ORDER: The instant criminal original petition is to call for the records in Special Case No. 1 of 1999 pending on the file of the Additional Sessions Judge, Nagercoil. 2. This criminal original petition has arisen in this way: The petitioner Ranibai was working as Village Health Nurse in Government Primary Health Centre, Aarudesam in Kanyakumari District. During 1979-80, the Government of India launched a drive for Family Planning Programme. Based on that, the Government of Tamil Nadu organised intensive Family Welfare Scheme during 1980. According to the programme, the District Collectors accorded temporary recognition to the private Doctors on recommendation of the District Family Welfare Maternity and Child Health Officer, to perform sterilization operations during the intensive drive period from 16.1.1980 to 31.3.1980. Alleging that the petitioner and eight others have misappropriated and cheated the Government to the extent of Rs.4,140 a case in Crime No.2 of 1983 for offence under Sec.120-B, I.P.C. read with Secs.420, 467, 468, 471, I.P.C. read with Sec.467, I.P.C. Secs.5(1)(d) read with 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and Sec. 109, I.P.C. has been registered, wherein the petitioner has been shown as the fifth accused. F.I.R. was filed on 23.5.1983. The charge sheet was filed on 10.4.1991 and the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nagercoil took cognizance of the case in Special Case No.1 of 1991. The petitioner was to retire on 30.6.2000, but the proceeding in Special Case No.1 of 1991 is still pending, the alleged offence is said to have been committed about twenty years ago, i.e., during 1980, the F.I.R. was filed about seventeen years ago, i.e., on 23.5.1983. The case was taken on file, about nine years ago, i.e., on 10.4.1991 and examination of the witnesses are yet to be completed by the prosecution. On the basis of the long delay, the petitioner seeks quashing of the proceedings. 3. The respondent filed counter, wherein he had slated that because of malpractice involving conspiracy, cheating, misappropriation and forgery, a regular case in Crime No.2 of 1983 was registered in Kanyakumari Detachment of the Directorate of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, Chennai under the provisions stated above. Large number of witnesses have been examined. The first accused filed petition before this Court for quashing the proceedings, which was dismissed on 17.3.1995. Large number of witnesses have been examined. The first accused filed petition before this Court for quashing the proceedings, which was dismissed on 17.3.1995. Then, after receipt of the records, accused 3 and 4 were absconding for few hearings and the prosecution was able to examine witnesses only from 1996. Then, 62 witnesses were cited in the chargesheet, 35 witnesses have been examined so far, of the remaining 27 witnesses, 6 are reported dead and the other witnesses are officials who are working in various places. They will be examined soon and the trial, would be over. It is also stated that by virtue of the judgment pronounced by the Apex Court in the ‘Common Cause’ v. Union of India, (1996)6 S.C.C. 33 and ‘Common Cause’, A Registered Society v. Union of India, (1996)6 S.C.C. 775 , in cases of this sort, i.e., cases involved corruption, misappropriation of public funds, cheating, etc. the petitioner cannot seek quashing of the proceedings, but they can only seek early trial. 4. Heard both the sides. Time and again, the Apex Court have been insisting that the trial in criminal cases should be concluded as early as possible and delay would amount to violation of the guaranty granted to the accused under Art.21 of the Constitution of India. In Common Cause v. Union of India, (1996)6 S.C.C. 33:1996 S.C.C. (Crl.) 589, the Apex Court has laid down the following guidelines for release of offenders on bail and closure of cases where the trial had not commenced. In that case, their Lordships have also detailed a list of cases where exemption from directions 1 and 2 has been given therein. Their Lordships have details as under: 1(a) Where the offences under I.P.C. or any other law for the time being in force for which the accused are charged before any Criminal Court are punishable with imprisonment not exceeding three years with or without fine and if trials for such offence are pending for one year or more and the accused concerned have not been released on bail but are in jail for a period of six months or more, the Criminal Court concerned shall release the accused on bail or on personal bond to be executed by the accused and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be found necessary, in the light of Sec.437 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Crl.P.C.). (b) Where the offences under I.P.C. or any other law for the time being in force for which the accused are charged be fore any Criminal Court are punishable with imprisonment not exceeding five years, with or without fine, and if the trials for such offences are pending for two years or more and the accused concerned have not been released on bail but are in jail for a period of six months or more, the Criminal Court concerned shall release the accused on bail or or personal bond to be executed by the accused and subject to imposing of suitable conditions, if any, in the light of Sec.437, Crl.P.C. (c) Where the offences under I.P.C. or any other law for the time being in force for which the accused are charged before any Criminal Court are punishable with seven years or less, without or without fine, and if the trials for such offences are pending for two years or more and the accused contented have not been released on bail but are in jail for a period of one year or more, the Criminal Court concerned shall release the accused on bail or on personal bond to be executed by the accused and subject to imposing of suitable conditions, if any, in the light of Sec.437, Crl.P.C. 2. (a) Where criminal proceedings are pending regarding traffic offences in any Criminal Court for more than two years on account of non-serving summons to the accused or for any other reason whatsoever, the Court may discharge the accused and close the cases. (b) Where the cases pending in Criminal Courts for more than two years under I.P.C. or any other law for the time being in force are compoundable with permission of the Court and if in such cases trials have still not commenced, the Criminal Court shall, after hearing the Public Prosecutor and other parties represented before it or their advocates, discharge or acquit the accused, as the case may be, and close such cases. (c) Where the cases pending in Criminal Courts under I.P.C. or any other law for the time being in force pertain to offences which are non-cognizable and bailable and if such pendency is for more than two years and if in such cases trials have still not commenced, the Criminal Court shall discharge or acquit the accused, as the case may be, and close such cases. (d) Where the cases pending in Criminal Courts under I.P.C. or any other law for the time being in force are pending in connection with offences which are punishable with fine only and are not of recurring nature, and if such pendency is for more than one year and if in such cases trials have still not commenced, the Criminal Court shall discharge or acquit the accused as the case may be, and close such cases. (e) Where the cases pending in Criminal Courts under I.P.C. or any other law for the time being in force are punishable with imprisonment up to one year, with or without fine, and if such pendency is for more than one year and if in such cases trials have still not commenced, the Criminal Court shall discharge or acquit the accused, as the case may be, and close such cases. (f) Where the cases pending in Criminal Courts under I.P.C. or any other law for the time being in force are punishable with imprisonment upto three years, with or without fine, and if such pendency is for more than two years and if in such cases trials have still not commenced, the Criminal Court shall discharge or acquit the accused, as the case may be, and close such cases. 3. For the purpose of directions contained in Clauses (1) and (2) above, the period of pendency of criminal cases shall be calculated from the date the accused are summoned to appear in the Court. 4. 3. For the purpose of directions contained in Clauses (1) and (2) above, the period of pendency of criminal cases shall be calculated from the date the accused are summoned to appear in the Court. 4. Directions (1) and (2) made hereinabove shall not apply to cases of offences involving (a) corruption, misappropriation of public funds, cheating, whether under the Indian Penal Code, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 or any other statute, (b) smuggling, foreign exchange violation and offences under the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, (c) Essential Commodities Act, 1955, Food Adulteration Act, Acts dealing with environment or any other economic offences, (d) offences under the Arms Act, 1959, Explosive Substances Act, 1987, (e) offences relating to the Army, Navy and Air Force (f) offences against public tranquillity, (g) offences relating to public servants, (h) offences relating to coins and government stamps (i) offences relating to elections, (j) offences relating to giving false evidence and offences against public justice, (k) any other type of offences against the State, (1) offences under the taxing enactments and (m) offences of defamation as detailed in Sec.499, I.P.C." Of course, the above decision is not applicable to the facts of the instant case, because this is not a case where the trial had not commenced and the petitioner is suffering incarceration. 5. In ‘Common Cause’, A Registered Society v. Union of India, (1996)6 S.C.C. 775 , their Lordships have issued certain further guidelines and modifications. Their Lordships have stated as under: "(i) In cases of trials before the Sessions Court the trial shall be treated to have commenced when charges are framed under Sec.228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in the cases concerned." 6. In Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar, J.T. (1999)7 S.C. 317:1998 S.C.C. (Crl.) 1692, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have laid down further directions: "(i) In cases where the trial is for an offence punishable with imprisonment for a period not exceeding seven years, whether the accused is in jail or not, the Court shall close the prosecution evidence on completion of a period of two years from the date of recording the plea of the accuses on the charges framed whether the prosecution has examined all the witnesses or not within the said period and the Court can proceed to the next step provided by law for the trial of the case. (ii) In such cases as mentioned above, if the accused has been in jail for a period of not less than one-half of the maximum period of punishment prescribed for the offence, the trial Court shall release the accused on bail forthwith on such conditions as it deems fit. (iii) If the offence under trial is punishable with imprisonment for a period exceeding 7 years, whether the accused is in jail or not, the Court shall close the prosecution evidence on completion of three years from the date of recording the plea of the accused on the charge framed, whether the prosecution has examined all the witnesses or not within the said period and the Court can proceed to the next step provided by law for the trial of the case, unless for very exceptional reasons to be recorded in the interest of justice the Court considers it necessary to grant further time to the prosecution to adduce evidence beyond the aforesaid time-limit. (iv) But if the inability for completing the prosecution within the aforesaid period is attributable to the conduct of the accused in protracting the trial, no Court is obliged to close the prosecution evidence within the aforesaid period in any of the cases covered by Clauses (i) to (iii). (v) Where the trial has beer stayed by orders of the Court or by operation of law, such time during which the stay was in force shall be excluded from the aforesaid period for closing the prosecution evidence. The above directions will be in addition to and without prejudice to the directions issued by this Court in ‘Common Cause’, A Registered Society v. Union of India, (1996) 6 S.C.C. (Crl) 589, as modified by the same Bench through the order reported in ‘Common Cause,‘ A Registered Society v. Union of India, 1997 S.C.C. (Crl.) 42." These directions issued by their Lordships apply to cases where trial has commenced and the date applicable is the date of recording of plea of the accused. Their Lordships have held that if the examination of witnesses are not completed within two years or three years, as the case may be, as per the direction, the prosecution should be closed and further proceedings should be ordered? 7. Their Lordships have held that if the examination of witnesses are not completed within two years or three years, as the case may be, as per the direction, the prosecution should be closed and further proceedings should be ordered? 7. In the latter decision reported in Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar, J.T. (1999) 7 S.C. 317, where certain further clarifications have been issued by the Apex Court, the Apex Court extended the exemption given under Direction No.(iii) to the Direction No.(i) also and also granted exclusion of certain periods which is as under: 8......"If the trial gets postponed on account of pendency of any appeal of revision filed against any interim order even though there was no order of stay it is open to the trial Court to reckon that period also within the ambit of Clause (iv) extracted above. 9.......We make it clear that if evidence of any witness appears to the Court to be essential to the just decision of the case it is the duty of the Court to summon and examine or recall and re-examine any such person. 10.......However, we have not noticed that absence of presiding officer in a trial Court (either on account of the physical disability or due to the delay in taking over the charge of the Court) is a valid cause which disables the prosecution from adducing evidence. So we are of the view that such time can also be excluded by the Court from the period which we have prescribed in the judgment for completing prosecution. 11.......Nonetheless, to avoid any possible dislocation of the trial on account of any such eventuality, we make it clear that if the tenure of office of a particular person as Public Prosecutor expires he shall continue to hold office and function as Public Prosecutor until his successor takes charge from him. If the office of a Public Prosecutor falls vacant on account of any other reason, a period of 3 months shall be excluded from the periods fixed under direction Nos.(i) and (iii) for enabling the State Government to appoint a Public Prosecutor to that office. 15. Shri Altaf Ahmad, learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that unless directions Nos.(i) and (iii) are made prospective from the date of judgment in Raj Deo Sharma prosecution in many pending cases would be jeopardised. 15. Shri Altaf Ahmad, learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that unless directions Nos.(i) and (iii) are made prospective from the date of judgment in Raj Deo Sharma prosecution in many pending cases would be jeopardised. He pointed out that on the date of the said judgment the period concerned stood expired in many cases. We have bestowed our consideration on the said submission and we find force in it. It is evident that the trial has commenced. Possibility of miscarriage of justice resulting therefrom must be averted. We are, therefore, inclined to include a rider that an additional period of one year can be claimed by the prosecution in respect of prosecutions which were pending on the date of judgment in Raj Deo Sharma’s case, J.T. (1999) 7 S. C. 317: 1998 S.C.C. (Crl.) 1692 and the Court concerned would be free to grant such extension if the Court considers it necessary in the interest of administration of criminal justice. As we suspended the operation of the judgment from 14.5.1999 till today the said time of suspension will stand excluded from the aforementioned additional period of one year." 8. In the present case, it is evident that the trial has commenced. 62 witnesses have been cited. Out of them, 35 have been examined and few more witnesses are to be examined. I do not think that this is a very exceptional case, considering the stature of the petitioner and also the amount involved to grant time extension to the prosecution to examine further prosecution witnesses. I feel, the guidelines laid down in Raj Deo Sharmas case, J.T. (1999)7 S.C. 317: 1998 S.C.C. (Crl.) 1692, have to be followed. Accordingly, this criminal original petition is partly allowed. The leaned Additional Sessions Judge, Nagercoil shall close the prosecution evidence and proceed further with the case in Special Case No.1 of 1991 pending on his file.