PRADEEP KANT, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner being aggrieved by the non-inclusion of his services rendered in the Civil courts at Lucknow for the period 14. 11. 1964 to 6. 8. 1975 and for the period commencing 7. 8. 1975 to 21. 2. 1978 during which period he was working with M/s. Scooters India Ltd. , lucknow for the purpose of grant of post retiral benefits including pension etc. , has approached this Court claiming that his continuity in service should be counted from 14. 11. 1964 till he reaches the age of superannuation. During the pendency of the writ petition the petitioner has retired while working as Private Secretary in the High Court. ( 2 ) THE petitioner was initially appointed as Stenographer in the Civil Courts at Lucknow by means of the order dated 14. 11. 1964 against a substantive vacancy on a permanent post. While the petitioner was working in the Civil Courts an advertisement was published by the Allahabad high Court inviting applications for filling up the vacancies of Personal Assistants. The petitioner can opt for his absorption in the service of the Company or he may choose otherwise. The District Judge thereafter did not give any response to this observation made in the letter by the Company but on 16. 7. 1976 another letter was sent to the Managing Director of the Company with the subject "deputation of Sri Harish Chandra Srivastava, Stenographer". In this letter the district Judge apprised the Managing Director that he was facing shortage of Stenographers in the Civil Court and, therefore, the petitioner, who was allowed to join the Company on 6. 8. 1975 on deputation may be reverted to his parent department. A request was made to relieve the petitioner and direct him to joint at the earliest. The letter, however, further stated that in case the petitioner wants to continue in the Company, he may submit his resignation forthwith so that another person may be appointed in his place on regular basis. Since the petitioner was not relieved from the Company and the petitioner had intact his lien in the parent department as per orders passed by the District Judge, Lucknow on 6. 8. 1975, the petitioner, being desirous of absorption in the Company, sent a letter on 14. 8. Since the petitioner was not relieved from the Company and the petitioner had intact his lien in the parent department as per orders passed by the District Judge, Lucknow on 6. 8. 1975, the petitioner, being desirous of absorption in the Company, sent a letter on 14. 8. 1976 which has been termed as letter of resignation mentioning that he was tendering his resignation from his service from the parent department with effect from 16. 8. 1976 or any other subsequent date as may be fixed by the district Judge with a view to seek permanent absorption in the Company. This resignation was never accepted by the District Judge and the petitioner continued to work on deputation in the company. However, a letter was written to the Chief Personnel Manager of the Company by the district Judge informing that the lien of the petitioner has been terminated with effect from 14. 8. 1976. this communication has reference of the resignation letter of the petitioner but it did not say any where as to when the resignation was accepted. Petitioners case is that he was compelled to send his resignation although when he was on deputation, the question of asking for any resignation did not arise. In any case, his further case is that the resignation having never been accepted, he would be deemed to be in continuous service of the parent department. The petitioner thus continue to work with the Company till the date when he was appointed on the post of Personal Assistant in the High Court i. e. , 1. 2. 1978 in pursuance of the selection which was held in the year 1968. On being appointed on the post of Personal Assistant in the High court, the petitioner joined the services in the High Court on 22. 2. 1978. The petitioner was later on promoted as Private Secretary on 26. 5. 1984 on which post he was confirmed on ,1. 7. 1989. It was during the fixation of the petitioners pay in the scale admissible to the Personal Assistants in the High Court it revealed that the period in question commencing 14. 11. 1964 to 6. 8. 1975 during which the petitioner worked in Lucknow Judgeship and thereafter the period commencing 7. 8. 1975 to 21. 2. 7. 1989. It was during the fixation of the petitioners pay in the scale admissible to the Personal Assistants in the High Court it revealed that the period in question commencing 14. 11. 1964 to 6. 8. 1975 during which the petitioner worked in Lucknow Judgeship and thereafter the period commencing 7. 8. 1975 to 21. 2. 1978 during which the petitioner worked on deputation with the Company has been excluded for the purpose of fixation of pay on the post of Personal Assistant. The petitioner made a representation on 31. 5. 1979 for regularization of his services during that period, which representation was rejected by the Registrar, which communication was made to the petitioner by means of the letter dated applied against the said post on 4. 3. 1968. However, in pursuance of the selection in the year 1968, the posts were filled in the year 1978 and consequently the petitioner was also appointed on the post of Personal Assistant on 1st February, 1978 and since then the petitioner had continuously worked in the High Court and has retired on reaching the age of superannuation from the post of Private Secretary. ( 3 ) THOUGH the selection for the post of Personal Assistant in the High Court was held in the year 1968 but the result was not declared for a long time i. e. till 1978 but in the meantime M/s. Scooters India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Company), which is a Government undertaking, notified certain vacancies of Steno/typists against which the petitioner also applied through proper channel with the consent of the then District Judge, Lucknow. The petitioner was selected by the Company and he was sent on deputation to the Company. He was appointed by means of the order dated 25. 7. 1975. This order has been brought on record which indicates that the Petitioner was appointed on a consolidated salary of Rs. 650/- per month and was placed on probation for a period of six months with a rider that in case his services were not found satisfactory, his services can be terminated with one months notice or pay in lieu thereof without assigning any reason and even after satisfactory completion of probation, the services of the petitioner can be terminated without assigning any reason with one months notice on either side or one months pay in lieu thereof. The order was couched in such language which indicated that this was an appointment on probation prescribing the age of retirement as 58 years but the said order in substance was treated to be an order of deputation and, therefore, the then District judge, Lucknow by means of the order dated 6. 8. 1975 while relieving the petitioner to join the new post directed and maintained his lieu in the Civil Court. The relieving order (Annexure-1)specifically states as follows : ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sri Srivastava has made request before me that he may be relieved to join the new post and his lien may be retained in this office which has been allowed. " ( 4 ) ON the basis of the aforesaid appointment and relieving order, the petitioner joined the post steno/typist in the said Company on 7. 8. 1975. By means of the letter dated 1. 6. 1976, the Sadar munsarim, under the orders of the District Judge, Lucknow addressed a letter to the petitioner treating him specifically on deputation and enquiring from him within 2 days as to why he should not be called back to his parent department and further the petitioner was directed to intimate the date of going on deputation and conditions thereof. In response to the above letter, the Chief Personnel Officer of the Company informed the District Judge, Lucknow by his letter dated 18. 6. 1976 that the petitioner has jointed the services with the Company as Steno/typist on 7. 8. 1975 and that there was no objection from their side if the petitioner retains his lien for a period of two years with the parent department and during this period he 30. 8. 1979. The order of rejection of representation did not contain any reason. It appears that the petitioner being dissatisfied with the aforesaid stand taken by the High Court made certain representations and requests upon which a query was made by the High Court from District Judge, Lucknow regarding the position of lien of the petitioner during the period of services as Stenographer in lucknow Judgeship. It appears that the petitioner being dissatisfied with the aforesaid stand taken by the High Court made certain representations and requests upon which a query was made by the High Court from District Judge, Lucknow regarding the position of lien of the petitioner during the period of services as Stenographer in lucknow Judgeship. In response to this query the District Judge, Lucknow categorically informed by his letter dated 1. 5. 1984 that the lien of the petitioner as Stenographer in the lucknow Judgeship was suspended from 16. 11. 1979 on his being appointed in substantive capacity to a permanent pest in the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court. The petitioner, therefore, again made a representation to the Registrar for regularization of his services for the period in question. This representation was not placed before Honble the Chief Justice but was forwarded to the State Government and the State Government informed the Registrar that the petitioner had tendered his resignation from Government service, therefore under Para 418 (a) of the Civil Services Regulations, he is not entitled for the benefit of the service rendered prior to his resignation. Consequently the services of the petitioner for the period in question cannot be counted towards pension. This decision of the State Government was communicated to the petitioner by means of the letter dated 3. 7. 1990 by the Deputy Registrar of the High Court. ( 5 ) IN the counter affidavit filed by the High Court it is admitted that the petitioner has served in the Lucknow Judgeship form 14. 11. 1964 to 6. 8. 1975 and with M/s. Scooters India Ltd. , lucknow from 7. 8. 1975 to 21. 2. 1978. It has been stated that the petitioner tendered resignation from service of Civil Court, Lucknow and is now claiming benefit for counting his services of the aforesaid period for pensionary benefits. It is also admitted that the State Government has rejected his representation finally in this regard. It is stated that the petitioner was not entitled to count his prior services in view of Para 418 (a) of the Civil Services Regulations. It is also admitted that the State Government has rejected his representation finally in this regard. It is stated that the petitioner was not entitled to count his prior services in view of Para 418 (a) of the Civil Services Regulations. So far as the benefit of Para 418 (b) of the Civil Services Regulations is concerned, the counter affidavit stated that it is true that provision of sub-rule (b) of Rule 418 of the Civil Services Regulations do make a provision that resignation from one Government Service to join another Government service is not a resignation but the resignation tendered by the petitioner was to join service in public Sector Undertaking and not in any Government establishment A supplementary counter affidavit has also been filed by the High Court in which it has been alleged that no proof in respect of the petitioner being sent on deputation has been furnished and according to the petitioner himself on terms of deputation were decided. The appointment of the petitioner with the Company was a direct appointment which is also reflected by the terms of the appointment order issued by the Company wherein it has been provided that the petitioner is being placed on probation initially for a period of six months which could be extended for another period of two years. ( 6 ) SO far as the Tendering of resignation by the petitioner is concerned, it has no where been stated in the counter affidavit or in the supplementary counter affidavit that the resignation was accepted by the District Judge and if it was accepted, then on what date. No such order of acceptance of his resignation was communicated to the petitioner rather in para 12 of the supplementary counter affidavit, it was stated : ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . it is wrong to say that no further action in respect of resignation was required to be taken except to accept the resignation. It was not necessary to communicate the acceptance. As far as termination of lien is concerned, as referred to in an earlier order of the District Judge, lucknow, it is submitted that it is the decision on the resignation taken on record and not communicated. It was not necessary to communicate the acceptance. As far as termination of lien is concerned, as referred to in an earlier order of the District Judge, lucknow, it is submitted that it is the decision on the resignation taken on record and not communicated. " ( 7 ) IT has been the specific case of the petitioner that though he was compelled to send his resignation but that resignation was never accepted. The reply tendered by the High Court in this regard does not explain any where as to whether the resignation was actually accepted at any point of time and if accepted then why the same was not communicated to the petitioner, rather it has been stated that the decision was taken on record and was not communicated. On such statement of the High Court, the Court required the opposite parties to produce the record and on production of record, it was found that there was no order accepting the resignation nor any such resignation could be produced before the Court. The controversy thus revolves around the following two facts, namely (i) whether the petitioner was sent on deputation in the service of the Company, and (ii) whether any resignation could have been asked for and if such a resignation has been sent, it was ever accepted and lien of the petitioner stood suspended or terminated during his tenure of service with the Company. ( 8 ) FOR finding out as to whether an appointment is on deputation or it is an appointment by way of direct recruitment, it is the nature of appointment which is to be seen carefully, and also the conduct and intention of the two departments, namely, borrowing and lending departments. Mere recital of certain conditions in. the appointment order sometimes may or may not pronounce the actual intention, of the two departments with respect to the nature of appointment and may not be a conclusive proof as regards the terms and conditions and the nature of appointment. In the instant case, the, petitioner, who was admittedly appointed against the substantive vacancy and permanent post in Lucknow Judgeship on 13. 11. 1964 and while in service he applied for appointment in the Company. Merely because a selection has taken place or the petitioner had applied in pursuance of an advertisement, it cannot be conclusively presumed that it was a case of direct appointment. 11. 1964 and while in service he applied for appointment in the Company. Merely because a selection has taken place or the petitioner had applied in pursuance of an advertisement, it cannot be conclusively presumed that it was a case of direct appointment. The intention of the two departments cannot be totally ignored in this regard, Had the petitioner been informed that he cannot be sent on deputation, the petitioner might not have joined the service in the Government Undertaking in preference to his service at lucknow Judgeship, The petitioner was not only given impression but he was specifically convinced that he is being sent on deputation which fact also emerges from the relieving order issued by the then District Judge, Lucknow dated 6,8. 1975, In this relieving order the District judge has categorically retained the lien of the petitioner in the parent department i. e. Lucknow judgeship and has relieved him to join his duties in the Company where the petitioner joined duties on 7. 8. 1975. After the petitioner joined and has worked for approximately 10 months with the Company, the Administrative Office of the District Judge, Lucknow required the petitioner to indicate as to why he should not be called back to his parent department. This letter specifically mentions the petitioner on deputation and also enquired from the petitioner the date on which he has gone on deputation. Further correspondence with the District Judge and the Company shows that by means of letter dated 18. 6. 1976 the Company also stated that the petitioner has been relieved by permitting his lien to be retained in the parent department (Lucknow Judgeship) and that the Company was having no objection in retaining such lien for a period of two years during which period he can opt for his absorption in the service of the Company or may choose otherwise. This letter dated 18-6-1976 bears special significance, as it clearly indicates the intention of both the departments regarding the appointment of the petitioner namely the District judge has undoubtedly relieved the petitioner for joining the service of the Company on deputation and the Company also endorsed and approved the retention of his lien in the parent department for a period of two years giving right to the petitioner to opt for absorption or choose otherwise. In this context the wordings of the appointment order, which, according to the learned counsel, for the petitioner was issued under the routine proforma, cannot wash away the fact of the true intention and nature of appointment of the petitioner, particularly when the terms and conditions mentioned in the said appointment order were never given effect to and were never acted upon and the petitioner was always treated on deputation. The entire correspondence which has been brought on record unambiguously speaks of the petitioner being sent on deputation with the consent of the District Judge, Lucknow who retained his lien in the Judgeship at Lucknow while relieving him for joining on deputation to the Company and the Company also in turn accepted and allowed the retention of lien of the petitioner in the parent department for a period of two years with a light being conferred upon the petitioner for opting for absorption or choose otherwise. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the petitioners appointment to the company was by way of direct recruitment and not on deputation. ( 9 ) THE next question which arises for consideration is as to whether the letter of the petitioner dated 14. 8. 1976 which is said to be the letter of resignation was ever accepted by the District judge, Lucknow or what is the effect of such resignation. Before proceeding to consider the effect of the resignation, it would be worthwhile to mention that the opposite parties have failed to produce the resignation before this Court and have also not been able to indicate any order from the record that such resignation was ever accepted and if accepted, then on what date. As a matter of fact, the said resignation was not to be found on record produced by the opposite parties. ( 10 ) RULE 14 of the Chapter III of Fundamental Rules prescribes as under : "14. (a) The lien of a Government servant on a permanent post which he holds substantively shall be suspended if he a appointed in substantive capacity: (1) to a tenure post or (2) to a permanent post outside the cadre on which he is borne, or (3) provisionally to a post on which another Government servant would hold a lien had his lien not been suspend under this rule. (b) The Government may at their option, suspend the lien of a Government servant on a permanent post which he holds substantively if he is deputed out of India or transferred to foreign service or in circumstances not covered by clause (a) of this rule, is transferred, whether in a substantive or officiating capacity to a post on another cadre and if in any of these cases there is reason to believe that he will remain absent from the post on which he holds a lien for a period of not less than three years. (c) Notwithstanding anything contained in clauses (a) or (b) of this Rule, a Government servants lien on a tenure post may in no circumstances be suspended, if he is appointed substantively to another permanent post. (d) If a Government servants lien is suspend under clauses (a) or (b) of this Rule, the post may be filled substantively and the Government servant appointed to hold it substantively shall acquire a lien on it provided that the arrangements shall be reversed as soon as the suspended lien revives. Note.- (1) This clause applied also if the post concerned is post in a selection grade of cadre. (2) When a post is filled substantively under this clause, the appointment will be termed a provisional appointment, the Government servant appointed will hold a provisional lien on the post and that lien will be liable to suspension under clause (a) but not under clause (b) of this rule. (e) A Government servants lien which has been suspended under clause (a) of this Rule shall revive as soon as he ceases to hold lien on a post of the nature specified in sub-clauses (1), (2) or (3) of that clause. (e) A Government servants lien which has been suspended under clause (a) of this Rule shall revive as soon as he ceases to hold lien on a post of the nature specified in sub-clauses (1), (2) or (3) of that clause. (f) A Government servants lien which has been suspended under clause (b) of this Rule shall revive as soon as he ceases to be on deputation out of India, or on foreign service or to hold a post in another cadre, provided that a suspended lien shall not revive because the Government servant takes leave if there is reason to believe that he will on return from leave, continue to be on deputation out of India, or on foreign service or to hold a post in another cadre and the total period of absence of duty will hold substantively a post of the nature specified in sub-clauses (1), (2) or (3) of clause (a ). " ( 11 ) THE lien of a Government servant thus would not cease nor it can be suspended or terminated unless either of the conditions enumerated in the above Rule are fulfilled. A government employee sent on deputation would have his lien intact in the parent department unless he is covered by sub-clause (b) of Fundamental Rule 14. The petitioner does not fall within the said clause and, therefore, even for the purpose of sub-clause (f) of Fundamental Rule 14, his lien cannot be said to have been suspended nor could have been suspended on the asking of the Government. Asking the petitioner to tender his resignation during subsistence of his lien when he was working on deputation was not at all called for. Even if some arrangement was to be made in the Judgeship at Lucknow, the same could have been done without affecting the lien of the petitioner in the parent department. It is not necessary for this Court to go into the reason for asking the resignation from the petitioner but suffice it to say that the said resignation was never accepted by the District Judge, Lucknow. Even the communication dated 17. 9. It is not necessary for this Court to go into the reason for asking the resignation from the petitioner but suffice it to say that the said resignation was never accepted by the District Judge, Lucknow. Even the communication dated 17. 9. 1976 does not say as to when the resignation was accepted and as to whether the resignation was ever accepted or not but it only says that in the context of his resignation, the petitioner is being informed that his lien has been terminated with effect from 14. 8. 1976. Unless the resignation was accepted, a fact which could not be established before this Court nor any such acceptance admittedly has been communicated to the petitioner the information regarding termination of his lien dated 14. 8. 1976 is of no value. The said letter though mentions that there were some orders previously passed and in pursuance of those orders the lien has been terminated with effect from 14. 8. 1976 but no such orders have also been filed or produced before the Court. The order dated 14. 8. 1976 was also neither communicated to the petitioner nor brought on record nor produced before the Court. To the contrary, when a query was made by the High Court from District judge, Lucknow regarding suspension of lien of the petitioner from the post of Stenographer in the Lucknow Judgeship, the then District Judge, Lucknow vide his letter dated 1. 5. 1984 informed the High Court that under Fundamental Rule 14 (a) (2) the lien of Sri Harish Chandra srivastava has been suspended with effect from 16. 11. 1979 because he was appointed on a permanent post in the High Court Lucknow Bench, Lucknow. This information was sent by the district Judge, Lucknow on 1. 5. 1984 a date which is much after 17. 9. 1976 (a letter in. which the petitioner was communicated that in view of the earlier orders passed, his lien has been terminated with effect from 14. 8. 1976, clearly speaks and confirms that the petitioners lien was kept intact till 16. 11. 5. 1984 a date which is much after 17. 9. 1976 (a letter in. which the petitioner was communicated that in view of the earlier orders passed, his lien has been terminated with effect from 14. 8. 1976, clearly speaks and confirms that the petitioners lien was kept intact till 16. 11. 1979 when he was appointed in substantive capacity on the post of Personal assistant in the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Courts The aforesaid document also strengthens and supports the stand taken by the petitioner that he was sent on deputation in the service of the Company and that his lien was kept intact. His resignation was unnecessarily called for but that resignation was never accepted and was never given effect to. The submission that petitioners lien remained alive for all the period when he was working on deputation with the Company is also fortified by the letter of the District Judge of the year 1984 which information has been given on the basis of the query made by the High Court itself. If the petitioners lien remained intact till the year 1979 when he was permanently appointed as personal Assistant in the High Court, it cannot be presumed by any stretch of imagination that his alleged resignation was ever accepted or his lien was terminated with effect from 14. 8. 1976. In the absence of any record being produced regarding resignation and its acceptance and the orders terminating the lien of the petitioner from i4. 8. 1976 a mention of which has been made in the communication dated 17. 9. 76 it cannot be presumed and accepted that the petitioners resignation was ever accepted or his lien was terminated. On the face of the representation of the district Judge in his letter dated 1. 5. 1984 in response to the query made by the High Court by its letter dated 31. 10. 1983, there is no reason to doubt that the petitioners lien remained intact and was kept alive till he was permanently appointed in the service of the High Court. Besides this, the lien of a Government employee, who has been sent on deputation, cannot be suspended nor it can come to an end otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of Fundamental Rules 14 (b) and (f ). Besides this, the lien of a Government employee, who has been sent on deputation, cannot be suspended nor it can come to an end otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of Fundamental Rules 14 (b) and (f ). Petitioners case does not fall in any of the category mentioned therein and , therefore, his lien could not have been terminated and even if terminated, the said termination would be bad and against the aforesaid Rules. ( 12 ) IT having been found that the petitioner was initially appointed in the Lucknow Judgeship on the post of Stenographer in the year 1964 on which post he was confirmed and later on while working in the aforesaid Judgeship he was sent on deputation in the service of the company and his lien remaining intact with the parent department namely Lucknow Judgeship till he was permanently appointed in the service of the High Court the petitioner is entitled to count his previous service for the period 14. 11. 1964 to 21. 2. 1978 for the purpose of pension and other post retiral benefits. ( 13 ) AFTER recording the above findings, further question arises as to whether the petitioner is entitled for counting his service rendered in the Civil Court, Lucknow and in the Company with his services rendered in the High Court. It is the specific case of the petitioner that the services of the petitioner rendered in the Civil Court would be counted along with the service rendered in the High Court and the period for which the petitioner remained on deputation with the company, he remained permanent employee of the Civil Court, as his lien was intact and therefore that period of service would also be counted for the purpose of counting the service of the Civil Court. Learned Standing Counsel also does not dispute this proposition and submits that in case petitioners services in the Company are treated on deputation, then he will be entitled for counting his entire length of service, namely the period spent in the service of the civil Court and also the period on deputation with the Company, namely, the period which is the subject matter of the present writ petitioner for the purpose of pensionary benefits. It has already been held that the petitioner has continuously worked without any break right from 1964 earlier in the Lucknow Judgeship up to 6. 8. It has already been held that the petitioner has continuously worked without any break right from 1964 earlier in the Lucknow Judgeship up to 6. 8. 1975 and thereafter his services in the Company has been held to be on deputation as such he remained the employee of the Civil Court during that period also, namely form 6. 8. 1975 to 21. 2. 1978. The petitioner was thereafter appointed against a permanent post in the High Court in February, 1978. In view of the findings recorded above, the petitioner shall be entitled to count his entire length of service right from his initial appointment in Lucknow Judgeship till he reached the age of superannuation while working in the High court. Length of service of a Government employee cannot be curtailed for the purpose of pensionary benefits simply because the Government employee without any break or interruption has worked in two different departments of the Government. Regulation 492 of the Civil Service regulations deals with such combination of appointments in the matter of grant of pensionary benefits and reads as under : "492. If an officer has held more than one appointment, In respect of each of which, if he had held it separately and alone, pension would have been admissible to him the pension admissible to him is the sum of the several pensions which would have been admissible to him if he had held each office separately and alone. The consolidated pension thus admissible is subject to the limitations prescribed in Articles 474 to 480 and 481. " ( 14 ) IN the instant case, the petitioner firstly continuously worked in the Civil Court and thereafter in the High Court without any break and therefore, he cannot be deprived of his services which he has rendered in the Civil Court and then on deputation to M/s. Scooters India ltd. , Lucknow, it is not disputed by the State that the employees of the Civil Court and the High court are nonetheless Government servants and unless there are rules to the contrary, the service rules as applicable to the Government servants are applicable to the employees of the High court. No such rule has been placed before the Court which prohibits counting of service rendered by an employee in the Civil Court with the service which he renders without any break on being duly appointed in the High Court. No such rule has been placed before the Court which prohibits counting of service rendered by an employee in the Civil Court with the service which he renders without any break on being duly appointed in the High Court. ( 15 ) FOR the reasons stated above, the writ petition is allowed. The orders dated 17. 9. 1976, 30. 8. 1979, 6. 6. 1990 and 3. 7. 1990 contained in Annexures 5, 8, 11 and 12 respectively to the writ petition are hereby quashed. A writ of mandamus be issued to the opposite parties to give benefit of continuous service to the petitioner from the date of his initial appointment i. e. , 14. 11. 1964 till he reached the age of superannuation and to refix his pension accordingly and provide all consequential benefits to the petitioner.