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2001 DIGILAW 409 (CAL)

Safik Khan v. Eastern Coal Field Ltd.

2001-07-10

Ajoy Nath Ray, S.N.Bhattacharjee

body2001
JUDGMENT The Court : This is an appeal preferred by a private person from a judgment and order passed in execution on the 2nd of November, 1998 refusing relief to the said appellant/plaintiff. 2. He had obtained an award and a judgment in terms of the award in or about the year 1994 and thereafter had succeeded in obtaining an order of attachment passed by one of us (Justice Ajoy Nath Ray when sitting singly) on the 10th of February, 1998 attaching a sum of Rs. 2,90,000/- in the State Bank of India, Asansol. Parties have not objected (understandably) to us hearing the matter. 3. In the tabular statement of the execution application which was dismissed in the court below it was prayed that a sum of Rs. 2,80,468/- be paid over to the plaintiff in satisfaction of the perfected award. 4. Execution was refused on the sole ground that this High Court was not the proper court with territorial jurisdiction to entertain the reference matter. It was opined that although the Eastern Coalified Ltd., the respondent in the appeal, does carryon business within the territorial limits of this Court, admittedly, at No. 13, R.N. Mukherjee Road, yet the registered office, and therefore, the principal office, of the respondent is at Dhanbad; accordingly, no part of the cause of action having arisen within the local limits of our court, this court lacked jurisdiction. 5. This point found favour with the Hon'ble Judge in the court below, although it had been taken for the first time, at the very last point of the proceedings, i.e. when the application for execution has been made for payment over of a sum which was already lying attached. 6. We are of the opinion, in accordance with settled authorities, that a basic and unanswerable point of jurisdiction can be taken even at the very last stages of execution, but we are also of the opinion, for reasons explained hereafter, that the point of jurisdiction taken in the instant case by the respondent, Eastern Coalfields, was an unsound one. 7. Before we deal with this point, we are compelled to dispose of an application for stay of hearing of appeal filed before us by the respondents. Mr. Roy appearing for the respondents has pressed the application in all seriousness; Mr. 7. Before we deal with this point, we are compelled to dispose of an application for stay of hearing of appeal filed before us by the respondents. Mr. Roy appearing for the respondents has pressed the application in all seriousness; Mr. Dutt appearing for the appellant has resisted the application as being unmeritorious and unmaintainable, although his client did not choose to file any affidavit-in-opposition. Indeed, in our opinion, the point is one of law, and no facts are needed from the side of Mr. Dutt's client, which could in any way help the court. More facts, if any, might come from the side of the respondents, but we have to deal with the petition as it stands today. 8. The petitioner proceeds on the basis that the Eastern Coalfields now is within the purview of section 16 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, commonly called the BIFR Act. It is stated in paragraph 4 of the petition that the respondent made an application to the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction under section 15 of the BIFR Act sometime in June 2000; it is further stated that an enquiry is pending before the BIFR. Mr. Roy submitted that the State Bank of India has been appointed as the operating agency. 9. Apart from these statements and submissions there is no other paper on record, and none significantly which has issued from the BIFR. 10. But even on the basis of this scanty, if not non-existent, material, Mr. Roy makes bold to have the appeal appropriately adjourned; and to pray before us that the decision on merits as to the local jurisdiction of this Court cannot and should not be given now. 11. The strength of Mr. Roy's client, no doubt a public undertaking of great importance, lies not in documents, and materials or reports and enquiries, either concluded or even seriously commenced, but in the language of section 22 of the BIFR Act. 12. The said section is a matter of great importance, not only in our litigation but in many others. The strength of Mr. Roy's client, no doubt a public undertaking of great importance, lies not in documents, and materials or reports and enquiries, either concluded or even seriously commenced, but in the language of section 22 of the BIFR Act. 12. The said section is a matter of great importance, not only in our litigation but in many others. It is usually submitted that by operation of that section, if and only if the BIFR merely touches a reference to itself, of an industrial undertaking supposedly sick, all legal proceedings, wherever pending, at whatever stage might those be, involving whatever stakes, will be automatically stayed, without the court, be it the High Court, be it even the Supreme Court, having any option in the matter, or having any permission even to address its mind to the controversy between the parties. 13. This indeed is a very great and grave result. It puts, in effect, a letter written under section 15 of the BIFR Act to the Board, and its receipt by an officer of the Board, at a pedestal higher than the entire judiciary, recognized and enshrined in our Constitution. 14. In our brief experience we have never come across the like of it. Various types of legal proceedings are entertained by various civil courts. There are suits, there are arbitration proceedings, there is winding up, there are writ proceedings, there are various proceedings under various special Acts, but if section 22 is to be given the meaning it is usually canvassed as possessing, then and in that event, all these proceedings will come to a halt, upto even, may be, a period of seven years, if a single letter is addressed, say, by a Company Secretary under section 15 of the Act and it is received, say, by the Secretary of the BIFR. 15. These results are surprising and shocking. In our opinion, unless the clear and unambiguous words of section 22, the purpose of Act and the binding authorities compel us to conclude, that the above is inescapably the appropriate and legal result, we should not give away to such conclusions which place one administrative department of the Central Government even above the Supreme Court. 16. Let us now examine the wording of section 22. 16. Let us now examine the wording of section 22. Under sub-section (1) the basic scheme is that: "Where an enquiry under section 16 is pending or any scheme under section 17 is under preparation, or an appeal under section 25 is pending, no winding up, execution or suit against the industrial company shall lie or be proceeded with further, except with the consent of the Board or the appellate authority". 17. There are various ramifications within the said sub-section, and it is easily available, if the full text is needed. But what we have quoted above, is the gist and soul of that sub-section. It is this basic element in the subsection which requires our interpretation. 18. Sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 22 are also equally important, although not exactly in the facts of this case, but certainly in the matter of interpretation which we have to make and give. Under sub-section (3) of section 22 it is provided that "Where an enquiry under section 16 is pending or any scheme referred to in section 17 is under preparation, a Board may by order declare with respect to the sick industrial company that the operation of all contracts or other instruments to which such company is a party shall remain suspended or that the rights arising thereunder, shall be enforceable in such manner as may be specified by the Board." 19. This sub-section refers to specific declarations by the Board regarding suspension of rights which might be had by any person in India (or even abroad) as against the sick company. 20. Under sub-section (4) it is provided, especially under clause (a) that "Any declaration shall have effect notwithstanding anything, and accordingly any remedy for the enforcement of any right and all proceedings relating thereto pending before any Court, Tribunal, Officer or other Authority shall remain stayed or be continued subject to such declaration;". 21. Mr. Roy referred us to the Supreme Court decision given in the case of Tata Davy Ltd., reported at 1997 (6) Supreme Court Cases, page 669. 22. 21. Mr. Roy referred us to the Supreme Court decision given in the case of Tata Davy Ltd., reported at 1997 (6) Supreme Court Cases, page 669. 22. It was decided in that case that even if the suspension caused by the BIFR Act has the effect of suspending the recovery of certain items under State Acts which are particularly within the State domain in List II, even then, the mere suspension of such recovery does not make the provision of section 22 either bad or inapplicable. 23. In paragraph 8 of the said judgment, referring to the Vallabh Glass case, the Court said as follows: "Since the enquiry under section 16 was ordered by the said Board, this court said, the various proceedings set out under section 22(1) of the Central Act were deemed to have been suspended." Again in paragraph 12 of the Tata Davy judgment the Court said as follows: "In the larger interest of the industrial health of the nation, section 22 of the Central Act requires all creditors seeking to recover their dues from sick industrial companies in respect of whom an enquiry under section 16 is pending or a scheme is under preparation or consideration or has been sanctioned to obtain the consent of the said Board to such recovery." 24. From the above two observations of the Supreme Court it can be seen that there is, inbuilt within sub-section (1) of section 22 a basic ambiguity. 25. The important words are that "No proceeding shall lie or be proceeded with except with the consent of the Board." 26. It is not a case of absolute prohibition. It is not that once an enquiry has started, no suit can be filed or be proceeded with.' Suits can be filed or proceeded with, but only with the consent of the Board. 27. Now, “be proceeded with” is in passive voice; which is the appropriate subject of this passive phraseology? If the dictum of the Supreme Court with reference to Vallabh Glass Works in paragraph 8 of the Tata Davy case is accepted, then the subject of this passive phrase is the Court itself; the full wording of section 22, would then, in effect be, that the suit or proceeding shall not be proceeded with by the court, even if the plaintiff or the applicant should pray for further proceeding with it. 28. 28. If, on the other hand, the true view is, as is mentioned in paragraph 12 of the Tata Davy case, then the subject of this passive voiced phrase is the applicant; or the plaintiff himself, and not the Court. The full meaning of section 22, in this alternative interpretation, would be, that the suit or proceeding shall not be proceeded with by the plaintiff, or the applicant, even if the court might permit it. 29. Mr. Roy gave us the case of Mithilesh Kumari, reported at 1989 (2) Supreme Court Cases page 95. He submitted from the phrasing of section 4 of the Benami Prohibition Act that no suit “shall lie” must mean that the suit itself is prohibited. No doubt the words “shall lie” are used in the Benami Act, as is involved here. The Board can give consent to the filing of the suit or the continuance of the suit as it might choose. Thus, neither a suit, nor the continuation of a proceeding, is absolutely barred under section 22 subsection (1), but is dependent upon the will of the Board to give consent or withhold it. 30. In our opinion, the passive voiced phrase of section 22 refers to the litigant, and not the Court itself. We reach this conclusion because of the primary factors indicated at the beginning of this judgment, viz., the ouster of a court's jurisdiction, to entertain or proceed with an appropriately framed legal proceeding, is not to be inferred, except in the cases of the most compelling and clear language employed by Parliament. 31. We are thus of the opinion that the mere pendency of an enquiry under section 16 of the BIFR Act does not prohibit the court either from entertaining a suit or from continuing with a proceeding. 32. The effect of sub-section (1) is to cause a prohibition to be faced by the proposed litigant or the continuing litigant, in his personal capacity. The Court is in no manner bound by that personal prohibition which attaches to the litigant himself. In other words, in our case, the appellant Safik Khan is under an embargo under sub-section (1) of section 22 from pressing his execution application, but the appeal Court is under no such embargo. 33. The point immediately arises, does this interpretation not rob section 22(1) of all its content? In other words, in our case, the appellant Safik Khan is under an embargo under sub-section (1) of section 22 from pressing his execution application, but the appeal Court is under no such embargo. 33. The point immediately arises, does this interpretation not rob section 22(1) of all its content? What is the use of a personal embargo upon an individual litigant, if he can nonetheless proceed with his legal proceeding? The answer to these questions must be understood with reference to the Act and the surroundings in which the Act was enacted. It is not that in every case, the litigant will be a private individual as the appellant. The claimant might be a statutory authority. It might be a Nationalised Bank. It might be the Tax Department. It might be the Customs Authorities, or it might be a host of other undertakings, which are usually not expected to act against another parallel Government Department; if the Board is considering rehabilitation of a company with large income tax dues, the Revenue might well be stopped, by methods other than express court orders, form recovering the arrear dues of the sick company. So also with, may be, unpaid excise duty. A Nationalised Bank might, because of an embargo under 22(1), refrain from approaching the Debt Recovery Tribunal on its own and as per joint decision of different Government Departments. These are not small matters to be discarded and these, even if those were to stand alone by themselves, would provide the sub-section with such sufficient content, that our interpretation could not be said to have robbed it of all its value and efficacy. 34. In the manner we have ventured to interpret sub-section (1) of section 22, the prohibition against filing of proceedings, and proceeding with already filed legal proceedings, would be a prohibition upon the prosecutor, or the litigant himself, and it would not be a bar upon the Court. We have opined, that in spite of the bar not extending to the Court, the prohibition under sub-section (1) is not rendered totally otiose. There are several Government undertakings operating in India today, also semi-government ones, which have within their control, large financial resources. It is often that a presently sick industrial undertaking is heavily indebted to these public financial, or semi-financial institutions. There are several Government undertakings operating in India today, also semi-government ones, which have within their control, large financial resources. It is often that a presently sick industrial undertaking is heavily indebted to these public financial, or semi-financial institutions. Similar is the case with the statutory debts owed by the sick undertakings to several statutory bodies, the two primary ones amongst those being Income-tax and Central Excise. 35. The prohibition contained in sub-section (1) would stop these institutions from levying execution or distress, or proceeding with their recovery proceedings against a sick undertaking. It might be said, that if this be the only effect of sub-section (1), then this could be easily achieved by departmental communications, and by the Government organisations themselves, holding back their actions in regard to sick industrial undertakings, until those should be given a chance to recover under the supervision of the BIFR. There was no -necessity for Parliament to enact, then. 36. This argument suffers from a double logical flaw. First, if an undertaking, which is not a Government fair and square, (for which the period of limitation is much more than 7 years,) does not file a legal proceeding inspite of being entitled to file it, limitation will start to run. It will not do, after the lapse of the period of limitation, to come to court and say that, well, to give the sick undertaking a chance to revive and to give them some breathing time, we did not file our proceeding earlier. This plea is not a plea at all as far as the Limitation Act is concerned. However, if that public financial undertaking obeys the prohibition of sub-section (1) of section 22, and does not institute, say a suit, even within three years, sub-section (5) of section 22 will stop the period of limitation from running. Parliamentary intervention was needed to achieve this end. Accordingly, the interpretation that we put upon sub-section (1) of section 22 is not totally without content, but is meaningful, since a regional purpose and meaning can be attached to subsection (1). Our interpretation is a possible one, and it does not suffer from the vice of robbing a statutory provision of all its meaning. Accordingly, the interpretation that we put upon sub-section (1) of section 22 is not totally without content, but is meaningful, since a regional purpose and meaning can be attached to subsection (1). Our interpretation is a possible one, and it does not suffer from the vice of robbing a statutory provision of all its meaning. Secondly, the withholding of action by a public institution, cannot be done by officers in power as they choose; in the present day circumstances, if a high-up officer whimsically or erratically fails to recover debts, and institute proceedings which should be instituted, for such recovery, then and in that event, the normal reaction will be, not to ascribe such inaction on the part of the high officer to whims or error alone, but suspicion will arise; there will be suspicion, that the debtor is being given time because the high-up officer in power has received illegal gratification under the table from the indelated concern. Accordingly, without the prohibition of sub-section (1), public financial institutions will be compelled to file proceedings for recovery of debt, whether the sick industrial undertaking is under consideration of revival by the Board or not. This gives a second meaning to sub-section (1). 37. Although in this case we are at the stage of the very threshold, and at best the BIFR has merely touched the Eastern Coalfields for consideration of its revival, and may be, if we accept the submissions from the Bar without any documents, has appointed the State Bank of India as the Operating Agency, yet, there will be cases where the BIFR proceeding has gone further. There will be cases, where declarations have been made under sub-section (3) and where the scheme of revival is already under operation. 38. In those circumstances, institution and continuance of proceedings against a sick undertaking will not be controlled and checked by sub-section (1), but in such cases the control will be by sub-section (4). 39. The words of sub-section (4) also have to be looked at by us in interpreting sub-section (1). Otherwise our interpretation would remain incomplete, and given without reference to the entirety of the Act, specially the parts of the Act other than sub-section (1) which are relevant to it and connected with it. 40. 39. The words of sub-section (4) also have to be looked at by us in interpreting sub-section (1). Otherwise our interpretation would remain incomplete, and given without reference to the entirety of the Act, specially the parts of the Act other than sub-section (1) which are relevant to it and connected with it. 40. If the BIFR starts an enquiry today, and makes a declaration under sub-section (3) in regard to a scheme after three months, it would not be right to say, that for the first three months the prohibition against recoveries from the sick undertaking partakes of one particular quality, and after three months, when the declaration is made, the prohibition becomes qualitatively different or more stringent. If we were to make an interpretation in those lines, we would be encouraging a scramble for recovery immediately upon start of enquiry, until the declaration under sub-section (3) should come. That cannot be a practical or a. wise interpretation. We, therefore, have to look necessarily at the language of sub-sections (3) and (4) also. 41. The main operative words of these sub-sections we have set out above. These words are, that when a declaration is made under sub-section (3), notwithstanding any other law, “Accordingly any remedy for enforcement shall remain stayed, or be continued subject to such declaration.” 42. It is specifically mentioned in sub-clause (a) of sub-section (4) that the stay shall be in regard to any remedy for enforcement before any Court also. Under the proviso to sub-section (3) the period of the declaration might continue upto seven years. 43. Various decisions have been reported on the BIFR Act but not all of those have been cited before us. The words of the sub-sections of section 22 have been interpreted to include proceedings of practically any and every type. Suits have been included by interpretation, execution proceeding have been included by such interpretation also. In so far as the type of the proceeding is concerned, the wording of section 22 is indeed very broad. But again, the point arises as to what is the meaning which should be ascribed to the phrase, that “According to the declaration” of the Board “Any remedy for enforcement before any Court shall remain stayed.” 44. These are the most important and operative words. But again, the point arises as to what is the meaning which should be ascribed to the phrase, that “According to the declaration” of the Board “Any remedy for enforcement before any Court shall remain stayed.” 44. These are the most important and operative words. The words say that according to the declaration of the Board, any remedy for enforcement of, say, a money debt, shall remain stayed in any Court. 45. Let us test for the proper meaning of this proposition. For such test, let us take an extreme hypothetical example. Suppose a private citizen has filed a suit in the High Court; it is decreed by a learned Single Judge; the decree has been upheld in appeal; after grant of SLP, the decree has been upheld by the Supreme Court; in an execution proceeding an order has been passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court again; such order might be for attachment, or sale; the execution order has been upheld in appeal; upon grant of SLP an appeal is pending before the Supreme Court. 46. At this juncture, the BIFR makes a declaration which is so wide as to cover the debt which is being sought to be recovered by the private person. Would that declaration, made by the Board, a department of the Government, have an automatic effect of staying the execution proceeding before the Supreme Court, even if the court should be of the opinion that the justice of the case requires that the private party be paid? 47. This is the question we have to answer. The gravity of the question will not be sufficiently appreciated if we think of a District Court or City Civil Court or the High Court. We have to think of the Supreme Court. The interpretation to be put by the Courts must be in this light, that according to their reading of section 22, a Government department can make a declaration which has the effect of stopping, without anything more, a proceeding before the Supreme Court also. It is not an Act staying actions, it is a departmental order only, which stays the Supreme Court action. Can that be? 48. It is possible that even an Article 32 petition will be a remedy for enforcement of a citizen's fundamental right affecting a sick undertaking adversely financially. It is not an Act staying actions, it is a departmental order only, which stays the Supreme Court action. Can that be? 48. It is possible that even an Article 32 petition will be a remedy for enforcement of a citizen's fundamental right affecting a sick undertaking adversely financially. If we are to give sub-section (4) its possible widest meaning, the Article 32 petition could be stayed by the BIFR as per its declaration. The proposition has only to be stated, and immediately the answer is, that this simply cannot be. 49. There is no illogic in this obvious answer. The simple way to understand sub-section (4) is, that just as the passive phraseology of sub-section (1) prevents the litigant from proceeding without the proceeding, if the litigant should be so minded to aid the BIFR in its revival process, so also, the language of sub-sections (3) and (4) require, the litigant to obtain a stay of his proceeding before any court, either by a simple adjournment, or by a conditional adjournment depending upon when the declaration of the Board will lose its restraint or hold upon proceeding against the sick undertaking. 50. In our example of the execution proceeding before the Supreme Court, it would be open to the litigant i.e. the plaintiff to come and submit before the Hon'ble Court, that kindly stay the proceeding, as we do not wish to proceed against the financial interest of a sick undertaking. Such prayer will come from the Government undertakings and public financial bodies. They are supposed to act in unison with the Board, but such prayers will never come from private persons who are keen to recover their money, and continue with their business, and not become insolvent, because of alleged public purposes being thrust upon them. 51. The quality of prohibition contained in sub-section (1) and sub-section (4) are, therefore, identical. The prohibition is personal, and in its operation, basically extra curial. Such personal prohibition might be translated into the actual stay of Court proceeding, if and when the person having the carriage of proceeding, prays for a stay before the Court concerned, and succeeds in getting an adjournment or a stay. The prohibition is personal, and in its operation, basically extra curial. Such personal prohibition might be translated into the actual stay of Court proceeding, if and when the person having the carriage of proceeding, prays for a stay before the Court concerned, and succeeds in getting an adjournment or a stay. However, it is ultimately for the Court to decide whether it will or will not grant a stay, and in so far as the court itself, is concerned, the prohibition of sub-sections (1) and (4) of section 22 do not squarely apply, and the court itself is under no prohibition against proceeding with pending litigation. 52. We have been shown various decisions including our Division Bench decisions, but since an interpretation of this nature has never earlier been ever argued or considered, with the greatest of respect, we are of the opinion, that we are not breaking any rule of precedent when we lay down the above law and the above interpretation. 53. Let us see now in our case whether the justice of the case requires that we stay the execution proceeding because of the BIFR proceeding. 54. We find absolutely no reason why because, Eastern Coalfields might have become sick, a private individual, who does not deal with any public money, should be compelled to stay his hands for a long time, may be extending to seven years, and thus face financial hardship. In our opinion, the public authorities have no right to ride rough shed over the rights of small citizens like this, who might have entered into some comparatively small business relationship with huge public undertakings. These huge public undertakings are welcome to become more huge, they are welcome to do business, but they are not welcome to do it at the cost of private citizens. We have stated that by an attachment order a small sum of a little under Rs. 3 Lakh is lying attached. If the execution proceeding is today allowed, this sum of money would be paid over to Mr. Dutt's client. It is perhaps nothing to Eastern Coalfields, but we cannot opine that it is a similar mere nothing to Mr. Dutt's client. 3 Lakh is lying attached. If the execution proceeding is today allowed, this sum of money would be paid over to Mr. Dutt's client. It is perhaps nothing to Eastern Coalfields, but we cannot opine that it is a similar mere nothing to Mr. Dutt's client. It is our considered opinion, that in general, no court should stay for the sake of B.I.F.R. considerations, any proceeding, filed at the instance of a purely private person, and intended to be continued by him, when there is no tinge or smell of public money in the business and working capital of the private litigant concerned. 55. We therefore refuse the application of Eastern Coalfields for stay of the appeal, and dismiss it' with costs. 56. We enter into the merits of the appeal. 57. This takes a very short time indeed. The execution proceeding failed in the Court below because of a point of local jurisdiction. It was said, that Eastern Coalfields might be carrying on business within the local limits, of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of this Court, at No. 13, R.N. Mukherjee Road, but since the Eastern Coalfields is a company, as per section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, its place of residence is only at its principal office i.e. its registered office. 58. That registered office is at Dhanbad. Therefore, this Court has no jurisdiction. 59. A Division Bench judgement of our High Court was relied upon by the Hon'ble Judge in the Court below. However, under section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure, section 20 does not apply to a chartered High Court like ours. The Letters Patent (which means, in plain English, open letters), sent at that time from the monarch of England, has attained, after the passing of our Constitution, the status of the least an ordinary Act of Parliament, if not something even higher. We need not bother about the higher status, if any, for the present. 60. Under our Letters Patent, as per clause 12, carrying on business by the defendant within jurisdiction has always given local jurisdiction to our Court. Section 2(c) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 has always been held to be at par with ordinary suits, thus allowing this Court to function as the Arbitration Court, if the defendant should carryon business within, even if it be not the principal place of business. 61. Section 2(c) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 has always been held to be at par with ordinary suits, thus allowing this Court to function as the Arbitration Court, if the defendant should carryon business within, even if it be not the principal place of business. 61. The Division Bench judgement relied upon in the Court below, reported at 1998(2) CLT page 453 no doubt lays down, that for section 2(c), residence of the defendant is not a proper consideration, but that, a part of cause of action must arise within our local limits. 62. Be that as it may, the judgment in the case of Food Corporation of India vs. Evdomen Corporation, reported in (1999) 2 SCC 446 , clearly lays down that in regard to the Letters Patent, applicable to the High Court of Bombay (and therefore, we conclude, Calcutta), residence of the defendant in reference, would not necessarily be material for founding jurisdiction. In that case, the principal office of the appellant was situated at Delhi. But since the appellant carried on business in Bombay too, the Bombay High Court would have jurisdiction. This was clearly stated by the Supreme Court and one need merely look at the last sentences of paragraphs 2 and 8 of the report to appreciate this. 63. Therefore, the point of lack of jurisdiction taken by the Eastern Coalfields Ltd. is unsustainable. We are of the opinion that this type of super technical point should not be taken by a public undertaking, in any event. 64. The appeal, therefore, succeeds. The judgment and order in appeal is set aside. The execution application of the appellant also succeeds. There shall be an order in terms of column 10 of the Tabular Statement. No receiver need be appointed just now. However, liberty to apply is preserved. The sum of money lying attached at the Assansol Branch of the State Bank of India shall be handed over to the Advocate-on-record of the appellant, who will hand over the same to Mr. Dutt's client, in the usual manner, as between the Attorney and client. Mr. Dutt's client would be entitled to costs of the appeal and costs in the court below, both to be added to his claim. Money to be handed over by the Bank within four weeks from date hereof. 65. Stay of operation of our order is prayed for is refused. 65. Mr. Dutt's client would be entitled to costs of the appeal and costs in the court below, both to be added to his claim. Money to be handed over by the Bank within four weeks from date hereof. 65. Stay of operation of our order is prayed for is refused. 65. The prayer made, for certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court, is also refused, on this ground, that although the question we have decided might be one of general importance, yet, unless there are very many conflicting decisions of the High Courts, we should not, on our own, burden additionally an already superburdened Supreme Court. 67. Appeal and the application are thus disposed of. 68. Xeroxed certified copy of this judgment be supplied expeditiously, if applied for. 69. All parties, the State Bank of India, Assansol Branch, and all others concerned, are to act on a signed copy of this judgment on the usual undertakings to have the order perfected. Ajoy Nath Ray, J. S. N. Bhattacharjee, J. Appeal succeeds.