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2001 DIGILAW 426 (CAL)

Syed Abul Hasin v. Joynab Bibi

2001-07-13

ARUNAVA BARUA

body2001
JUDGMENT 1 .This revisional application under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is directed against the Order No. 27 dated 21.8.87 passed by Shri K.K. Prosad, Munsif, 1st Court, Jangipur, Dist.- Murshidabad in Title Suit No. 220 of 1984. 2. The facts of the case may be briefly stated thus. 3. The plaintiffs-opposite parties filed Title Suit No. 220 of 1984 along with two other title suits being Nos. 219 and 221 of 1984 against the defendants-petitioners in the 1st Court of Munsif, Jangipur, Dist. Murshidabad for declaration of title and other reliefs in respect of lands which were the subject-matter of three deeds registered by the District Registrar, Murshidabad under Section 74 of the Indian Registration Act after having held an enquiry and recording evidence therein. 4. The cases made out in the plaints were that the two deeds of Heba-bil-ewaz dated 6.4.75 and one deed of Hebanama dated 6.4.75 executed by one Mariam Bibi were invalid, fraudulent, null and void, inoperative and not binding upon the plaintiffs-opposite parties. 5. The validity of those three deeds were challenged mainly on the ground that the testator was not in a sound state of mind at the time of execution of the deeds and the same were made by undue influence, fraud and collusion. 6. When it came to registration of the said deeds, the District Registrar embarked upon an enquiry in a enquiry case under Section 74 of Act XVI of 1908. The Registrar having weighed the evidence, both oral and documentary produced before him by the parties rendered his opinion at the end of the said enquiry that the execution of the deeds had been proved and that requirements of law for the time being in force had been complied with. He, therefore, ordered registration of deeds under Section 75 of Act XVI of 1908. 7. The decisions of the District Registrar in the said enquiry case was challenged on the ground that they were obtained by fraud and collusion. 8. The defendants-petitioners raised preliminary objections about the maintainability of the suits on the ground that the District Registrar while holding the enquiry and taking the decision after recording evidence was a Court of limited jurisdiction and the decision is binding on the parties in respect of the same subject-matter. 9. The defendants-petitioners took the plea that the Title Suit Nos. The defendants-petitioners raised preliminary objections about the maintainability of the suits on the ground that the District Registrar while holding the enquiry and taking the decision after recording evidence was a Court of limited jurisdiction and the decision is binding on the parties in respect of the same subject-matter. 9. The defendants-petitioners took the plea that the Title Suit Nos. 219, 220 and 221 of 1984 were barred by the principle of res judicata. 10. The main stay of this revisional application is that the said decision passed by the District Registrar in the enquiry case under Section 74 of the Indian Registration Act being the decision of a Court of limited jurisdiction and/or a quasi judicial Tribunal, the said suits of the plaintiffs-opposite parties between the same parties in respect of the same subject-matter are not maintainable as they are hit by the principles of res judicata. 11. The learned Munsif, 1st Court, Jangipur, who took up the issue whether the suit was barred by the principles of res judicata on 21.8.87 and against which this revisional application under Section lis of C.P.C. has been initiated in this Court had made an elaborate discussion on the points taking into consideration the allegations of the plaintiffs that the aforesaid deeds in question, namely, the Heba-bil-ewaz dated 6.4.75 and one Hebanama dated 6.4.75 executed by Mariam Bibi were invalid, fraudulent, null and void, inoperative and not binding upon the plaintiffs. 12. From what has been stated above the following points emerge for my consideration : (i) Whether the District Registrar acting under Section 74 of the Indian Registration Act whereby he embarked upon an enquiry could finally decide on a question of title on the basis of a finding whether certain deeds, that is, two deeds of Heba-bil-ewaz and one deed of Hebanama executed by one Mariam Bibi, were invalid, fraudulent, null and void, inoperative and not binding upon a party. (ii) Whether in the capacity of a Court of limited jurisdiction and/or a Tribunal a decision on the said disputed deeds would be a final decision so far as this dispute is concerned. (iii) Whether the three title suits stated above would be barred by the principles of res judicata or the principle analogous thereto because of the decision with regard to the said disputed deeds arrived at by the District Registrar in the said enquiry proceeding. 13. (iii) Whether the three title suits stated above would be barred by the principles of res judicata or the principle analogous thereto because of the decision with regard to the said disputed deeds arrived at by the District Registrar in the said enquiry proceeding. 13. The learned Advocate for the petitioners has submitted that the decision of the District Registrar had reached its finality and was conclusive so far as the disputed questions with regard to the said deeds in question are concerned and that decision of the District Registrar would operate as res judicata to bar the said three suits brought about by the plaintiff. He further submits that the learned Munsif was wrong in his finding that the decision of the Registrar arising out of an enquiry under Section 74 of the Indian Registration Act will not be res judicata to bar the title suits in question. In support of his submission, the learned Advocate for the petitioners submitted an old decision of this Court reported in (1) 39 CLJ page 40, Dijendra Narayan Ray v. Jogesh Ch. Dey & Ors. Another decision was (2) AIR 1978 Kerala 172 (F. B.). 14. I have gone through the said case laws submitted by the learned Advocate for the petitioners. To my mind, none of the decisions cited above applies to the facts and circumstances of this case. 15. In the first place, the decision reported in 39 CLJ 40, pertains to an enquiry in a suit under Section 77 of the Indian Registration Act and it was said in the said decision that the doctrine of "res judicata" was not excluded from full operation. In our instant case, the decision or dispute referred to pertains to an enquiry by the Registrar and his final decision, thereof, at the end of that enquiry which is sought to be pleaded as a bar to the suits in question on the principles of res judicata. The scope of enquiry by the Registrar under Section 74 of the Registration Act is distinctly limited. This enquiry by the Registrar is to be directed to two points only viz., (a) whether the document has been executed and whether certain requirements of law for the time being in force have been complied with by the applicant or person presenting the document for registration. This enquiry by the Registrar is to be directed to two points only viz., (a) whether the document has been executed and whether certain requirements of law for the time being in force have been complied with by the applicant or person presenting the document for registration. Then again, the requirements of law for the time being in force as stated above and as it appears in Clause-B of Section 74 of the Registration Act, must be the requirements of law relating to registration, or in other words, it must mean the requirement under the Registration Act. The scope of enquiry cannot be extended to ascertain if the document is valid or not. 16. The question of validity of a document can only be gone into in a suit properly framed for that purpose. 17. As a matter of fact, as we see from the order in question by the District Registrar, Murshidabad who had made an enquiry in the enquiry case under Section 74 of Act XVI of 1908, he duly considered the evidence on record before him and arguments placed in connection therewith and concluded his finding thus :- "I am of the opinion that the execution of the deeds have been proved. Requirements of law for the time being in force have been complied with. I, therefore, order registration of the deed under Section 15 of Act XVI of 1908." 18. It appears, therefore, the District Registrar evidently did not overstep his limits of the enquiry only on the points stated above as envisaged under Section 74 of the Registration Act, 1908. He did not go to the length of deciding whether the documents in question were a product of fraud or whether those were invalid or null and void and rightly so. 19. The question of validity of the documents could only be gone into in a suit properly framed for that purpose. Truly speaking, Section 74 of the Registration Act envisages that the enquiry under this section shall be a summary enquiry rind that a comprehensive enquiry touching upon the genuineness of the document should be made in a properly framed suit under Se8tion 31 of the Specific Relief Act. And to a summary enquiry such as this, the bar of res judicata under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall not be applied. 20. And to a summary enquiry such as this, the bar of res judicata under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall not be applied. 20. To buttress my point, I might profitably rely upon a decision of the Supreme Court reported in (3) AIR 1989 SC 2240 , which runs thus :- “It is true that Section 11 is now made applicable by the explanations and interpretation to certain proceedings giving more extensive meaning to the word 'suit'. In its comprehensive sense the word 'suit' is understood to apply to any proceeding in a Court of Justice by which an individual pursues that remedy which the law affords. The modes of proceedings may be various but that if a right is litigated between parties in a Court of Justice, the proceeding by which the decision of the Court is sought may be a suit. But, if the proceeding is of a summary nature not falling within the definition of a suit, it may not be so treated for the purpose of Section 11." 21. Basically, the disputed question emerging from the aforesaid three deeds alleged to be fraudulent essentially entailed the question of title between the parties and there is probably no gainsay in the fact that in an enquiry by the District Registrar under Section 74 of the Registration Act, 1908, the Registrar could not certainly make an enquiry or decide upon the question of title. 22. The point if further cemented by decision of this Court in the case of (4) Mohima Chunder Dhur v. Jugal Kishore Bhattacharjee, 1881 ILR 7 Cal 736. It was held therein ;- "It appears to us, that it is impossible to say that the proceedings of the Registrar, when he inquired whether the documents had been executed, are in any sense "proceedings of a competent Court". They are the proceedings of an executive officer invested with quasi judicial functions for the limited purposes of the Registration Act....... ....................." 23 As already pointed out, the enquiry contemplated under Section 74 of the Registration Act, 1908 must necessarily relate to the two points only. The Registrar is merely to find out whether the documents tendered actually is in the state in which it was executed by the parties to it. ....................." 23 As already pointed out, the enquiry contemplated under Section 74 of the Registration Act, 1908 must necessarily relate to the two points only. The Registrar is merely to find out whether the documents tendered actually is in the state in which it was executed by the parties to it. The nature of enquiry by the District Registrar under the provisions of the Registration Act cannot be said to be similar to that of a regular Court of law, such as the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction, with regard to the genuineness of the document in question or with regard to the circumstances under which the said document is alleged to have been executed. To sum it up, the proceedings of the Registrar cannot be said to be one before a "competent Court" so as to call its findings to be operative as res judicata. 24. I have gone through the impugned order passed by the learned Munsif and find that he had duly given his mind to the points of law and fact bearing upon the disputed questions and had arrived at the right conclusion that the decisions of the Registrar arising out of an enquiry under Section 74 of the Indian Registration Act will not be res judicata in the nature of the cases before his Court. 25. In this view of the matter, no interference in revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is called for. 26. In the result, the revisional application fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Let a xerox certified copy of the order, if applied for, be given to the parties on usual terms.