ORDER V. Gopala Gowda, J.—Petitioner in this case seeking for issuance of a writ of certiorari to quash the endorsement dated 22.12.1990 bearing No. ARO (BN) DA 75/KTR. 48 of 1988-89 Annexure 'E' and further sought for a direction to the first Respondent-Corporation to transfer the Khatha in the name of the Petitioner in respect of the property purchased by him under sale deed dated 22.2.1988 which is registered as document No. 3538 in Book-I, Volume 2694 urging various facts and legal contentions. 2. The detailed statement of counter is filed by the second Respondent referring to the original suits in respect of property in question and also contended that this writ petition is not maintainable for the reason that the Petitioner filed number of original suits, suppressed those proceedings in filing this writ petition and further referred to the Original Suit Proceedings 494 of 1964, Miscellaneous First Appeal No. 233 of 1967, Ex. No. 56 of 1970, O.S. No. 37 of 1973, O.S. No. 436 of 1980 and M.P. No. 10114 of 1982 and further stated that second Respondent is not a party in the execution proceedings in Ex.C. No. 56 of 1970 and that second Respondent has no knowledge of the execution of the sale deed in respect of the property in favour of the deceased Petitioner and she is not a party in the Ex.C. No. 46 of 1987 and she is not aware of the execution of the sale deed in favour of the father of the Petitioner except from the records and further stated that an application was filed under Order 21, Rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure in Ex.C. No. 46 of 1987, the said application was dismissed vide order dated 23.5.1988 as not maintainable. The rights of the second Respondent are not decided in the application filed by her under Order 21, Rule 58 as could be noticed from Annexure 'E'. Therefore the said Respondent has not abused the process of the Court as alleged by the Petitioner. 3. It is also further stated that father of the Petitioner filed Miscellaneous Petition No. 10134 of 1990 for delivering the warrant issued by the Court, for delivery of the property. There was no delivery of the property in question and was only a paper delivery. In the said proceedings, second Respondent was a party as she was impleaded by the Petitioner's father. There was no delivery of the property in question and was only a paper delivery. In the said proceedings, second Respondent was a party as she was impleaded by the Petitioner's father. In the miscellaneous petition proceedings referred to supra, no L.R. application was filed to bring the LR's of the deceased Petitioner on record as required in law. Therefore the said proceedings were abated vide order at Annexure "R-1". Affidavit filed by the second Respondent in the said miscellaneous proceedings produced at Annexure "R-2". The second Respondent filed Original Suit No. 10178 of 1983 long before the miscellaneous case referred to supra. The said suit was withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh suit as there was no necessity to continue the proceedings for the reason that the suits and proceedings started by the deceased Petitioner in respect of the property in question came to be abated and he did not prosecute the proceedings which was initiated by the deceased Petitioner. The order of withdrawal of the original suit referred to supra is as per Annexure "R-3". Another Suit No. 10493 of 1994 was filed by Sri B.L. Narayan, in the said suit, the relief was claimed against the second Respondent and others contending that property belong to them. In the said suit, second Respondent has stated in her written statement that property belongs to her and further she has taken up a contention that the said original suit is not maintainable in view of the previous original suit proceedings in O.S. No. 37 of 1973 and other proceedings referred to supra and in the miscellaneous proceedings rights of the second Respondent were not decided and further it is contended that the Petitioner has suppressed filing of the Original Suit No. 10924 of 1990 referred to supra against Sri K.P. Rajendran by the deceased Petitioner through his Power of Attorney Holder for permanent injunction contending that deceased Petitioner was in possession. The said suit came to be abated vide order dated 21.1.1992 at Annexure "R-5" and further deceased Petitioner has filed another Original Suit No. 5797 of 1988 against the second Respondent for permanent injunction. The said suit also came to be abated vide order dated 2.3.1993 at Annexure "R-6". A decree is passed in the said suit as per Annexure "R-7". The said suit also came to be abated vide order dated 2.3.1993 at Annexure "R-6". A decree is passed in the said suit as per Annexure "R-7". Another suit filed by the deceased Petitioner O.S. No. 6747 of 1990 against the second Respondent for cancellation of the registered sale deed in favour of the second Respondent on 22.4.1985. The said suit was dismissed on 27.5.1992 vide Annexure "R-8". 4. Petitioner has also suppressed other relevant fact namely that the property in question is dilapidated structure which had been attached by the Court on 22.1.1960 in O.S. No. 317 of 1960 (New O.S. No. 936 of 1965) pending before the Subordinate Judge, Bangalore. That was a money suit against Lakshminarayana Setty who has suffered a decree. The said decree was executed in Ex.C. No. 355 of 1967. The said property was brought to sale in the public auction. One Mr. Subramaniyan purchased the property, got the sale certificate on 14.4.1976 and came to the possession of the property. He had obtained possession of the property in question through the Court. He sold the property on 24.5.1988 in favour of the second Respondent and she has been put in possession of the property and invested lakhs of rupees by putting up basement floor and a portion of the ground floor. Khatha of the property has been changed in the name of the second Respondent. The aforesaid relevant facts have been suppressed by the Petitioner and further the deceased Petitioner also gave a complaint to the jurisdictional police to put him in possession and that complaint dated 27.10.1990 is at Annexure "R-9". Therefore the learned Counsel Mr. G.S. Visweswara for the second Respondent submits placing reliance upon the various judgments of the Court and the legal proceedings in respect of the property in question between the Petitioner's father and Mr. Lakshminarayan Shetty who was the original owner of the property and second Respondent's vendor Mr. Subramanyam and Lakshminarayan Shetty and the Petitioner and the second Respondent that the impugned order passed by the first Respondent is in conformity with the provisions of Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 and in accordance with law. The legal contentions which are referred to by the Learned Counsel for the parties will be adverted at the time of considering the rival contentions of the parties in this order. 5. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner Mr. The legal contentions which are referred to by the Learned Counsel for the parties will be adverted at the time of considering the rival contentions of the parties in this order. 5. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner Mr. Paras Jain in support of his case placed relianced upon the judgment of the Apex Court reported in Kedar Nath Lal and Another Vs. Ganesh Ram and Others, AIR 1970 SC 1717 with regard to the Doctrine of Lis Pendens and its applicability under Section 52 of Transfer of Property Act in respect of the facts on hand. He also placed reliance upon Mitra's Transfer of Property Act, Page No. 254, 15th Edition, in support of the proposition of law that during pendency of the suit any transfer of property, such transfer is void and further placed reliance upon the judgment of the Nivarti Govind Ingale and Others Vs. Revanagouda Bhimanagouda Patil, (1996) 9 AD SC 406 in support of the proposition that subsequent purchaser of the property is bound by the decree rendered in favour of the decree holder in that original suit, at para 7 of the said case it has been held that "subsequent purchaser second Respondent had no knowledge of pendency of the suit is bound by the agreement, any subsequent sale will be barred by the doctrine of lis pendens as provided under Section 52 of Transfer of Property Act and therefore the subsequent purchaser is bound by the decree of specific performance and liable to reconvey the property of the appellants". He has also placed reliance upon the Judgment of Apex Court in Ram Harakh (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Hamid Ahmed Khan (Dead) by Lrs. and Others, JT (1998) 9 SC 227 and Achutananda Baidya Vs. Prafullya Kumar Gayen and others, AIR 1997 SC 2077 in support of the proposition that this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 judicial review power includes the administrative superintendence, and therefore he submits that this Court can also interfere with finding of fact arrived at and recorded by the subordinate Court if such findings are not based on any evidence or based on manifesting misreading of the evidence. 6. Learned Counsel Mr. 6. Learned Counsel Mr. G.S. Visweswara placed reliance upon the proceedings in the civil litigation referred to above in the original suits filed by the Petitioner, which are referred in the counter statement and those original suits seeking the reliefs in respect of the property in question were dismissed. He further states that those facts have not been stated in the writ petition with a deliberate intention to get the relief at the hands of this Court and therefore he is not entitled for the relief at the hands of this Court. Further learned Counsel for the second Respondent has contended that the order of the Joint Commissioner of the Corporation is strictly in conformity with the provisions of the Act. He had no jurisdiction to conduct the trial based on the civil rights of the parties in exercise of its statutory power under Section 114(A) of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act and determine the rights on the basis of the disputed questions of fact. The second Respondent has been put in possession of the property in question as per the documents produced by him and the alleged possession of the Petitioner pursuant to the execution proceedings referred to in the writ petition are only paper delivery possession of the property, neither Petitioner is in actual possession or in constructive possession. Therefore the first Respondent has rightly rejected the application for change of Khatha in respect of the property in question after conducting an enquiry as contemplated under Sections 114 and 114(A) of the Act. Therefore he has urged that this Court need not examine various legal contentions urged by the Petitioner's Counsel and the reliance placed upon the judgments of the Apex Court are not applicable to the facts of this case. Hence, he has requested this Court to reject the contentions as the same are wholly untenable in law. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties, the following two questions that would arise for consideration of this Court and answer the same as hereunder: 1) The Sale of the property in question in favour of the second Respondent by her vendor who was an auction purchaser in the public auction is hit by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. 2) Khatha of the property made in favour of the second Respondent by the first Respondent in respect of the property in question on the basis of the sale deed executed by the second Respondent-vendor's is legal and valid? 3) Whether the impugned order passed by the first Respondent either suffers from error in law or the findings are erroneous, which warrants interference by this Court in exercise of its judicial review power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India? 7. To answer the above said points framed by this Court, it is necessary for this Court to refer to the provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, which is extracted hereunder: Section 52. During the pendency in any Court having authority within the limits of India excluding the State of Jammu and Kashmir or established beyond such limits by the Central Government,...of any suit or proceeding which is not collusive and in which any right to Immovable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein, except under the authority of the Court and on such terms as it may impose. 8. It is an undisputed fact that the Petitioner's father who had the decree against the original owner of the property in question in O.S. No. 494 of 1964, which original suit is for specific performance of contract, pursuant to an agreement against the deceased Defendant Mr. Lakshminarayan Shetty he paid a sum of Rs. 8,000.00 as an advance amount and the balance consideration amount of Rs. 17,000.00 within a week from the date of decree passed. The said amount was deposited under R.O. No. 4033 by the Petitioner's father. The said decree was a subject matter of an appeal before this Court and the same came to be dismissed. The said decree was executed in the execution proceedings. During pendency of the execution petition, the judgment debtor in the suit filed by the deceased Petitioner had filed a partition suit. Therefore one of his brother's son got whole of the execution proceedings stayed including operation of the decree passed in O.S. No. 494 of 1964. The said suit came to be dismissed in the year 1993. During pendency of the execution petition, the judgment debtor in the suit filed by the deceased Petitioner had filed a partition suit. Therefore one of his brother's son got whole of the execution proceedings stayed including operation of the decree passed in O.S. No. 494 of 1964. The said suit came to be dismissed in the year 1993. One Mr. G.B. Subramanyam who had filed money suit against Lakshminarayana Setty-judgment debtor in O.S. No. 494 of 1964, who was fully aware of the fact that there was a suit for specific performance of the contract, which was filed by the deceased Petitioner and the same was decreed and appeal filed against said decree was dismissed and the balance consideration amount of Rs. 17,000.00 was deposited by him pursuant to the decree passed by the Civil Court. Despite knowledge of the aforesaid relevant facts with Sri G.B. Subramanyam, he had purchased the said property in execution of a decree for a sum of Rs. 4,800.00. Purchase of the said property by said Sri G.B. Subramanyam second Respondent's vendor was during pendency of the lis between late Petitioner and Sri Lakshmi Narayan Shetty pursuant to the recovery of the money decree amount of Rs. 4,800.00 in the year 1976 in the Court Auction for a sum of Rs. 7,600.00, though the property was sold before 16 years for a sum of Rs. 25,000.00 to the deceased Petitioner pursuant to the agreement. In view of the said undisputed fact the case of the parties are required to be examined by this Court with reference to the law laid down by the Apex Court with regard to the "Doctrine of Lis Pendens" as provided under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Apex court in the case of Kedarnath Lal upon which much reliance is placed by the Petitioner's Counsel, with reference to the provisions of Section 52, the Apex Court has laid down the law succinctly at Paragraphs 15 to 17, which reads thus: 15. The first argument is that there could be no lis pendens till August 16, when the money award was issued because a money suit or proceeding cannot lead to the application of the doctrine of lis pendens. As a proposition of law the argument is sound but it is wrongly grounded on fact. The first argument is that there could be no lis pendens till August 16, when the money award was issued because a money suit or proceeding cannot lead to the application of the doctrine of lis pendens. As a proposition of law the argument is sound but it is wrongly grounded on fact. The proceeding was to get a mortgage award, the equivalent of a mortgage decree. The Court made a mistake and treated it as a proceeding for a money decree. When the Court corrected its order, the mortgage award related back to the petition as made and the whole of the proceeding must be treated as covered by the doctrine. We cannot, therefore, accede to the suggestion that the doctrine did not apply at any rate, on this suggested ground. 16. The second ground of attack is that before the proceedings commenced before the Registrar these fields had been attached and therefore, the doctrine of lis pendens again cannot apply. We are unable to accept this argument either. If the property was acquired pendente lite, the acquirer is bound by the decree ultimately obtained in the proceedings pending at the time of acquisition. This result is not avoided by reason of the earlier attachment. Attachment of property is only effective in preventing alienation but it is not intended to create any title to the property. On the other hand, Section 52 places a complete embargo on the transfer of immovable property right to which is directly and specifically in question in a pending litigation. Therefore the attachment was ineffective against the doctrine. Authority for this clear position is hardly necessary but if one is desired it will be found in Moti Lal Vs. Karrab-ul-Din, (1897) 24 I A 170 (PC). 17. Lastly it was contended that the sale was by Court auction and the doctrine of lis pendens would not apply to such a sale. This point was considered in Samarendra Nath Sinha and Another Vs. Krishna Kumar Nag, AIR 1967 SC 1440 by one of us (Shelat, J) and it was observed as follows: ...The purchaser pendente lite under this doctrine is bound by the result of the litigation on the principle that since the result must bind the party to it so must it bind the person deriving his right, title and interest from or through him. This principle is well illustrated in Radhamadhub Holder v. Monohar, (1887)15 Ind App 97 where the facts were almost similar to those in the instant case. It is true that Section 52, strictly speaking, does not apply to involuntary alienations such as Court sales but it is well established that the principle of lis pendens applies to such alienations (See Nilkant Vs. Suresh Chandra, (1885) 12 Ind App 171 and (1897) 24 Ind App 170 (PC)". This ground also has no validity. 9. The said principle has been reiterated by the Apex Court in the subsequent judgments upon which reliance is placed by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner. At para 4, Ram Harakh (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Hamid Ahmed Khan (Dead) by Lrs. and Others, JT (1998) 9 SC 227 the Apex Court with reference to the provisions of the Zamindari Abolition Act and various enactments referred to in the said paragraph and Section 52 of the Act, it has clearly laid down the law holding that the entries made in respect of the property in question has no legal effect as the matter was covered by Lis Pendens. 10. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has also placed reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court reported in Achutananda Baidya Vs. Prafullya Kumar Gayen and others, AIR 1997 SC 2077 paras 9, 10 and 11 with reference to the judicial review of power under Article 227 of this Court for the purpose of examining the order passed by the first Respondent keeping in view of the undisputed facts and the clear pronouncement of law laid by the Apex Court in the case referred to supra, which is extracted hereunder: 9. We are, however, unable to accept such contention of Mr. Bhattacharya. In this case, the High Court has rightly held that the appellate authority came to the finding of non-existence of oral agreement of reconveyance without considering the evidence on record. If the appellate authority does not consider the materials on record having a bearing on a finding of fact and makes the finding of fact, such finding of fact arrived without consideration of relevant materials on record cannot be sustained in law. The High Court, in such circumstances, will be competent to consider the validity of the finding of fact assailed before it with reference to materials on record. 10. The High Court, in such circumstances, will be competent to consider the validity of the finding of fact assailed before it with reference to materials on record. 10. The power of superintendence of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is not confined to administrative superintendence only but such power includes within its sweep the power of judicial review. The power and duty of the High Court under Article 227 is essentially to ensure that the Courts and tribunals, inferior to High Court, have done what they were required to do. Law is well settled by various decisions of this Court that the High Court can interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution in cases of erroneous assumption or acting beyond its jurisdiction, refusal to exercise jurisdiction, error of law apparent on record as distinguished from a mere mistake of law, arbitrary or capricious exercise of authority or discretion, a patent error in procedure, arriving at a finding which is perverse or based on no material, or resulting in manifest injustice. As regards finding of fact of the inferior Court, the High Court should not quash the judgment of the subordinate Court merely on the ground that its finding of fact was erroneous but it will be open to the High Court in exercise of the powers under Article 227 to interfere with the finding of fact if the subordinate Court came to the conclusion without any evidence or upon manifest misreading of the evidence thereby indulging in improper exercise of jurisdiction or if its conclusions are perverse. 11. If the evidence on record in respect of a question of fact is not at all taken into consideration and without reference to such evidence, the finding of fact is arrived at by inferior Court or tribunal, such finding must be held to be perverse and lacking in factual basis. In such circumstances, in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court will be competent to quash such perverse finding of fact. 12. In such circumstances, in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court will be competent to quash such perverse finding of fact. 12. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case cited supra, the filing of the subsequent suits by the deceased Petitioner against various persons are all not relevant and good grounds for this Court in not to grant the reliefs in favour of the Petitioner in this petition in view of the reasons recorded in this order while answering the first point formulated by this Court. Therefore, this Court has to hold that the sale of the property in the Court Auction pursuant to the money decree filed by one Mr. G.B. Subramanyam the second Respondent's vendor is totally impermissible in law and consequently the purchase of the property by the second Respondent's vendor is void ab-initio in law. The ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the cases referred to supra, after interpreting Section 52 of the Act and also the Mitra's Transfer of Property Act at page 254, in this view of the matter, the various contentions urged by the Learned Counsel Mr. G.S. Visweswara on behalf of the second Respondent that the Petitioner has suppressed many relevant material facts of institution of the original suits and the second Respondent's vendor was not a party in the execution proceedings and second Respondent also not a party in the execution proceedings and she has purchased the property from her vendor who had purchased the property in the Court Auction pursuant to a money decree and he was put in possession after execution of the sale deed. The second Respondent was put in possession pursuant to the sale deed executed in her favour cannot be accepted in view of the law declared by the Apex Court and under the provisions of Section 52 of Transfer of Property Act. The sale transaction in respect of the property in question is void ab-initio in law. Therefore the first point is already answered against the second Respondent and in favour of the Petitioner. 13. The sale transaction in respect of the property in question is void ab-initio in law. Therefore the first point is already answered against the second Respondent and in favour of the Petitioner. 13. Therefore, the points 2 and 3 are required to be answered together by this Court with reference to the undisputed facts and the law laid down by the Apex Court in the cases cited supra and this Court has already recorded a finding on point No. 1 holding that sale made in favour of the second Respondent is void ab-initio in law as the same is hit by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and further the khatha made in the name of the second Respondent by the first Respondent on the basis of the claim made by the second Respondent should have been examined with reference to the titles of the property in respect of which the claim was made by the second Respondent. The deceased Petitioner filed an application before the first Respondent under Section 114A of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 contending that there was a valid ground for rectification of the Khatha made in favour of the second Respondent producing the documents to show that the decree passed in a suit for specific performance filed by the deceased Petitioner against the original owner of the property was executed and he has been put in possession of the property in question. These important aspects of the matter have not been taken into consideration by the first Respondent at the time of passing the order to enter the name of the second Respondent as Khathedar of the property. The contention urged on behalf of the second Respondent contending that the first Respondent is not a Civil Court to determine the civil rights of the party to recall the order passed by the Authority in registering the second Respondent as Khathedar of the property, as he has got limited powers under Section 114A of the Act of 1976 and therefore he has no power to resolve the disputed questions of fact and record a finding is also examined and considered by this Court keeping in view the law declared by the Apex Court in the case of 1995 (5) SCC 76 paras 9 to 11. By reading Section 114A of the Act of 1976 the first Respondent has got suo-motu power or otherwise after such enquiry as he considered necessary as specified with any transfer of title in respect of an immovable property under Section 114A of the Act of 1976 it finds that khata of the property is obtained either by fraud, misrepresentation or suppression of facts by a person. The nature of power conferred upon the first Respondent is a quasi-judicial exercise of power for the reason that the Commissioner under Section 114A of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act has got a statutory duty of conducting an enquiry and affording an opportunity to the parties concerned before taking a decision under the above said provision. The Commissioner of the Corporation has to determine the rights of the parties on the basis of the undisputed documents with respect to the Immovable property in exercise of his power under Section 114A of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act. In the instant case, already this Court recorded a finding while answering the point No. 1 framed by it in favour of the Petitioner holding that the sale made by the second Respondent's vendor in her favour is void ab-initio in law in view of Section 52 of Transfer of Property Act and the law laid down by the Apex Court in the cases referred to supra which are applicable to the facts of this case with all fours. The documents produced by the deceased Petitioner should have been considered by the first Respondent while exercising his power under Section 114A of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act. Therefore, this Court has to hold that the first Respondent has failed to exercise his jurisdiction properly and further the reasons given by the second Respondent in the impugned order are contrary to law, the Court documents and the documents upon which reliance is placed by the Petitioner. Therefore the order passed by the second Respondent is bad in law. Therefore the first Respondent was not right in directing Petitioner to approach the competent Civil Court as the same is not in conformity with the law laid down by the Apex Court in the cases referred to supra. Therefore the order passed by the second Respondent is bad in law. Therefore the first Respondent was not right in directing Petitioner to approach the competent Civil Court as the same is not in conformity with the law laid down by the Apex Court in the cases referred to supra. The first Respondent should have noticed that the second Respondent on misrepresentation of facts without disclosing the relevant facts such as pendency of the suit filed by the deceased Petitioner against the original owner, decree of specific performance passed in favour of the deceased Petitioner in respect of the property in question and execution of the decree and got the sale deed executed in favour of the deceased Petitioner in respect of the property and the provisions of Section 52 of the Act are all the grounds upon which the first Respondent should have accepted the case of the Petitioner and pass the appropriate order. Therefore the impugned order passed by the second Respondent suffers from error in law. Therefore, the Petitioner must succeed in this petition and the impugned order is liable to be quashed. 14. In the normal course, this Court after having come to the conclusion after considering rival contentions that the impugned order at Annexure 'E' is vitiated in law, matter could have been remanded back to the first Respondent for his reconsideration. Keeping in view the law on the relevant issue, however this Court having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, particularly the longevity of the case and undisputed facts with regard to the pendency of the suit and the property was purchased by the second Respondent's vendor, which is hit by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, the said sale of the property in question is void and the law laid down by the Apex Court in this regard. The khatha of the property in question made in the name of the second Respondent based on purchase of the property by the second Respondent's vendor and subsequently in the name of the second Respondent is in violation of Section 114 as either of them have acquired valid title to the property in question and the second Respondent has got khatha of the property made in her favour by misrepresentation of facts as stated above. Therefore it is a proper and fit case for this Court to exercise its power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for the reason that the grounds enumerated under Section 114A of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act are attracted in the instant case. Further, having regard to the longevity of the litigation pending between the parties for the last two decades, it would be proper and appropriate to direct the first Respondent to make the Khatha in the name of the Petitioner as expeditiously as possible, but not later than six weeks from the date of receipt of this order. Accordingly, I pass the following order: 15. Writ petition is allowed, Rule made absolute. Impugned order at Annexure-E dated 22.12.1990 is hereby quashed. The first Respondent is directed to comply with the direction issued in the penultimate paragraph of this order. 16. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, no costs are awarded in these proceedings.