Research › Search › Judgment

Karnataka High Court · body

2001 DIGILAW 464 (KAR)

L. NAGARAJ v. DODDAIAH

2001-06-21

A.V.SRINIVASA REDDY, G.C.BHARUKA

body2001
A. V. SRINIVASA REDDY, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners claiming to be public spirited citizens have filed the present petition in public interest seeking the common relief of quashing the order dated 20-7-1989 made in lra No. 30 of 1987 on the file of the land reforms appellate authority, Bangalore. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case", briefly stated, are as follows: sy. No. 53 measuring 49 acres, 20 guntas situate at mallasandra village, yeshwanthapur hobli, Bangalore north taluk belonged to one vasudeva rao whose forefather received it as an inam in 1876. On the coming into force of inams abolition Act, the said land vested in the government. Doddaiah, the first respondent herein, filed an application before the land tribunal, north taluk in lrf a No. 1036 of 1980 claiming occupancy rights in respect of the said sy. No. 53 of mallasandra village, yeshwanthapur hobli, Bangalore north taluk. The tribunal, after enquiry, rejected the claim of the first respondent by its order dated 25-11-1986, on the ground that the lands are government lands and the application for grant of occupancy rights in respect of government lands is not maintainable. The first respondent preferred an appeal to the district land reforms appellate authority in lra No. 30 of 1987. The appellate authority allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the tribunal dated 25-11-1986 and granted occupancy rights in respect of sy. No. 53 (old No. 38) of mallasandra village, Bangalore north taluk measuring in all 49 acres and 20 guntas. By the present petition filed in the year 1994, the petitioners seek quashing of the said order of the appellate authority on various grounds. ( 3 ) THE main ground of attack against the impugned order Annexure-D is that the lands in question are gomal lands and, therefore, no occupancy rights could have been bestowed on the first respondent. The petitioners rely on the order of the special deputy commissioner dated 9-7-1961 by which he rejected the claim of the first respondent in respect of 12 acres of land in sy. No. 53 of mallasandra village, Bangalore north taluk. It is their case that against the said order the first respondent preferred an appeal to m. r. a. t. in No. 1570 of 1964. No. 53 of mallasandra village, Bangalore north taluk. It is their case that against the said order the first respondent preferred an appeal to m. r. a. t. in No. 1570 of 1964. The m. r. a. t. set aside the order of the special deputy commissioner and remitted the matter to the special deputy commissioner for inams for fresh disposal. On remit, the deputy commissioner for abolition of inams by his order dated 2-9-1974 rejected the claim of first respondent. The first respondent did not prefer any appeal against the said order and, therefore, the said order became final. As the matter acquired finality in the light of the order dated 2-9-1974, the petitioners contend, the grant of occupancy rights by the appellate authority in a subsequent proceedings is bad in law. It is also their case that since the lands concerned are gomal lands, public interest is involved and, therefore, this court in exercise of its jurisdiction under article 226 should interfere and set at nought the impugned order of the appellate authority. ( 4 ) WE have heard the learned counsels on both sides as well as the learned high court government pleader. ( 5 ) THE two points that would arise for our consideration are: (I) whether the petitioners have any locus standi? (ii) whether the petition could be permitted to be entertained after a delay of more than 7 years? ( 6 ) POINT No. 1. Though the parties in this petition have referred to various proceedings, both before the special deputy commissioner for inams abolition and the land reforms appellant tribunal, as also their respective appellate authorities, the fact remains that the petitioners having no personal stake in the matter could pose a challenge to an order passed by a statutory authority, which had attained finality, only in their representative capacity as persons espousing the cause of public interest. Shorn of the mantle of public interest that these petitioners seek to espouse, their challenge in this petition would come to nought on its own. Shorn of the mantle of public interest that these petitioners seek to espouse, their challenge in this petition would come to nought on its own. Therefore, the onus lies on the petitioners to establish that the case involves a matter of public interest failure on their part to establish the existence of public interest would, as stated earlier, render their challenge innocuous and there would be no necessity for us to go into the merits of either the order impugned herein or the several orders passed by the various statutory authorities. ( 7 ) THE petition is filed stating that the lands in question are gomal lands and are, therefore, not amenable to appropriation either under the Land Reforms Act or under the inams abolition act. Gomal lands having been set apart to serve a particular public interest, the petitioners contend, the grant of occupancy rights to the first respondent is against public interest. ( 8 ) THIS court while deciding W. P. No. 34011 of 1982 filed by the first respondent observed:"it is admitted that the land in dispute originally formed part and parcel of sy. No. 97. At the time of preliminary survey settlement of inam lands, a new number has been assigned to this sy. No. I. e. , 38 and at the time of final settlement, this 38 has become sy. No. 53. It is undisputed that the vesting took place in the year 1959. The question whether it is a gomal land or not can only be decided with reference to documents prior to date of vesting. Subsequent preliminary and final survey settlement records may not correctly reflect the nature of the land material to the date of vesting. The conclusion solely based on revenue records subsequent of vesting is not correct". we are quite in agreement with the view expressed by the learned single judge in the said order. The nature of the land as on the date of vesting i. e. , 1-2-1959 is what is relevant and no documents have been produced before us by the petitioners to prove that the lands in question were gomal lands at the appointed date. On the other hand, the land reforms appellate authority has observed in the course of its order at page 10 as follows:"ex. On the other hand, the land reforms appellate authority has observed in the course of its order at page 10 as follows:"ex. A6 is the final quit rent register related to jodi mallasandra village which shows that wo portion of the inam land was reserved as gomal. Ex. A6 is an ancient document of 1897. Ex. A4, the preliminary record of right shows that original survey No. 38 was sub-divided from 1 to 11 as survey No. 38/1 to 38/11. Sy. no. 38/1 to 38/10 had been cultivated by different persons under the jodidar vasudeva rao. From ex. A4, it is clear that no portion of survey No. 38 was reserved as gomal up to the year 1956". ( 9 ) THE portion of the impugned order extracted herein above leaves nothing to doubt that the latter entries showing the lands in question as 'gomal lands' are without any basis. The observations in the order of the appellate authority clearly point to the fact that these lands were under cultivation. Moreover, it is only on passing of an order by the deputy commissioner under Section 40 of the Mysore land revenue code that any land could be reserved for gomal purposes. The state and the village panchayat were parties before the land reforms appellate authority. If there were records to show that these lands were gomal lands on the appointed date, without doubt either the state or the village panchayat would not have failed to produce them. The report of the first division surveyor got prepared when the matter was pending before the land tribunal also, as could be gathered from the impugned Order, showed that the entire extent of lands in question was being cultivated by the first respondent. Thus, the essential ingredient for setting in motion a petition in public interest which alone would provide the locus standi to these petitioners, who are otherwise unconcerned with the lands in question, is sorely missing. The orders passed by the statutory authorities have some sanctity and they cannot be meddled with after a number of years, more so after they attain finality, at the instance of persons whose rights are in no way affected by such action. The orders passed by the statutory authorities have some sanctity and they cannot be meddled with after a number of years, more so after they attain finality, at the instance of persons whose rights are in no way affected by such action. The petitions filed by such persons cloaked as public interest litigation when apparently no public interest is involved are to be thrown out of the courts so as to ensure that this new found remedy is not rendered prone for abuse by busybodies or meddlesome interlopers. We have no doubt in our mind that the present petition is the result of a mala fide intention on the part of the petitioners to deny the first respondent the fruits to which he was held rightfully entitled to by orders passed by authorities in exercise of their statutory power. In sanjay musale v state of madhya pradesh, the apex court had occasion to deal with a litigation filed in public interest in which the element of 'public interest' was absent. Dismissing the petition, the apex court observed:". ,. . The petitioner appears to have filed the litigation for someone. There is no public interest involved in the petition. The high court rightly found him to be a busybody, and, in our opinion, such a meddlesome interloper cannot be permitted to maintain a public interest litigation petition". in the absence of any material produced by the petitioners to establish the fact that the lands in questions were gomal lands on the date of their vesting, it becomes clear that the petitioners have no locus standi in the matter and their position, however lofty their intentions may be, would be reduced to mere meddlesome interlopers. The petition has to fail on that count itself. , ( 10 ) IN lawyers' initiative through sh. R. s. bains, Advocate and another v State of Punjab through its chief secretary and others , a division bench of punjab and haryana court while interpreting the question as to at whose instance the court could intervene in public interest, observed;"the question of locus standi would not be material and the court would allow litigation in public interest if it is found. (i) that the impugned action is violative of any of the rights enshrined in part iii of the Constitution of India and relief is sought for its enforcement; (ii) that the action complained of is palpably illegal or mala fide and affects the group of persons who are not in a position to protect their own interest on account of poverty, incapacity or ignorance; (iii) that the person or a group of persons were approaching the court in public interest for redressal of public injury arising from the breach of public duty or from violation of some provision of the constitutional law; (iv) that such person or group of persons is not a busybody or meddlesome interloper and have not approached with mala fide intention of vindicating their personal vengeance or grievance; (v) that the process of public interest litigation was not being abused by politicians or other busybodies for political or unrelated objective. Every default on the part of the state or public authority being not justiciable in such litigation; (vi) that the litigation initiated in public interest was such that if not remedied or prevented would weaken the faith of the common man in the institution of the judiciary and the democratic set up of the country; (vii) that the State Action was being tried to be covered under the carpet and intended to be thrown out on technicalities; (viii) public-interest litigation may be initiated either upon a petition filed or on the basis of a letter or other information received but upon satisfaction that the information laid before the court was of such a nature which required examination; (ix) that the person approaching the court has come with clean hands, clean heart and clean objectives; (x) that before taking any action in public interest the court must be satisfied that its forum was not being misused by any unscrupulous litigant, politicians, busybody or persons or groups with mala fide objective of either for vindication of their personal grievance or by resorting to blackmailing or considerations extraneous to public interest". the lands in question were in possession of the first respondent at the relevant point of time and he was cultivating them. The petitioners' endeavour to intervene is an attempt to subverse the private interest of the first respondent over these lands and nothing more. The court cannot permit such misuse by the petitioners. the lands in question were in possession of the first respondent at the relevant point of time and he was cultivating them. The petitioners' endeavour to intervene is an attempt to subverse the private interest of the first respondent over these lands and nothing more. The court cannot permit such misuse by the petitioners. ( 11 ) POINT No. 2. This petition is preferred 7 years after the date of passing of the impugned order. The petitioners had knowledge throughout of the various proceedings in which the first respondent was laying claim to the lands in question. The petitioners who claim to be public spirited citizens should have approached this court at the earliest point of time after the matter was ultimately settled in favour of the first respondent. If a parallel right has come to be created by the impugned Order, it was but reasonable to expect the petitioners, one of them being a practising advocate, to act post-haste in the matter. In the circumstances of the case and considering the fact that the petitioners were throughout aware of the goings-on, the time that was allowed to be elapsed before recourse is had to the special remedy of public interest litigation cannot be held to be 'reasonable' and there is no explanation, let alone proper explanation, forthcoming from the petitioners for the undue delay of 7 years that had elapsed after the passing of the impugned order. In such circumstances the apex court in bhoop singh v union of India and others, observed: there is another aspect of the matter. Inordinate and unexplained delay or laches is by itself a ground to refuse relief to the petitioner, irrespective of the merit of his claim. If a person entitled to a relief chooses to remain silent for long, he thereby gives rise to a reasonable belief in the mind of others that he is not interested in claiming that relief. Others are then justified in acting on that behalf. In this case the matter was finally settled in favour of the first respondent in the year 1986 and none of the aggrieved, including the government, took any steps to challenge the impugned order. Others are then justified in acting on that behalf. In this case the matter was finally settled in favour of the first respondent in the year 1986 and none of the aggrieved, including the government, took any steps to challenge the impugned order. The first respondent must have acted in relation to the lands in question, all these years, on the premise that he has acquired a valuable right over the lands in question and such a right that has accrued to the first respondent cannot be allowed to be challenged in a petition preferred belatedly without any explanation for the delay. Thus, this petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches also. ( 12 ) IN the result, for the reasons stated above, the writ petition is dismissed. --- *** --- .