JUDGMENT - Dr. D.Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.:---The present proceedings in writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arise out of an order of the Industrial Tribunal dated 18th April, 2001. The order of the Industrial Tribunal arose out of a complaint, being complaint ULP No. 1160/1999, filed under Items 5, 9 and 10 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971. 2. The principal issues which arose before the Industrial Tribunal were in regard to a settlement dated 26th May, 1998 in so far it relates to (1) An Incentive Scheme; and (2) The conduct and management of a Canteen facility. In so far the incentive scheme is concerned, the Tribunal by its impugned order has directed the petitioner to implement Clause 4.6 of the settlement and to review the Incentive scheme after discussing the issue with the Complainant Union. 3. The contention of the management before the Industrial Tribunal was that under Clause 4.2 of the settlement the incentive scheme was provided for in order to achieve and enhance productivity by offering an incentive to the employees. The bone of contention between the parties was in relation to the following clause in Annexure E to the settlement which deals with the revision of the scheme : "Revision of the Scheme: The scheme may undergo revision in terms of payment basis and/or payment rates for the purpose of improving individuals/group performance of staff during the pendency of the settlement in consultation with the concerned unions. The review will generally be undertaken only after a period of one years." While according to the union, the management was bound to review the basis of payment or the rates provided for in the scheme after one year, according to the management, there was no right vested in the union to such a review of the existing scheme. According to the submissions of the learned Counsel for the petitioner the object of the incentive scheme is to achieve an enhancement in productivity and if, in view of the present market conditions a further enhancement in the productivity is not required to be achieved by the management for want of demand, there is no necessity of revising the scheme any further. 4. The second issue which arose before the Industrial Tribunal was in relation to the provisions of the canteen facility. 4. The second issue which arose before the Industrial Tribunal was in relation to the provisions of the canteen facility. The union relied upon certain file notes and memoranda of understanding which had been arrived at between the parties prior to the settlement dated 26th May, 1998. According to the management these cannot be relied upon once the settlement is arrived at under section 18 of the Act, since the settlement in Clause 4.19.2 expressly provides that all the demands which had been raised in the Charter of Demands, during the course of negotiations and those contained in the clause which had not been acceded to in the settlement would be deemed to have been settled or withdrawn. Moreover, Clause 4.19.4 of the settlement provided that during the pendency of the settlement the union will not raise any demand resulting directly or indirectly in financial burden on the company. 5. I heard the learned Counsel for the parties. From a perusal of the order of the Industrial Tribunal which runs into 56 pages it would be apparent that the findings are essentially contained in two pages between paragraphs 34 and 36. The Industrial Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the petitioners had shown favouritism to one set of workers regardless of merits and is, therefore, guilty of an unfair labour practice under Item 6 of Schedule IV. Similarly in paragraph 36 the conclusion which has been arrived at is that by failing to review the incentive scheme the petitioner has engaged in an unfair labour practice under Item 9 of Schedule IV. The allegation that there was a violation of Item 10 of Schedule IV has, however, been rejected. 6. There is substance in the contention of the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that there is virtually no discussion at all of the submission which were advanced on behalf of the petitioner and the first respondent before the Industrial Court in regard to the interpretation of the clause in Annexure E relating to the revision of the incentive scheme. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the first respondent submitted that there is sufficient evidence on the record on the basis of which the respondent will be able to demonstrate to the Industrial Court that there was a failure on the part of the management to implement the scheme. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the first respondent submitted that there is sufficient evidence on the record on the basis of which the respondent will be able to demonstrate to the Industrial Court that there was a failure on the part of the management to implement the scheme. The learned Counsel has, however, fairly stated that the evidence has not been duly considered by the Industrial Court and that the findings which have been arrived at do not deal with the material on the record. Similarly on the issue relating to the canteen facility, the question as to whether the File Notes and Memoranda of understanding between the parties prior to the date of the settlement could at all be relied upon once an industrial settlement was arrived at has not been dealt with by the Industrial Court. That being the position, it is only appropriate and proper that the matter be remanded back to the Industrial Court to reconsider the case on the basis of the evidence and the material which is already on the record before it. It would be proper for the Industrial Tribunal not merely to extract the pleadings of the parties and to extract verbatim the evidence on the record but also to discuss the material on the record with regard to the submissions of the rival parties before it. The reasons in a judgment disclose the element of judicial consideration and of an application of mind by the adjudicating authority. The findings of fact must therefore emerge upon an assessment and discussion of the oral and documentary evidence. Similarly, the conclusion of law must be arrived at with reference to the relevant statutory provisions and the principles laid down in the decided cases. An exercise of extracting the pleadings, followed by the evidence is not adequate unless the Industrial Court furnishes adequate reasons for the conclusions and findings on the issues of fact and law. In the circumstances, the learned Counsel have agreed that the impugned order may be set aside and that the case may be remanded back to the Industrial Tribunal for fresh consideration. It is clarified that this order should not be construed as amounting to an expression of opinion on the merits of the case and all the rights and contentions of the parties on all issues are kept open. It is clarified that this order should not be construed as amounting to an expression of opinion on the merits of the case and all the rights and contentions of the parties on all issues are kept open. The Industrial Court is directed to hear and dispose of the reference within a period of three months from today. Parties shall appear before the Industrial Court for directions on 18th June, 2001 so that a time schedule for the hearing of the case can be laid down by the Court. The writ petition is accordingly allowed and the impugned order of the Industrial Court is quashed and set aside. In the circumstances there shall be no order as to costs. Certified copy expedited. Writ petition allowed. -----