filing of R.C.O.P. in this case, has arrived at the erroneous conclusion to allow the appeal filed by the tenant setting aside the eviction order passed by the Rent Controller. 13. The learned counsel would then bring out the subsequent events wherein R.C.O.P.No.758 of 1989 was allowed on 22.6.1992 and the appeal preferred by him in R.C.A.No.1055 of 1992 was dismissed on 25.7.1997 resulting in the petitioner handing over possession of the premises in which he was a tenant at Rangarajapuram Road, Kodambakkam and having removed all the machineries from there at the time of surrendering possession, they are now kept ideal without use in the house of his mother-in-law with very much hardship and inconvenience. Pointing out that the position which fell vacant in the meantime was not suitable and sufficient for running the flour mill business, the learned counsel would further point out that the law is settled that the tenant cannot dictate terms to the landlord about his bona fide requirement and would cite the following decisions: (1) Nandan Brothers and others v. Kamaladevi Chandak and others Nandan Brothers and others v. Kamaladevi Chandak and others Nandan Brothers and others v. Kamaladevi Chandak and others (1989)2 MLJ. 469 ; (2) M.K.Abdur Rashed Sahib v. A.R.Rahimunnisa Begum M.K.Abdur Rashed Sahib v. A.R.Rahimunnisa Begum M.K.Abdur Rashed Sahib v. A.R.Rahimunnisa Begum (1990)1 MLJ. 386 : (1990)1 L.W. 582 ; (3) M.P.M. Hameed Ibrahim and another v. V.S.Bagirathan M.P.M. Hameed Ibrahim and another v. V.S.Bagirathan M.P.M. Hameed Ibrahim and another v. V.S.Bagirathan (1999)1 C.T.C. 396 . (4) P.M.Kuppa Sah v. Rajaram Sah P.M.Kuppa Sah v. Rajaram Sah P.M.Kuppa Sah v. Rajaram Sah (1979)1 MLJ. 498 ; (5) Kuthalingam v. Jahir Hussain (1997)2 MLJ. 495. 14. In the first judgment cited above, it has been held: If on the facts of the case, it is found that the portions which came under the control of the landlord during the pendency of the proceedings are not sufficient to satisfy the needs of the landlord and fulfil his requirements, the Court cannot refuse to uphold the bona fide of the requirement which is established by the evidence on record. 15. In the second judgment cited above, it has been held: As stated in Annamalai & Company v. Sital Achi (1975)1 MLJ. 335: 88 L.W. 805 this Court has repeatedly taken the view that it is not for the tenant to dictate took the landlord as to which portion he must choose for the personal occupation of for the occupation of any member of his family. 16. In the third judgment cited above, it has been held: The argument of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners that the petition under Sec.10(3)(a) (iii) of the Act is not maintainable and only a petition under Sec.10(3)(c) of the Act is maintainable, as he landlord is in occupation or a portion of the very same premises,; does not appeal to be correct. In view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India referred to above V.Radhakrishnan v. S.N.Loganatha Mudaliar V.Radhakrishnan v. S.N.Loganatha Mudaliar V.Radhakrishnan v. S.N.Loganatha Mudaliar (1999)1 MLJ. (S.C.) 1: (1998)3 C.T.C. 108: (1998)3 L.W. 186.… Mere quoting a wrong provision of law cannot be a ground to deny the relief to the landlord, if the materials otherwise available on record enables him to get the relief is too well settled. 17. In the fourth judgment cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it has been held: “..…It is not for the tenant to dictate as to what should be the requirement of the landlord”. 18. 17. In the fourth judgment cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it has been held: “..…It is not for the tenant to dictate as to what should be the requirement of the landlord”. 18. In the last judgment cited on the part of the petitioner also it is held: “It is not for the tenant to dictate terms and to say that the portion now asked for additional accommodation is inadequate or insufficient for the purpose of carrying on business or for living purpose.” 19. For non-occupation of the premises which fell vacant by the petitioner, the learned counsel for the petitioner besides submitting that it is factually incorrect would further submit that even otherwise the subsequent event of the portion falling vacant will not militate the case of the landlord s has been held in V.T.Asokan v. Bowjija Begum V.T.Asokan v. Bowjija Begum V.T.Asokan v. Bowjija Begum (1998)3 L.W. 661 , S.Mariappan v. Kader Beevi S.Mariappan v. Kader Beevi S.Mariappan v. Kader Beevi and Ranganatha Mudaliar v. M.S.Yakoof Khan Ranganatha Mudaliar v. M.S.Yakoof Khan Ranganatha Mudaliar v. M.S.Yakoof Khan (1983)2 MLJ. 191 and would exhort that the tenant cannot take advantage of this situation to attribute mala fide intentions to the landlord. On such oral and written arguments submitted on the part of the learned counsel for the revision petitioners, he would ultimately pray to allow the revision petition setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority. 20. On the contrary, from the oral and written arguments submitted on the part of the learned counsel appearing on the part of the respondent/ tenant what comes to be established is that the petitioner/ landlord is making all out efforts to evict the respondent/ tenant, even adopting third degree methods resulting in a police complaint being lodged by the tenant on 19.5.1990 further issuing a lawyers notice against the threat posed with the help of his henchment for forcible eviction; that the claim of the petitioner is neither genuine nor bona fide; that just prior to filling the eviction petition in January, 1989, the landlord let our another portion, which fell vacant, to a new tenant for Pawn Brokers business; that since the appellate authority got convinced of the facts and circumstances of the case, he reversed the finding of the Rent Controller. 21. 21. The learned counsel would further bring to the notice of the Court that even subsequent to the delivery of the judgment in R.C.A. yet another shop fell vacant, which was occupied by the petitioner and even a third shop which fell vacant was let out to a fancy store and therefore the appellate authority has rightly rejected the false case projected by the petitioner totally disbelieving his evidence. The learned counsel would then point out that no relief could be granted to the petitioner in view of his admitted case that he is no longer carrying on the flour mill business in any place, that for maintaining the above petition under Sec.10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act, the revision petitioner should be carrying on business and the requirement should continue to exist till finality of the proceedings; that in the instant case, since the revision petitioner is admittedly not carrying on any flour mill business for which purpose the premises is sought for, on this very limited ground itself, the revision petition should fail; that in proper consideration of the evidence placed on record, both oral and documentary, the appellate authority has rightly concluded that the petitioner has not made out a case for eviction under Sec.10(3)(a)(iii). In support of these contentions, the learned counsel would cite the following judgments, all delivered by this Court at different points of time: (1) M/s.A.Ahmed & Co. represented by its Partner, Ashfeque Ahmed and two others v. M.Anwar Basha M/s.A.Ahmed & Co. represented by its Partner, Ashfeque Ahmed and two others v. M.Anwar Basha M/s.A.Ahmed & Co. represented by its Partner, Ashfeque Ahmed and two others v. M.Anwar Basha (1998)2 L.W. 328 ; (2) Fakir Mohideen v. Habibunnissa (Died) and others Fakir Mohideen v. Habibunnissa (Died) and others Fakir Mohideen v. Habibunnissa (Died) and others (1997)2 MLJ. 278 ; (3) K.V.C. Pandithurai v. Samrath Bibi (Died) and others K.V.C. Pandithurai v. Samrath Bibi (Died) and others K.V.C. Pandithurai v. Samrath Bibi (Died) and others 2000 T.L.N.J. 347; (4) P. Senniappan and others v. Kannammal and others P. Senniappan and others v. Kannammal and others P. Senniappan and others v. Kannammal and others (1998)2 MLJ. 278 ; (3) K.V.C. Pandithurai v. Samrath Bibi (Died) and others K.V.C. Pandithurai v. Samrath Bibi (Died) and others K.V.C. Pandithurai v. Samrath Bibi (Died) and others 2000 T.L.N.J. 347; (4) P. Senniappan and others v. Kannammal and others P. Senniappan and others v. Kannammal and others P. Senniappan and others v. Kannammal and others (1998)2 MLJ. 509 : (1998)1 C.T.C. 537 ; (5) M/s.Nataraja Trading Company represented by its Partners and others v. K.Manohar M/s.Nataraja Trading Company represented by its Partners and others v. K.Manohar M/s.Nataraja Trading Company represented by its Partners and others v. K.Manohar (1995)2 MLJ. 27 ; (6) Fakir Mohideen v. Chitraputiran (2000)2 MLJ. 131 . 22. In the first judgment cited above, the landlord applied for eviction of the tenant on ground that he is under threat of eviction at the place in which he was conducting business but later admitted that he shifted business to another premises. In such circumstances, the learned single Judge of this Court on finding that the reasons stated in the petitioner were not in existence on the date of passing the order of eviction held that the need of landlord should be genuine and bona fide and failure to establish the same will disentitle the landlord for eviction. 23. In the second judgment cited above, it has been held, It is settled law that a claim for eviction on the ground of bona fide own occupation, that requirement must be available to the landlord not only on the date of petition but it should continue to be there on the date of final adjudication of rights. If, in between the periods, there is a change of circumstance due to subsequent events, that is also a matter which should be taken into consideration by this Court. 24. In the third judgment cited above, a learned single Judge of this Court after observing that prior to pending proceedings, other buildings owned by landlord became vacant and let out to others and no explanation was given for not occupying those portions, held that the petition filed by the landlord for eviction of the tenant lacks bona fides and dismissed the same. 25. 25. In the fourth judgment cited by the learned counsel for the respondent, the learned single Judge of this Court having fund that the requirement of the landlord is no longer in existence, upheld the eviction of the tenant ordered by the Rent Control Appellate Authority. 26. In the fifth judgment cited by the learned counsel for the respondent, it has been held: It is no doubt true that it is not for he tenant to suggest which of the petitions the landlord should occupy and the sufficiency of the said portion. But it remains to be seen that in the present case, the tenant categorically stated that the portion occupied by M/s.J.Sreenivsulu and Co., fell vacant after the petition for eviction was filed and that was let out to third party on a higher rent. The landlord has not come forward with any explanation to prove that the portion which fell vacant subsequent is not fit for his occupations. As per the decisions rendered in Smt.Mahadevi v. Goutam Chand Jain Smt.Mahadevi v. Goutam Chand Jain Smt.Mahadevi v. Goutam Chand Jain 100 L.W. 612 and M/s.Variety Emporium v. Md. Ibrahim Naina M/s.Variety Emporium v. Md. Ibrahim Naina M/s.Variety Emporium v. Md. Ibrahim Naina the subsequent can be taken into consideration in the matter of considering the bona fide requirement of the landlord. This would go to show that there is a lack of bona fide on the part of the landlord in requiring the petition premises. 27. In the last judgment cited by the learned counsel for the respondent, it has been held: “Even though the power under Sec.25 of the Rent Control Act is more than Sec,115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, still this Court cannot reappreciate the evidence as if it is a second Court of first appeal. If the view expressed by the authorities below are reasonable and such a view is also possible on the available materials, simply because another view can be taken will not be a ground for interference under Sec.25 of the Act. If the authorities below have taken into consideration all relevant materials and has also followed settled legal principles uninitiated by the Supreme Court or by this Court, then the revisional powers are not to be exercised.” With this, the learned counsel for the respondent would end up his arguments praying to dismiss the above civil revision petition. 28. If the authorities below have taken into consideration all relevant materials and has also followed settled legal principles uninitiated by the Supreme Court or by this Court, then the revisional powers are not to be exercised.” With this, the learned counsel for the respondent would end up his arguments praying to dismiss the above civil revision petition. 28. In consideration of the pleadings by parties, having regard to the materials placed on record and on perusal of the written submissions and upon hearing the learned counsel for both, what is understood is that the petitioner in the above civil revision petition is the landlord of the premises in Door No.65/2, Thambayya Reddy Street, West Mambalam,Chennai-33, of which the respondent is the tenant on a monthly rent of Rs.550 making use of the same for commercial purposes, that requiring the premises for his own occupation, the petitioner filed a rent control petition under Sec.10 (3)(a)(iii) of the Act seeking eviction of the tenant from the premises on grounds that he himself is a tenant of anothers building for his flour mill business and that the landlord has filed an eviction proceeding against the petitioner seeking eviction from the said premises lying in Door No.117, Rangarajapuram Road, Kodambakkam,Chennai-24 and since the premises occupied by the respondent being the suitable place for shifting the flour mill business and on many requests made on the part of the petitioner with the respondent, since he did not come forward to concede, the petitioner had to seek remedy with the Rent Controller filing the R.C.O.P. 29. The above contention of the petitioner would be denied by the respondent/ tenant on ground that it is only a hoax that the petitioners landlord sought for eviction and filed R.C.O.P.No.758 of 1989 against him which is nothing but on mutual understanding between them in order to evict the respondent from the premises in question; that in fact, the petitioner sought for an enhanced rent of Rs.650 per month for which the respondent did not accede and only on account of this, to eject the respondent somehow or other, the petitioner was following all such tactics and foul means of troubling the respondent by disconnecting electricity, water connection etc., besides threatening forcible eviction with the help of hooligans resulting in the respondent lodging a complaint before the Police, who issued stern warning against such of the acts of the petitioner and with their interference, the amenities were restored. 30. The Rent Controller having conducted an enquiry in which both, the petitioner and the respondent would enter into the box and depose to the effect of their respective cases besides the petitioner marking three documents as Exs.P-1 to P-3. Ex.P-1 dated 24.2.1990 being the notice issued by the petitioner to the respondent. Ex.P-2 being the acknowledgment and Ex.P-3 being the copy of the petition in R.C.O.P.No.758 of 1989. Likewise, the respondent would also mark seven documents in support of his case, as Exs.R-1 to R-7, Ex.R-1 dated 5.3.1990 being the reply to Ex.P-1 notice. Ex.R.2 being the electricity receipt, Ex.R.5, dated 19.5.1990 being the copy of the police complaint. Ex.R-4 being the receipt issued by the police and Exs.R-5 to R-7 being the photographs and negatives. 31. In consideration of the above materials placed in evidence, appreciating the same in its own way, the Rent Controller having regard to the case of the petitioner that the premises was directly required for shifting his flour mill from the rented building to the premises occupied by the respondent and asserting that when the premises is required by the landlord for his own occupation. The respondent should evict the same and would ultimately decide ordering eviction of the premises. The respondent should evict the same and would ultimately decide ordering eviction of the premises. Aggrieved the tenant has preferred an appeal before the Rent Control Appellate Authority wherein five more documents would be marked on the part of the petitioner as Exs.P-4 to P-8, Ex.P-4 being the receipt for Rs.3,000 and Exs.P-5 to P-8 being the rental receipts issued in the year 1993. Equal number of documents would be marked as additional evidence by the respondents before the Rent Control Appellate Authority as Exs.R-8 to R-12, Ex.R-8 being the re-settlement. Ex.R-9 being the official communication. Exs.R-10 and R-11 being the notice and the reply and Ex.R-12 being the photograph. 32. Having regard to all these evidence made available on record, the Rent Control Appellate Authority, having framed the point whether the premises has been required to the landlord genuinely as pleaded? and finding that the petitioner did not disclose that he was running another flour mill in another premises belonging to him and this fact came to be known only on Ex.R-9 being marked in evidence, which is a deliberate suppression of fact and further remarking that even after filing of the Rent Control proceedings, the landlord let out another premises in favour of one Gopalakrishnan under Ex.R-8 and hence distrusting the genuineness of the landlord in seeking eviction of the tenant of this premises, the Rent Control Appellate Authority has arrived at the conclusion to hold that the ground under which the eviction is sought for on the part of the landlord is not bona fide and would allow the appeal filed by the respondent/ tenant setting aside the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller. 33. Aggrieved against this decision dated 20.4.1999, the landlord has filed the above civil revision petition on certain grounds as brought forth in the grounds of civil revision petition. 34. 33. Aggrieved against this decision dated 20.4.1999, the landlord has filed the above civil revision petition on certain grounds as brought forth in the grounds of civil revision petition. 34. During arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioner would try to impress upon the Court that the requirement of the premises by the petitioner is bona fide nd true and hence the Rent Controller ordered eviction mainly based on the tenants admission that he knew that the petitioner was running his flour mill in a rented premises and that the petitioners landlord had filed an R.C.O.P. to evict him from that premises; that the Rent Control Appellate Authority distrusting the bona fide requirement of the petitioner had allowed the appeal; that during pendency of the proceedings in R.C.O.P.No.758 of 1989 on appeal and revision ultimately the petitioner had also been evicted from out of the premises of his landlord and now he is keeping the machineries ideal at his mother-in-laws place without having any place to run the business. Learned counsel would also cite five judgments, in the first one of which it is held that another portion came under the control of the landlord during the pendency of the proceedings is not sufficient to satisfy the needs of the landlord and fulfil his requirement and the Court cannot refuse to uphold the bona fide of the requirement. The second, fourth and last judgments are to the effect that it is not for the tenant to dictate as to what should be the requirement of the landlord. The third judgment is for the arguments of the respondent that the petition under Sec.10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act is not maintainable and only a petition under Sec.10(3)(c) of the Act is maintainable, wherein the Court has held that mere quoting a wrong provision of law cannot be a ground to deny the relief to the landlord if the materials otherwise available on record are enabling him to get the relief. 35. 35. It would further be submitted on the part of the learned counsel for the petitioner that for non-occupation of the premises by the petitioner which fell vacant will not militate the case of the landlord as held in the judgments respectively reported in V.T.Asokan v. Bowjija Begum V.T.Asokan v. Bowjija Begum V.T.Asokan v. Bowjija Begum (1998)3 L.W. 661 , S.Mariappan v. Kader Beevi S.Mariappan v. Kader Beevi S.Mariappan v. Kader Beevi and Ranganatha Mudaliar v. M.S.Yakoof Khan Ranganatha Mudaliar v. M.S.Yakoof Khan Ranganatha Mudaliar v. M.S.Yakoof Khan (1983)2 MLJ. 191 and would further submit that the tenant cannot take advantage of this situation to attribute mala fide intention to the landlord. 36. On the other hand, from the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent, it comes to be known that the petitioner had not only let out another premises to the third party during the pendency of the Rent Control Application but also just prior to the filing of the eviction petition in January, 1989, the landlord let out another portion which fell vacant, to a new tenant for pawn brokers business, as though at that time he had no necessity to shift his flour mill from anothers premises. On the part of the respondent also, the judgments pronounced in six cases would be cited for different propositions of law of which it would be held in the first case reported in M/s.A.Ahmed & Company, represented by its Partner Ashfeque Ahmed v. M.Anwar Basha M/s.A.Ahmed & Company, represented by its Partner Ashfeque Ahmed v. M.Anwar Basha M/s.A.Ahmed & Company, represented by its Partner Ashfeque Ahmed v. M.Anwar Basha (1998)2 L.W. 328 that the need of the landlord should be genuine and bona fide and failure to establish the same will disentitle the landlord for eviction. The second judgment cited by the respondent reported in Fakir Mohiden v. Habibunnissa (1997)2 MLJ. 278 is also for the ground of bona fide claim for own occupation wherein it is held that the requirement of the landlord should not only be on the date of the petition but it continue to be there till the date of final adjudication of the right. 278 is also for the ground of bona fide claim for own occupation wherein it is held that the requirement of the landlord should not only be on the date of the petition but it continue to be there till the date of final adjudication of the right. In the third judgment cited by the respondent reported in K.V.C.Pandithurai v. Samrath Bibi K.V.C.Pandithurai v. Samrath Bibi K.V.C.Pandithurai v. Samrath Bibi 2000 T.L.N.J. 347 which is a case in which prior to pending proceedings, other building owned by the landlord has been let out to others and no explanation offered for not occupying that building is held that the petition filed by the landlord for eviction of the tenant is not on bona fide ground of own occupation. In the fourth judgment cited by the respondent reported in P.Senniappan v. Kannammal P.Senniappan v. Kannammal P.Senniappan v. Kannammal (1998)2 MLJ. 509 : (1998)1 .C.T.C. 537 it is held that the requirement of the landlord is no longer in existence and this Court has upheld the eviction of the tenant ordered by the Rent Control Appellate Authority. In the fifth judgment reported in M/s.Nataraja Trading Company v. K.Manohar M/s.Nataraja Trading Company v. K.Manohar M/s.Nataraja Trading Company v. K.Manohar (1995)2 MLJ. 27 it is held that the landlord letting out a portion of the building to another, when it fell vacant after the petition of eviction was filed with no explanation to the effect that it is not fit for his occupation and the subsequent events would go to show that there is lack of bona fide on the part of the landlord. The last judgment cited by the respondent is one reported in Fakir Mohideen v. Chitraputiran (2000)2 MLJ. 131 wherein it is held that even though the power under Sec.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, still, this Court cannot appreciate the evidence as if it is a second Court of first appeal. 37. The last judgment cited by the respondent is one reported in Fakir Mohideen v. Chitraputiran (2000)2 MLJ. 131 wherein it is held that even though the power under Sec.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, still, this Court cannot appreciate the evidence as if it is a second Court of first appeal. 37. To assess the case in hand in a nutshell, the eviction petition filed by the landlord before the Rent Controller for his bona fide requirement of the premises let out in favour of the respondent for shifting his flour mill business run in another place on being satisfied of the reasons assigned before the Rent Controller, the Rent Controller trusting the genuineness of the case of the petitioner landlord ordered eviction of the respondent from the premises which is meant for commercial purposes. It is relevant to mention that on the evidence made available before the Rent Controller, he could arrive at only the conclusion that he had arrived at. But, on additional evidence having been placed on record before the Rent Control Appellate Authority, not only in reappreciation of those evidence placed before the Rent Controller, but also in appreciation of the additional evidence placed before him, the Rent Control Appellate Authority having considered the facts and circumstances in a larger spectrum was able to arrive at the reason offered on the part of the petitioner/ landlord being not in the genuine requirement of his own purpose in spite of the fact that he was running a flour mill in anothers premises coming to be held true by both the Courts below on account of the further evidence made available to the effect that it is not the one flour mill business but yet another business of the same kind had also been carried on by the landlord in some other premises and since this fact had been suppressed by the landlord before the Rent Controller, which came to be revealed in the additional evidence placed by the respondent, the Rent Control Appellate Authority has taken serious exception of the suppression of fact and has preliminarily decided that the case of the landlord lacked bona fide. 38. 38. The Rent Control Appellate Authoritys impression regarding the genuineness of the case of the petitioner requiring the premises for his own use and occupation in sitting the flour mill business from rental premises to that of his own premises which is in occupation of the respondent got consolidated by further events came to be proved that not only during the pendency of the Rent Control Application but also just prior to filing the same, the premises owned by the landlord had been let out to third parties by the petitioner and the arguments of the Appellate Authority are pointed towards the mere denial of the same by the landlord without establishing in evidence that those two premises let out in favour of the third parties were not suitable for the running of the flour mill business of his own. Therefore, the Appellate Authority had drawn adverse inference regarding the genuineness of the requirement of the premises by the petitioner/ landlord as has held in many decisions cited by the respondent wherein it is held that unless it is established on the part of the landlord, the unsuitability of the premises let out in favour of the third parties for his business with proper explanation, the authorities are right in deciding against the genuineness of the requirement of the premises by the landlord for his own purposes. 39. Though all the judgments cited in favour of the respondent of case either connecting to the bona fides of the landlord a requirement of the premises for his own occupation or even regarding the extent of jurisdiction of this Court in the appreciation of evidence they have direct application to the case in hand and in the test held on the question of bona fides of the landlord, it must be held that the landlord has failed to come at to the expectations of the Court especially before the Appellate Authority wherein both sides have been allowed to let in additional evidence in appreciation of which in a larger spectrum than that of the Rent Controller who had only a limited scope of appreciation since all those materials have not been placed before him and therefore the Appellate Authority has every reason to differ from the conclusion arrived at by the Rent Controller. Therefore, this Court is unable to see any patent errors of law or perversity in approach so far as the decision arrived at by the Appellate Authority is concerned and hence there is no valid or tangible reason for this Court either to differ from or to interfere with the well considered and well merited judgment and decree rendered by the Rent Control Appellate Authority in this Rent Control matter. In result, the above civil revision petition fails and the same is dismissed. 40. The judgment and decree dated 20.4.1994 rendered in R.C.A.No.705 of 1992 by the Rent Control Appellate Authority and the IV Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras thereby setting aside the fair and decretal order dated 29.4.1992 made in R.C.O.P.No.1111 of 1990 by the Rent Controller and the XII Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras, is hereby confirmed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.