ORDER S.J. Mukhopadhaya, J. 1. The petitioner has challenged the notification dated 12th June, 2000 issued by Honble Chancellor, Ranchi University whereby and whereunder the petitioner was suspended having arrested on 5th June 2000 in connection with Vigilance P.S. Case No. 28/95 and 29/95 and having remanded to Judicial custody with effect from 5th June, 2000. The order of suspension was given ef-feet from 5th June, 2000. 2. The petitioner was a professor of Ranchi University as also Dean, Students Welfare. He was made a member of screening committee to scrutinise the appointments made in the teaching and non-teaching cadre, of newly converted constituent colleges. The said committee after inspection of colleges submitted its report to Inter University Board. Subsequently two vigilance cases were registered against the members being Vigilance P.S. Case No. 28/95 and 29/95. 3. The aforesaid vigilance case while remained pending the petitioner superannuated from the services of University on 31st December, 1997. Subsequently, inspite of pendency of criminal cases the Honble Chancellor vide Notification dated 3rd March, 1999 was pleased to appoint the petitioner as Vice-Chancellor, Ranchi University, Ranchi. 4. The petitioner while functioning as Vice-Chancellor Ranchi University was taken into custody on 5th June, 2000 in pursuance of vigilance P.S. Case No. 28/95 and 29/95 for the offences under Sections 467, 468, 471, 477A, 420, 201, 120B l.P.C. and Section 5(1)(d) read with 5(2) corresponding to Section 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the P.C. Act. 5. The petitioner having taken into custody preferred two separate bail applications in Special Case No. 17/95 and 18/95. They were heard and learned Special Judge, Vigilance, Patna enlarged the petitioner on ball in both the cases by two orders, both dated 8th June, 2000. The petitioner was in fact released from custody on 11th June, 2000, subsequently placed under suspension by impugned notification dated 12th June 2000 w.e.f. 5th June, 2000, the date he was taken into custody. 6. According to petitioner, the order of suspension is void, contrary to the law settled by the courts, arbitrary as the continuance under suspension violates his rights and such continuance is without application of mind. 7. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order of suspension was passed because the petitioner was taken into custody on 5th June, 2000. But the said order was passed on 12th June, 2000, by the time the petitioner had already been enlarged on bail. 7. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order of suspension was passed because the petitioner was taken into custody on 5th June, 2000. But the said order was passed on 12th June, 2000, by the time the petitioner had already been enlarged on bail. Moreover, the criminal cases having instituted in 1995, after about ten years of conversion of constituent colleges for arbitrary action of vigilance department in taking the petitioner into custody, there was no occasion to suspend the petitioner. 8. It was submitted that the petitioner having enlarged on bail represented the Honble Chancellor of Universities to revoke/withdraw the order of suspension but no order haying passed and the petitioner being allowed to continue illegaly under suspension and that the order of suspension has unnecessarily humiliated and adversely affected the dignity and prestige of petitioner, he had no option but to move the court. 9. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of Honble Chancellor, Ranchi University it is accepted that vigilance cases were instituted in 1995 while he was in the University services and retired on 31st December 1997. The petitioner was subsequently appointed as Wee-Chancellor vide Notification dated 3rd March, 1999. The stand of the Honble Chancellor is that petitioner was suspended w.e.f. 5th June, 2000 on the ground that he had been remanded to judicial custody from the said date. The Chancellor being the appointing authority also claim right to suspend a Vice-Chancellor, as a Vice-chancellor can also be removed under Section 11 of the Bihar State Universities Act, 1976. , 10. Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on Clause 10 of Statute relating to general condition of services and submitted that in terms with Sub- clause (3) to Clause 10 the order of suspension can not exceed one year from the date of suspension. Reliance was placed by both the parties on one or other provision of Bihar Universities Act, 1976 and decisions of Patna High Court and Supreme Court. 11. The officers of the University has been shown under Section 7 of the Universities Act, 1976. The power and duties of the Chancellor is stipulated under Section 9. While Section 10 stipulates Vice-Chancellor1 including its appointing authority, under Section 11 the Chancellor has been clothed with power to remove a Vice-Chancellor. 12. 11. The officers of the University has been shown under Section 7 of the Universities Act, 1976. The power and duties of the Chancellor is stipulated under Section 9. While Section 10 stipulates Vice-Chancellor1 including its appointing authority, under Section 11 the Chancellor has been clothed with power to remove a Vice-Chancellor. 12. The Statute has been framed under Section 34 of the Universities Act, 1976 wherein Clause 10 deals with suspension of a University servant, as set out hereunder : 10. (1) A University servant should be placed under suspension for reasons to be recorded in writing and while doing so the following principles may be observed:-- (i) If a University servant is being prosecuted on a criminal charge, he should be placed under suspension if he has been refused bail by the court and has been committed to prison. (ii In cases of criminal prosecution, a University servant should be suspended if the charge against him is such that on being found guilty of it, he is likely to be sentenced to a term of imprisonment or on which he would be dismissed or removed from service, in a departmental enquiry. In such cases however the order of suspension need not be passed in every case immediately after cognizance has been taken. In suitable cases it may be passed after charges have been framed. (2) Where a University servant is being proceeded against departmentally- on charges of gross-misconduct, bribery, corruption or dereliction of duty, the question of suspension should be considered with reference to the prima facie evidence available against him. If there are good reasons to believe, on the basis of material available at the time of the initiation of the proceedings, that the University servant has been guilty of gross-misconduct or dereliction of duty or bribery or corruption which, if proved, would lead to his dismissal or removal, he should be placed under suspension. In cases in which such prima facie evidence is lacking at the start, the question of suspension of the University servant may be kept pending till the findings of the enquiring officer are available. In such cases he should be required to proceed on such leave as may be due to him, and, if there is no leave to his credit, on extra- ordinary leave. In such cases he should be required to proceed on such leave as may be due to him, and, if there is no leave to his credit, on extra- ordinary leave. On the conclusion of the enquiry, if it is found that the University servant is guilty of gross-misconduct or dereliction of duty or bribery or corruption which would entail his dismissal or removal from service, he should be placed under suspension. (3) In all cases where there are reasons to believe that the University servant, if allowed to continue in active service, might attempt to tamper with the evidence, he should be required to proceed on such leave as may be due to him, or, if there is no leave to his credit, on extraordinary leave. If he refuses to proceed on leave, he may be suspended: "Provided that the period of suspension of such University servant shall not exceed one year from the date of suspension except in circumstances beyond the control of the University." 13. One of the question arises as to whether a Vice-Chancellor, who along with the Chancellor, have been categorised as Officers of the University under Section 7 of the Universities Act, 1976 are covered by Clause 10 of the Statute which deals with University servant. Learned Counsel for the petitioner and learned Advocate General for the Chancellor both submitted that University servant includes the officers of the University. Though, I have reservation with regard to the aforesaid submission that an officer of the University like the Chancellor or the Vice-chancellor to be created as University servants, it is not necessary to decide the issue in the present case having not raised by the parties. 14. The question as to whether the Chancellor has power to suspend or dismiss a Vice-Chancellor fell for consideration before Patna High Court in Acharya Prabhakar Mishra v. The Chancellor; reported in AIR 1972 Patna 393. The court held that if there was a power with the Chancellor to dismiss the Vice- Chancellor under the Act, he has also the inherent power to suspend him. 15. In the case of Bool Chand v. Kuruchetra University, reported in AIR 1968 SC 292 , the Supreme Court upheld the order of Chancellor suspending the Vice- chancellor. 16. The court held that if there was a power with the Chancellor to dismiss the Vice- Chancellor under the Act, he has also the inherent power to suspend him. 15. In the case of Bool Chand v. Kuruchetra University, reported in AIR 1968 SC 292 , the Supreme Court upheld the order of Chancellor suspending the Vice- chancellor. 16. Under Section 19 of the Bihar and Orissa General Clauses Act, 1971, it is stipulated that a power to make appointment if conferred, then, unless a different intention appears, the authority, having power to appoint shall have power to suspend or dismiss a person appointed by it in exercise of such power. 17. Thus, the Honble Chancellor being the appointing authority of a Vice- Chancellor, he has inherent power to suspend and thereby the impugned notification can not be held to be without jurisdiction. 18. The provision of Clause 10 of Statute, as quoted above, fell for consideration before Patna High Court in the case of Vidyapati Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar reported in 1996(1) PLJR 435 . Taking into consideration sub- clause (2) of Clause 10 the Court held that if in a case a prima facie evidence is available against a University servant in such case, a person can be proceeded and can be placed under suspension. In such a situation there is no question of holding a fact finding enquiry, after asking the delinquent charged employee to proceed on leave. It is only in cases where a primafacie evidence is lacking and fact finding enquiry requires to be made, during the fact finding enquiry the charged University servant can be asked to proceed on leave. 19. Sub-clause (3) to Sub-rule (10) permits the University servant to proceed on leave, where there are reasons to believe that the University servant, if allowed to continue in active service, might attempt to tamper with the evidence. If he refuses to proceed on leave then only the University servant to be suspended. However, in such case also the suspension is not to exceed one year from the date of suspension except in circumstances beyond the control of the University. 20. In the present case, admittedly, the criminal cases were lodged in the year 1995 when the petitioner was a University servant, a Professor-cum-Dean, Students Welfare. However, in such case also the suspension is not to exceed one year from the date of suspension except in circumstances beyond the control of the University. 20. In the present case, admittedly, the criminal cases were lodged in the year 1995 when the petitioner was a University servant, a Professor-cum-Dean, Students Welfare. During the investigation he was not asked to proceed on leave nor he was placed under suspension by the competent authority. Even after retirement of petitioner, inspite of pendency of such criminal cases and its investigation the petitioner was appointed as Vice-Chancellor of University vide notification dated 3rd March. 1999. Thus, it can be safely stated that the competent authority or the Honble Chancellor of the University did not think it proper to ask the petitioner to proceed on leave or to suspend him. The petitioner was merely suspended as he was taken into custody on 5th June, 2000 as evident from impugned notification of suspension dated 12th June, 2000. There is no other reason shown either in the impugned order or in the counter affidavit. 21. Admittedly, the appointment of petitioner is for a tenure of three years which will come to an end by 3rd March, 2002, te. after about eight months. In the aforesaid background, on release of petitioner from custody, the respondents should have considered the matter for his reinstatement on revocation of suspension in absence of any further development. 22. It is not the case of the respondents that a cognizance has been taken in the criminal cases and/or the respondents intend to make any departmental enquiry. In the aforesaid background, the Court feels that the order of suspension should have been revoked on release of petitioner from custody and now more than one year having passed, in terms with proviso to Sub-Cluase (3) to Clause 10 of the Statute. 23. In the facts and circumstances, the order of suspension is revoked from immediate effect. The petitioner stands reinstated. 24. So far as arrears of salary for the period of suspension is concerned, the competent authority may determine the same in accordance with law, if necessary after disposal of the criminal cases. The writ petition stands disposed of with the aforesaid observations. 25. Writ Petition disposed of.