JUDGMENT B. PANIGRAHI, J. — This appeal has assailed the order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Sambalpur, in S.T.No. 112 of 1994 under Sec. 302, Indian Penal Code, whereby the appellant was directed to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life. 2. The gist of the prosecution story as narrated in the trial Court’s judgment is that on 7.1.1994 at 5.00 p.m. in vil¬lage Gobindpur, the appellant had allegedly assaulted the de¬ceased Paradeshi Khadia in his Bari by means of a spade (Rapha) causing his instantaneous death. When the other witnesses, namely P.Ws. 1 to 3 wanted to intervene at that time, the appellant immediately escaped from the scene of occurrence towards the nearby jungle. During the night, the appellant was said to have proceeded to village Tumbapali where his brother Punia Khadia was residing. It is alleged that in the early hours of the following morning, the appellant also escaped from the house of his brother Punia without his knowledge. The incident was reported to the police and immediately thereupon, the Investigating Officer went in search of the appellant, who was subsequently apprehended from Jharsuguda railway station on 8.1.1994 after being identified by Punia Khadia. Inquest was held on the dead body of the deceased Paradeshi Khadia. Blood-stained earth and sample earth were collected and the wearing apparels of the accused and the spade were seized during the course of investigation. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was placed against the appellant under Sec. 302, Indian Penal Code. The learned S.D.J.M., Sambal¬pur, took cognizance of the offence against the appellant and committed the case to the Court of Session. 3. In order to bring home the charge against the accused, the prosecution had examined 12 witnesses of whom P.Ws. 1 to 5 deposed about the occurrence; P.W.6 is a post-occurrence witness; P.W.8 is a witness to the inquest; P.W.9 stated to have accompanied the informant to the Police Station to lodge the F.I.R.; P.W.7 is the doctor, who conducted the post mortem exami¬nation; P.W.10 is a Revenue Collection Muharrir who prepared the spot-map and P.Ws. 11 and 12 are respectively the Sub-Inspector of Police and Circle Inspector of Police who had investigated into the case. The report of the chemical analyst was also proved during trial. 4. The plea of the accused is a complete denial of the occurrence. 11 and 12 are respectively the Sub-Inspector of Police and Circle Inspector of Police who had investigated into the case. The report of the chemical analyst was also proved during trial. 4. The plea of the accused is a complete denial of the occurrence. He had pleaded false implication in the case, but, however, declined to adduce any evidence in support of his de¬fence. 5. The learned Sessions Judge after evaluating the prosecution evidence, particularly of P.W.2 and P.W.3, a child witness, found the appellant guilty and accordingly recorded an order of conviction and sentence, which is under challenge in this appeal. 6. It is to be first considered whether the deceased met a homicidal or suicidal death in the circumstances narrated by the prosecution. P.W.7 was the doctor, who conducted the post mortem examination over the dead body of Paradeshi Khadia on 8.1.1994 at 4.00 p.m. He found an abrasion over the lateral aspect of right thigh and also two lacerated injuries of bone deep on the head of the deceased and on dissection it was noted that there was frac¬ture of the skull of the deceased. The meninges were torn up with laceration to the brain matter of temporal lobe of right cerebral hemisphere. All the injuries were found to be ante mortem in nature and sufficient in course of ordinary nature to cause death which was due to shock resulting from injury to vital organ like brain. It has been also proved by the prosecution that such injuries on the deceased could be possible by a blow with help of M.O.I., the spade. From the above, there can be no doubt that the deceased met a homicidal death. 7. In order to bring home the culpability against the appellant, the prosecution has mainly relied upon the evidence of two witnesses who are said to be the eye-witnesses to the inci¬dent. They are P.Ws. 2 and 3. It is indubitably true that P.Ws. 2 and 3 are related to both parties. P.W.1, also a relation of the accused as also the deceased, who had disclosed in the F.I.R. to have seen the incident, in Court made a clean breast admission that he had not seen the occurrence. Therefore, his evidence does not in any way help the prosecution in order to prove the impli¬cation of the appellant. 8. P.W.1, also a relation of the accused as also the deceased, who had disclosed in the F.I.R. to have seen the incident, in Court made a clean breast admission that he had not seen the occurrence. Therefore, his evidence does not in any way help the prosecution in order to prove the impli¬cation of the appellant. 8. Turning to the evidence of P.W.2, it appears that in chief examination she says that she only noticed a blow on the right side thigh of Paradeshi Khadia by means of a spade. At that time Paradeshi was standing in an open field adjoining his house. In cross-examination, it was brought out that she was alone present when the accused inflicted the blow by means of a spade on the right thigh of the deceased. Her statement, however, had not revealed that she saw any other injuries on the head of the deceased as allegedly given by the appellant. It was testified before the learned Sessions Judge that there was a single blow on the right thigh of Paradeshi by means of a spade, but on turning to the medical evidence, it is found that there was only abrasion on the right thigh above knee of the deceased. Assuming that spade was used as a weapon of offence, it could not have caused merely an abrasion, but it could have caused some lacerated injury. Considering the evidence of P.W.2 from this angle, it is, however, not above board to accept her version in proving the prosecution case. 9. Coming to the evidence of P.W.3 is appears that she was a child witness. She does not speak of the presence of P.W.2. It is, no doubt, true that she has deposed that the appellant gave two blows, one on the leg and the other on the head as a result of which Paradeshi expired at the spot. While appreciating her evidence, it has to be noticed whether her evidence suffered from any tutoring by police or by any other person. There could be no controversy over the legal position that evidence of a child witness if found to be free from infirmities can be accepted to believe the prosecution case. While appreciating her evidence, it has to be noticed whether her evidence suffered from any tutoring by police or by any other person. There could be no controversy over the legal position that evidence of a child witness if found to be free from infirmities can be accepted to believe the prosecution case. But, however, while appreciating the evidence of a child witness if grave doubts arise as regards the veracity of the witness, then, without corroboration from other evidence, it would be risky to solely rely upon such child witness. The Court should be circumspect and careful while exam¬ining the credibility of a child witness. In this case, the statement of P.W.3 was recorded by the Magistrate under Sec. 164, Cr.P.C. In the said statement, P.W.3 did not utter anything with regard to the injuries on the right leg of Peradeshi, but only stated with regard to the injuries on the head. It is further brought out in the cross-examination that at the time of the incident, darkness was already set in. From the evidence of P.W.1 it was brought out that the distance where the witness allegedly stood was at least 100 to 200 metres away from the place of occurrence. In that view of the matter it does not satisfy the scientific test that the witness could have seen the occurrence standing at such a distance. In this regard, reliance can be placed on a Division Bench decision of this Court reported in 1987 (II) OLR 220 (Arjun Sahu v. State of Orissa). The Division Bench relied on an extract from Gross’s Criminal Investigation 5th Edition, at page 159, to the effect : “It is appropriate here to call attention to what has been said about the distance at which we can reorganise persons. Presuming the eyesight to be normal and the light good, one is able in broad daylight to recognise : (a) persons whom one knows very well, at a distance of from fifty to ninety yards; when there are particular and very charac¬teristic signs, 110 yards; in exceptional cases up to 165 yards. (b) Persons one does not know very well and has not often seen, from twenty-eight to thirty-three yards. (c) People one has only seen once, sixteen yards.” and observed as follows : “Of course, these are approximate indications as stated therein. (b) Persons one does not know very well and has not often seen, from twenty-eight to thirty-three yards. (c) People one has only seen once, sixteen yards.” and observed as follows : “Of course, these are approximate indications as stated therein. But giving a further allowance of some cubits in respect of both P.Ws. 2 and 5, it would not be possible for these two witnesses to clearly identify the assailant and the deceased from such distances.” Therefore, in the above background, it would be difficult to place utmost reliance on the evidence of P.W.3 that she could have seen the occurrence. Added to it, from her evidence it has further transpired that her paternal uncle refreshed her memory about the incident from which it could not be held that the evidence of this witness should be regarded as voluntary in nature. 10. P.Ws. 4 and 5 have turned hostile to the prosecution. The evidence of P.W.6 also does not help the prosecution. The evidence of P.W.7, the doctor, has already been discussed at length. P.W.8 was a witness to the inquest. P.W. 9 also does not prove with regard to the incident save and except that he was a witness to the inquest held by the Investigating Officer. P.W.10 only had drawn up the sketch-map of the spot of occurrence. P.Ws. 11 and 12 are the two Investigating Officers. 11. On a brief resume of the evidence already discussed above, it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was the author of the crime. Accordingly, we are unable to agree with the observation of the learned Sessions Judge. We, therefore, record an order of acquittal of the accused. The Jail Criminal Appeal is allowed. The order of conviction and sentence passed against the appellant is set aside and the appellant be set at liberty forthwith. L. MOHAPATRA, J. I agree. Appeal allowed.