ORDER: Aggrieved by the land acquisition proceedings initiated by the second respondent pursuant to the Notification issued under Sec.4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act made in G.O.No.3D-336, Adi-Dravidar Tribal Welfare, dated 14.5.1992, the petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari to call for the records of the second respondent pertaining to the proceedings in L.A.No.10/91, (AD TW) Kangeyam taken pursuant to the G.O.No.3D-336, AD (TW), dated 14.5.1992 and published on 22.7.1992 and to quash the same. 2.1. According to Mr.T.R.Mani, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, one Mr.M.P.Periyasami, Taluk Surveyor of Dharapuram Taluk Office, Erode, Periyar District, by his letter dated 11.3.1992, had written to the petitioner’s husband that the Government Servants, working in the Dharapuram Taluk Office, proposed to construct 350 houses and decided to purchase the land that belongs to the petitioner of an extent of 2.68.0 hectares in Survey No.336/2 (old No.481/part and 482/part) in Chitravuthampalayam Village, Dharapuram Taluk, Periyar District. Since the said request was turned down by the petitioner’s husband and the petitioner, the revenue authorities, with a mala fide intention, decided to acquire the said land to provide house sites to homeless Adi-Dravidars, Chitravuthampalayam Village, Dharapuram Taluk, Periyar District and initiated action under the Tamil Nadu Land Acquisition Act, and in pursuance of which, a Notification under Sec.4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) was issued in G.O.No.3-D 336, Adi Dravidar and Tribal Welfare, dated 14.5.1992 and therefore, the impugned acquisition proceedings is liable to be set aside on the ground of mala fide. 2.2. Mr.T.R.Mani, learned senior counsel, further contends that the Notification issued under Sec.4(1) of the Act made in G.O.No.3-D 336, Adi Dravidar and Tribal Welfare, dated 14.5.1992 was published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette on 22.7.1992 and the same was published in the Tamil Dailies, namely, ‘Namadu M.G.R. ‘and ‘Dhinathoodu’ on 23.7.1992 and in the locality on 20.8.1992. Thereafter, on enquiry under Sec.5-A of the Act was conducted on 22.10.1992 pursuant to a notice dated 7.10.1992 issued to the petitioner for the enquiry under Sec.5-A of the Act, which was received by the petitioner on 8.10.1992. The husband of the petitioner had submitted his objection on 19.10.1992, but, however, sought for an adjournment on 22.10.1992. Thereafter, on enquiry under Sec.5-A of the Act was conducted on 22.10.1992 pursuant to a notice dated 7.10.1992 issued to the petitioner for the enquiry under Sec.5-A of the Act, which was received by the petitioner on 8.10.1992. The husband of the petitioner had submitted his objection on 19.10.1992, but, however, sought for an adjournment on 22.10.1992. The second respondent, without giving a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner, proceeded with the acquisition proceedings and submitted a report on 26.10.1992 overruling the objections raised by the petitioner and ultimately, issued a declaration under Sec.6 of the Act on 10.8.1993 in G.O.(3-D) No.572, Adi Dravidar and Tribal Welfare. 2.3. According to the learned senior counsel, the refusal of adjourning the enquiry conducted under Sec.5-A of the Act on 22.10.1992, to enable the petitioner to object the acquisition proceedings effectively, is the violation of principles of natural justice. 2.4. It is further argued by the learned senior counsel that the draft declaration issued under Sec.6 of the Act was prepared and published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette on the same day i.e., on 10.8.1993 and the same was published in the Tamil Dailies namely, ‘Vetri Malai’ and ‘Makkal Kural’ circulated in that locality as well as in the locality on the very next day i.e., on 11.8.1993, reflect the mala fide intention of the second respondent in proceeding with the impugned acquisition proceedings. 2.5. Mr.T.R.Mani, learned senior counsel, further contends that an effective objection had been raised on behalf of the petitioner in his statement dated 19.10.1994 to the effect that the impugned lands are cultivable lands and therefore, instead of acquiring the impugned lands, the second respondent could have utilised the Government poromboke lands of an extent of 2.11.5. hectares in Survey No.230/1: 3.54.0 in R.S.No.483/1.2; 1.29.5 hectares in R.S.No.484/1, 2: and 1.05.5 hectares in R.S.No.491/1 of the same village, to provide house sites to the Adi Dravidars in Chitravuthampalayam Village, Dharapuram Taluk, Periyar District and the refusal to consider such alternative sites by the second respondent is arbitrary and unreasonable. 2.6. The learned senior counsel contends that even though this Court granted an order of interim stay on 25.2.1994, the second respondent had taken possession of the impugned land on 17.3.1994. However, it is further contended that the petitioner still continues to be in possession of the impugned lands and cultivating the same. 2.7. 2.6. The learned senior counsel contends that even though this Court granted an order of interim stay on 25.2.1994, the second respondent had taken possession of the impugned land on 17.3.1994. However, it is further contended that the petitioner still continues to be in possession of the impugned lands and cultivating the same. 2.7. Finally, the learned senior counsel contends that the houseless Adi Dravidars of Chitravuthampalayam Village, Dharapuram Taluk, Periyar District have already been provided with separated houses with patta and hence, the impugned lands are not required or the purpose for which they were acquired. 3.Per contra, Mr.Selvanayagam, learned Government Advocate, contends that the petitioner has challenged only the notification issued under Sec.4(1) of the Act and not the subsequent proceedings, which culminated into a declaration made in G.O.(3-D) No.572, Adi Dravidar and Tribal Welfare, dated 10.8.1993 and the award passed under Sec.9 of the Act. He further contends that in pursuance of the award passed, the possession of the impugned land had already been taken by the second respondent on 17.3.1994 and hence, this writ petition is not maintainable in law. 3.2. The learned Government Advocate further clarifies that even though the petitioner had obtained an order of interim stay on 25.2.1994 in W.M.P.No.4933 of 1994, the same was communicated by the petitioner to the second respondent on 30.3.1994 and the copy of the order sent by the Registry of this Court was served on the second respondent only on 7.4.1994, since the original order was wrongly served on the Tahsildar, Taluk Office, Kangeyam, who had forwarded the same to the second respondent with a covering letter dated 29.3.1994 of the Tahsildar, Kangeyam and before that, the possession had been taken by the second respondent on 17.3.1994 itself as per Sec.47 of the Act. 3.3. Mr.Selvanayagam, learned Government Advocate, also contends that the decision of the second respondent to the suitability of the land cannot be questioned, merely because the value of the impugned land is more than the alternative poromboke lands available and in any event, it is contended that the possession of the petitioner, subsequent to the date of taking possession, is unlawful and therefore, the same will not vitiate the impugned acquisition proceedings. 3.4. The learned Government Advocate finally contends that the impugned land is still required for the purpose for which it was acquired. 4. 3.4. The learned Government Advocate finally contends that the impugned land is still required for the purpose for which it was acquired. 4. I have given careful consideration to the submissions of both sides. 5. I am unable to accept the contention of the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that merely because one N.P.Periyasami, who was working as Surveyor in Dharapuram Taluk Office, Erode, Periyar District, had written a letter, expressing the desire of the Tahsildar, Dharapuram to acquire the lands of the petitioner for the purpose of construction of 350 houses for the Government Employees working in the Taluk Office and therefore the impugned acquisition proceedings are mala fide, because obviously the impugned lands are not required for the purpose of providing house sites to the said Government staff, but for a totally different purpose, namely providing house sites to the Adi-Dravidars in Chitravuthampalayam Village, Dharapuram Taluk, Periyar District and the action was initiated by a different authority, namely, the Special Tahsildar, Adi Dravidar and Tribal Welfare, Land Acquisition, the second respondent herein. The contention of the learned senior counsel is not acceptable in law. 6. That apart, even though Mr.T.R.Mani would contend that the second respondent refused to adjourn the enquiry conducted under Sec.5-A of the Act, I do not find any such request in the representation dated 9.1.1994 or in the report dated 22.10.1994 at the time of the enquiry and on the other hand, in the report submitted by the enquiry officer, it is stated that the petitioner had not appeared in the enquiry at all. The petitioner, having availed such an opportunity, in my considered opinion, she is not entitled to contend that the second respondent had not provided her a reasonable opportunity. 7. The contention of Mr.T.R.Mani, learned senior counsel, that the draft declaration made in G.O.(3-D) No.572, Adi Dravidar and Tribal Welfare Department, dated 10.8.1993 published in the Tamil Dailies, namely, ‘Vetri Malai’ and ‘Makkal Kural’ as well as in the locality on the same day i.e., on 11.8.1993 would again constitute a mala fide, is also not tenable. In my considered opinion, the act of the second respondent would only show the seriousness and urgency in the matter of acquiring the impugned land to provide house sites to the Adi Dravidars, Chitravuthampalayam Village, Dharapuram Taluk, Periyar District. 8. In my considered opinion, the act of the second respondent would only show the seriousness and urgency in the matter of acquiring the impugned land to provide house sites to the Adi Dravidars, Chitravuthampalayam Village, Dharapuram Taluk, Periyar District. 8. As rightly contended by the learned Government Advocate, merely because the impugned land is more valuable, it cannot be a ground to interfere with the impugned acquisition proceedings as the suitability of the impugned lands for providing house sites to the Adi-Dravidars of Chitravuthampalayam Village , Dharapuram Taluk, Periyar District, cannot be gone into by this Court under Art.226 of the Constitution of India, as the respondents are the competent authorities to decide the said fact. 9. Similarly, the availability of alternative sites also cannot be a ground to interfere with the impugned acquisition proceedings, as the directions issued by the Government not to acquire the cultivable lands, are not mandatory, in view of the decision of this Court in C.Ponnusamy v. Government of Tamil Nadu, (1997)1 C.T.C. 212 , which is as follows: “As regards the contention that the lands on which coconut trees stand, should be excluded in terms of the Government Order and as laid down by this Court in A.Subbiah and another v. Government of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R.1988 Mad. 355, the learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the dicta of the Apex Court reported in State of Tamil Nadu v. Mahalakshm Ammal, (1996)7 S.C.C. 269 . The Apex Court had already held that giving the benefit of the Government orders, exclusion of certain lands on identical reasoning is no longer permissible and that the Government order is administrative instructions issued by the Government for the purpose of consideration by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board and the Government orders have since been withdrawn. Hence, this contention is also no longer available to the petitioners.” 10. The further contention of the learned Government Advocate that the possession of the impugned land by the petitioner, subsequent to the date of acquisition, is unlawful, is supported by the decision of the Apex Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Mahalakshm Ammal, (1996)7 S.C.C. 269 , which is as follows: “It is well-settled law that publication of the declaration under Sec.6 gives conclusiveness to public purpose. Award was made on 26.9.1986 and for Survey No.2/11 award was made on 31.8.1990. Award was made on 26.9.1986 and for Survey No.2/11 award was made on 31.8.1990. Possession having already been undertaken on 24.11.1981, it stands vested in the state under Sec.16 of the Act free from all encumbrances and thereby the Government acquired absolute title to the land. The initial award having been made within two years under Sec.11 of the Act, the fact that subsequent award was made on 31.8.1990 does not render the initial award invalid. It is also to be seen that there is stay of dispossession. Once there is stay of dispossession, all further proceedings necessarily could not be proceeded with as laid down by this Court. Therefore, the limitation also does not stand as an impediment as provided in the proviso to Sec.11-A of the Act. Equally, even if there s an irregularity in service of notice under Secs.9 and 10, it would be a curable irregularity and on account thereof, award made under Sec.11 does not become invalid. Award is only an offer on behalf of the State. If compensation was accepted without protest, it binds such party but subsect to Sec.28-A. Possession of the acquired land would be taken only by way of a memorandum, Panchnama, which is a legally accepted norm. It would not be possible to take any physical possession. Therefore, subsequent continuation, if any, had by the erstwhile owner is only illegal or unlawful possession which does not bind the Government nor vested under Sec.16 divested in the illegal occupant. Considered from this perspective, we hold that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the award”. 11. From the responds, I am satisfied that even though this Court granted an order of interim stay, the same was communicated by the Registry to the Revenue Tahsildar, Kangeyam on 30.3.1994 and thereafter, it was re-directed to the second respondent only on 7.4.1994 and the copy of the said order sent by the petitioner was received by the second respondent only on 30.3.1994, before which, the impugned lands had been taken possession by the second respondent. Therefore, I am satisfied that the delay in service of the interim orders of this Court dated 27.2.1994 passed in W.M.P.No.4933 of 1994.