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2001 DIGILAW 460 (BOM)

Hormuzd R. Nejabat v. Bombay Electric Supply and Transport Undertaking and others

2001-06-15

D.Y.CHANDRACHUD

body2001
JUDGMENT - Dr. D.Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.:---The first respondent had invited tenders on 16th January, 1995 for running and conducting of a BEST Staff Canteen on the terms and conditions which were set out in the notice inviting tenders. Under the terms of the tender the criteria of eligibility which the contractor was required to meet were set out. The respondent was to prepare a waiting list of all applicants which would be operative for a period of one year. The respondent, it is common ground, would thereupon allot contracts for conducting of the Canteens (described as Tea Stalls) to successful bidders in accordance with the waiting list. Clause 13 of the bid document provided that the contract would be awarded initially for a period of five years. The terms and the conditions would be revised after every five years or as decided by the respondent from time to time. Clause 16 provided that the contractor would forfeit his earnest money deposit if he refused to accept the contract. The name of the petitioner was first on the waiting list since his offer was found to be the best amongst the bidders. On 15th May, 1995 the undertaking offered to allot to the petitioner Tea Stall at the Shanti Ashram Bus Stand, Borivali. On 25th May, 1995 the petitioner by a letter stated that he was interested in running the Tea Stall at certain other places including at the August Kranti Maidan and near Videsh Sanchar Nigam, Fountain and not at Borivali. The case of the petitioner is that on 25th July, 1995 he was offered a Tea Stall at the August Kranti Maidan Bus Depot and was given possession thereof in pursuance of which he made arrangements for conducting the Tea Stall. On 2nd August, 1995 the petitioner was orally informed to hand back the possession of the Tea Stall at August Kranti Maidan on the ground that the stall had been allotted to him only as a temporary arrangement. It is common ground that no written agreement was entered into between the first respondent undertaking and the petitioner. The petitioner challenged the decision of the first respondent by filing the present proceedings under Article 226. It is common ground that no written agreement was entered into between the first respondent undertaking and the petitioner. The petitioner challenged the decision of the first respondent by filing the present proceedings under Article 226. On 17th August, 1995 the writ petition came to be admitted and an interim order was passed restraining the respondents from dispossessing the petitioner from the Tea Stall at the August Kranti Maidan Bus Depot, save and except, by adopting legal proceedings in this behalf. The learned Single Judge was of the view that the petitioner had made out a prima facie case for the admission of the petition and for grant of the interim relief. 2. Now it is common ground that in pursuance of the interim order which was passed by the Court the petitioner has continued in occupation of the Tea Stall until date. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the contesting parties have informed the Court that the petitioner has paid all the dues of the first respondent for the period for which he has conducted the Tea Stall at the August Kranti Maidan Bus Depot under the interim order of the Court. Condition 13 of the terms and the conditions governing the bid provided that the contract was to be awarded for a period of five years. Even the period of five years has elapsed since the passing of the interim order on 17th August, 1995. In fact, the petitioner has now been conducting the Tea Stall for more than six years during the pendency of the writ petition. The grievance which has being made by the petitioner in the writ petition regarding the decision of the first respondent in the circumstances, therefore does not survive any further. Even if a contract had been entered into between the first respondent and the petitioner, the period of five years would have elapsed by now. 3. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has stated that the petitioner is willing to apply to the first respondent for the renewal of the existing facility under which he is conducting the Tea Stall. Since the petitioner continued to operate the Tea Stall under the interim order of this Court, the application would not strictly speaking be one for the renewal for an existing contract. Since the petitioner continued to operate the Tea Stall under the interim order of this Court, the application would not strictly speaking be one for the renewal for an existing contract. However, it is stated on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner is willing to offer revised terms and conditions to the first respondent which would be commensurate with what the first respondent is deriving as and by way of revenue yield from similarly placed Tea Stalls in locations which are similarly situated. Any application which is made by the petitioner for the extension of the facility shall be duly and fairly considered by the first respondent, having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances including the yield which the first respondent expects to realise from the Tea Stall in question. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has submitted that the first respondent has in the case of other Tea Stalls granted a renewal of the extending facility for five years subject to increase in the rates. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the first respondent has stated that it is not possible for the first respondent to make any assurance in this regard having regard to the fact that there is no existing contract under which the petitioner was operating. However, the learned Counsel states that the first respondent will duly consider any application made by the petitioner. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it is for the first respondent to decide whether the petitioner should be granted a renewal of the facility on fresh terms or whether the contract for the Award of the Tea Stall should be re-advertised. No mandamus, by its very nature can be issued. It would be open to the petitioner to submit a fresh bid if the first respondent decides to readvertise. The learned Counsel for the first respondent states that until a final decision is arrived at by the first respondent, the petitioner would be allowed to run the Tea Stall, subject to the right of the first respondent to adopt any steps for termination in the event of breach of the usual conditions. The learned Counsel for the first respondent states that until a final decision is arrived at by the first respondent, the petitioner would be allowed to run the Tea Stall, subject to the right of the first respondent to adopt any steps for termination in the event of breach of the usual conditions. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner states that the petitioner would apply for the renewal of the facility within a period of two weeks from today failing which the first respondent is at liberty to take necessary steps in accordance with law. 4. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs. -----