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2001 DIGILAW 440 (ORI)

Manoj Kumar Binayak Prasad Mohapatra v. State of Orissa

2001-10-09

B.P.DAS

body2001
ORDER 9. 10. 2001 — This is an application under Sec. 438 of the Code of Crimi¬nal Procedure (in short ‘Cr.P.C.’) praying for anticipatory bail. 2. From the averments made in the application, it appears that an F.I.R. was lodged by the Deputy Chief Materials Manager (Stores) of Bokaro Steel Plant, Bokaro, registered as Marafari Thana Case No. 52/97 corresponding to G. R. Case No. 553/97 which is pending in the Court of Chas, Bokaro. From the affidavit filed by the petitioners, it reveals that the petitioners have been implicated in the offences under Secs. 407/420/421, I.P.C. It is also stated that the petitioners are the officers f M/s. Indian Metals and Ferros Alloys Ltd., Bhubaneswar, and at the relevant time were posted at its factory at Therubali and they are in no way connected with the alleged offences. However, the Bihar police have come to Orissa and are threatening the petitioners to arrest them. It is stated that the petitioners are all respect¬able citizens of the State and are employed in high posts in I.M.F.A. at Bhubaneswar and Therubali. 3. During the course of hearing, learned Addl. Govt. Advocate contends that the application under Sec. 438, Cr.P.C. is absolutely not maintainable before this Court as this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the same because the offences are alleged to have been committed by the accused petitioners in another State. According to him, the place of domicile cannot be regarded as a factor for conferring jurisdiction in this Court. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the State refers to a Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court in Sayed Zafrul Hassan v. State, AIR 1986 Patna 194, wherein it was held as follows : “.........Section 438 of the Code does not permit the grant of anticipatory bail by any High Court or any Court of Session within the country where the accused may choose to apprehend arrest. Such a power vests only in the Court of Session or the High Court having jurisdiction over the locale of the commission of the offence of which the person is accused.” 4. In view of the contention raised by the learned counsel for the State, it is apposite to have a look at Section 438, Cr.P.C. which reads thus : “438. In view of the contention raised by the learned counsel for the State, it is apposite to have a look at Section 438, Cr.P.C. which reads thus : “438. Direction for grant of bail to person apprehending arrest :- (1) When any person has reason to believe that he may be arrested on an accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or the Court of Session for a direction under this section; and that Court may, if it thinks fit, direct that in the event of such arrest, he shall be released on bail. (2) When the High Court or the Court of Session makes a direction under Sub-sec.(1), it may include such conditions in such directions in the light of the facts of the particular case, as it may think fit, including - (i) a condition that the person shall make himself available for interrogation by a police officer as when required; (ii) a condition that person shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police officer; (iii) a condition that the person shall not leave India without the previous permission of the Court; (iv) such other condition as may be imposed under Sub-sec. (3) of Section 437, as if the bail were granted under that section. (3) If such person is thereafter arrested without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station on such accusation, and is prepared either at the time of arrest or at any time while in the custody of such officer to give bail, he shall be released on bail; and if a Magistrate taking cognizance of such offence de¬cides that a warrant should issue in the first instance against that person, he shall issue a bailable warrant in conformity with the direction of the Court under Sub-sec. (1).” In this context, it is profitable to quote the observation made by the Constitution Bench of the apex Court in Gurbaksh Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 1632 , in para 7 thereof: “7. The facility which Section 438 affords is generally referred to as ‘anticipatory bail’, an expression which was used by the Law Commission in its 41st report. The facility which Section 438 affords is generally referred to as ‘anticipatory bail’, an expression which was used by the Law Commission in its 41st report. Neither the section nor its marginal note so describes it but, the expression ‘anticipatory bail’ is a convenient mode of conveying that it is possible to apply for bail in anticipation of arrest. Any order of bail can, of course, be effective only from the time of arrest because, to grant bail, as stated in Wharton’s Law Lexicon, is to ‘set at liberty a person arrested or imprisoned, on security being taken for his appearance’. Thus, bail is basically release from restraint, more particularly, release from the custody of the police. The act of arrest directly affects freedom of movement of the person arrested by the police, and speaking generally, an order of bail gives back to the accused that free¬dom on condition that he will appear to take his trial. Personal recognisance, suretyship bonds and such other modalities are the means by which an assurance is secured from the accused that though he has been released on bail, he will present himself at the trial of offence or offences of which he is charged and for which he was arrested. The distinction between an ordinary order of bail and an order of anticipatory bail is that whereas the former is granted after arrest and therefore means release from the custody of the police, the latter is granted in anticipation of arrest and is therefore effective at the very moment of ar¬rest. Police custody is an inevitable concomitant of arrest for non-bailable offences. An order of anticipatory bail constitutes, so to say, an insurance against police custody following upon arrest for offence or offences in respect of which the order is issued. In other words, unlike a post-arrest order of bail, it is a pre-arrest legal process which directs that if the person in whose favor it is issued is thereafter arrested on the accusation in respect of which the direction is issued, he shall be released on bail. In other words, unlike a post-arrest order of bail, it is a pre-arrest legal process which directs that if the person in whose favor it is issued is thereafter arrested on the accusation in respect of which the direction is issued, he shall be released on bail. Section 46 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure which deals with how arrests are to be made, provides that in making the arrest, the police officer or other person making the arrest “shall actually touch or confine the body of the person to be arrested, unless there be a submission to the custody by word or action”. A direction under Sec. 438 is intended to confer condi¬tional immunity from this ‘touch’ or confinement.’’ The apex Court while dealing with the legislative intention in inserting the provision in Section 438, Cr.P.C. in the case of Balchand Jain v. State of M.P., AIR 1977 S.C. 366 , observed that there was no such power under the existing provisions of the old Code, in order to relieve a person from being disgraced by being detained in jail for some days before he can apply for bail when he is implicated in a false case by a rival; and apart from such case, where there are reasonable grounds for holding that a person accused of an offence is not likely to abscond, or other¬wise misuse his liberty while on bail, there also seems no justi¬fication to require him first to submit to custody, remain in prison for some days and then apply for bail. It is clear that the salutary provision was enshrined in Section 438 to see that the liberty of the subject is not put in jeopardy on frivolous grounds at the instance of unscrupulous or irresponsible persons or officers who may be in charge of prosecution. 5. Thus, Section 438 is a safeguard against arrest, that too pre-trial arrest, which stands on a different footing than the trial of the case, and bail under that section can be granted where the person must have genuine apprehension regarding his arrest and it has to be based on accusation pertaining to a non-bailable offence. So, the language used in the section, i.e., “.................person has reason to believe that he may be arrested........”, is most important and not the locale of the commission of the offence. 6. So, the language used in the section, i.e., “.................person has reason to believe that he may be arrested........”, is most important and not the locale of the commission of the offence. 6. In a recent decision of this Court in Dinesh Kumar Naik v. State of Orissa, 91 (2001) CLT 309, it was held that the place where a person apprehends arrest is the place for determining the jurisdiction of the High Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, and that the relief in the shape of anticipatory bail may be granted to a petitioner if he satisfies the Court that he would be arrested at a place within the territorial limits of a particular Court and the apprehension is based on reasonable grounds. 7. Now I have to examine whether in the facts of the present case, the petitioners are entitled to get any relief under Sec. 438, Cr.P.C. 8. Admittedly, the petitioners are officers of a private limited company of the State and they have been implicated in some non-bailable offences as would appear from the F.I.R. lodged at Marafari Thana in Bokaro in the State of Bihar. In para 7 of the petition, it is stated that the police at Bokaro came to Therubali after about 5 years on 10.5.2001 on the pretext of making investigations and are trying to harass the petitioners demanding appearance of the petitioners before Bokaro police, failing which to-face warrant of arrest. From the facts disclosed in the petition, the apprehension of the petitioners is genuine. Considering the submission of the learned counsel for the peti¬tioners, I direct that in the event of arrest of the petitioners in connection with G.R. Case No. 553/97 corresponding to Marafari Thana Case No. 52/97 for the offences under Secs. 407/420/421, I.P.C., they shall be released on bail on executing a bond of rupees fifty thousand each with two sureties of local residents of Bhubaneswar each for the like amount to the satisfaction of the arresting officer with the condition that the petitioners shall approach the appropriate Court in the State of Bihar within four weeks from the date of their arrest. This order shall remain effective till appearance of the petitioners before the appropri¬ate Court at Bokaro or expiry of the period of four weeks from the date of the order and shall automatically stand cancelled after expiry of the aforesaid period. In the meantime, the peti¬tioners shall make themselves available for interrogation before the Investigating Officer as and when required and shall not directly or indirectly indulge in either tampering with the evidence or influencing any witness. The application is allowed accordingly. Application allowed.