TIRATH SINGH THAKUR, J. ( 1 ) THIS miscellaneous first appeal arises out of an order passed by the 6th additional civil judge, Bangalore in arbitration case No. 39 of 2000, whereby an application purporting to be one under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, seeking condonation of delay in the filing of a petition under Section 34 (3) of the arbitration and conciliation Act, 1996, haa been dismissed as not maintainable. ( 2 ) THE respondents in this appeal are owners of site nob. 20, 21 and 22/2 situate in the langford garden in Bangalore, and measuring 92' 250' in all. A two storeyed old building standing on the said sites, was in terms of an agreement executed between the appellant-company and the respondents, to be pulled down by the former for construction of a multistoreyed building in its place. The agreement stipulated the terms and conditions subject to which the company was to put up the proposed new construction and part with a built-up area to the extent of 36% of the total comprising three residential flats on the first and the second floor of the new building. It also provided for arbitration in the event of any dispute arising between the contracting parties. Disputes having eventually arisen the parties agreed to refer the same for adjudication to Shri mohan ram, retired district and sessions judge. The said proceedings culminated in an award dated 31st of December, 1999 which was challenged in a. c. No. 39 of 2000 filed by the appellant-company, under Section 34 of the arbitration and conciliation Act, 1996. Since the application for setting aside was made beyond the period prescribed under Section 34, an application purporting to be filed seeking condonation of delay. That application has been by the order impugned in this appeal, dismissed primarily on the ground that the Provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 have no application to the act aforementioned. Aggrieved, the appellant-company, has filed the present appeal as already noticed earlier, ( 3 ) WE have heard the counsel for the parties at some length and perused the record. Aggrieved, the appellant-company, has filed the present appeal as already noticed earlier, ( 3 ) WE have heard the counsel for the parties at some length and perused the record. ( 4 ) SECTION 34 of the arbitration and conciliation Act, 1996, provides for recourse against arbitral award and inter alia stipulates that an application for setting aside of the award may not be made after three months from the date on which the party making the application has received the arbitral award and in case where a request under Section 33 had been made from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal. Proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 34, however, empowers the court to entertain an application for setting aside the award, within a further period of 30 days provided the court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application. It would at this stage be useful to extract sub-sec- , tion (3) of Section 34 for facility of ready reference. "section 34 (1) xxx xxx xxx; (2) xxx xxx xxx; (3) an application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under Section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal: provided that if the court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter". ( 5 ) A plain reading of the above leaves no manner of doubt that an application for setting aside of an arbitral award, has to be made within a period three months from the date the arbitral award, is received by the party making such application or from the date on which the request made in terms of Section 33 was disposed of by the arbitral tribunal. The proviso as seen earlier, empowers the court to entertain any such application for setting aside the arbitration award, within a further period of 30 days, but not beyond. The proviso as seen earlier, empowers the court to entertain any such application for setting aside the arbitration award, within a further period of 30 days, but not beyond. The expression "further period of thirty days but not thereafter" in our opinion leaves no option for the court dealing with the application, but to refuse condonation if the same is for a period beyond the stipulated period of 30 days. ( 6 ) MR. Srinivasa, counsel appearing for the appellant however, made a valiant attempt to argue that notwithstanding the Provisions of Section 34 (3), supra, Section 5 of the Limitation Act could be invoked for condonation of delay beyond the period of 30 days condonable in terms of the proviso. He submitted that Section 29 of the Limitation Act, required the exclusion of the Provisions of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, by any special or local law to be in express terms. Since no such exclusion was, according to the learned counsel, discernible from the Provisions of Section 34 of the arbitration and conciliation Act, 1996, or from any other provision contained therein, the Provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, would continue to be available for condonation of any delay beyond the period prescribed by the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 34. Reliance in support was sought to be placed by the learned counsel upon two decisions of the Supreme Court in M/s. Transparent packers v the arbitrator-cum-managing director and another and union of India v M/s. Hanuman prasad and brothers. ( 7 ) IN transparent packers case, supra, the question that fell for consideration of their lordships of the Supreme Court was whether an application seeking condonation under Section 34 of the arbitration and conciliation Act, 1996, would be maintainable on the strength of an affidavit supporting any such application. It was argued that a prayer for condonation of delay in terms of Section 34, could not be supported only on the basis of an affidavit and that the person making the prayer ought to step into the witness-box and tender evidence. The Supreme Court however did not find favour with the said contention. It was argued that a prayer for condonation of delay in terms of Section 34, could not be supported only on the basis of an affidavit and that the person making the prayer ought to step into the witness-box and tender evidence. The Supreme Court however did not find favour with the said contention. The court declared that affidavit evidence would be sufficient evidence in support of the application for condonation of delay and that if the opposite side wanted the deponent to be present for cross-examination, it would be open to it, to make such a request. The ratio of the said decision in our opinion has no application to the facts of the instant case for in the present case the question is not whether the application as filed before the court below was maintainable under Section 34 of the Act, but whether the said application could be sustained on the strength of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for condonation of delay beyond the period prescribed by Section 34. ( 8 ) IN union of india's case, supra, the question that fell for consideration was whether an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for condonation of a delay of two months and 22 days in filing of objections under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act was maintainable. The high court appears to have taken the view that the application was not maintainable. That view was reversed by the Supreme Court holding that an application under Section 5 was maintainable for condonation of delay. It is true that while saying so the order passed by the court makes a reference to the Provisions of arbitration and conciliation Act, 1996, but the said reference appears to us to be either a case of mistake, or misreporting. That is because the decision refers to objections filed under Section 30 of the arbitration and conciliation Act, 1996. It is common ground that Section 30 of the arbitration and conciliation Act, 1996, does not envisage filing of any objections to the award made by the arbitral tribunal. It was only Section 30 of the Arbitration Act of 1940, that envisaged objections to the award made by the arbitrator. In fairness to Mr. It is common ground that Section 30 of the arbitration and conciliation Act, 1996, does not envisage filing of any objections to the award made by the arbitral tribunal. It was only Section 30 of the Arbitration Act of 1940, that envisaged objections to the award made by the arbitrator. In fairness to Mr. Srinivasa, counsel for appellant, we must say that he did not pursue his reliance upon the decision referred to above, for he conceded that reference to the Provisions of Section 30 in the decision relied upon by him apparently was a reference to Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and not Section 34 of the arbitration and conciliation Act, 1996. ( 9 ) COMING then to the merits of the contention the question whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, stand excluded from application in a case where the special enactment itself prescribes the period of limitation as also the condonable limits of delay is no longer res integra. The decision of the Supreme Court in mohd. Ashfaq v state transport appellate tribunal, Uttar Pradesh and others, is in our opinion directly on the point. That was a case where an application for renewal of a permit was in terms of Section 58 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 required to be made within 120 days, before the date of expiry of the permit. Subsection (3) of Section 58 of the said Act, vested the regional transport authority with the power to entertain an application for renewal even if it is beyond the prescribed period, provided the delay was not more than 15 days. The question that fell for consideration was whether the delay beyond 15 days condonable limit prescribed by Section 58 (3) could be condoned by the authority by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Repelling the contention that Section 5 could be invoked the Supreme Court held that a provision which prescribed period of limitation and also the period upto which the delay could be condoned tantamounted to an express exclusion of the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The following passage from the said decision is in this regard apposite. Repelling the contention that Section 5 could be invoked the Supreme Court held that a provision which prescribed period of limitation and also the period upto which the delay could be condoned tantamounted to an express exclusion of the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The following passage from the said decision is in this regard apposite. "it is, therefore, clear that sub-section (3) of Section 58 confers a discretion on the regional transport authority to entertain an application for renewal when it is made beyond the time-limit specified in the proviso to sub-section (2), but not more than 15 days late and the discretion is to be exercised in favour of entertaining the application for renewal when it is shown that there was sufficient cause for not making it in time. Now the question which arises is: does Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 apply so as to empower the regional transport authority, for sufficient cause, to entertain an application for renewal even where it is delayed by more than 15 days? Section 29, sub-section (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 makes Section 5 applicable in the case of an application for renewal unless its applicability can be said to be expressly excluded by any provision of the act. The only provision of the Act, sought to be pressed into service for this purpose was sub-section (3 ). Does sub-section (3) expressly exclude further extension of time under Section 5? If it does, then Section 5 cannot be availed of by the appellant for condonation of the delay. Sub-section (3) in so many terms says that the regional transport authority may condone the delay in making of an application for renewal and entertain it on merits provided the delay is of not more than 15 days. This dearly means that if the application for renewal is beyond time by more than 15 days, the regional transport authority shall not be entitled to entertain it, or in other words, it shall have no power to condone the delay. There is thus an express provision in sub-section (3) that delay in making an application for renewal shall be condonable only if it is of not more than 15 days and that expressly excludes the applicability of Section 5 in cases where an application for renewal is delayed by more than 15 days. This provision may seem harsh,. There is thus an express provision in sub-section (3) that delay in making an application for renewal shall be condonable only if it is of not more than 15 days and that expressly excludes the applicability of Section 5 in cases where an application for renewal is delayed by more than 15 days. This provision may seem harsh,. But it has been deliberately and advisedly made, because the question of renewal of a permit must obviously be decided before the expiration of the period of the permit and in view of the elaborate procedure set out in Section 57 for dealing with an application for renewal, a certain minimum period before the expiration of the period of the permit must be provided within which this procedure can be completed so that the renewal can, if at all, be granted well in time before the permit expires. If an application for renewal could be entertained even if made at any stage, it would dislocate the procedural machinery set out in Section 57 and that is why the legislature prescribed in sub-section (3) of section 58 that the delay in making an application for" renewal may be condoned by the regional transport authority only if it is of not more than 15 days. Here, the application made by the appellant for renewal of his permit was admittedly late by more than 15 days and hence the delay was not condonable and the regional transport authority was right in rejecting the application for renewal as time barred". (emphasis supplied) ( 10 ) RESPECTFULLY following the view expressed in the aforementioned decision, we have no hesitation in holding that Section 34 of the arbitration and conciliation Act, 1996, insofar as it prescribes a period of limitation for filing an application and also limits the power of condonation to 30 days from the said period expressly excludes the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act beyond the said period. The court below was therefore justified in holding that the application made by the appellant for condonation of delay beyond the period prescribed under the proviso to Section 34 (3) was not maintainable. ( 11 ) IN the light of what we have stated above, we consider it unnecessary to express any opinion as regards the true purport and scope of Section 43 of the arbitration and conciliation Act, 1996. ( 11 ) IN the light of what we have stated above, we consider it unnecessary to express any opinion as regards the true purport and scope of Section 43 of the arbitration and conciliation Act, 1996. ( 12 ) IN the result, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed but in the circumstances without any orders as to costs. --- *** --- .