1. By this common judgment all three ap­peals 120 of 98 titled National Insurance Com­pany Ltd. vs. Mst.Zaina & ors. 121 of 98 titled National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Mst. zaina & ors. 141 of 98 titled National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Prem Piaree & others, are taken for dis­posal in so for as common questions of fact and law arise in all three Appeals. The appeals are against awards of Motor Accident Claims Tri­bunal Srinagar dated 30.06.1998, 06.07.1998 and 24.08.1998 respectively, passed in claims arising out of vehicular accident on 13.12.1990 at Kargil Srinagar Road, at Captain mod(bend) at Zogila pass. All ten occupants of the vehicle including the driver died in accident. The ve­hicle and the occupants fell in deep ravine (nalla). Neither the vehicle nor the bodies could be retrieved. 2. In CIA 120/98 vide impugned award dated: 30.06.1998, the claimants-Respondents in Claim petition 12/91, have been awarded compensation of Rs.1,68,000/- with 6% inter­est from institution of the claim petition (16.05.1991) till date of decision and from 30.06.1998 @12% till payment is made and award satisfied. 3. In CIA 121/98, claimants-Respondents vide impugned award dated: 06.07.1998, in claim petition No. 11/1991, have been awarded Rs.3,68,000/- with 6% interest from the date of institution of the claim petition (16.05.1991) till date of decision and thereafter @12% till the award is satisfied. 4. In CIA 147/98, claimants in claim petition 13/91 vide impugned award dated 24.08.1998, claimants have been awarded compensation of Rs.1,44,000/- with 12% interest from the date of institution of the claim petition on 16.05.1991 till the award is satisfied. 5. These impugned awards have been challenged on grounds common to all the three appeals. 6. The appellants counsel concedes that the other seven occupants of the Taxi killed in the vehicular accident in question were awarded compensation in seven different claim petitions by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Srinagar, against those awards, statutory appeals were preferred in the High Court. Learned Single Judge upheld the award in each claim petition by a common judgment. However, LPA was filed by the National Insurance Company against the judgment. This court again by a common judgment dated: 28.12.1998 in LPA No.364/97 to LPANo.370/97 dismissed the ap­peals and upheld the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge and in terms confirmed the awards given by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. 7. Mr. However, LPA was filed by the National Insurance Company against the judgment. This court again by a common judgment dated: 28.12.1998 in LPA No.364/97 to LPANo.370/97 dismissed the ap­peals and upheld the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge and in terms confirmed the awards given by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. 7. Mr. J.A. Kawoosa, learned counsel for the appellants, concedes that the factual matrix and legal issues raised in all the three appeals are covered by the above LPA Bench Judgment. He also concedes that no factual preposition or legal contention other than those encompassed and adjudicated upon by the LPA Bench Judg­ment in above appeals is raised or raises in all these appeals. In such circumstances, it can be legitimately concluded that the division Bench Judgment shall govern these three appeals as well in so far as the contentions raised and le­gal preposition formulated are convered and adjudicated by the above larger Bench Judg­ment. 8. Mr. Kawoosa, admits that there is no dis­pute whatsoever, regarding the factual aspects of the case and that he does not question the quantum of compensation award in any of the appeals and the mode and manner of arriving at the awarded compensation(s). He further submits that the statement of facts and narration of dates and other details are correctly reflected and figure in the impugned awards. What Mr. Kawoosa strenuously contends is that the liability of the Insurance Company is limited to five passengers and the Driver and the vehicle was carrying double that load when it met with the fatal accident, in which all the ten passen­gers and the Driver died. Therefore, the liabil­ity of the Insurance Company is confined to the five passengers and the driver and not un­limited as held by the Tribunal. There is no special contract between the Insurance Com­pany and the insured to cover unlimited liabil­ity by the Company. By carrying more passengers, there has been breach of policy and therefore the appellant-Insurance Company cannot be foisted with unlimited liability. All these contentions were raised earlier before the learned Single Bench in earlier said appeal un­der Section 173 of Motor Vehicle Act and there­fore before the LPA Bench against the judg­ment of learned Single Judge. However, these contentions were turned down by the Bench. All these contentions were raised earlier before the learned Single Bench in earlier said appeal un­der Section 173 of Motor Vehicle Act and there­fore before the LPA Bench against the judg­ment of learned Single Judge. However, these contentions were turned down by the Bench. The LPA Bench, to which I was a party, held that merely because the Taxi car carried more passengers than permissible, would not absolve Insurance Company of liability, more so when the violation of terms of policy, in the facts and -circumstances of the case could not be inferred. It was further observed that in any case, it was no so fundamental as to allow the Insurance Company to eschew liability altogether. The court in the context of wider scope on applica­tion of norms of meaningfully interpreting the provision of Section 147 and 149 of the Motor Vehicles Act, held that in the facts and circum­stances of the case, claimants were entitled to claim compensation from the Insurance Com­pany and that the Tribunal had rightly awarded the compensation. 9. In other 7 LPAs referred earlier hereto with lead case National Insurance Co. vs. Mohd. Ali and another (LPA 364 of 97), this court by a Division Bench judgment observed:- "....to deal with the contention that carrying of passengers more than covered by the In­surance Policy amounted to committing breach of terms of policy, therefore, the In­surance Company is not liable to pay com­pensation with respect to persons exceed­ing the number covered by the policy, this court takes the view that the appellant is not absolved from the responsibility altogether, Motor Owners Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Jadavji Keshvji Modi and others (AIR 1981 SC 2059) meets the objections raised by the appellant. This accident amounts to "acci­dent to any one thereby covering each of the persons died in this accident". No con­trary decision was brought to our notice by the learned counsel for the appellant, therefore, the appellant would be responsi­ble for payment of compensation for all the victims of accident. Whether the vehicle was being used in violation of the terms of policy and the provisions of Motor Vehi­cles Act, 1988 is a comprehensive legisla­tion to replace the existing Act of 1939. It does away with the limited liability of In­surance Company with respect to Insurance claims under Section 147(2)(a). Whether the vehicle was being used in violation of the terms of policy and the provisions of Motor Vehi­cles Act, 1988 is a comprehensive legisla­tion to replace the existing Act of 1939. It does away with the limited liability of In­surance Company with respect to Insurance claims under Section 147(2)(a). In case In­surance company is permitted to raise de­fence of limited liability on the basis of terms of Insurance policy, object of Section 147 would stand frustrated. Moreover, parties cannot stipulate which runs counter to the provisions of statutory enactment. We find that factually accident in this case took place on December 13,1990 and the new Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 came into force from July 1,1989 by SO-368(E) dated May 22, 1989. Therefore, stipulation contrary to the statutory provisions and contention to that effect is hardly acceptable. Even otherwise, alleged breach of terms of policy by the In­sured may be an offence under other provi­sions of this Act, but surely that does not fall under Section 149(2)(a) of the Act by carrying persons more than covered by the Insurance policy, which has neither been proved nor stipulation established as per Single Judge." 10. In the Madras Motor and General In­surance Co. Ltd. and another vs. Nanjamma and others (AIR 1977 Kamataka 46), a Division Bench observed that so long Taxi car was be­ing used for carrying passengers merely because there was over loading, it cannot be said that the car was used for a different purpose, in breach of terms of policy. Similarly, in Kesavan Nair vs. State Insurance Officer (1971 ACJ 219). the Apex Court observed that merely be­cause offending vehicle a carriage stage per­mit holder was carrying passengers in breach of stage carriage permit, the vehicle cannot be said to have been used for the purpose other than the one for which permit was issued so long it was carrying passengers on hire and reward. 11. In B.V. Nagaraju vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. (1996 ACJ 1178), the Apex Court ob­served that carrying of passenger in goods ve­hicle more than the number permitted in terms of the policy, is not a breach so fundamental as to afford ground for eschewing liability to pay compensation altogether. 12. The contention of Mr. 11. In B.V. Nagaraju vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. (1996 ACJ 1178), the Apex Court ob­served that carrying of passenger in goods ve­hicle more than the number permitted in terms of the policy, is not a breach so fundamental as to afford ground for eschewing liability to pay compensation altogether. 12. The contention of Mr. Kawoosa, that in the Special Leave Petition preferred under Ar­ticle 138 of the Constitution of India against the above LPA Bench Judgment dated: 28.12.1998, Supreme Court while declining to interfere with the Bench decision of this court observed that the questions of law raised in the Special Leave Petition before the Apex Court needed closer look and therefore the legal issues may be re-examined in view of the observation. 13. I am afraid that this contention of Mr. Kawoosa cannot be upheld for the reason that in so far as this court is concerned, the law laid down by LPA Bench with one and the same factual matrix/premises in all ten cases is binding on this Bench sitting singly. These three cases as also the other connected cases referred also in the above LPA Bench are governed by the decision of this court. After all same set of facts arising out of the same transaction and circumstances, cannot be decided differently. It is not open to this court to interpret law differently in respect of different claimants when occurrence is same and all the person died in the same occurrence of vehicular accident. Court cannot apply dif­ferential legal yard sticks as far as the claim­ants of the compensation in these cases are concerned. Besides, as a precedent, the law laid down by the above LPA Bench cannot be bye-passed. The observations of the learned Judges of the Apex Court while disposing of SLP (Civil)No.6297-6303/1999 on 04.05.99 that:- ".....So far as the question of law is con­cerned prima facie, learned counsel for the petitioner was right when he submitted that it requires closer consideration. But on the facts of this case we are not inclined to entertain this contention. The observations of the learned Judges of the Apex Court while disposing of SLP (Civil)No.6297-6303/1999 on 04.05.99 that:- ".....So far as the question of law is con­cerned prima facie, learned counsel for the petitioner was right when he submitted that it requires closer consideration. But on the facts of this case we are not inclined to entertain this contention. Keeping the question of law open, therefore, this Spe­cial Leave Petition is dismissed." Obviously convey that the questions of law raised before the Apex Court in the Special Leave to Appeal in the case may be consid­ered by Supreme Court of India in some other case, but not in the facts and circumstances of this case, where the Apex Court declined to entertain the contention. In result, for what is stated above, all the three Appeals are dismissed.