Judgment :- V.S.Sirpurkar, J.: This appeal is filed against the order of the learned single Judge, whereby the writ petition filed by the appellant is dismissed. In that writ petition, the petitioner had challenged the action of the respondent in suspending his licence under ‘C’ Form for a period of 30 days. 2. There was a surprise inspection of the Krishna Theatre which is in Palanichettipatty owned by the appellant on 27.11.1992 at 4.30 p.m. and it was found that excess fare was collected from some of the spectators and though 346 persons were found occupied in the first class, tickets were issued only to 35 persons. From this, it was adduced that the intention of the appellant was to evade entertainment tax. However, this was compounded under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Entertainments Tax Act, 1939 by making the payment of Rs.1,500. On the basis of this compounding, however, the Collector had initiated action under Sec.9(1) of the Tamil Nadu Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1955 and suspended the ‘C’ Form Licence for 30 days. Since there is no appeal provided against the suspension order passed under Sec.9(1) of the Tamil Nadu Cinemas (Regulation) Act, the appellant/ petitioner filed the writ petition. The main ground urged was that the action was taken without issuing the show-cause notice. The respondent took a stand that since the action was taken only on the basis of the admissions made by the appellant, there was no question of issuing any show-cause notice. The Department also pointed out that there were flagrant breaches on the part of the appellant and such flagrant breaches were also admitted by the appellant and, therefore, there is no question of giving any show-cause notice. 3. The learned single Judge relying on the Division Bench judgment reported in Sri Kamatchi Theatre v. District Collector, Madurai (2000)2 L.W. 255 took the view that there was no necessity even for a show-cause notice. The learned single Judge also relied on the law laid down by the Apex Court in Dharmarathamakara Raibahadur Arcot Ramaswamy Mudaliar Educational Institution v. Educational Appellate Tribunal (1999)7 S.C.C. 332 and took the view that it is always necessary to issue a show-cause notice to give an opportunity to the aggrieved party to submit his explanation, before any final order is to be passed. But when the final order is to be passed only on the basis of the admissions of the aggrieved party himself, then there would be no need to issue any show-cause notice. The learned single Judge, therefore, took a view that there would be no necessity to issue show-cause notice as contemplated under Sec.9(2) of the Tamil Nadu Cinemas (Regulation) Act, before passing any order under Sec.9(1) of that Act, particularly, where such order is based on compounding of the offences or violations by the licensee. However, taking into account that there was lapse of time all these years, the learned single Judge reduced the period of suspension from 30 days to 10 days. It is the judgment which is being challenged before us in the present appeal. 4. At the outset, the learned counsel Mr.Muthukumarasamy brought to our notice the provision which was introduced by the Tamil Nadu Act 48 of 1987videSec.9(2-A). The provision is as under: “No licence shall be revoked or suspended under Sub-sec.(1) or Sub-sec.(2) unless the licensee has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against such revocation or suspension”. The learned counsel says that the very nature of this provision is for safeguarding the principles of natural justice and the language of the provision suggests that it is a mandatory provision. The learned counsel points out that even if it is admitted fact that the offences or irregularities committed by the licensee under the Tamil Nadu Entertainments Tax Act, 1939 are compounded or the licence is convicted of an offence under Sec.7 or 8 of the Act, there could still be circumstances, on consideration of which, the concerned authority could still use its discretion regarding the suspension or, as the case may be, cancellation of the licence. The learned counsel was at pains to point out that there is a subtle difference in between Sub-sec.(1) of Sec.9 and Sub-sec.(1-A) of the some punishments while under Sub-sec.(1) the last words are: “the licence may be revoked or suspended by the licensing authority by an order in writing”, in case of Sub-sec.(1-A), the concerned words are: “the licensing authority shall, by an order in writing, revoke the licence”. It is obvious therefore, that in Sub-sec.(1) itself there is a discretion left with the concerned authority, which discretion is not available to the authority in the eventualities covered by Sec.9(1-A). It is obvious therefore, that in Sub-sec.(1) itself there is a discretion left with the concerned authority, which discretion is not available to the authority in the eventualities covered by Sec.9(1-A). Once there is a discretion which is apparent from the language of the Section, as in this case, then such a discretion will have to be read along with the provision under Sub-sec.(2-A), which is a specifically introduced provision. The provision under Sub-sec.(2-A) is an in built mechanism for assuring that the concerned authority does not act arbitrarily or in a capricious manner or in a biased manner. We have also noted that there is no appeal against the action under Sec.9(1) or 9(1-A). Such appeal which is provided videSec.9-A is only against the action under Sub-sec.(2) of Sec.9. In the absence of a statutory appeal, the provision of Sec.9(2-A) which provides an injunction against an authority from taking any action of revocation or suspension of the licence becomes all the more prominent and assumes much more importance than what it ordinarily would have. This factor of absence of a statutory remedy against the action of suspension or the cancellation of the licence puts us on guard and it is for this reason that we are of the firm opinion that the authority is bound to issue a show-cause notice at least, to assure this minimum guarantee against the arbitrariness. We are unable to agree with the learned single Judge when the learned single Judge says that even such notice is not necessary. We have carefully seen the ratio laid down by the Division Bench in Sri Kamatchi Theatre v. District Collector, Madurai (2000)2 L.W. 255 where the Division Bench has come to the conclusion that a detailed enquiry may not be necessary in case where the action is contemplated under Sec.9 (1). However, in paragraphs 61 and 62, the Division Bench to which the learned single Judge was a party has also reiterated upon the importance of giving the notice. Reading the decision fully, the service of show-cause notice, seems to have been held as the sine qua non for an action by the authority for suspension or revocation. However, in paragraphs 61 and 62, the Division Bench to which the learned single Judge was a party has also reiterated upon the importance of giving the notice. Reading the decision fully, the service of show-cause notice, seems to have been held as the sine qua non for an action by the authority for suspension or revocation. The following words would throw some light: “61……As already pointed out, there has been compounding of the offences under Sec.15 of the Entertainment Tax Act and based on that compounding, further action is taken under Sec.9(1) and therefore, as provided in Sec.9(2), a show-cause notice alone is sufficient, and it is not necessary to hold a detailed enquiry as has been held by Dinakaran, J. We agree and approve the view taken by S.S.Subramani, J. as against the view taken by Dinakaran, J.” 62. Inother words, we hold that when once the lincensee is permitted to compound the offence, which means that there exists a pre-existing conviction (sic.) or order of composition which does not require any further enquiry and it would be sufficient to issue a show-cause notice as provided in Sub-sec.(2) of Sec.9. We also make it clear that when the petitioners themselves had concedingly admitted the irregularities by compounding the offences, nothing more is required to hold that the petitioner or their managers or agents or attorneys have violated the licensing conditions, and no further enquiry is warranted for an action being taken under Sec.9(1) of the Tamil Nadu Cinemas (Regulation) Act and the authority is well justified in passing an order after issuing the show-cause notice”. 5. The Division Bench, therefore, has at least not dispensed with the necessity of issuing a notice under Sec.(2-A) and, if that is so, then the provision which is a mandatory provision, has been observed only in its breach in the present case. The learned single Judge has relied on the judgment reported in Dharmarathamakara Raibahadur Arcot Ramaswamy Mudaliar Educational Institution v. Educational Appellate Tribunal (1999)7 S.C.C. 332 . This was a case under the service jurisprudence. It did not involve a statutory provision as we have shown its existence in the present case. The Apex Court in their decision has held that there would be no necessity for an enquiry if the allegations against the concerned delinquent person were admitted. This was a case under the service jurisprudence. It did not involve a statutory provision as we have shown its existence in the present case. The Apex Court in their decision has held that there would be no necessity for an enquiry if the allegations against the concerned delinquent person were admitted. The Supreme Court in that case was not on the breach of a mandatory statutory provision, as Sec.9(2-A) in the present case. We are afraid that we are not in a position to agree with the learned single Judge as the learned single Judge has not taken into consideration the mandatory nature of Sec.9(2-A). According to us, the law stated by the Apex Court is not applicable to the present controversy. 6. We are not able to agree with the observation and finding by the learned single Judge on the basis of the Division Bench judgment. The Division Bench has not at any point of time or anywhere in the judgment dispensed with the mandatory provision under Sec.9(2-A). What has been held is that there need not be a detailed enquiry and nothing more. We have already pointed out the necessity of the notice under Sec.9(2-A) in view of the discretion available to the authority under Sec.9(1) in sharp contradistinction of Sec.9(1-A) where there is no such discretion. According to us the learned single Judge has gone beyond the law stated by the Division Bench. He had only to consider as to whether not giving a notice under Sec.9(2-A) was fatal. We are of the firm opinion that it is fatal. 7. We would, therefore, set aside the judgment of the learned single Judge and allow the appeal. However, we hasten to clarify that it will be open for the authorities to give a fresh notice since we do not find any provision regarding limitation for issuing the notice. Consequently, the connected C.M.P. is closed.