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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2001 DIGILAW 413 (MP)

Kabra Drug Ltd. v. Appellate Authority for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction

2001-05-10

J.G.CHITRE, SHAMBHOO SINGH

body2001
Judgment ( 1. ) THE impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge has been assailed in this L. P. A. Shri P. M. Choudhary placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Mangalbhai v. Dr. Radhyshyam AIR 1993 SC 806 . By placing reliance on the ratio of this judgment, Shri Choudhary submitted that the learned Single Judge was in error in treating the writ petition filed by the appellant as under Article 227 of the Constitution of India instead of treating it in view of Article 226. In the said judgment, the Supreme Court has observed : "[in our opinion] where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution, and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226. " (p. 808) The Supreme Court further held while quoting the observations of the Supreme Court in the matter of Umaji Keshao Meshram v. Smt. Radhikabai AIR 1986 SC 1272 that : "where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution, and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal, the court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226,. . . " (p. 1273) ( 2. ) SHRI P. M. Choudhary also placed reliance on the judgment of the Single Bench of this court in the matter of Kavayan and Co. , Indore v. Addl Asstt. Commissioner of Sales-tax, (sic) this Court held by quoting the observation of the Supreme Court in T. C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa AIR 1954 SC 440 that : "as is well known, the issue of the prerogative writs, within which certiorari is included, had their origin in England in the kings prerogative power of superintendence over the due observance of law by his officials and tribunals. The writ of certiorari is so named because in its original form, it required that the king should be certified of the proceedings to be investigated and the object was to secure by the authority of a superior court that the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal should be properly exercised. These principles were transplanted to other parts of the kings dominions in India during the British days. The three chartered High Courts of Calcutta/bombay and Madras were alone competent to issue writs and that too within specified limits and the power was not exercisable by the other High Courts at all. The language used in Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution is very wide and the power of the Supreme Court as well as of all the High Courts in India extends to issuing of orders, writs or directions including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, prohibition and certiorari as may be considered necessary for enforcement of the fundamental rights and in the case of the High Courts, for other purposes as well. In view of the express provisions in our Constitution, the court need not now look back to the early history or the procedural technicalities of these writs in English Law, nor feel oppressed by any difference or change of opinion expressed in particular cases by English Judges. It can make an order or issue a writ in the nature of certiorari in all appropriate cases, and in appropriate manner, so long as it keeps to the broad and fundamental principles that regulate the exercise of jurisdiction in the matter of granting such writs in English Law. " (p. 440) ( 3. ) IN the same judgment, this court held that: "the supervision of the superior court exercised through writs of certiorari goes on two points. One is the area of inferior jurisdiction and the qualifications and conditions of its exercise; the other is the observance of law in the course of its exercise. These two heads normally cover all the grounds on which a writ of certiorari could be demanded. Certiorari may and is generally granted when a court has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. . . . " (p. 441) ( 4. These two heads normally cover all the grounds on which a writ of certiorari could be demanded. Certiorari may and is generally granted when a court has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. . . . " (p. 441) ( 4. ) SHRI Choudhary submitted that the learned Trial Judge has failed to note that the facts of the present case were sufficient enough to allow him to grant a writ of certiorari to correct the decisions given by BIFR which was confirmed by AAIFR. But the learned advocate has failed to note that the learned Judge has quoted two paragraphs from the judgments of BIFR and AAIFR for recording his conclusion in respect of the writ which was heard by the learned Single Judge. He has quoted the paragraphs from the judgment of BIFR as" bench after careful consideration of all the facts have concluded that the company (KDL) have systematically manipulated their financial accounts for over a number of years. Their accounts cannot be relied upon and balance sheets do not reflect a true and fair picture of the companys financial position. The promoters have also deliberately misled the Bob (Bank of Baroda) in the process. As the promoters have approached the Board with unclean hands, and the companys accounts are unreliable, companys reference is rejected as non-maintainable. " ( 5. ) WHILE quoting the judgment from the AAIFR, the learned Single Judge has pointed out that : "bifr has also come to the conclusion, on the basis of record, that KDL inflated its figures of the profits and obtained finance from Bob by inflating the value of stock and presenting the misleading profit figures. KDL has not rebutted these findings. It is further seen from BIFRs order dated 26-10-1999 that a specific charge was made that some debtors are not genuine. The learned counsel for KDL has not brought any evidence or arguments to rebut this allegation. In view of the above discussion, we do not see any error in BIFRs conclusion that KDLs accounts are not reliable and do not reflect a true and fair picture of its financial position. We do not see any reason for interference in the impugned order. The appeal is dismissed. " ( 6. In view of the above discussion, we do not see any error in BIFRs conclusion that KDLs accounts are not reliable and do not reflect a true and fair picture of its financial position. We do not see any reason for interference in the impugned order. The appeal is dismissed. " ( 6. ) THE learned Single Judge goes on further observing in his judgment that" it is with this background and the finding, the question that arises is, whether a case, much less, prima facie case is made out by the petitioner for admission of this writ under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. " ( 7. ) LEARNED Single Judge further held that "learned counsel for the petitioner mainly attacked the findings of two authorities on facts, on the ground that no adequate opportunity to rebut some of the reports filed by Bob was granted, that not appointing OA, but appointing Bob as co-ordinating agency, resulting in prejudice. These were the basic submissions which were elaborated in the arguments with reference to the relevant sections of the SICA. " The learned Single Judge thereafter concluded that the petitioner did not make out a ground for admission of the writ petition. He further pointed out that "it is well settled that the jurisdiction of this court under Article 227 of the constitution, is confined to only jurisdiction issues arising out of the impugned orders. In other words, this court not being the Second Appellate Court sitting over the order of First Appellate Court (AAIFR), cannot appreciate the factual issues. " He held that in his opinion, the observations of BIFR and affirmed by AAIFR on the conduct of petitioner in manipulating their accounts and in holding that the accounts were not thus reliable and binding on him. He pointed out that he can neither ignore these findings, nor can [he] set them aside in the writ jurisdiction. He held that those were the findings arrived at by these two authorities which were based on appreciation of facts and documents filed by the parties which obviously include balance sheets of the petitioner on the basis of which the declaration was sought. He held that those were the findings arrived at by these two authorities which were based on appreciation of facts and documents filed by the parties which obviously include balance sheets of the petitioner on the basis of which the declaration was sought. Indeed, the task of BIFR and that of AAIFR is essentially to examine the genuineness of the balance sheet filed by the petitioner with a view to find out, whether a case of declaration to be of sick industry is made out or not ? The learned Judge further held that his Court was not to decide the submissions in isolation, but was to see the entire factual scenario with a view to see whether such submission has some substance or not ? He concluded that every case has to be tried and decided on its own facts. Thus, he dismissed the writ without admission. ( 8. ) SHRI Choudhary pointed out in his submissions that it was necessary for BIFR to make an inquiry, and for that, it was essential for the BIFR to appoint independent agency for satisfying itself whether the industry in question should be treated as sick industry. The record shows that a proper inquiry was made by BIFR. AAIFR has also considered the relevant factors while affirming the judgment and order of BIFR. ( 9. ) THE tone and texture of the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge does indicate that he has considered all facets of the matter. The BIFR has also considered all facets of the matter. The necessary inquiry" has also been made in the case. Therefore, the BIFR was not wrong in appointing Bob as necessary agency. ( 10. ) THUS, the facts of this case do not attract the provisions of Article 226. We do not find anything wrong in the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge and the L. P. A. has to be dismissed without admitting it for final hearing. ( 11. ) DISMISSED.