( 1 ) WE have heard the appellants' learned Counsel, learned Counsel for the contesting respondents and the learned Government Advocate on merits. The present appeal is directed against an order of the learned single Judge dated 12-3-2001 whereby the writ petitions filed by the appellants were dismissed. The dispute is within a very narrow ambit and we shall summarise the controversy very briefly. The appellants owned a plot of land on the bank of a nala which was sold in the year 1993 to respondents 4 and 5 and has been numbered as R. S. No. 2/1 and 2/2. The nala or river in question has apparently changed course and as often happens, a piece of alluvial land has been formed between the aforesaid lands and the river and the entire dispute is with regard to this alluvial land. The respondents 4 and 5 applied for the grant of this land to them and there is some controversy as to what was the role of the appellants. It is correct to state that the record indicates that the appellants did object to the grant of the lands to the respondents 4 and 5 but the application is so worded that it also states that the lands should have been granted to them. The authorities have passed an order granting the alluvial land to respondents 4 and 5 on certain terms and conditions. Respondents 4 and 5 have deposited the amount which is equivalent to three times the assessment against the allotment and according to them they have also been put in possession. ( 2 ) THERE has been considerable litigation that has emanated as a result of these decisions because the appellants have challenged the grant principally on the ground that under Section 92 of the Karnataka land Revenue Act, 1964 they have the right to ask for the alluvial land in question, that they had in fact done so and that they were not given a hearing nor was their application considered. The Karnataka Appellate tribunal after hearing the parties dismissed the two appeals filed by the appellants and it was against this order that they preferred the two writ petitions which were in turn dismissed by the learned Single Judge. The Karnataka Appellate tribunal after hearing the parties dismissed the two appeals filed by the appellants and it was against this order that they preferred the two writ petitions which were in turn dismissed by the learned Single Judge. Both the forums below have proceeded on the footing that the alluvial land could only have been offered to the respondents who were the adjoining landholders and that therefore, the authorities were not obliged to give any notice to the appellants even if they had objected or even if they had staked a rival claim. The present appeals are directed against these orders. ( 3 ) MR. Patil, learned Counsel who represents the appellants has submitted that the refusal to hear the appellants or rather to issue notice to them constitutes a negation of the appellants' rights. His submission is that there is a breach of procedure insofar as since the appellants had applied for the grant of the lands to them, that the authorities were obliged to consider their case along with that of the respondents 4 and 5 and that the appellants would have demonstrated that the whole or part of the alluvial land should have been allotted to them because according to Mr. Patil, the appellants have a right to ask for it. His submission is that Section 92 will have to be interpreted in such a way as to create a vested right in all those persons who are the adjoining owners on the bank or the shore and that since the appellants were owners upto 1993 that they have every right to be considered. ( 4 ) MR. Hebballi, learned Counsel who represents respondents 4 and 5 submitted that the appellants have absolutely no locus standi in the proceeding because it is not the question of who applies but the law postulates that for very obvious reasons it is the authorities who are required to ascertain who the adjoining holders are on the bank or the shore and offer the newly formed alluvial land to them and only if they refuse, that the procedure contemplated under Section 91 of holding out the land for allotment etc. , would arise. Mr. Hebballi has also met the second argument canvassed by Mr. , would arise. Mr. Hebballi has also met the second argument canvassed by Mr. Patil by contending that assuming without admitting that these rights had vested in the appellants who were the previous owners prior to 1993, that these rights stand transferred to the respondents 4 and 5 who are the new owners, that they are rights that run with the land and are inseparable therefrom. Either way, he submitted that the appellants are totally disentitled from any consideration and that the authorities have very rightly excluded them. The learned Government Advocate has supported the order because it was his submission that the authorities are not obliged to take cognizance of applications or objections from all and sundry but that the authorities have to go by the requirements of law which postulate that they have to offer the lands to the adjoining owner and to nobody else, his submission therefore is that consequentially there was no question or legal necessity of considering the objections/applications of the appellants. ( 5 ) WE need to record that the legal position is very clear insofar as the law enjoins upon the authorities to offer the alluvial land in the first instance to the adjoining holders or occupants as they would be the best suited to bring those lands under cultivation. It is only if they refuse the offer that the question of advertising and inviting other applicants would come in. From this point of view, normally the position as pointed out by the learned Counsel who represents the respondents and learned government Advocate would hold good and we would have totally declined any interference whatsoever. There is only one aspect of the case that has created a slight problem which is the fact that admittedly, the alluvial lands are formed over a long period of time because this is a very slow process of nature. We have taken note of the fact that it is a relatively large area of 8 acres which must have been formed over several years. The position that emerges is that if factually the alluvial land had been formed prior to the date of the sale and if at that point of time it had been offered to the appellants who admittedly at that point of time were the adjoining owners then they would certainly have had a right to consider the offer. The position that emerges is that if factually the alluvial land had been formed prior to the date of the sale and if at that point of time it had been offered to the appellants who admittedly at that point of time were the adjoining owners then they would certainly have had a right to consider the offer. Had they accepted it, one can visualise a situation whereby they might have sold their pre-existing lands or all the lands or part of them or retained some of them. The real question is as to whether if the offer has come only at a point of time after the sale, whether the legal position as canvassed by Mr. Hebballi would hold good. As indicated by us earlier, he has clearly submitted that the section has to be construed in relation to the date on which the consideration was done by the authorities or rather the date when the offer was made by the authorities and that assuming any rights had vested in the appellants at an earlier point of time even if the land had been then formed, that those rights have now merged with the rights of respondents 4 and 5. We refrain from recording any findings with regard to this aspect for the reason that it is purely hypothetical and would be depending on the factual position, namely the question as to whether there is evidence to indicate that the whole or part of the alluvial land had been formed prior to the date of the sale. Having regard to this position, we decline interference as far as the present decision is concerned. We direct the Deputy Commissioner concerned to hold an enquiry after issuing notice to both the parties and to record a finding as to when and at what point of time was the alluvial land formed and if it was a gradual process, how much of it can be said to have been formed prior to the date of the sale and how much thereafter. If there is evidence to indicate that the whole or part of the alluvial land was in existence prior to the date of the sale then only, the Deputy Commissioner shall consider whether at all the appellants can be said to have acquired any right in respect of those lands or in other words whether, if those lands or part of them were offered to them, whether they would have had a right of refusal. Depending on the outcome of this enquiry, the Deputy Commissioner shall pass appropriate orders. ( 6 ) WE make it clear that during the interim period the present arrangement shall continue undisturbed. The Court is informed that the respondents 4 and 5 have deposited the required amount and that they have been put in possession and that arrangement shall continue until the completion of the enquiry. If the Deputy Commissioner comes to the conclusion that the appellants are entitled to be offered any part of the alluvial lands, then only the arrangement may be altered at that point of time. These are the limited directions that we are issuing in the present appeals which stand disposed of on merits. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. It goes without saying that both the parties shall be permitted to lead whatever evidence they so desire in the course of the enquiry. --- *** --- .