Devinder Gupta ( 1 ) FOUR appeals have been preferred under Section 54 of land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) by Union of India seeking reduction in the amount of compensation as awarded by the impugned award passed on 28. 7. 1986 by the Additional District Judge, Delhi by which the said reference Court answered the reference of the claimant-respondents under Section 18 of the Act and determined the amount of compensation payable to them. Claimants/respondents in the cross-objections are seeking further enhancement in the amount of compensation. ( 2 ). Considerable land situate in village Masoodpur was notified under Section 4 of the Act on 24. 10. 1961 for being acquired at public expense for public purpose, namely. Planned Development of Delhi. Before declaration under Section 6 of the act could be issued additional land situate within the same revenue estate was notified under Section 4 of the Act on 23. 1. 1965 for being acquired for the same public purpose. On 5. 5. 1966 declaration under Section 6 was made with respect to a portion of land which was notified on 24. 10. 1961, for being acquired for which the collector, Land Acquisition on 25. 2. 1967, after completing necessary formalities, made his Award No. 1944 classifying the land in three blocks A, B and C and offering compensation @ Rs. 1,200. 00, Rs. 900. 00 and Rs. 750. 00 per bigha for categories A, B and C. On 6. 8. 1966 another declaration was made under Section 6 of the Act for the remaining land which was notified on 24. 10. 1961. For this portion of land on 2. 12. 1967 the Collector, Land Acquisition made his Award No. 2040 and offered amount of compensation to the claimants @ Rs. 1,000. 00-, and Rs. 800. 00 respectively to categories B and C lands. On 6. 9. 1966 another declaration under Section 6 was made with respect to part of the land which had been notified on 23. 1. 1965 for being acquired. The Collector on 26. 3. 1969 made his award No. 2225 for the said land offering compensation to the claimants @ Rs. 1/580. 00, Rs. 1,175. 00 and Rs. 600. 00 respectively for categories A, B and C lands and lastly on 26. 12. 1968 declaration under section 6 was issued for the remaining land for which on 22. 12. The Collector on 26. 3. 1969 made his award No. 2225 for the said land offering compensation to the claimants @ Rs. 1/580. 00, Rs. 1,175. 00 and Rs. 600. 00 respectively for categories A, B and C lands and lastly on 26. 12. 1968 declaration under section 6 was issued for the remaining land for which on 22. 12. 1980 Award No. 90/ 80-81 was made offering compensation @ Rs. 1,200. 00, Rs. 900. 00 and Rs. 700. 00 respectively for categories A, B and C lands. ( 3 ). It is not in dispute that the specific purpose under the general purpose of planned Development of Delhi to acquire the land being establishment of Jawaharlal nehru University and it is also admitted that Jawaharlal Nehru University was set up on the acquired land. ( 4 ). Feeling dis-satisfied with the amount of compensation offered to the claimants under separate awards, references were sought under Section 18 of the act for determination of the amount of compensation. The Reference Court from time to time answered those references by separate awards. Feeling aggrieved appeals were filed against some of the awards of the Reference Courts by the appellants seeking reduction in the amount of compensation which were dismissed. In some of the cases appeals were carried to Supreme Court also by the appellant. The same were also dismissed. Reference to those cases will be made subsequently, while considering the preliminary objection raised on behalf of claimant-respondents that in so far as the instant appeals by Union of India seeking reduction in the amount of compensation, are now barred by the principles of res-judicata as regards the determination of amount of compensation qua the appellant. Preliminary objections further say that in any case the appellant is estopped from questioning the impugned awards since the amount of compensation already stands paid to the other claimant-respondents, whose lands were acquired under the same notification. In so far as the claimant-respondents are concerned they have filed cross objections seeking further enhancement in the amount of compensation. ( 5 ). The facts leading to acquisition and determination of the amount of compensation in the instant appeals are being stated. Smt. Pramod Gupta and Ors. , respondents in RFAs 85/87 and 86/87 were bhumidar of1/ 4undivided share in the entire holding of village Masoodpur. Similarly, Shri Rajiv Gupta and Ors. ( 5 ). The facts leading to acquisition and determination of the amount of compensation in the instant appeals are being stated. Smt. Pramod Gupta and Ors. , respondents in RFAs 85/87 and 86/87 were bhumidar of1/ 4undivided share in the entire holding of village Masoodpur. Similarly, Shri Rajiv Gupta and Ors. , respondents in RFAs 83/87 and 84/87 were bhumidars/owners of 1 /8 undivided share in the joint holding of the entire village Masoodpur. Feeling dis-satisfied with award Nos. 2040 and 2225 respectively Smt. Pramod Gupta and Ors. filed reference petitions under Section 18 of Land Acquisition Act. Surinder Gupta, the predecessor- in-interest of respondent Rajiv Gupta and Ors. filed two reference petitions under section 18, feeling aggrieved with Award Nos. 2040 and 2225 respectively. These were, therefore, assigned separate number by the Land Acquisition Collector. Surinder Kumar Gupta was substituted firstly by Ratan Lal Gupta and later on by rajiv Gupta and Ors. in the two reference petitions. ( 6 ). The Reference Court with respect to the land, which was subject matter of award No. 2040, awarded compensation @ Rs. 22,000. 00 per bigha. He in fact assessed compensation payable for the minor mineral (china clay) embedded in the land@rs. 12,000/-per bigha and market value for the land @ Rs. 10,000. 00per bigha. With respect to the land which was subject matter of Award No. 2225 the Reference court awarded compensation @ Rs. 28,000. 00 per bigha for which he held Rs. 10. 000. 00 per bigha to be compensation for minor mineral (china clay) embedded in the land and Rs. 18,000. 00 per bigha towards market value of the land. ( 7 ). By the time these appeals were filed we are informed that reference petitions arising out of Award No. 1944 have not yet been decided by the Reference Courts. With respect to Award No. 90/80-81 also no information was supplied to us by either of the parties. ( 8 ). Learned Counsel for the parties were heard at length and we were taken through the entire record which was placed before the Reference Court. With respect to Award No. 90/80-81 also no information was supplied to us by either of the parties. ( 8 ). Learned Counsel for the parties were heard at length and we were taken through the entire record which was placed before the Reference Court. On behalf of Union of India the challenge to the impugned awards has been on various grounds but during course of submissions the points urge4 were, (a) Reference court was not justified in allowing interest for the period during which reference proceedings under Section 18 of the Act were stayed with effect from 17. 1. 1971 and 25. 2. 1971 to28. 5. 1980; (b) claimant-respondents are not entitled to additional amount under Section 23 (1a) of the Act since the awards in question were made by the Collector, Land Acquisition much prior to coming into force of the Land acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984; (c) no interest is payable to the claimant- respondents on solatium; (d) Collector, Land Acquisition had classified the land in three blocks, therefore, the Reference Court was not justified in doing away with this classification as the land of claimant-respondents fell under Block C, they could not have been awarded compensation more than Rs. 900. 00 per bigha, as such the enhancement of compensation is bad in law and is not based on rational basis; (e) claimant-respondents had claimed compensation @ Rs. 25. 00 per sq. yard for the land which was acquired through Notification dated 24. 10. 1961 and @ Rs. 50/ - per sq. yard for the acquisition which took place through the Notification dated 23. 1. 1065. The Reference Court thus exceeded in its jurisdiction in allowing compensation @ Rs. 28,000. 00 per bigha for the land which was the subject matter of award No. 2225, ignoring the bar created by Section 25 of the Act; (f) claimant- respondents are not entitled to any compensation separately for china clay mineral embedded in the acquired land for the reason that under the provisions of Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 the same belongs to government. ( 9 ). ( 9 ). On behalf of the claimant-respondents a preliminary objection was raised that the appeals filed by Union of India are barred by principles of res-judicata and on merits it was urged that the interest cannot be denied which statutorily is payable to the claimant-respondents, whose property is compulsorily acquired, irrespective of the fact that the proceedings were stayed, whether by order of the Court or with consent of the parties. It was urged that interest on solatium is payable. There was no embargo in the Reference Court having awarded compensation at uniform rate, keeping in view the potentiality particularly when Reference Courts found that it was the market value, which was prevalent as on the date of the notification under section 4 of the Act. The appellants had failed to satisfy the requirements, which would justify invoking the bar of Sub-section (2) ofsection25 of the Act. Itwas urged that in an earlier litigation between the parties the owners were held entitled to the china clay, therefore, the appellant was estopped from questioning tide of the claimants to compensation for the minor mineral (china clay) embedded in the acquired land and moreover, it is not specifically and expressly mentioned or recorded in Wajib-ul-arz that the china clay embedded in the land belongs to the government, in the absence of which it must be presumed that the china clay belongs to the claimant-respondents. In addition on behalf of claimant-respondents it was urged that the cross objections were liable to be allowed by enhancing the amount of compensation, as per the fair market value as existed on the date of the notification under Section 4 of the Act. ( 10 ). We have given due consideration to the submissions made at the bar. Our findings are as under: whether the appeals of Union of India seeking reduction in compensation are barred by the principles of res-judicata : applications were filed by the claimant-respondents in each appeal seeking dismissal of the appellant s appeals being barred by principle of res-judicata. It is stated that appeals were filed by Union of India against the award of Reference court dated 28. 7. 1986 by which compensation for land as well as china clay i. e. subsoil minerals embedded therein, acquired by the two awards (Nos. 2040 and 2225) was assessed at Rs. 22,000. 00 and Rs. 28,000. 00 per bigha respectively. It is stated that appeals were filed by Union of India against the award of Reference court dated 28. 7. 1986 by which compensation for land as well as china clay i. e. subsoil minerals embedded therein, acquired by the two awards (Nos. 2040 and 2225) was assessed at Rs. 22,000. 00 and Rs. 28,000. 00 per bigha respectively. The claimant- respondents were bhumidars alongwith the others, who for their undivided share in the joint holding, which had also been acquired under the same notifications had also sought references against the two awards. The references were answered separately by various Reference Courts, determining similar amount of compensation payable to the claimants. Appeals were filed to this Court against various awards of the Reference Court, which were dismissed. Against the judgments of this Court special Leave Petitions were filed by the appellants to the Supreme Court which were also dismissed. Accordingly it was urged that the decisions rendered by the reference Courts had become final and conclusive and the same operates as resjudicata against the Union of India, more particularly when the appellant has already paid compensation to the co-bhumidars at the same rates at which compensation has been awarded to the claimant-respondents by the Reference court including compensation for china clay. In the applications full particulars of the cases have been supplied by the claimant-respondents. Despite opportunities no reply was filed by the appellants to the applications. It was urged that the appellant had no reply to the respondents claim and there is no answer with the appellant, therefore, the appeals of the appellants have to the dismissed and only cross objections would require consideration. ( 11 ). At this stage, we may quote what the claimant-respondents urged with respect to the factual matrix on which the plea of res-judicata is being raised : "an area of 4307 bighas 18 biswas of lands situate in village Masoodpur was acquired by Government under three awards bearing Nos. 1944,2040 and 2225. The present appeals are concerned only with the lands acquired by award Nos. 2040 and 2225. The respondents are co-bhumidars of the aforesaid acquired lands along with Shri Inder Pal Malhotra, Ram Pal Malhotra, Shri kewal Wadhera, Shri Vikram Kumar Jain, Shri Chikram Kumar Jain, Shri sukhdev Singh and Shri K. M. Sharma and others who have also undivided shares in the joint holding which has been acquired. 2040 and 2225. The respondents are co-bhumidars of the aforesaid acquired lands along with Shri Inder Pal Malhotra, Ram Pal Malhotra, Shri kewal Wadhera, Shri Vikram Kumar Jain, Shri Chikram Kumar Jain, Shri sukhdev Singh and Shri K. M. Sharma and others who have also undivided shares in the joint holding which has been acquired. It is also an admitted fact that these respondents namely Smt. Pramod Gupta and others have 1/4 undivided share in 4200 bighas of acquired land while Shri Rajiv and others have 1/8 share in the aforesaid undivided holding of 4200 bighas. " ( 12 ). After the decree/award passed by Shri S. R. Goel, ADJ in the cases of Smt. Pramod Gupta and Ors. v. Union of India and Shri Rajiv Gupta and Ors. v. Union of India, the reference petitions filed under Section 18 of the Act by the above-named co- bhumidars/owners were decided by Shri Padam Singh, Additional District Judge and also Shri S. N. Kapoor, Additional District Judge (as his Lordship then was) respectively. Reference petitions filed by Shri Inder Pal Malhotra, Ram Pal Malhotra and Shri Kewal Wadhera were decided by Shri Padam Singh, Additional District judge on 12/04/1990 in LAC No. 15/81,16/81 and 119/81 respectively and were awarded compensation @ Rs. 22,000. 00 per bigha for the lands acquired under award No. 2040 and @ Rs. 24,340. 00 per bigha for the lands acquired under Award no. 2225. Shri Padam Singh differed from the judgment of Shri S. R. Goel only to the extent of increase in the market value of the lands between years 1961 to 1965, thedifference in time between the notifications of the said two Award Nos. 2040 and 2225. It may be stated that the notification under Section 4 of the Act in the case of award No. 2040 is dated 24. 10. 1961 while the date of notification issued under section 4 of the Act in the case of Award No. 2225 is 23. 1. 1965. ( 13 ). Union of India filed appeals against the judgments and decree passed by shri Padam Singh in the aforesaid cases which were registered in this Hon ble Court as RFANo. 567/90 and RFA 604/90 against the aforesaid LAC Nos. 15/81 and 16/ 81 respectively. Appeals were also filed by Union of India in the case of Shri Kewal wadhera which was registered as RFA No. 567/90. 15/81 and 16/ 81 respectively. Appeals were also filed by Union of India in the case of Shri Kewal wadhera which was registered as RFA No. 567/90. RFA No. 567/90 came up for hearing before the Division Bench comprising of Hon ble Mr. Justice S. B. Wad and hon ble Ms. Justice Usha Mehra and the same was dismissed by Their Lordships vide order dated 25. 10. 1990. Other sets of appeals bearing RFA No. 604/90 filed by union of India against Shri Inder Pal Malhotra and Ram Pal Malhotra in other LAC, came up for hearing before the Division Bench of this Hon ble Court comprising of hon ble Mr. Justice N. N. Goswami and Hon ble Mr. Justice S. C. Jain and the same was dismissed vide order dated 6. 12. 1990. RFA No. 546/90 filed by Union of India against Kewal Wadhera represented by his L. Rs. was heard by Hon ble Mr. Justice n. N. Goswami and Hon ble Mr. Justice S. C. Jain and the same was also dismissed by Their Lordships on 6. 12. 1990. ( 14 ). Reference petitions under Section 18 of the Act filed by the Vikram Kumar jain, Chikram Kumar Jain and Sliri K. M. Sharma the other co-bhumidars of the aforesaid undivided joint holdings of 4200 bighas came up for hearing against the said two Awards bearing Nos. 2040 and 2225 and were decided by Shri S. N. Kapoor, additional District Judge (as his Lordship then was ). The other reference petition filed by Shri Sukhdev Singh was also decided by Shri S. N. Kapoor, Additional district Judge (as his Lordship then was), vide judgment and decree dated 30. 7. 1990 while the reference petitions of Shri Vikram Kumar Jain and Chikram Kumar Jain were decided by Shri S. N. Kapoor, Additional District Judge (as his Lordship then was) vide his judgment and decree dated 31. 7. 1990. ( 15 ). The reference petition filed by Shri K. M. Sharma was also decided by Shri s. N. Kapoor, Additional District Judge (as his Lordship then was) on 30. 7. 1990. Shri s. N. Kapoor, Additional District Judge (as his Lordship then was) vide his aforesaid judgment and decrees awarded compensation to the said reference petitioners at the rate of Rs. 22,000. 00 per bigha acquired under Award No. 2040 and Rs. 28,000. 7. 1990. Shri s. N. Kapoor, Additional District Judge (as his Lordship then was) vide his aforesaid judgment and decrees awarded compensation to the said reference petitioners at the rate of Rs. 22,000. 00 per bigha acquired under Award No. 2040 and Rs. 28,000. 00 per bigha for the lands acquired vide Award No. 2225 after arriving at his own independent findings as were recorded by Shri S. R. Goel, ADJ in the reference petitions of these respondents. ( 16 ). The Union of India filed Regular First Appeal (RFA) Ho. 527/93 against the aforesaid judgment passed by Shri S. N. Kapoor, Additional District Judge (as his lordship then was) in the case of Shri Sukhdev Singh which was dismissed by this hon ble Court on 19. 8. 1993. RFA No. 456/93 filed by Union of India against Shri sukhdev Singh in the case of another Award was also dismissed on 21. 3. 1994. ( 17 ). Appeal filed by Union of India in the case of Shri K. M. Sharma in RFA No. 479/93 was dismissed by this Court on 28. 7. 1993. RFA No. 472/93 filed by Union of India against Shri K. M. Sharma was also dismissed by another Division Bench of this Hon ble Court on 22. 9. 1993. ( 18 ). RFA No. 454/93 filed by Union of India against Shri Vikram Kumar Jain and Chikram Kumar Jain was dismissed by the Division Bench of this Hon ble court comprising Hon ble Mrs. Justice Sunanda Bhandare and Hon ble Mr. Justice arun Kumar on 29. 7. 1993. RFA No. 437/93 filed by Union of India against Vikram kumar Jain and other, was dismissed by another Division Bench comprising of hon ble Mr. Justice P. N. Nag and Hon ble Ms. Justice Usha Mehra on 15. 4. 1994. ( 19 ). The Union of India, it is learnt, filed special leave petitions against all the aforesaid orders passed by the different Division Benches of this Hon ble Court against the decree/award passed by Shri Padam Singh, ADJ and Shri S. N. Kapoor, additional District Judge (as his Lordship then was) and the same were dismissed. 4. 1994. ( 19 ). The Union of India, it is learnt, filed special leave petitions against all the aforesaid orders passed by the different Division Benches of this Hon ble Court against the decree/award passed by Shri Padam Singh, ADJ and Shri S. N. Kapoor, additional District Judge (as his Lordship then was) and the same were dismissed. In case no special leave petitions were filed by Union of India against the aforesaid orders passed by this Hon ble Court even then the awards/decrees passed by Shri padam Singh, ADJ and Shri S,n. Kapoor, Additional District Judge (as his Lordship then was), became final and conclusive and the same operate as res-judicata against union of India on the following issues: (1) The market value of the acquired lands vide Award No. 2040 including the china clay, minor mineral held by both Shri Padam Singh, ADJ and shri S. N. Kapoor, Additional District Judge (as his Lordship then was), has become final. The Government after the dismissal of its appeals by this Hon ble Court paid the compensation amount to the aforesaid co- bhumidars namely, Inder Pal Malhotra, Ram Pal Malhotra, Shri Kewal wadhera, Shri Vikram Kumar Jain, Shri Chikram Kumar Jain, Shri sukhdev Singh and Shri K. M. Sharma. (2) With regard to Award No. 2225, the decree passed by Shri S. N. Kapoor, additional District Judge (as his Lordship then was), awarding a market value of the lands acquired under Award Nos. 2040 and 2225 @ Rs. 22,000. 00 perbigha and Rs. 28,,000. 00perbigha including china clay respectively, has become final and the Government has paid the amount of compensation at the aforesaid rates of Rs. 22. 000. 00 and Rs. 28,000. 00 per bigha respectively to the above-named co-bhumidars and as such the awards/decrees passed by Shri S. N. Kapoor, Additional district Judge (as his Lordship then was) has become final and operates as res-judicata. It is submitted that the Union of India accepted the aforesaid judgments and decreespassedbyshris. N. Kapoor,additional district Judge (as his Lordship then was) and confirmed vide the aforesaid orders made by this Hon ble Court by the aforesaid Division benches of this Court as correct and the unchallengeable and has paid the compensation accordingly to the aforesaid claimants/co-bhumidars. It is submitted that the Union of India accepted the aforesaid judgments and decreespassedbyshris. N. Kapoor,additional district Judge (as his Lordship then was) and confirmed vide the aforesaid orders made by this Hon ble Court by the aforesaid Division benches of this Court as correct and the unchallengeable and has paid the compensation accordingly to the aforesaid claimants/co-bhumidars. In view of the finality of the judgments and decrees passed by the Court of Shri s. N. Kapoor, Additional District Judge (as his Lordship then was) and the same having been acted upon by the Government in making the payment of compensation to the said co-bhumidars / claimants, the present appeals against the respondents in respect of the same lands acquired which is a joint and undivided holding are barred by res-judicata. These respondents cannot be paid compensation at a lesser rate/amount than what has already been paid to other co-bhumidars/co-owners both on the principles of res-judicata and equality before law and are entitled to be treated with the same treatment and parity. It is submitted that the appeals are barred by res-judicata or principles of res-judicata. " ( 20 ). It has not been denied that in so far as the co-bhumidars are conceme4 in their case also, by separate awards, the Reference Courts awarded compensation at the same rates as has been awarded to claimant-respondents by the impugned awards. Appeals were filed against the said awards by the appellant-Union of India. which were dismissed. Special leave petitions of Union of India were also filed, which also stand dismissed. Copies of special leave petitions and orders passed ; thereon have not been appended to the applications. It has not been brought to our notice by the appellants that any special leave petition is still pending consideration, therefore, it has to be presumed that at least the decisions of this Court, which were not appealed against, have become final. By the decisions rendered by the Reference courts in the cases of other co-bhumidars the market value of the land inclusive of compensation payable for china clay embedded in the soil has been determined at rs. 22. 000/- and Rs. 28/000. 00 per bigha for the land acquired through Notifications dated 24. 10. 1961 and 23. 1. 1965 respectively. Not only that the awards have become final even compensation has also been paid by the appellant to the co-bhumidars. ( 21 ). 22. 000/- and Rs. 28/000. 00 per bigha for the land acquired through Notifications dated 24. 10. 1961 and 23. 1. 1965 respectively. Not only that the awards have become final even compensation has also been paid by the appellant to the co-bhumidars. ( 21 ). In Sheodan Singh v. Daryao Kunwar, AIR 1966 SC 1332 , it was held that where the Trial Court decides two suits having common issues on merits and there are two appeals therefrom and one of them is dismissed on some preliminary ground like limitation or default the result is that the Trial Court s decision stands confirmed, the decision of the Appeal Court will be res-judicata and the Appeal court must be deemed to have heard and finally decided the matter. In such a case the result of the decision of the Appeal Court is to confirm the decision of the Trial court given on merits, and if that is so the decision of the Appeal Court will be res- judicata whatever may be the reason for the dismissal. It would be a different matter, however, where the decision of the Appeal Court does not result in the confirmation of the decision of the Trial Court given on the merits, as for example where the appeal Court holds that the Trial Court had no jurisdiction and dismisses the appeal, even though the Trial Court might have dismissed the suit on the merits. ( 22 ). Principles laid down in Sheodan Singh s case (supra), were followed in premier Tyres Limited v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, AIR 1993 SC 1202 , wherein it was held that finality of findings recorded in the connected suit, due to non filing of appeal, precludes the Court from proceeding with the appeal in the other suit. ( 23 ). Principles laid down in Sheodan Singh s case (supra), were followed in premier Tyres Limited v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, AIR 1993 SC 1202 , wherein it was held that finality of findings recorded in the connected suit, due to non filing of appeal, precludes the Court from proceeding with the appeal in the other suit. ( 23 ). On the ratio of the two decisions aforementioned, in so far as the instant appeals are concerned, at least it has to be held that when between the co-bhumidars and the appellant-Union of India the question of determination of the market value of land and the compensation payable for the china clay, embedded in the land has become final and the appellant has also paid the amount of compensation to the said co-bhumidars, the appellant is precluded in these appeals from challenging the market value and the compensation which has been payable to the claimant- respondents for china clay or in other words is precluded from seeking reduction in the amount of compensation. ( 24 ). Dismissal of one appeal, when the common issues arise for consideration in connected appeals; will have the result of making the other appeals also not maintainable. In Badni v. Sri Chand and Ors. , U (1999) SLT 217=11 (1999) CLT 46 (SC) = 1999 (2) Supreme 104 , it was held that dismissal of one appeal as having abated would result in conflicting decrees, therefore, the other appeals were also dismissed as not maintainable. ( 25 ). Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in State of U. P. v. Babu Ram (deceased by L. Rs.) and Others etc. , AIR 1995 Allahabad 2, held that when market value is determined in one reference, which has become final, same rate would also govern the land of the other owners, having similar advantages. Para 5 of the report says: "market value is determined on the date of notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act. Under Section 23 for determination of the market value examplers of contemporaneous transactions in respect of land having similar advantages have the evidenciary value. Previous awards have also evidenciary value to consider the question of market value. When in respect of one of the land owners, compensation has been awarded at a rate which is same as in respect of other owners of the land. Previous awards have also evidenciary value to consider the question of market value. When in respect of one of the land owners, compensation has been awarded at a rate which is same as in respect of other owners of the land. acquired under the same notification in the village, it can be presumed that acquired lands of the various owners have similar advantages. Accordingly, when market value as determined in one reference which has become final in absence of any appeal, the same rate would also govern the land of other owners. Thus, there is force in contention of Mr. Verma in the preliminary objection. " ( 26 ). Question of bar of res-judicata does not depend on the existence of a right of appeal of the same nature against each of the two decisions. One of the questions in deciding whether the doctrine of res-judicata applies to a particular case or not, as held in Narayana Prabhu Venkateswura Prabhu v. Narayana Prabhu Krishna Prabhu (dead) by L. Rs. , AIR 1977 SC 1268 , is to determine whether two inconsistent decrees will come into existence. ( 27 ). In view of the aforementioned factual background arid the decision of supreme Court, we are of the view that when proceedings, as regards determination of market value of the land with china clay embedded in the soil, have attained finality qua the other co-bhumidars vis-a-vis the appellant, the appellant is estopped from questioning the same in these appeals. The appellant cannot litigate again and again on the same issue. For this principle reference be made to the decision of supreme Court in Hope Plantations Ltd. v. Talukland Board, Peermade and Another, (1999) 5 SCC 590 . The Court held: "it is settled law that the principles of estoppel and res-judicata are based on public policy and justice. Doctrine of res-judicata is often treated as a branch of the law of estoppel through these two doctrines differ in some essential particulars. Rule of res-judicata prevents the parties to a judicial determination from litigating the same question over again even though the determination may even be demonstratedly wrong. When the proceedings have attained finality, parties are bound by thejudgment and are estopped from questioning it. They cannot litigate again on the same cause of action nor can they litigate any issue which was necessary for decision in the earlier litigation. When the proceedings have attained finality, parties are bound by thejudgment and are estopped from questioning it. They cannot litigate again on the same cause of action nor can they litigate any issue which was necessary for decision in the earlier litigation. These two aspects are "cause of action estoppel" and "issue estoppel". These two terms are of common law origin. Again, once an issue has been finally determined, parties cannot subsequently in the same suit advance arguments or adduce further evidence directed to showing that the issue was wrongly determined. Their only remedy is to approach the higher rise to, as noted above, an issue estoppel. It operates in any subsequent proceedings in the same suit in which the issue had been determined. It also operates in subsequent suits between the same parties in which the same issue arises. Section 11 of the Code of Civil procedure contains provisions of rcs-judicata but these are not exhaustive of the general doctrine of rcs-judicata. Legal principles of estoppel and res-judicata are equally applicable in proceedings before Administrative Authorities as they are based on public policy and justice. " ( 28 ). In view of the decision aforementioned the appeals of Union of India would be liable to be dismissed. ( 29 ). There are few applications pending consideration. In view of the order passed on 25. 8. 1999 allowing amendment to the memorandum of appeal and of the fact that deficiency in Court-fee was made good there is no need to pass separate orders. In any case the applications seeking amendment to memorandum of appeal, in terms of order dated 25. 8. 1999 and of the decisions of Supreme Court in harcharan v. State of Haryana, AIR 1983 SC 43 ; Bhag Singh and Ors. v. Union territory of Chandigarh, (1985) 3 SCC 737 ; Scheduled Caste Co-operative Land owning Society Ltd. , Bhatindav. Union of India and Others, (1991)1 SCC 174 ; Chand kaur and Others v. Union of India, (1994) 4 SCC 663 ; and Buta Singh (Dead) by LRs. v. Union of India, (1995) 5 SC 284, are allowed. ( 30 ). v. Union territory of Chandigarh, (1985) 3 SCC 737 ; Scheduled Caste Co-operative Land owning Society Ltd. , Bhatindav. Union of India and Others, (1991)1 SCC 174 ; Chand kaur and Others v. Union of India, (1994) 4 SCC 663 ; and Buta Singh (Dead) by LRs. v. Union of India, (1995) 5 SC 284, are allowed. ( 30 ). The appellants have in separate applications prayed for permission to place photo copies of the sale deed on record, by which the predecessors of claimant- respondents are stated to have purchased the land, much prior to the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act, which application is vehemently opposed by the respondents. The ground urged in seeking permission is that this is a relevant piece of evidence in determining the amount of compensation. Needless to add that the sale deeds by which the claimant-respondents or their predecessors purchased the property was within the knowledge of the appellants and the Collector, Land acquisition. No effort was made to rely upon this sale deed and obviously so because it is not in close proximity to the date of acquisition but much prior thereto and moreover, as per the recitals in the sale deed the land was subject matter of numerous litigations. What reasons prevailed in fixing the market value thereof are not on record and at this late stage it will neither be fair nor proper for us to permit reopening of the entire case by permitting the parties to lead evidence. Moreover, the price at which the owners purchased the property much prior to the date of acquisition cannot be relevant, when admittedly the market value has to be determined with reference to the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act. The appellants have also not produced certified copy of the judgment. Rather they have sought permission to place reliance on a photo copy. The appellants have also not produced certified copy of the judgment. Rather they have sought permission to place reliance on a photo copy. Respondents in their reply have assigned valid and cogent reasons that why the appellants be not permitted to place reliance upon photo copy of the judgment, more particularly for the reason about the knowledge which the appellants are alleged to be having about the sale deed and the reasons which might have prevailed with the appellants for not producing the same at the relevant time, which we will also extract hereinafter but before that we may notice that the appellants have not assigned any reason that how they are prevented from placing reliance on this document during the pendency of the reference before the Reference Court. ( 31 ). The respondents have stated in para 8 of their reply that even on the appellant own showing they were fully aware of the sale deed executed by Smt. Gulab Sundri in favour of her transferees including the respondents, which had already been produced by the transferees of Smt. Gulab Sundri before the Land acquisition Collector. The transferees claimed compensation on the strength of the sale deed, for the land which was notified for acquisition on 24/10/1961. The appellants besides having full knowledge of the said sale deed and in particular the land Acquisition Collector did not consider the sale deed relevant as reflecting the true market, value of the land as on 24/10/1961. The appellants knew very well that the said sale deed was executed by Smt. Gulab Sundri pursuance to an agreement to sell, which she had entered into with one Shri Devi Chand Malhotra at the time after the bhumidari/declaration certificate issued to her under the provisions of Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 on 5/07/1958 had been cancelled by the Revenue Assistant, Delhi vide order dated 14/07/1958. The said agreement to sell her bhumidari rights was on the basis of the bhumidari rights on as is where is basis. The appellants had been litigating against Smt. Gulab Sundri and her transferees including the respondents since the year 1959-60, which fact has been duly noted in the- decision dated 20. 5. 1980 delivered by the Additional District judge, Delhi, in the reference filed under Sections 30 and 31 of the Land Acquisition act. The appellants had been litigating against Smt. Gulab Sundri and her transferees including the respondents since the year 1959-60, which fact has been duly noted in the- decision dated 20. 5. 1980 delivered by the Additional District judge, Delhi, in the reference filed under Sections 30 and 31 of the Land Acquisition act. The appellants were fully aware of the circumstances under which the alleged sale deed was executed and for that reason besides others the appellant rightly considered the same as irrelevant and of no consequence in assessing market value of the land. According to terms of agreement to sell it was for Shri Devi Chand malhotra to take legal proceedings for getting the order of cancellation set aside at his own cost, expense and risk. The alleged sale deed was executed pursuant to the agreement to sell in favour of Shri Devi Chand Malhotra and his assigness. The bhumidari rights were in jeopardy and were under litigation since 1959. There was litigation between the appellants on one hand and Smt. Gulab Sundri and her transferees on the other before the Civil Courts and Revenue Courts. Also there was litigation between the recorded proprietors of the acquired land on one hand and smt. Gulab Sundri and her transferees including the respondents on the other, in different Forums/courts. These facts have been referred to in the award of the reference Court, who incidently also decided the reference under Sections 30/31 of the Act. Against the said award, by which the title to the land was declared in favour of Smt. Gulab Sundri and her transferees and the claims of the appellants and also of the other recorded proprietors were negatived and the compensation amount lying deposited in the Court was directed to be paid to Smt. Gulab Sundri and her transferees including the respondents the recorded owners filed appeals bearing rfa No. 309 and RFA No. 310, RFA No. 356 and RFA No. 357 of 1980 while the unionofmdia and Gaonsabha filed RFANo. 340 and RFANo. 341ofl980. The said regular First Appeals were dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on 2 6/02/1991. The Union of India and Gaon Sabha did not file any further appeal before the Supreme Court. The consequence being that the judgment of this Court in favour of Smt. Gulab Sundri and her transferees including the respondents became final and conclusive as regards title. The Union of India and Gaon Sabha did not file any further appeal before the Supreme Court. The consequence being that the judgment of this Court in favour of Smt. Gulab Sundri and her transferees including the respondents became final and conclusive as regards title. ( 32 ). In the background aforementioned the respondents case is on sound footings that the sale deed was within the knowledge of the appellant throughout and had even been produced by the transferees, including the respondents, before the Land Acquisition Collector way back in 1961-62 under which they claimed compensation to the acquired land. The appellants knowing fully well that the said sale deed was not relevant for determining compensation and did not represent the fair market value of the land at all, in any manner whatsoever, rightly did not rely upon the same before the Land Acquisition Collector and never produced the same before the Reference Court, therefore, there is no force in the applications filed by the appellant under Order 41 Rule 27, CPC, which are hereby dismissed. ( 33 ). In another set of applications prayer has been made by Shri Rajiv Gupta, respondent for deletion of the three names of Sanjay, Sumangli and L. R. Gupta and for continuing with two names only on the ground that bhumidari rights were acquired by him and late Smt. Framed Gupta only and not by the others. These applications were vehemently opposed by the other respondents. In the reply filed by respondents it is stated that the respondents being members of L. R. Gupta, HUF were substituted in that capacity in proceedings under Section 30 of the Act. Needless to add that names of all the respondents were duly substituted in proceedings under Sections 30 and 31 of the Act. After the said reference was decided no further appeal was carried by the applicant or by any other person. In this reference filed under Section 18 of the Act, there is neither any question, nor any scope of again going into the alleged dispute of apportionment. The prayer thus cannot be allowed, which is apparently misconceived. Inter se disputes amongst the respondents could have been subject matter of aseparate reference for apportionment under Sections 30-31 of the Act. In such proceedings names of all respondents stood duly substituted. The prayer thus cannot be allowed, which is apparently misconceived. Inter se disputes amongst the respondents could have been subject matter of aseparate reference for apportionment under Sections 30-31 of the Act. In such proceedings names of all respondents stood duly substituted. These appeals have arisen out of reference under Section 18 of the act only for determination of the amount of compensation. There is no meritin these applications, which are dismissed. The amount of compensation has thus to be realised, received and withdrawn only by the Karta of L. R. Gupta HUF, through shri L. R. Gupta. The amount of compensation, therefore, deserves to be paid to L. R. Gupta, HUF through its Karta Shri L. R. Gupta, ordered accordingly. Interest during period of stay: ( 34 ). On the question as regards entitlement of the claimant-respondents to interest for the period during which proceedings before the Reference Court remained stayed, reliance was placed on behalf of the appellant to the orders passed in the four reference petitions. In Land Acquisition Case No. 186/81 the following order was passed on 17. 1. 1972: Present: Sh. L. R. Gupta, Counsel for the claimant sh. J. S. Chowdhary for UOI Shri Gupta learned Counsel for the petitioners states that the petition may be stayed sine die and that the petitioner would not be claiming any interest on the enhanced amount of compensation money, if any, for the period of stay. Counsel for UOI has no objection to the proposed stay on the terms stated. I would accordingly stay the proceedings in this case sine die on the condition that no interest will be awarded to the petitionerson the enhanced compensation which may be eventually granted to him, for the period of stay. A. D. J. 17. 1. 1972 ( 35 ). On 25. 2. 1981 following order was passed in Land Acquisition Case No. 189/81: President: Sh. L. R. Gupta, Advocate for petitioner mr. Madan, Counsel for UOI It is stated by petitioner Counsel Mr. Gupta that another reference under Sections 30/51 is pending in the Court of Sh. F. S. Gill, A. D. J. , Delhi regarding title below me petitioner, respondent No. 2 Gaon Sabha, Masoodpur and other. He, therefore, prays that this case under Section 18 of the Act be stayed till the disposal of that reference. Mr. Gupta that another reference under Sections 30/51 is pending in the Court of Sh. F. S. Gill, A. D. J. , Delhi regarding title below me petitioner, respondent No. 2 Gaon Sabha, Masoodpur and other. He, therefore, prays that this case under Section 18 of the Act be stayed till the disposal of that reference. Mr. Madan, Counsel for UOI has no objection to this prayer of petitioners Counsel if the petitioner forgo their claim regarding interest on the amount of enhanced compensation, if any, during the continuance of stay. I, therefore, order the stay of this case during the pendency of that other reference petition under Sections 30 / 31 of the L. A. Act. It is further ordered that the petitioner would not be entitled to interest on the amount of enhanced compensation, if any, during the pendency of this reference. File be consigned to record room. Either party is entitled to have this case revived after disposal of that other reference. A. D. J. 25. 2. 1981 36. 0n 5-3. 1973 following order was passed in Land Acquisition Caseno. 188/: 81: present: Counsel for the petitioner counsel for respondent No. 1 the petitioners Counsel states that further proceedings in the case may be stayed sine die till the decision of the reference petition under Sections 30/31 of the L. A. Act pending in this Court pertaining to the compensation in; question a warded in this case. He further states that the petitioner would not claim interest for the period during which the proceedings in the case remain stayed. The Counsel for respondent No. 1 agrees to that. Under the circumstances whether proceedings in the case are stayed sine die till the decision of the said reference petition under Sections 30/31 of the L. A. Act. The proceedings shall be revisable on the decision of the said reference. A. D. J. 5. 3. 1973 ( 36 ). Pursuant to the aforementioned orders reference proceedings remained stayed and stood revived only after the reference petitions under Sections 30/31 of the Act were disposed of. No statement was made in the fourth reference case on behalf of the claimants, namely, the reference arising out of Award No. 2225, Smt. Pramod Gupta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. , proceedings were stayed suo moto by the Court. ( 37 ). No statement was made in the fourth reference case on behalf of the claimants, namely, the reference arising out of Award No. 2225, Smt. Pramod Gupta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. , proceedings were stayed suo moto by the Court. ( 37 ). It was submitted on behalf of the appellants that voluntarily statements were made on behalf of the claimant-respondents, therefore, they are precluded from claiming interest for the period of stay. Learned Counsel for the respondents contended that the statements of disclaimer of interest being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law, the Reference Court was justified in allowing interest, even for the period of stay. ( 38 ). The mandate contained in Sections 28 and 34 of the Act requires payments of interest, which cannot be denied in any circumstance. Section 28 lays down payment of interest on the amount of compensation in excess of the sum,which the collector awarded as compensation and it reads: "collector may be directed to pay interest on excess compensationif the sum which, in the opinion of the Court, the Collector ought to have awarded as compensation is in excess of the sum which the Collector did award as compensation, the award of the Court may direct that the Collector shall pay interest on such excess at the rate of [nine percentum]per rannum from the date on which he took possession of the land to the date of payment of such excess into Court. " ( 39 ). Section 34 of the Act provides for payment of interest when compensation is not paid or deposited on or before the Collector taking possession of land, which is payable on the amount assessed and awarded by the Collector. Section 34 reads as under: "payment of interest. When the amount of such compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land, the Collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon at the rate of nine per centum per annum from the time of so taking possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited. " ( 40 ). When the amount of such compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land, the Collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon at the rate of nine per centum per annum from the time of so taking possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited. " ( 40 ). Interest under Section 34 is an integral part of compensation and it is the liability of the Collector to pay interest, In the instant appeals the question involved is of interest which is payable under Section 28 and not the interest payable under section 34 of the Act. The contention on behalf of the appellant is that on the enhanced amount of compensation interest cannot be allowed for the period during which the reference proceedings under Section 18 of the Act remained stayed because of pendency of reference under Sections 30/31 of the Act. Reliance was placed by learned Counsel for the claimant-respondents on a number of decisions of this Court where despite similar orders of stay the claimants were held entitled to interest on the enhanced amount of compensation even for the period during which reference proceedings remained stayed on account of pendency of petitions under Sections 30 and 31 of the Act. The decisions are, Moti Sagar and Others v. Union ofIndia, RFA 240/79 decided on 17/04/1984; Union of India v. Birla Cotton spinning Mills, RFA No. 294/79 decided in September, 1979; Rati Ram etc. v. Union of India. C. R. Nos, 393-396/80 decided on 29. 8. 1980; Union of India v. Hakumat Devi charon Topkhanewale Dhannarth Trust, RFANo. 242/76 decided on 25. 8. 1983; Shri rodney Shyam v. Union of India, RFA 137/83 decided on 27. 7. 1984; Swaroop Singh v. Union of India, RFA 360/84, decided on 6. 11. 1984; Union of Indiav. Kishan Chand etc. , 47 (1992) DLT 60; Net Ram and Ors. v. Union of India, 59 (1995) DLT 569 and ashok Kumar v. Union of India and Ors. , RFA 275/81 decided on 14. 11. 1995. ( 41 ). 7. 1984; Swaroop Singh v. Union of India, RFA 360/84, decided on 6. 11. 1984; Union of Indiav. Kishan Chand etc. , 47 (1992) DLT 60; Net Ram and Ors. v. Union of India, 59 (1995) DLT 569 and ashok Kumar v. Union of India and Ors. , RFA 275/81 decided on 14. 11. 1995. ( 41 ). Full Bench of J and K High Court in Collector v. Habibullah Din and Others, air 1967 Jandk 44, construed the word "may" in Section 28 of the Act as "shall" holding that the word "may" in Section 28 does not invest mere discretion in the court but imposes a duty on it to pay interest at the rate mentioned in the section and therefore, it is mandatory. ( 42 ). Supreme Court in Vijay Cotton and Oil Mills v. State of Gujarat, JT 1990 (4) sc 771, held that once the conditions under Section 28 or Section 34 of the Act are satisfied award of interest is consequential and automatic. It was further held that there is inherent evidence in the wording of Sections 28 and 34 of the Act to show that the framers of the Act intended to assure payment of interest to the persons whose land was acquired and it was not the intention to subject said payment to procedural hazards. So far as the interest is concerned it was held that it is never an issue between the parties. The Court in paras 13,14 and 16 of the judgment held: "13. There is no dispute that under the Act the claimant is entitled to compensation at the rate of the market value of the land on the date of notification under Section4oftheact. Section23 (l)oftheactenumerates the matters which are to be taken into consideration in determining the compensation. On a reference under Section 18 of the Act the parties go to trial before the Court primarily on issue of determination of market value of the land. So far as award of interest is concerned it is never an issue between the parties. Once the conditions under Section 28 or section 34 of the Act are satisfied the award of interest is consequential and automatic. " 14. The High Court while appreciating the point in issue did not consider the mandatory provisions of Section 34 of the Act. Once the conditions under Section 28 or section 34 of the Act are satisfied the award of interest is consequential and automatic. " 14. The High Court while appreciating the point in issue did not consider the mandatory provisions of Section 34 of the Act. The said section specifically provides that when the amount of compensation is not paid on or before taking possession, of the land the Collector shall pay interest at 12% per annum from the date of taking over possession. The payment of interest is not dependent on any claim by the person whose land has been acquired. There can be no controversy or any lis between the parties regarding payment of interest. When once the provisions of section 34 are attracted it is obligatory for the Collector to pay the interest. If he fails to do so the same cane be claimed from the Court in proceedings under Section 18 of the Act or even from the Appellate court/courts thereafter. 16. There is inherent evidence in the wording of Sections 28 and 34 to show that the framers of the Act intended to assure the payment of interest to the person whose land was acquired and it was not the intention to subject the said payment to procedural hazards. Section 34 lays down that "the Collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest at 6% per annum. . . . ". The legislative mandate is clear. It is a directive to the collector to pay the interest iii a given circumstance. Section 34 nowhere says that the interest-amount is to be included in the award- decree as prepared under Section 23 (1) read with Section 26 of the Act. Similarly Section 28 provides "the award of the Court may direct that the Collector shall pay interest". Here also the award under Section 23 (1) read with Section 26 has been kept distinct from the payment of interest under the section. The interest to be paid under Section 34 and also under Section 28 is of different character than the compensation amount under Section 23 (1) of the Act. Whereas the interest, if payable under the Act can be claimed at any stage of the proceedings under the act, the amount of compensation under Section 26, is subject to the rules of Procedure and Limitation. The rules of procedure are hand maiden of justice. Whereas the interest, if payable under the Act can be claimed at any stage of the proceedings under the act, the amount of compensation under Section 26, is subject to the rules of Procedure and Limitation. The rules of procedure are hand maiden of justice. The procedural hassle cannot come in the way of substantive rights of citizens under the Act. " ( 43 ). In Manipur Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Collector of Hailakandi, AIR 1997 SC 1779 , it was held that word "may" in proviso to Section 28 has to be construed as "shall". Therefore, the Court have no discretion in the matter whether to award or not to award interest since the Statute has given measure of interest and the period for which it is payable. ( 44 ). From the aforesaid decisions, we are of the view that payment of interest is not a matter of Us or controversy between the claimants and the State. Section 28 of the Act is mandatory in character, which mandates payment of interest at the rate specified therein, as also the period for which it is to be paid. It is a legislative policy to pay interest to the claimants under Sections 28 and 34 of the Act. There is absolutely no discretion left with the Collector or the Court not to grant interest. On the aforementioned principle the Reference Court proceeded to hold the claimants entitled to interest even for the period of stay. We are of the view that the impugned award to that extent is unassailable for the reason that since it is a legislative mandate that claimant must be paid interest at the specified rate for the period mentioned under Section 28 of the Act. ( 45 ). As regards the statements made by the Counsel that whether it would amount to waiver we are of the view that it will not since there cannot be any question of waiver against mandatory and statutory provisions. ( 46 ). In Woman Srinivas Kimi v. Rahul Lal Bhayvan DOS and Company, AIR 1959 sc 689 , it was held that plea of waiver is not sustainable if it enforces an illegal agreement, which contravenes the statutory provisions based on public policy and produces the very result which the Statute prohibits and makes illegal. ( 46 ). In Woman Srinivas Kimi v. Rahul Lal Bhayvan DOS and Company, AIR 1959 sc 689 , it was held that plea of waiver is not sustainable if it enforces an illegal agreement, which contravenes the statutory provisions based on public policy and produces the very result which the Statute prohibits and makes illegal. It was further held that by enforcing the contract the consequence will be the enforcement of illegality and infraction of a statutory provision, which cannot be condoned by any contract or agreement of parties. An agreement to waive illegality is void on the ground of public policy and would be enforceable. It is an established principle of law that a waiver in derogation of a statutory right is not favoured and a waiver will be void if it infringes on the rights of others or would be against public policy or morals. ( 47 ). Supreme Court in Supdt. of Taxes, Dhubri and Ors. v. M/s. Onkannal nathmal Trust, AIR 1975 SC 2065 , held that there could be no waiver against the mandatory provisions. In para 68 of the said decision it was observed: "furthermore, the waiver even where both sides have agreed to waive the portion of a statutory provision, cannot extend to a case in which the effect may be either to oust the jurisdiction conferred by Statute or to confer a jurisdiction, which according to the Statute, is not there. In other words, if a notice under Section 7 (2) of the Act is a condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction to make the best judgment assessment, I do not think that the doctrine of waiver will confer jurisdiction so as to enable the parties to avoid the effect of violating a mandatory provision on a jurisdictional matter even by agreement. Other judgments reported in AIR 1962 Assam 20 (22) DB; 1979 all L. J. 1072 at pages 1075 and 1076, by which it was laid down that there could be no Estoppel or Waiver against the mandatory provisions of the Statute," ( 48 ). Other judgments reported in AIR 1962 Assam 20 (22) DB; 1979 all L. J. 1072 at pages 1075 and 1076, by which it was laid down that there could be no Estoppel or Waiver against the mandatory provisions of the Statute," ( 48 ). On the principles aforementioned and in view of the mandatory character of Section 28 of me Act, we do not find any illegality in the impugned awards by which the Reference Court held me claimant-respondents entitled to interest for the entire period including the period during which the proceedings under Section 18 of the Act remained stayed, irrespective of the statement of Counsel for claimants. ( 49 ). On the question of payment of interest on solatium, learned Counsel for the respondent frankly and rightly so conceded that since in Kapur Chand Jain v. State government of H. P. , (1999) 2 SCC 89 , reference has been made to a larger Bench because of conflict on this question whether interest is payable on solatium or not, he would not insist on a separate decision by this Court but would seek a direction that in the event of it being held in Kapur Chand Jain s case (supra), or in any other reference that interest is payable on solatium, direction be issued for payment of interest on solatium also. ( 50 ). After the arguments were heard in this case the larger Bench of Supreme court has since answered the reference by its judgment dated 19. 9. 2001 in VI (2001) slt 641 =iv (2001) CLT 18 (SC)=civil Appeal No. 6271 /98 Sunder v. Union of India, holding that the person entitled to compensation awarded is also entitled,to get interest on the aggregate amount including solatium. In view of the said decision claimants will be entitled to interest on solatium. Bar of Section 25 of the Act.