JUDGMENT - H.L. GOKHALE, J.:---This petition is concerning a plot of land situated a Mahim, Mumbai bearing Plot No. 377 (Part). TPS III having approximate area of 1801.02 sq. metres. A part of this plot is already rented out to the Bombay Telephones who are having their stores thereon since about 1953. The respondent No. 1 to this petition is union of India and respondent No. 3 is the General Manager, Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd., the successor of Bombay Telephones. The respondents Nos. 2 and 4 are State of Maharashtra and its Special Land Acquisition Officer No. III. The petitioners are the landlords of the concerned plot of land. 2. The respondents No. 1 and 3 thought it proper that the said plot No. 377 (Part) be acquired for their activities and hence they moved respondent No. 2 for that purpose. The respondent No. 2 issued a notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ("the Act" for short) on 3rd October, 1981 and also appointed under section 3(c) of the Act the Special Land Acquisition Officer (III), Bombay and Bombay Sub-urban District to perform the functions of a Collector under section 5-A of the Act. That notification was duly published by the State Government in the gazette on 15th October, 1981. Since no objections were received, a notification was issued under section 6 of the said Act on 17th August, 1983 and the same was published in the Government Gazette on 1st September, 1983. Thereafter the Award was made by the concerned Land Acquisition Officer on 23rd September, 1986. This petition has been filed thereafter on 15th October, 1986 to challenge the said Award as also the above referred two notifications. 3. Mr. C.M. Korde with Mr. P.S. Kowli appears for the petitioners. Mr. H.V. Mehta appears for respondent No. 1. Mr. R.M. Sawant appears for respondent Nos. 2 and 4, Ms. S.I. Shah appears for respondent No. 3. 4. The petition annexes thereto the above referred notifications under section 4 and section 6 at Exhibits Z-11 and Z-15 respectively. As far as the Award dated 23rd September, 1986 is concerned, what the petitioners have annexed is only the letter of the Land Acquisition Officer informing them that the Award has been declared on 23rd September, 1986. 4. The petition annexes thereto the above referred notifications under section 4 and section 6 at Exhibits Z-11 and Z-15 respectively. As far as the Award dated 23rd September, 1986 is concerned, what the petitioners have annexed is only the letter of the Land Acquisition Officer informing them that the Award has been declared on 23rd September, 1986. A copy of that letter is annexed at Exhibit Z-24, which states that the vacant possession will be taken on 16th October, 1986. It is at that stage that this petition was filed and an ad interim order was passed on 15th October, 1986. Thereafter the petitioners did not care to apply and obtain a copy of the Award although they had received a letter dated 23rd September, 1986 informing that the Award had been made. It is much later i.e. 12 years thereafter that they took inspection of the papers from the office of the Government Pleader sometimes in the year 1998 for that purpose. 5. It is at this stage that the petitioners felt that in the inspection they had not seen any approval for the Award given by the State Government as required under section 11 of the Act. Hence on Counsel's advise, a chamber summons was taken out to amend the petition and to raise the submission that the Award was bad in law in the absence of approval of the State Government under section 11 of the Act. The Chamber Summons was supported by the affidavit of the 2nd petitioner who stated therein "When this question was raised, I remembered that in the inspection of file which I had taken there was nothing relating to the said approval". A reliance is placed in this behalf on para 6 of the judgment of the Apex Court in (State of U.P. v. Rajiv Gupta)1, reported in 1994(5) S.C.C. 687. The petitioners themselves tendered in this Court a copy of the Award on obtaining the same from the respondents. Page 847, which was the last page of that Award (being the running page number of the file from the Special Land Acquisition Officer) contained an endorsement of the Land Acquisition Officer that the approval of the Commissioner had been obtained. Yet, the chamber summons was allowed and the petitioners have been permitted to raise this point so that they are not denied opportunity to raise these submissions. 6. Yet, the chamber summons was allowed and the petitioners have been permitted to raise this point so that they are not denied opportunity to raise these submissions. 6. The respondents filed two affidavits in reply. Firstly that of one Shri Raghunath Gopal Jadhav, Special Land Acquisition Officer, MHADA who is the present in-charge of the particular proceedings. He annexed to his affidavit the memorandum dated 12/18th September, 1986 from the office of the Commissioner, Konkan Division. The memorandum makes some suggestions with respect to the draft Award submitted by S.L.A.O. (III) for approval. At the bottom of that memorandum, there is an endorsement "Draft approved by Commissioner". Mr. Jadhav has stated in para 4 of his affidavit that by the said letter, the Divisional Commissioner has granted approval for making of the Award. 7. Mr. Korde, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, on inspection of the said memorandum (a copy of which was enclosed to the affidavit), pointed out that the copy from the file of the Commissioner relied upon by Shri Jadhav did not have the signature of the Commissioner and in the absence thereof, it is difficult to accept that such an approval had been granted. He made this submission particularly on the footing that the period of two years for making of the Award was about to lapse and therefore it is quite possible that in a hurry certain decisions might have been taken without the approval of the Commissioner. Mr. Sawant, learned Government Pleader, therefore filed another affidavit of one Shri Balasaheb Dadaji Panpatil, Town Planner from the office of the Commissioner, Konkan Division. He relied upon the other contemporaneous records from the office of the commissioner. That included a detailed note dated 5th September, 1986 prepared by the then Town Planner (Award Section) for the Commissioner to look into with respect to the draft Award which had been submitted by the S.L.A.O. (III). In last para of that note, the Town Planner states as follows : "If approved, the draft memo put up herewith may please be approved." Thereafter, below that note, there is an endorsement of the then Commissioner of Konkan Division Mr. Nalinakshan, which reads as follows : "Discussed. As proposed, subject to remarks in margin. sd/- 10/9" 8. Mr. Sawant, then pointed out that in the margin of para 9 of that note, the then Commissioner had made query in his handwriting. Nalinakshan, which reads as follows : "Discussed. As proposed, subject to remarks in margin. sd/- 10/9" 8. Mr. Sawant, then pointed out that in the margin of para 9 of that note, the then Commissioner had made query in his handwriting. The relevant sentence in para 9 of the note reads as follows : "However on page 12 in item (A) for calculating reversionary value of land, an area of 761.60 sq. mts. is incorrectly taken and it should be taken as 741.60 sq.mts. as mentioned in third line of page 12. This sentence is underlined in red ink and in the margin the following remark appears in red ink "why? explanation from Collector". In the memorandum of approval dated 12/18 September, 1986 it stated that the draft Award is approved subject to the observations recorded therein. The observation No. 3 records as follows- "for calculating reversionary value of land (in Item A on page 12) an area of 761.60 sq. mts. is incorrectly taken and it should be taken as 741.60 sq.mts. as mentioned in 3rd line on page 12". And then we find that on the Award also for calculating reversionary value of land, the area of 741.60 mtrs. is taken. Mr. Sawant therefore submitted that this clearly shows that on receiving the draft Award a detailed note had been submitted for the consideration of the Commissioner, the commissioner had gone through that note, made his remarks in the margin of the note and then placed his endorsement as above at the bottom of the note approving the draft memorandum. Accordingly the memorandum of approval was issued and then the Award was made. On the basis of this material, in para 4 of his affidavit. Shri Panpatil stated as follows : "I say that the said note was approved by the then Commissioner, Konkan Division Shri K. Nalinkashan and bears his signature at the foot of the said note. I say that from the above record, it is clear that the approval was granted by the then Commissioner for declaration of the said Award." 9. Mr. Korde has submitted that in the absence of the approval by the Government under the first proviso to section 11(1) of the Act, the Award was non est. This section 11(1) reads as follows :- 11. Mr. Korde has submitted that in the absence of the approval by the Government under the first proviso to section 11(1) of the Act, the Award was non est. This section 11(1) reads as follows :- 11. Enquiry and Award by Collector.---(1) On the day so fixed, or on any other day to which the enquiry has been adjourned, the Collector shall proceed to enquire into the objections (if any) which any person interested has stated pursuant to a notice given under section 9 to the measurements made under section 8, and into the value of the land at the date of the publication of the notification under section 4, sub-section (1), and into the respective interests of the persons claiming the compensation and shall make an Award under his hand of -- (i) the true area of the land: (ii) the compensation which in his opinion should be allowed for the land : and (iii) the apportionment of the said compensation among all the persons or believed to be interested in the land, of whom, or of whose claims, he has information, whether or not they have respectively appeared before him: Provided that no Award shall be made by the Collector under this sub-section without the previous approval of the appropriate Government or of such officer as the appropriate Government may authorise in this behalf. Provided further that it shall be competent for the appropriate Government to direct that the Collector may make such Award without such approval in such class of cases as the appropriate Government may specify in this behalf." What the Apex Court has observed in para 6 of State of U.P. v. Rajiv Gupta (supra) on the first proviso to section 11(1) is as follows : "6. Section 11 postulates of conducting an enquiry and making the Award by the Collector. The first proviso envisages that "no Award shall be made by the Collector under sub-section without the previous approval of the appropriate Government or of such officer as the appropriate Government may authorise in this behalf". Section 11 postulates of conducting an enquiry and making the Award by the Collector. The first proviso envisages that "no Award shall be made by the Collector under sub-section without the previous approval of the appropriate Government or of such officer as the appropriate Government may authorise in this behalf". It is common knowledge that exercising the power under the first proviso, the appropriate Government made rules or statuary orders or instructions whatever be the nomenclature, they have statutory operation giving authorisation to the Land Acquisition Collector to make an Award upto a particular pecuniary limit without prior approval either of the appropriate Government or an officer authorised by the appropriate Government in that behalf. If the Award exceeds the limit, prior approval of the State Governments or authorised officer is mandatory. Any Award made in violation thereof, renders the Award non est and void as it hinges upon the jurisdiction of the Land Acquisition Collector or Officer." Now, what is relevant to note is that in this case it was the Government of U.P. which had raised the objection that the Award was in excess of the pecuniary limits for the concerned officer and therefore it was non est in the absence of the approval of the Government. In the present matter, that is not the case. In fact, here the Government is very much maintaining that the Commissioner had given the approval for making of the Award. Besides, it is not the case of the petitioners also that the Land Acquisition Officer had exceeded her pecuniary limit. 10. Mr. Korde, learned Counsel for the petitioners, then submitted that the note put up to the Commissioner together with his endorsement cannot be said to constitute approval. The Government Pleader has produced the relevant record and we have gone through the file. The file made available for our perusal was also made available for the perusal of the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners. The file had been maintained properly and it is a part of the official record. As noted above, after receiving the draft Award, a detailed note had been prepared, the Commissioner had considered, it, made his query and then placed his endorsement at the bottom thereof whereby he approved the issuance of the memorandum of approval. The file had been maintained properly and it is a part of the official record. As noted above, after receiving the draft Award, a detailed note had been prepared, the Commissioner had considered, it, made his query and then placed his endorsement at the bottom thereof whereby he approved the issuance of the memorandum of approval. The memorandum dated 12/18 September, 1986 issued accordingly conveyed the approval of the Commissioner to the draft Award subject to the observations recorded therein. The Award had been made after taking into consideration these observations. In the light of these facts on record, there is no reason why one should not accept the submission of Mr. Sawant that the note along with the endorsement by the Commissioner constituted the approval. The note as well as the endorsement at the bottom thereof are quite clear. The approval memorandum was issued accordingly and the Award was also made in accordance therewith. In the circumstances, we reject the challenge raised by the petitioners based on first proviso to section 11(1) of the Act contending that the approval of the Commissioner was not obtained. The record clearly establishes the fact of approval. 11. The only other substantive point raised by Mr. Korde was that the purpose for which the plot is to be utilised is contrary to the purpose for which the adjoining area is to be utilised. His submission is that the entire adjoining area is specified as a residential zone and in that the telephone store cannot be permitted. In this behalf, Mr. Korde relied upon the observations of the Apex Court in paras 18 and 19 of its judgment in (Tulsi Co-operative Housing Society v. State of Andhra Pradesh)2, 2000(1) S.C.C. 533 . In that matter, the lands which were to be acquired for a housing project were sought to be utilised by the Government for a water tank and the Counsel for the Government had tried to defend that action. Mr. Korde stressed the following observations in para 19 of this judgment. "We are unable to accept the extreme contention urged by the learned Senior Advocate for the Government that the land should be permitted to be utilised for purposes other than those for which it was acquired." Mr. Korde then drew our attention to an earlier judgment of the Apex Court in (Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. I.D.I. Co. "We are unable to accept the extreme contention urged by the learned Senior Advocate for the Government that the land should be permitted to be utilised for purposes other than those for which it was acquired." Mr. Korde then drew our attention to an earlier judgment of the Apex Court in (Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. I.D.I. Co. Pvt. Ltd.)3, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 482. That was a judgment of a Bench of two judges. Whereas the Senior Judge Justice K. Ramaswamy in his judgment held that the land acquired for one public purpose may be used for another public purpose. Justice Majmudar in his separate judgment did not agree with the observations of Justice Ramaswamy though he agreed with the learned Judge on the question of delay. Mr. Korde therefore submitted that permitting telephone stores in a residential zone amounted to change of user and should not be permitted. 12. Mr. Sawant, the Government Pleader, on the other hand submitted that a change in the public purpose was always permissible and apart from the above I.D.I. Co. case (supra) he relied upon the observations in (State of Tamil Nadu v. L. Krishnan)4, reported in 1996(1) S.C.C. 250 . The observations in the Tulsi Co-operative Housing Society case (supra) relied upon by Mr. Korde were not on the main controversy in that matter. He however submitted that in the present case there was no change of purpose at all. He pointed out that a part of this parcel of land has been already let out to respondents Nos. 1 and 3 since about 1953 and a store of telephones was already existing over there since then. Besides, a telephone store at all material times should always be considered as not an activity alien to the residential purpose. Right from the beginning the public purpose for which the land is being acquired has been clearly specified in section 4 notification as "for telecommunication Store of Bombay Telephones". If at all the petitioners wanted to raise any objection, they ought to have raised it at that time. Mr. Sawant submitted that these objections, are essentially for the purpose of challenging notifications under sections 4 and 6 and that being so, the petitioners ought to have taken steps after section 4 notification, or at the highest when section 6 declaration was made. Mr. Mr. Sawant submitted that these objections, are essentially for the purpose of challenging notifications under sections 4 and 6 and that being so, the petitioners ought to have taken steps after section 4 notification, or at the highest when section 6 declaration was made. Mr. Sawant relied upon a judgment of the Apex Court in (Jai Narain v. Union of India)5, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 697. In that matter, the land in dispute was shown in the Master Plan and the Zonal Development Plan as agricultural green. It was sought to be acquired for public purpose of setting up a sewerage treatment plant. The Apex Court held that it cannot be said that the utilisation was contrary to the Master Plan and the Zonal Development Plan. On an analogy, Mr. Sawant submitted that the telephones are undoubtedly required for people staying in the area and the utilisation for stores cannot be said to be for an alien purpose. We are in agreement with Mr. Sawant. Provision of telephone stores cannot be said to be contrary to residential zone. Besides, that purpose has been specified all throughout in the notifications. The present case can not be said to be one where land acquired for one public purpose is being used for another purpose nor can the use be said to be conflicting with the Zonal Development Plan. In the facts of the present case, it is not at all necessary for us to go into the controversy as to whether a user for another public purpose is permissible or not. The submission of change of user or use for an alien purpose is totally misconceived. 13. Then Mr. Sawant submitted that there was gross delay in filing this petition. This alternative submission of Mr. Sawant is also well taken. Right from the Constitution Bench judgment in (Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi)6, reported in 1975(4) S.C.C. 285 , the Apex Court has held that all such challenges to sections 4 and 6 notifications have to be taken at the latest within a reasonable time after section 6 notification. There are a series of judgments to that effect in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. I.D.I. Co., 1996(11) S.C.C. 501 (paras 15 and 19) (L. T. v. State of Gujarat)7, 1998(4) S.C.C. 387 (para 21) and (Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Haider Beg)8, 2000(2) S.C.C. 40. There are a series of judgments to that effect in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. I.D.I. Co., 1996(11) S.C.C. 501 (paras 15 and 19) (L. T. v. State of Gujarat)7, 1998(4) S.C.C. 387 (para 21) and (Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Haider Beg)8, 2000(2) S.C.C. 40. It has been well established that if at all one is aggrieved by the public purpose specified in the notification, one has got to raise the grievance at the appropriate time. If the persons concerned are really prejudiced by the specification of the particular purpose, they have to take steps to have the notification quashed on that ground within a reasonable time. They cannot permit the acquisition proceedings to be completed and thereafter to raise all these points after the Award is published. In the present case, the notifications under sections 4 and 6 have been issued in October 1981 and August 1983 respectively whereas the petition is filed in October 1986. For this reason, namely for the reason of delay also, such a plea cannot be allowed to be raised at this stage. 14. For the reasons stated above, this petition cannot be entertained. The same is dismissed with costs. 15. Mr. Korde draws our attention to sub-clause (iv) of prayer (a) which is concerning the claim of the petitioners with respect to the arrears or rent, municipal taxes, water charges, etc. He further states that the petitioner No. 1 has already taken steps for recovery of this amount in the appropriate Court and is not pressing this prayer in this matter. It is therefore recorded that he is not pressing this prayer in this petition. It would be open for the petitioners to agitate this claim in that particular proceeding. 16. Mr. Korde applies for continuation of interim relief for a further period of 8 weeks. As recorded earlier, Telephone Department is already in possession of a part of this plot of land. In the circumstances, the only direction will be that the Land Acquisition Officer will not take possession of the entire plot under the Award for a period of 8 weeks, though the respondent No. 3 will continue to remain in possession of the portion which is already with them. -----