JYOTESH BANERJEE, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal from the appellate decree is directed against the judgement of reversal passed by Sri S. K. Mukherjee, Additional District Judge, 4th Court, Burdwan on 30/11/1979, by which he set aside the judgment and decree of dismissal passed by the trial Court, allowed the appeal and decreed the suit declaring plaintiff/respondents title to 'ga' Schedule property of the plaint. ( 2 ) BEING aggrieved by such decision, the appellant preferred the appeal. It is to be indicated here that the present Second Appeal was admitted by this Court without recording whether this Court was satisfied that the case involved a substantial question of law or not. Be that as it may, the facts and circumstances leading to the filing of the present appeal may briefly be described as follows :- the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 filed the suit for declaration of his title to the land described in the Schedule 'ga' of the plaint (hereinafter be referred as the suit land) and for permanent injunction in respect of the said suit land. The specific case of the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 was that 'ka' Schedule land measuring. 80 decimals to which the suit land appertained originally belonged to two brothers Abdul Hakim and Abdul Rashid in equal shares and they amicably partitioned the said land. Hakim got the demarcated western half whereas Rashid got the demarcated eastern half of the 'ka' Schedule land and they were in separate possession in respect of their respective portions. It was alleged that Hakim sold his demarcated western half to one Jelder by a registered sale-deed dated 11-5-53 and parted with the possession thereof in favour of the said purchaser Jeldar, who in his turn sold the said western half to Md. Hossain, father of the plaintiff/respondent No. 1, by a registered sale-deed dated 26-3-54 and put the said Md. Hossain in possession thereof. It is alleged further that Rashid who got the eastern half of the 'ka' Schedule land sold demarcated. 20 decimals of his land from the eastern most portion to defendant No. 2 by a registered sale-deed dated 12-9-56 and put him in possession thereof. Rashid however, continued to possess the other half of his land that is say. 20 decimals of land in the western side of his demarcated portion and the said. 20 decimals land is the subject-matter of the suit. Rashid however, continued to possess the other half of his land that is say. 20 decimals of land in the western side of his demarcated portion and the said. 20 decimals land is the subject-matter of the suit. It is further alleged that Rashid while in possession of the said. 20 decimals of land sold the same to the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 by a registered sale-deed dated 14-8-57 and put him in possession thereof. It is the allegation that in 1967 while the plaintiff's father was getting the suit land ploughed by his labourers, defendant No. 1 appeared and disclosed that he had purchased the suit land from Rashid and in this way he claimed his title to the suit land on the basis of his alleged purchase by a deed on 25-4-67 executed by the said Rashid along with his mother Lebachan and wife Rahila. The plaintiff/respondent contended that after the sale of the suit land to him by Rashid in the year, 1957, the said Rashid had no interest whatsoever in the suit land and his mother and wife had also no right, title and interest in the suit land. Therefore, defendant No. 1 could not by his alleged purchase acquire any interest in the suit land. In the above circumstances, the plaintiff/respondent brought the suit, for the above mentioned reliefs. The defendant No. 1 filed a written statement to contest the suit but he died during the pendency of the suit and his heirs who were substituted in place of the original defendant adopted the written statement. Through such written statement, the defence case was that the suit land belonged to Hakim and Rashid who never partitioned the same between them but for the sake of convenience they used to possess separate specific portions of 'ka' Schedule land which originally belonged to Ibrahim the father of said Hakim and Rashid. Ibrahim died leaving the aforesaid sons and also their mother Lebachan. So according to the Muslim Personal Law Hakim and Rashid inherited -/7/- annas each in the 'ka' Schedule land whereas the widow Lebachan inherited -/2/- annas. The defendant admitted that Md. Hossain father of the plaintiff purchased the share of Hakim but because Hakim had only. 35 decimals of land in 'ka' Schedule, the purchaser Md. Hossain could not acquire title to more than. 35 decimals of 'ka' Schedule land. The defendant admitted that Md. Hossain father of the plaintiff purchased the share of Hakim but because Hakim had only. 35 decimals of land in 'ka' Schedule, the purchaser Md. Hossain could not acquire title to more than. 35 decimals of 'ka' Schedule land. It was the further defence case that Abdul Rashid while in possession according to his share, namely,. 35 decimals of land in 'ka' Schedule, gifted the same to his mother Lebachan, by creating life estate by a deed of settlement dated 18-5-1944 and in this way Lebachan started to possess the said. 35 decimals of land in 'ka' Schedule along with her. 10 decimals of land which she inherited. On 12-9-56, the said Abdul Rashid along with his mother Lebachan sold. 20 decimals of land from the eastern most portion of the 'ka' Schedule land to defendant No. 2 by a registered sale-deed. On the same day, the said Abdul Rashid along with his mother Lebachan gifted the 'ga' Schedule land (the suit land) to Rohila, the wife of Abdul Rashid by a registered deed. Rohila in her part sold the suit land ('ga' Schedule land) to defendant No. 1 by registered deed and since then defendant No. 1 has been in possession of the same. The defendant also challenged the sale-deed on the basis of which the plaintiff claimed title as a paper transaction which was never acted upon. In this way defendants finally alleged that the plaintiff did not possess the suit land ever. Finally the defence case was that Lebachan and Md. Hossain were necessary parties to the suit and since they were not impleaded, the suit was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties and the same was not maintainable in the present form. ( 3 ) THE learned Munsif in his judgment in title suit No. 155/71 held that Abdul Rashid and Abdul Hakim were the sons of the admitted owner of 'ka' Schedule land portion of which as indicated above is the suit land and Lebachan Bibi is the widow of the said admitted owner. He further pointed out that the plaintiff's claim of title over the suit land that is to say 'ga' Schedule land was based on a sale-deed dated 14-8-57 (Ext. 1 (b)) executed by one of the sons, namely, Abdul Rashid. He further pointed out that the plaintiff's claim of title over the suit land that is to say 'ga' Schedule land was based on a sale-deed dated 14-8-57 (Ext. 1 (b)) executed by one of the sons, namely, Abdul Rashid. In the said sale-deed, the vendor Abdul Rashid declared through the recitals of the deed that the property in question was paternal property. He also pointed out to the evidence of P. W. 3, the father of the plaintiff who admitted that 'ka' Schedule property originally belonged to Md. Ibrahim which statement stood corroborated by the oral testimony of the P. W. 4. Considering these, the learned Munsif came to a finding that the suit land originally belonged to Md. Ibrahim so on his death Lebachan, the wife of Ibrahim inherited -/2/- annas share in the 'ka' Schedule property measuring about. 80 decimals. Therefore, he further held that Abdul Hakim got only. 35 decimals out of 'ka' Schedule land and therefore by Ext. 1, the purchaser Sk. Jeldar Rahaman would only acquire interest in respect of. 35 decimals of land. It followed that Jeldar Rahaman through the sale-deed Marked Ext. 1 (a) sold the said. 35 decimals of land to the father of the plaintiff which Sk. Abdul Hakim inherited on the death of the original owner of 'ka' Schedule land Ibrahim, his father. In this way, the learned Munsif came to a finding that on the death of original owner Ibrahim, Abdul Rashid, Abdul Hakim and Lebachan Bibi became the co-owners of the plot described in Schedule 'ka' of the plaint. The purchaser, therefore, stepped into the shoes of his vendor on such purchase and became co-owner along with others. He further held that by virtue of the registered deed of settlement dated 18-5-1944 (Ext. A (I)) Rashid wanted to create life estate in respect of the entire suit plot in favour of his mother Lebachan but Rashid had no right to settle the entire suit plot. In that way as he had only. 35 decimals of land out of 'a' Schedule property, it was further held through Ext. A (1), the settlor settled the usefructs in favour of his mother Lebachan who accepted the life estate and such life estate under the law was created only in respect of. 35 decimals of land, the share of Rashid in the suit plot. 35 decimals of land out of 'a' Schedule property, it was further held through Ext. A (1), the settlor settled the usefructs in favour of his mother Lebachan who accepted the life estate and such life estate under the law was created only in respect of. 35 decimals of land, the share of Rashid in the suit plot. So the learned Munsif found that by virtue of the deed of settlement Lebachan had life estate in respect of. 35 decimals of land and she had title over. 10 decimals of land which she inherited from her husband. The defendants through the written statement claimed that Lebachan was in possession of. 45 decimals of land out the said 'a' Schedule land without any connection whatsoever with Abdul Rashid. The learned Munsif further held that through Ext. 2, Lebachan transferred her life interest in the suit plot which she got from Rashid by the deed dated 18-5-1944 that is Ext. A (1) to Rahila. The learned Munsif further held that the materials on record were too insufficient to support oral partition on the suit plot specially when Lebachan having. 10 decimals of land in the suit plot was not a party. He further held that Hakim transferred. 35 decimals of land to Jeldar Rahaman vide Ext. 1 and by virtue of Ext. 1 (a), the plaintiffs father acquired the said interest from Jeldar Rahaman. Therefore, both the father of the plaintiff and Lebachan Bibi were necessary parties to the suit in the absence of whom no effective decree could be passed. Therefore, dismissed the suit coming to a finding that the same was bad for non-joinder of both Lebachan and father of the plaintiff and he also found that the suit as framed was bad as the plaintiff had only undivided. 15 decimals of land in the suit plot and therefore was not entitle to a relief as prayed for. Therefore, dismissed the suit coming to a finding that the same was bad for non-joinder of both Lebachan and father of the plaintiff and he also found that the suit as framed was bad as the plaintiff had only undivided. 15 decimals of land in the suit plot and therefore was not entitle to a relief as prayed for. ( 4 ) THE learned appellate Court in Title Appeal No. 54/79, by the judgment impugned dated 30-11-1979 held that although Ibrahim, father of Hakim and Rashid was the admitted original owner of 'ka' Schedule land, the materials on record clearly proved that there was an amicable partition amongst the heirs of Ibrahim in respect of 'ka' Schedule land and by virtue of which Hakim and Rashid, got separate portions, the former having alloted the demarcated western half and the latter having allowed the demarcated eastern half of 'ka' Schedule land and Lebachan having no further share therein. In order to arrive on such a conclusion, the learned Judge heavily relied on the statement made in the pleadings of the parties, specifically, the statement made in paragraph 1 of the plaint categorically alleging that 'ka' Schedule land belonged to two brothers Hakim and Rashid and that by amicable partition Hakim got the western half whereas Rashid got the eastern half of the same and the admission made by the original defendant No. 1 which were subsequently adopted by the substituted defendants in paragraph 7 of the written statement that 'ka' Schedule land indeed belonged to two brothers Hakim and Rashid who were in possession thereof. He also pointed out to a statement made in paragraph 13 of the written statement that the 'ka' Schedule land was the ejmali property of Hakim and Rashid but for convenience of possession they used to possess separate portions. The learned Judge has further pointed out that contrary to the above admission, the defendants pleaded that suit land belonged to Ibrahim and it was inherited by Hakim, Rashid and their mother Lebachan and they were in ejmali possession thereof. The learned Judge has observed rightly that the defendants in this way have put forward two absolutely inconsistent cases which were mutually destructive. The learned Judge further pointed out that C. S. Khatian was not produced by either of the parties, DW 1 Sk. The learned Judge has observed rightly that the defendants in this way have put forward two absolutely inconsistent cases which were mutually destructive. The learned Judge further pointed out that C. S. Khatian was not produced by either of the parties, DW 1 Sk. Golam Ambia son of defendant No. 2 admitted in his evidence that name of Lebachan was not recorded in the C. S. Khatian. He further admitted that Hakim used to possess the western half of the same whereas Rashid used to possess the eastern half, and their lands were demarcated by ails (ridges ). The learned Judge also noted that during the R. S. Khatian (Ext. C), Lebchan was not recorded as having any interest in the 'ka' Schedule land. The learned Judge then considered the deed of settlement (Ext. A (1) on the basis of which Abdul Rashid gifted his interest in 'ka' Schedule land to his mother in life estate. In the judgment impugned, it was noted that in the said deed originally both Rashid and his brother Hakim wanted to gift the entire 'ka' Schedule land to their mother and the deed was so scribed but subsequently Abdul Hakim backed out and so the name of Abdul Hakim was penned through, in such deed of settlement. It was claimed there that 'ka' Schedule land belonged to Abdul Rashid and his brother Hakim. Learned Judge rightly pointed out that the deed of gift was accepted by Lebachan but there was no material on record that Lebchan at any point of time raised any protest against the recital of the said deed. The learned Judge also considered the sale-deed dated 11-5-1953 (Ext. 1) by virtue of which Jeldar, the predecessor-in-interest of Md. Hossain, purchased the western half of 'ka' Schedule land from Hakim. In this deed Abdul Hakim categorically stated that he was the owner of western. 40 decimals of land in the 'ka' Schedule. The learned Judge thereafter considered the deed of settlement dated 12-9-1956 (Ext. 2) which was executed by Abdul Rashid and his mother Lebachan in favour of the wife of Abdul Rashid,, Rohila Khatoon. In this deed Abdul Hakim categorically stated that he was the owner of western. 40 decimals of land in the 'ka' Schedule. The learned Judge thereafter considered the deed of settlement dated 12-9-1956 (Ext. 2) which was executed by Abdul Rashid and his mother Lebachan in favour of the wife of Abdul Rashid,, Rohila Khatoon. The learned Judge noted that in such deed Rohila was given life interest in the disputed land but from the recital of the said deed it transpires that Lebachan did not claim any independent title in respect of any portion of the 'ka' Schedule land but she claimed her limited interest therein as conferred on her by Rashid by the deed of settlement dated 18-5-1944 (Ext. A (1) ). The learned Judge also mentioned plaintiff's own title deed (Ext. 1b) wherein his vender Abdul Rashid asserted that he was the absolute owner of the suit land. Considering all these, facts and circumstances and also evidence on record, the learned Judge came to a finding that although 'ka' Schedule land originally belonged to Ibrahim and on his death it was inherited by his sons Hakim and Rashid and his widow Lebachan, but there must be an amicable partition through which the 'ka' Schedule land came to Hakim and Rashid, former having got the demarcated western half and the latter having got the demarcated eastern half of the same. But Lebachan was not given any share in the said plot. The learned Judge further observed that the Lebachan relinquished the disputed land in favour of Rohila and from the sale-deed by virtue of which, the plaintiff claimed title to the suit land (Ext. 1b) indicated that Rahila relinquished her life estate in the disputed land in favour of her husband and Abdul Rashid came to a possession of the disputed land as the full owner unencumbered with the life estate either of Rahila Khatoon or of Lebachan pointing out that the relinquishment of life estate which confers the right to enjoy the property only without vesting the corpus could be effected orally. The learned Judge further observed that the sale-deed (Ext. 1b) where Abdul Rashid was the vendor and through which the plaintiff acquired title over. The learned Judge further observed that the sale-deed (Ext. 1b) where Abdul Rashid was the vendor and through which the plaintiff acquired title over. 20 decimals of land of 'ka' Schedule land which is the suit land was challenged by the defendants as fictitious one but they could not adduce any cogent evidence to support their contention. He noted in the judgment that even the learned trial Court found that said sale-deed was executed by Rashid in favour of the plaintiff for valuable consideration. In this way, the learned Judge came to a clear finding that 'ka' Schedule land belonged to Hakim and Rashid in equal shares and by an amicable partition Rashid got the demarcated eastern half of 'ka' Schedule land and the plaintiff by his purchase from Rashid acquired title to the entire 'ga' Schedule land and the learned Judge also accepted the finding of the learned Munsif that the plaintiff was in possession of the 'ga' Schedule land. The learned Judge further found that Md. Hossain acquired title to the western half of 'ka' Schedule land which before the transfer belonged to Hakim. The said western half was demarcated and Md. Hossain after his purchase began to possess his demarcated western half. So Md. Hossain had nothing to do with the demarcated eastern half of 'ka' Schedule land including the suit land described in 'ga' Schedule. ( 5 ) ON the above findings, the learned Judge clearly held that the suit as framed was perfectly maintainable and the same was not liable to be dismissed for defect of parties as held by the learned Munsif. Thereafter , he allowed the appeal and decreed the suit. ( 6 ) NOW, at the time of hearing of the appeal only point on which the learned Advocate for the appellant wants to challenge the judgment impugned is that it is not a proper judgment for reversal. For this purpose, the learned Advoacte for the appellant has relied on a very old judgment of this Court, in the case of Anukul Chandra Bhattacharjee v. Surendra Nath Bhattacharjee reported in (1939) 69 Cal LJ 431 : (AIR 1939 Cal 451 ). According to the submission of the learned Advocate a similar question cropped up before the Division Bench for consideration. According to the submission of the learned Advocate a similar question cropped up before the Division Bench for consideration. On going through such reported case, it transpires that the High Court set aside the judgment passed by the firist appellate Court, on a clear finding that the learned Judge of the lower appellate Court omitted to consider what the trial Court did not consider, namely whether witnesses were interested and howfar their evidence would stand the test of consideration in the light of probabilities and gave a clear finding that the learned Judge of the Court below did not consider the evidence in all its aspects as the learned Munsif did. But it is not the same case here. As I have already noted that the learned Munsif dismissed the suit mainly on a finding that Lebachan and the father of the plaintiff are necessary parties and no effective decision could be given in their absence. The learned Court below reversed that finding and clearly held that the suit plot described in Schedule 'ka' of the plaint on the death of the original owner became the exclusive property of two brothers as stated above and in coming to such a conclusion assigned sufficient reasons which disclosed that the learned Judge examined the pleadings of the parties evidence on record both oral and documentary and the other necessary circumstances. So it cannot be said for a moment that the learned Judge did not consider the material points in all its aspects as in the case of Anukul Chandra Bhattacharjee v. Surendra Nath Bhattacharjee (supra ). The learned Advocate has also referred the case of Pankaj Bhargava v. Mohinder Nath (1991) 1 SCC 556 , wherein the Apex Court has clearly observed as follows (para 8) :- 'what is a substantial question of law would certainly depend upon facts and circumstances of every case and if a question of law had been settled by the highest Court of the country that question however important and difficult it may have been regarded in the past and however large may be its effect on any of the parties, would not be regarded as substantial question of law. " here following above quoted decision, it can be said that non-consideration of a material points which are absolutely necessary for coming to a decision on a particular point is no doubt a substantial question of law which would depend upon facts and circumstances of every case. I should mention here a recent decision of the Apex Court, Iswar Das Jain v. Sohan Lal reported in (2001) 1 SCC 434 in that reported case, the Apex Court has very clearly stated that there are two situations in which the interference with the findings of the fact is permissible. The first one is when material or relevant evidence is not considered which, if considered would have led to a opposite conclusion. Second situation is in which interference with findings is permissible is where a finding has been arrived at by the appellate Court by placing reliance on inadmissible evidence which it omitted, opposite conclusion was possible. In the instant case, it has been clearly seen from the judgment impugned that the learned Judge in coming to the conclusion that the suit was not bad for defect of parties or there was no defect in the framing of the suit did not place any reliance on any inadmissible evidence. On careful consideration I do not find anything where from it can be said that the learned Judge failed to consider material or relevant evidence. On the other hand, I find that at the very outset, the learned Judge considered the case made out in the pleadings of the respective parties and the admission made by the defendants in the written statement and also pointed out the inconsistency found in the defence case and thereafter proceeded to consider the case in the light of the pleadings and also on the basis of the evidence on record. It is well settled that in the Second Appeal, High Court should not substitute the finding of the Court below with its own finding unless there is absence consideration of material evidence as noted above. ( 7 ) IN the result, I hold that the instant Second Appeal must fail. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed but since the respondent has not appeared and contested, I make no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.