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2001 DIGILAW 42 (MAD)

T. Fenn Walter v. E. Padmanabhan

2001-01-12

K.SAMPATH, N.K.JAIN

body2001
Judgment : 1. One T. Fenn Walter and 13 other Advocates, practising in the High Court and Subordinate Courts in the State of Tamil Nadu, have filed this writ petition as Public Interest Litigation with the allegation that the appointment of a sitting Judge of this Court as President of the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Pondicherry for a period of five years vide G.O.Ms.No.2, Civil Supplies Department, Pondicherry dated 21.5.1999 is bad and he has to vacate his office as Judge of this Court. In this writ petition they seek for the issuance of a writ of quo-warranto that the abovementioned sitting Judge of this Court has no authority to hold the judgeship of this Court after his appointment as President, State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Pondicherry, (hereinafter referred to as the 'Commission') as he ceased to hold the office of Judgeship, in view of Article 217(1) of the Constitution of India. 2. The grievance of the petitioners is that even after his appointment as President of the Commission, the first respondent continues functioning as a Judge of this Court, which is contrary to constitutional scheme, independence of judiciary and impartial dispensation and administration of justice. It is further stated that previous incumbents accepted such posts only after vacating the office as Judge of High Court. 3. Ms R.Vaigai, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, made an elaborate argument at times vehemently, and cited various decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court and made us to look into various provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') and also relevant Articles of the Constitution of India. 4. Commencing her argument, she argued that the appointment to the Office of the President of the Commission is made by the State Government as per Section 16 of the Act and therefore, there existed a relationship of master and servant between the State Government and the President of the Commission. She contended that though the proviso to Section 16(1) of the Act states that no sitting Judge of a High Court shall be appointed except after consultation with the Chief Justice of High Court, it will not, in anyway sanction the holding of two judicial posts simultaneously. Referring to proviso to Article 217(2) of the Constitution of India, she contended that when a Judge accepts another office he should quit his previous post. Referring to proviso to Article 217(2) of the Constitution of India, she contended that when a Judge accepts another office he should quit his previous post. She contended that the State Commission is a regular statutory body having regular posts and that it decides disputes between the parties forming a part of the judicial system and as such, the appointment as President of the Commission cannot be equated to the appointment made under the Commission of Inquiry Act. To this proposition, she relied upon the decision in Alok Kumar Roy v. S.N.Sarma, AIR 1968 SC 453 . Relying heavily upon the decision in Chandrakumar v. Union of India, AIR 1997 SC 1125 she contended that members of the Tribunals could not claim to be equal to the Judges of High Courts since the latter hold a high constitutional office. Placing reliance upon the decision in R.K. Jain v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 1763 she contended that as per the dicta laid down in the above case, unless the office of President of a Tribunal is for a longer tenure, a High Court Judge will not be inclined to accept such a post whereas in this case, the first respondent is appointed for a period of five years which would imply that he ceased to hold the office of the Judgeship. 5. Referring to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Advocates on Record Association v. Union of India, 1993 (4) SCC 441 and its opinion in the Special Reference No.l of 1998 1998 JT (7) SC 307 wherein the law laid down was to the effect that even in the appointment of Judges, the executive should have no say, learned counsel contended that a sitting High Court Judge cannot be allowed to function as a servant of the State Government though with a statutory status. Pointing out that under the Indian Constitution, the judiciary is absolutely independent and insulated from any kind of interference from other two limbs, viz.. the Executive and the Legislature, she deplored that the State Commission is a forum subordinate to the High Court subject to the power of superintendence and therefore, an incongruous situation eroding a fair dispensation of justice has occurred in this case warranting interference of this Court. 6. the Executive and the Legislature, she deplored that the State Commission is a forum subordinate to the High Court subject to the power of superintendence and therefore, an incongruous situation eroding a fair dispensation of justice has occurred in this case warranting interference of this Court. 6. Learned counsel relied upon a critical analysis made by Grenville Austin in Working A Democratic Constitution/the Indian Experience with particular reference to Keshavananda Bharati's case in Chapter 11. She submitted that the basic structure of the Constitution could not be compromised at any cost. Learned counsel made her attack sharpened on the point that this is not the case as if the first respondent is lacking in any qualification, but he has compromised the office of the High Court Judge. She submitted that in this case, a perusal of records would reveal that the Judge concerned has vacated Judgeship by his own actions and thus seemed to have ceased to hold the office of a Judge and, therefore, the issue at hand will not attract Article 217 read with Article 124 of the Constitution which provide for the removal of a Judge only by the President. She contended that the commission is composed of three members and a situation may arise when two non-judicial members can over-rule the decision of the President. She relied upon the decisions in Majumdar v. Union of India, AIR 1995 SC 693. Union of India v. Pratiba Banerjee, AIR 1995 SC 693. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1997 SC 1125 , K.S. Haja Sheriff v. Governor of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1985 Mad. 55 (FB) to substantiate her case. According to her, we have to go by the conventions and we cannot subvert the Constitution. 7. The learned counsel made particular reference to paragraphs 41, 42, 43-end, 48, 78, 81, 88, 8.63, 8.64, 8.65, 89, 93, and 95 to 97 in Chandra Kumar's case, AIR 1997 SC 1125 ; paragraphs 5, 66, 70, 74 and 76 in R.K.Jain's Case, 1993 (4) SCC 119 ; paragraphs 74, 81,322, 324, 331, 336 and 351 in Second Judge's case, 1993 (4) SCC 441 as also paragraphs 429, 433 and 477 in the majority view of the same case; and paragraphs 37, 96, 100, 219, 304 and 434 in S.R.Bommai and others v. Union of India and others, 1994 (3) SCC 1 . 8. 8. Before dwelling into the question to be decided, it will be appropriate to know how the appointment of President of the Commission came into existence and how the President has to function as per the provisions of the Act. 9. The Consumer Protection Act has been in force from 1986. In most of the states, the practice prevalent was appointment of a Forum at the State / divisional level or appointment of the district Judge as Ex-Officio Chairman of the District Forum. On account of that, many consumers, who had smaller grievances to ventilate were not able to go to the divisional headquarter, and the Judicial Officers, who had been given additional duty to act as Chairman of the District Forums under the Act, were not able to sit to work everyday. As a consequence, the District Forum sat only once a week. The inflow of cases was more than the disposal. The District Fora were not able to give their full attention to the complaints. In those circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Common Cause A Registered Society v. Union of India 1992 (1) SCC 707 passed the following order: "We direct that within two months from today, every district shall have a District Forum which would be presided over by an exclusively appointed Judicial Officer in terms of the prescription of the statute In such districts only, where the minimum monthly load is not above 150 consistently for a six months period, it would be open to the State Government with the concurrence of the High Court to continue a sitting District Judge to do this work. But the District Judge should devote attention to complaints under the statute on three alternative days of every week which would mean that he should be sitting as a Consumer court on three days a week. We do not intend to divert judicial attention from normal work by our order and if the High Court is of the opinion that this would affect the normal judicial work, it is open to the High Court not to agree to this arrangement and that would mean that in those areas, the State Government will have an obligation to appoint a whole time Judicial Officer". 10. We have also perused the original files called for from the Registry and the materials available. 10. We have also perused the original files called for from the Registry and the materials available. We find that a similar situation arose in Pondicherry with regard to the appointment of the President. State Consumer Redressal Commission. The terms o: appointment with regard to salaries and other allowances, as set out, in Rule 6 of the Pondicherry Consumer Protection Rules, 1987 apparently were not attractive and many retired Judges, when approached, were not willing to take up the assignment. In those circumstances, the present arrangement came into effect. It would be relevant to extract the communication from the Government of India, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, New Delhi addressed to the Under Secretary, Law Department Government of Pondicherry, which runs as follows: "Sir,- I am directed to refer to the Government of Pondicherry's letter No.F.422/Adv/98-LD dated the 6th April, 1999, intimating therein about the decision of the U.T. Government as to the appointment of Justice E.Padmanabhan, Judge, Madras High Court, as President, State Commission under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, with the prior approval of Chief Justice of that High Court. In view of above, the President is pleased to request Justice E.Padmanabhan, Judge, Madras High Court, to function as the President, State Commission, Pondicherry, under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, in terms of the high Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of Service) Act, 1954. The time spent by Justice E. Padmanabhan, Judge, Madras High Court in the performance of the above functions will count as Actual Service within the meaning of para 11(b)(i) of Part-D of the second schedule to the Constitution of India read with Section 2(1)(c)(i) of the High Court Judges (Salaries and C/S) Act, 1954. Justice E. Padmanabhan, Judge, Madras High Court, will not be entitled to any remuneration for the above work except travelling allowance and daily allowance as admissible under the High Court (Travelling Allowance) Rules, 1956. Yours faithfully S.D/- (P.N. Singh) Under Secretary to the Government of India." 11. Accepting the appointment, the first respondent mentioned above is discharging his functions in the said post and also simultaneously continuing as Judge. Under these circumstances, the petitioners are before this Court as stated above challenging the appointment and the continuance of the first respondent working as a High Court Judge after 21 .5.1999. 12. Accepting the appointment, the first respondent mentioned above is discharging his functions in the said post and also simultaneously continuing as Judge. Under these circumstances, the petitioners are before this Court as stated above challenging the appointment and the continuance of the first respondent working as a High Court Judge after 21 .5.1999. 12. No doubt, this Court in an appropriate case can issue direction in the Public Interest Litigations when there is a violation of the Fundamental Rights or touching the conscience of the Court. But at the same time, it cannot be used for personal gain or mere publicity or with political motive. 13. Upon giving our earnest consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel and on perusing the materials available and taking into consideration the settled position of law laid down in the decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court cited before us and upon going through the relevant provisions of the Act and the Constitution of India, touching the point in issue, in our considered opinion, we feel the following points emerge for consideration. (1) Whether the writ petition is maintainable? (2) Whether any direction can be issued that the first respondent ceased to be the Judge of the High Court on his assuming the office of the President of the Forum, in exercise of the discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India? 14. Point No. 1: It is settled that writ of quo-warranto is an extraordinary remedy and a citizen invoking a writ of quo-warranto, must satisfy the Court inter alia that the office in question is a public office and is held by usurper without legal authority, and that the appointment is illegal because the appointee did not possess the requisite qualifications. The learned counsel for the petitioners has not been able to point out any disqualification disqualifying the learned Judge to function as a Judge of the High Court and in the absence of the same, merely on the basis of the allegations which are as vague as could be, no writ of quo warranto can be issued and this writ is not maintainable. 15. 15. So far as the argument that this Court can enlarge the scope and give interpretation in view of the argument and paragraphs referred to particularly with reference to those cases cited above, it is well settled proposition of law that in interpreting the constitutional provisions in this area, the Court should adopt a construction, which strengthens the foundational features and the basic structure of the Constitution. Rule of law is a basic feature of the Constitution, which permeates the whole of the constitutional fabric and is an integral part of the constitutional structure. Independence of the judiciary is an essential attribute of rule of law. It is an undisputed proposition that if the Court is of the view that in the interest of the public, the legal position with respect to the alleged usurpation of a public office should be judicially declared, it could issue a writ of quo warranto. It is also to be borne in mind that in a petition seeking Quo warranto only an appointment, which is contrary to law can be questioned. The procedure of quo warranto confers jurisdiction and authority on the judiciary to control executive action in the matter of making appointments to public offices against the relevant statutory provisions. Therefore it is manifestly clear that before a citizen can claim a writ of quo warranto, he must state, inter alia, that the office in question is a public office and is held by usurper without legal authority. In our humble opinion, the argument that merely functioning as President of the forum, the enlargement of the interpretation, as desired, to enlarge the scope of Article 217 of the Constitution has to be invoked cannot be accepted. Admittedly, none of the conditions of Article 217 of the Constitution has been established. Law is not disputed that the power of judicial review over legislative action, vested in the High Court under Article 226, and in Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, is an integral and essential feature of the Constitution, constituting part of its basic structure. Ordinarily, therefore, the power of the High Courts and the Supreme Court to test the constitutional validity of legislations can never be ousted or excluded. Ordinarily, therefore, the power of the High Courts and the Supreme Court to test the constitutional validity of legislations can never be ousted or excluded. The Supreme Court held that the power vested in the High Courts to exercise judicial superintendence over the decisions of all Courts and Tribunals within their respective jurisdictions is also part of the basic structure of the Constitution. As discussed, the petitioners cannot take advantage of the observations made in the above cases and they are not helpful in view of the facts of the case on hand. 16. It is well established that where a legal wrong or a legal injury is caused to a person by reason of violation of any constitutional or legal right or without authority of law any member of the public can maintain an application in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is the duty of the to be nothing but a Temple of Justice that such a litigant must not succumb to spasmodic sentiments and behave like a knight-errant roaming at will in pursuit of issues providing publicity. Above all, it is well settled that no authority can do what the Constitution by necessary implication forbids. Keeping in mind the dicta laid down by the Honourable Apex Court and upon a purposive and harmonious construction and exposition of the provisions of the Act, the issues raised in the writ petition have to be resolved. 17. In Sub Committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India, 1991 (4) SCC 699 the Honourable Supreme Court rejected the contention advanced that the judiciary itself has the jurisdiction and in appropriate cases a duty to enquire into the integrity of one of its members and restrain the Judge from exercising judicial functions as it is beset with grave risks. Holding that the relief of a direction to restrain the Judge from discharging judicial functions cannot be granted, Their Lordships in the case of Sub Committee on Judicial accountability, 1991 (4) SCC 699 observed thus: "It is the entire Constitutional Scheme including the provisions relating to the process of removal of a Judge which are to be taken into account for the purpose of considering this aspect. It is difficult to accept that there can be any right in any one running parallel with the Constitutional Scheme, for this purpose contained in Clauses (4) and (5) of Article 124 read with Article 121." 18. In Union of India v. M/s. Cottage Arts Emporium, A.I.R.1992 S.C.2219 the above mentioned position had been reiterated excluding all other methods. Supreme Court Advocates On Record Association v. Union of India, 1993 (4) SCC 441 is also to the same effect. In Ravichandran v. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee, 1995 (5) SCC 457 . Their Lordships categorically held that where Bar Council or Bar Association reasonably and honestly believes the conduct of a Judge of a High Court to be bad, though not proved misbehaviour, the Chief Justice of India has to be approached and his decision would be final. The framers of Our Constitution, while drafting the Constitution, gave protection by way of safeguards, to the constitutional authorities. Proviso (b) to Clause (2) of Article 124 states that a Judge may be removed from his office in the manner provided in clause (4). Clause (4) of Article 124 provides that a Judge of the Supreme Court shall not be removed from his office except by an order of the President passed after an address by each House of Parliament supported by a majority of the total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of that House present and voting has been presented to the President in the same session for such removal on the around of proved misbehaviour or incapacity. Though the learned counsel argued that this is not a case attracting provisions of Articles 217 and 124, and as soon as he accepted another appointment he should be deemed to have ceased to hold the office of Judgeship, it is not appealing to us. What cannot be done directly cannot be allowed to get achieved indirectly. We are of the considered opinion that in the catena of decisions the mandates provided, mentioned above, remain unaltered and unshattered. When the position remains in tact as stated above, we are not at all justified in granting a relief, as prayed for, as it would certainly amount to usurping the powers of the Parliament which can alone initiate proceedings for ousting a Judge of a High Court or the Supreme Court. When the position remains in tact as stated above, we are not at all justified in granting a relief, as prayed for, as it would certainly amount to usurping the powers of the Parliament which can alone initiate proceedings for ousting a Judge of a High Court or the Supreme Court. In our considered view, the writ petition is not at all maintainable on this ground and this point is answered accordingly. 19. Point No.2: Though we could have restricted ourselves from proceeding further, as we have already answered the first point against the petitioners, for the sake of completeness, we are proceeding further to consider the second point also. Learned counsel was at great pains in pointing out that by accepting the position as President of the Commission, the first respondent had condescended to be a servant of the Government may be with statutory status, he exposed himself to the rise of being over-ruled by two non-judicial members, that he further subjected the decisions to be questioned under Articles 226 and 227 and because of these compromises, the first respondent must be deemed to have vacated his office. In short her attempt was to show that the State Commission was identical in all respects to Administrative Tribunals, which have in effect been made amenable to writ jurisdiction by the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India after the pronouncement of the decision in Chandrakumar's case, AIR 1997 SC 1125 . In Chandrakumar's case, AIR 1997 SC 1125 , it was argued that the power to interpret the provisions of the Constitution was one, which had been solely vested in the Constitutional Courts and could not be bestowed on newly created quasi-judicial bodies which were susceptible to executive influences. It was also argued that the appointment of Administrative Members to the Tribunal should be discontinued. The Supreme Court rejected the contentions and with regard to appointment of Administrative Members, the Supreme Court held that "it must be remembered that the setting up of these Tribunals is founded on the premise that specialist bodies comprising both trained administrators and those with judicial experience would, by virtue of their specialised knowledge, be better equipped to dispense speedy and efficient justice." 20. Let us proceed as to what is 'Tribunal' under the Administrative Tribunals Act, and what is 'Commission' like the present one. Let us proceed as to what is 'Tribunal' under the Administrative Tribunals Act, and what is 'Commission' like the present one. The word 'Tribunal' occurs in Article 136 of the Constitution and has been interpreted by the Supreme Court, in juxtaposition with the word 'Court' to mean quasi-judicial Tribunals other than the ordinary Courts, which have the trappings of a Court. Though all Tribunals are not Courts, all Courts are Tribunals. If judicial functions were not invested in the Tribunal, then it would be outside the ambit of Article 136. Further, if the Tribunal is required to proceed judicially, but does not pronounce a final and binding decision in a dispute, then it will not be a Tribunal under Article 136. The Administrative Tribunals and other Tribunals viz. Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Land Reforms Tribunal etc. are constituted either under Article 323-A or 323-B. As such, the Tribunals mentioned above cannot be equated to Consumer Fora created under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. A sitting or a retired High Court Judge is appointed as the Vice Chairman or the President as the case may be. for the Tribunal as well as the Commission. The similarity between the two ends there. 21. The circumstances under which the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 came to be passed, had already been extracted at the earlier portion of the order. However, to understand the issue at hand, the Preamble to the Consumer Protection Act is extracted hereunder. "An Act to provide for better protection of the interests of consumers and for that purpose to make provision for the establishment of consumer councils and other authorities for the settlement of consumers' disputes and for matters connected therewith." 22. As stated above, the Supreme Court has held in Indian Photographic Company Limited case, (cited supra), that the interpretation of the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act should be in a rational manner so as to achieve the object of 1986 Act and not in a technical manner. As stated above, the Supreme Court has held in Indian Photographic Company Limited case, (cited supra), that the interpretation of the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act should be in a rational manner so as to achieve the object of 1986 Act and not in a technical manner. A look at Article 323 of the Constitution makes it clear that Articles 323-A and 323-B were inserted by the Constitution 42nd Amendment Act, 1976 by substantially excluding judicial review of administrative decisions, at the same time empowering the Legislature to set up Administrative Tribunals for the adjudication of disputes between the State and the individual relating to certain specified matters and to lay down the jurisdiction and powers of such Tribunals. It is thus very much clear that the Consumer Fora are not constituted under either of the Articles mentioned above. They are indeed Tribunals as envisaged under Article 136 of the Constitution. State Commission is constituted under Section 16 of the Act, providing appeals under Section 19, to the National Commission, with further appeal to the Supreme Court under Section 23 of the Act. Except for certain common features already referred to the Administrative Tribunals and the Consumer Commissions perform different functions and are poles apart. It is crystal clear that the Administrative Tribunals exclude the jurisdiction of the Courts, while the Consumer Commissions as stated above, have been constituted in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law. It is also clear that for the time being in force, as pointed out in Fair Air Engineers Ltd. v. N.K.Modi, 1996 (6) SCC 385 , they are judicial authorities and the proceedings before them are legal proceedings. We are very much satisfied with the proposition that they are judicial authorities and proceedings before them are legal proceedings and they are intended to provide inexpensive and expeditious remedy. No doubt, .Articles 226 and 227 have been invoked against orders of Consumer Courts only on the occasions, which are few and far between, when the Commission is not functioning with full strength. But when the Commission functions in full strength. Articles 226 and 227 are not allowed to be invoked. No doubt, .Articles 226 and 227 have been invoked against orders of Consumer Courts only on the occasions, which are few and far between, when the Commission is not functioning with full strength. But when the Commission functions in full strength. Articles 226 and 227 are not allowed to be invoked. Whereas, after Chandrakumar's case (cited supra) writ petitions are entertained by the High Court against the decisions of State Administrative Tribunals as the High Court has power to weigh and correct the decisions rendered by the Tribunal under Article 226 and also exercising the power of superintendence, The mere fact that Articles 226 and 227 are invoked in the situations mentioned above certainly cannot be a plausible argument for equating the State Commission to Administrative Tribunals. That cannot be a litmus test. The argument of the learned counsel on this aspect cannot be countenanced. 23. We are of the view that even though this Court has got the extraordinary jurisdiction as pointed out, the discretion should be exercised only applying all the mandates judiciously. As stated, nothing is available calling for our interference. 24. As far as the appointment of Members to the Commission is concerned, as per Section 16(1)(b), persons of ability, integrity and standing and who have adequate knowledge or experience or have shown capacity in dealing with problems relating to economics, law. commerce, accountancy, industry, public affairs or administration, have been appointed as Members by the State Government on the recommendation of a Selection Committee consisting of President of the State Commission, Secretary of the Law Department, dealing with consumer affairs in the State. Merely because the other Members can together take a view different from the one taken by the President, it cannot mean anything. 25. In Alok Kumar Roy's case, AIR 1968 SC 453 a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court makes the position very clear. It runs thus: ".. It is only where a Judge of the High Court is appointed to another post, which is a whole time post that it may be said that on such appointment he can no longer work as a Judge of the High Court for the time being, though even in such a case, when the work is over, he reverts as a Judge of the High Court without fresh appointment." 26. We feel that our view will be strengthened by drawing analogies from Estate Abolition and Inam Abolition Acts. Special Tribunal Appeals are provided in those Acts to be entertained by two Judges of the High Court nominated by the Chief Justice and designated as Tribunals. They are personae designatae and technically the decision by the Tribunal is amenable to writ jurisdiction. But then the Judges constituting the Tribunal do not cease to be Judges of the High Court. Nor does their position while acting as personae designate cease to be that of High Court Judges. 27. Thus it will be clear that the functioning of the first respondent as President of the State Commission, as above, is not at all in derogation of his position as Judge of the High Court. It was nothing but a gesture warranted by compelling necessity and that by reason of that arrangement, by no stretch of imagination, can it be said that the first respondent, ceased to be Judge of the High Court. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner, trying to equate the Administrative Tribunals with that of Commission for all purposes, will be odious. In our considered view, we are not justified to accept the contention of the learned counsel as tenable. 28. According to the learned counsel we have to go by the convention and we cannot subvert the Constitution. But the stark reality remains that conventions can evoke a high respect but they cannot have the force of law. whereas, undisputedly, we are governed by the Rule of law. 29. The critical analysis made by Granville Austin was relied on by the learned counsel. Relying upon the same, learned counsel submitted that even the Judges of the Supreme Court were not spared from executive pressures and the President of a State Commission would be more vulnerable to executive interference. This argument on the basis of the above observation is not helpful to issue any direction as prayed for. That apart, what matters is the attitude of the individual occupying the post and not the actual post and we desist ourselves from saying anything more. 30. Learned counsel then relied on the decision in K.S.Haja Shareff v. His Excellency the Governor of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1985 Mad. 55 . That apart, what matters is the attitude of the individual occupying the post and not the actual post and we desist ourselves from saying anything more. 30. Learned counsel then relied on the decision in K.S.Haja Shareff v. His Excellency the Governor of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1985 Mad. 55 . In that case, the question arose as to whether a member of a Legislative Assembly could accept Honorary Consulship of another Government and could still continue as a member of the Legislative Assembly. A Full Bench of this Court held that "consequent to appointment as Honorary Consul, the member concerned had acknowledged the adherence to a Foreign State and therefore he had suffered the disqualification under Article 191 of the Constitution of India". The Full Bench observed, "a close association with a foreign country as Honorary Consul cannot be belittled as of no consequence pertaining to the membership in Legislature and Parliament in the country". However, each case depends upon the facts of its own. So, the above case will not be applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case on hand. 31. The learned counsel put her last but not the least weapon placing reliance upon the judgment of one of us (N.K.Jain, Chief Justice) (as Judge of Rajasthan) in Ritu Pareek v. Union of India and 7 others, 1996 (1) RLR 222 in support of her contention. In that case, the Chief Justice of the High Court of Rajasthan, after his demitting office, was appointed as the Chairman of the Central Administrative Tribunal. He worked there for some time. Thereafter, he resigned from that post and sent a letter of resignation to take effect from a later date. In a public interest litigation, filed by one Ritu Parekh, alleging that the Chief Justice could not be permitted to join as he had already ceased to be the Judge of the High Court, after joining the Tribunal, it was argued that even now after demitting the office of the Chairman, he cannot come back and join as the Chief Justice. It was also pointed out that at the time of his appointment as the Chairman of the Tribunal, he did not request to keep the office of the Chief Justice intact nor was he permitted by the President of India to hold two offices simultaneously, i.e., Chairman of the C.A.T. and the Chief Justiceship of Rajasthan and therefore, his letter to His Excellency, the President of India demitting office, before his appointment of the Chairman, C.A.T. will have to be deemed to be a resignation within the meaning of Article 217 of the Constitution of India. It was also argued that the competent authority had already sanctioned his pension and released the Provident Fund and he was also sanctioned Earned Leave as on 7.5.1996, the last date as Chief Justice of High Court. His letter of resignation stating that he was prepared to work and he could be considered favourably for any suitable post clearly revealed that he had no lien to the post of Chief Justice. The averment made in that case clearly reveals that his appointment as Chairman, CAT. should be treated as if he had vacated the office of the Chief Justice as provided under Article 217 (1) (c) of the Constitution. 32. It was also argued in the said case that when a Judge was allowed to join in any other Tribunal, under the provisions of the Article 217 (1), after demitting his office, he will be deemed to have vacated the post. The Court also considered some other argument and while admitting the writ, direction, restraining the Chairman from resuming or functioning as the Chief Justice, was given. It is also pertinent to note that there was difference of opinion between the Judges in an identical matter in Division Bench at Jodhpur Kashi Nath v. Union of India and others, Civil Writ Petition No.2303 of 1996. In another identical single Bench Hot Chand v. Union of India, Civil Writ Petition No. 3082 of 1996 before the Jaipur Bench, an interim stay was also granted vide order dated 02.9.1996. Special Leave Petitions were also preferred before the Hon'ble Supreme Court against interim orders passed on 2.9.1996 passed in single Bench Civil writ Petition No.3482 of 1996 mentioned above. Special Leave Petitions were also preferred before the Hon'ble Supreme Court against interim orders passed on 2.9.1996 passed in single Bench Civil writ Petition No.3482 of 1996 mentioned above. The Hon'ble Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petitions by order dated 16.9.1996 considering the fact that the fourth respondent therein had resigned with immediate effect on 11.9.1996 and nothing survived. It was also observed that the differing judgments of the two learned Judges of the Rajasthan High Court shall not be treated as binding statements of law and thus, the said three writ petitions stood dismissed by the order dated 16.9.1996 of the Hon'ble Apex Court. However, the point in issue in Ritupareek v. Union of India and others was not touched. Therefore, the learned counsel for the petitioners cannot take advantage of that order. That apart, the facts of the above case are not applicable as in the present case; the first respondent has not demitted or resigned from Judgeship at any point of time. Only a request was made by His Excellency, the President of India to the first respondent to function as President of the State Commission in terms of the High Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of Service) Act, 1954. Moreover, nowhere in the Act it was mentioned that after his functioning as the President of the forum, the post of Judgeship would cease. As discussed above, as per Section 16 of the Act, on composition of the State Commission, each Commission shall consist of a person, who is or has been a Judge of the High Court. There is a provision in the Act itself to appoint a sitting Judge. So, if a sitting Judge is appointed, what is necessary is that, it should be in consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court. If the Judge is getting additional work, it was also necessary for a Judge, to get the consent of His Excellency, the President of India, as in this case. Accordingly, a request was made to His Excellency, the President of India and the permission was also accorded. Further, as per the Act, a sitting Judge can be appointed as President. Accordingly, the learned Judge was appointed as President after consultation with the Chief Justice of this Court. It is also pertinent to note that he is not getting any remuneration by the appointment as President. Further, as per the Act, a sitting Judge can be appointed as President. Accordingly, the learned Judge was appointed as President after consultation with the Chief Justice of this Court. It is also pertinent to note that he is not getting any remuneration by the appointment as President. Once, it is patently clear that the appointment of the learned Judge as President was made in accordance with the High Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of Service) Act and the Rules made thereunder, the petitioners cannot question the same. Therefore, the argument that due to the appointment as per G.O., he ceased to be Judge of the High Court is not tenable in the eye of law. It is, therefore, rejected. 33. We are also not satisfied with the argument of the learned counsel, Ms.Vaigai that as per the alleged convention, on earlier occasion some of the learned Judges had accepted their assignment only after demitting their office as Judges of the High Court and the same course should be adopted here, cannot have any binding effect in the absence of any statutory requirement under the particular act as stated. That apart, even if the sitting Judge assumes other post till the date of superannuation, he is considered as a Judge of the High Court for all service conditions of pay, and after the date of superannuation, the salary is calculated as salary of the other post less pension as Judge of the High Court. Therefore, on this ground also, a direction as sought for that the learned sitting Judge has ceased to be a Judge of the High Court cannot at all be granted. 34. While considering the maintainability of this PIL, it is also to be seen that the Honourable Supreme Court, in a catena of decisions repeatedly making a warning that "public interest litigation is a weapon, which has to be used with care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see that under the guise of redressing a public grievance it does not encroach upon the sphere reserved by the Constitution to Executive and the Legislature". In Sri Sachidanad Pandey and another v. The State of West Bengal and others, AIR 1987 SC 1109 at 1136, Their Lordships observed how the public interest litigation poses a threat to Courts and public alike, as follows: "If Courts do not restrict the free flow of such cases in the name of Public Interest Litigation, the traditional litigation will suffer and the Courts of law, instead of dispensing justice, will have to take upon themselves administrative and executive functions". 35. It has also been held that "the Court must be careful to ensure that the process of the Court is not sought to be abused by a person, who desires to persist with his point of view, almost carrying it to the point of obstinacy...." Learned counsel appearing before us canvassed her arguments, keeping the force always intact, focussing towards the centre of attack, that this is a case where the Judge concerned, by his own actions, has vacated and thus ceases to hold the office of a Judge. Learned counsel submitted that though he is not suffering any disqualification yet he has compromised the office of the Judge of the High Court by accepting the office of the President of the Consumer Forum and for any misconduct, he is governed by the Act and the rules made thereunder. By repeatedly arguing, saying not once but many times that we should go by convention, the learned counsel requested to at least issue notice to find out the real truth. As we have stated, the petitioners have not been able to point out that the learned Judge is not qualified to hold the post or he has contravened any binding rule of law. The counsel has not been able to point out any manifest error shown to have been involved. So, for merely accepting the additional work as President of the Forum, which has been entrusted as per law and the procedure prescribed, his appointment and continuance as a Judge cannot be challenged in the garb of Public Interest Litigation. As already stated, he is legally qualified to hold the post and otherwise also, no discretionary remedy by issuing writ of quo warranto can be given. 36. It is pertinent to note that the writ is filed not by a layman, but by a set of advocates practising allied disciplines of law. As already stated, he is legally qualified to hold the post and otherwise also, no discretionary remedy by issuing writ of quo warranto can be given. 36. It is pertinent to note that the writ is filed not by a layman, but by a set of advocates practising allied disciplines of law. Some of them are having a very high standing at bar. So, whatever be the reasons, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. Therefore, keeping in mind, the view of the decision of the Supreme Court as stated in the previous paragraphs, this petition is nothing but a vexatious one and it is liable to be dismissed. The writ petition is dismissed with no order as to costs. Consequently, connected W.M.Ps. are also dismissed.