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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2001 DIGILAW 473 (MP)

Rameshprasad v. Bhagwati Bai

2001-07-05

S.P.KHARE

body2001
Judgment ( 1. ) THIS is plaintiffs second appeal under Section 100, CPC. The following substantial questions of law were formulated by order dated 21-9-1989 at the time of admission of this appeal:- (1) Whether the Lower Appellate Court was right in reversing the decree passed by the Trial Court ? (2) Whether the property which was given for the maintenance only to the two widows will confer any title or ownership to them ? ( 2. ) THE facts relevant for the decision of the questions referred above are that Ganesh Prasad died long back in the year 1920 leaving behind his two widows Ganeshi Bai and Bhagwatibai and two sons-- Jagannath through the first wife and Suddiram through the second wife. Suddiram also died in the year 1925 and the name of his widow is also Bhagwatibai. She is defendant in the suit. By an award dated 23-11-1927 the two Bhagwatibais were given land Khasra No. 69 area 7. 32 acres of village Piparia for maintenance during their life-time. Bhagwatibai, widow of Ganesh Prasad died in the year 1972 (Samvat 2028 ). Jagannath filed the suit for possession of half share of deceased Bhagwatibai on the ground that her right to maintenance from the suit land came to an end on her death. Jagannath died during the pendency of the suit and her legal representatives who arc the appellants before this Court were brought on record. ( 3. ) THE Trial Court decreed the suit for half share holding that the right of deceased Bhagwatibai to maintenance came to an end on her death and her share reverts back to the plaintiffs. In appeal by defendant Bhagwatibai the First Appellate Court held that the land held by two Bhagwatibais was given to them "in lieu of their pre-existing right to maintenance" and they became absolute owners of this land as per Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act ). In appeal by defendant Bhagwatibai the First Appellate Court held that the land held by two Bhagwatibais was given to them "in lieu of their pre-existing right to maintenance" and they became absolute owners of this land as per Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act ). It has been further held that after the death of Bhagwatibai, Jagannath became entitled to half of her half share (i. e. 1/4th) and the other half of her share (1/4th) would go to defendant Bhagwatibai as widow of the predeceased son of the husband of deceased Bhagwatibai as per Section 15 read with Section 8 of the Act and accordingly the decree of the Trial Court has been modified. ( 4. ) IT has been argued on behalf of the appellants that a restricted estate was created in favour of deceased Bhagwatibai by the Award dated 23-11-1927 and that could not be enlarged into full ownership in view of Section 14 (2) of the Act. It is pointed out that Ganesh Prasad had died in the year 1920 and his widow had no right of inheritance at the time and therefore she did not acquire any right, title or interest in the suit land except the right to maintenance as per award and that right came to an end on her death. ( 5. ) IN the opinion of this Court the view taken by the First Appellate Court is legally correct. The land in dispute was acquired by the two widows under the award dated 23-11-1927 "in lieu of maintenance" within the meaning of the Explanation to Section 14 (1) of the Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act must be read only as a proviso or exception to sub-section (1) and its operation must be confined to cases where property is acquired for the first time as a grant without any pre-existing right. Where the property is acquired by a female Hindu "in lieu of maintenance", it is in lieu of a pre-existing right and such an acquisition would not be within the scope and ambit of sub-section (2), even if the instrument, decree, order or award allotting the property prescribes a restricted estate in the property. Such an acquisition in lieu of pre-existing right of maintenance blossoms into full estate. Such an acquisition in lieu of pre-existing right of maintenance blossoms into full estate. It would make no difference whether the property was allotted to Hindu widow after her husbands death before 1937 or after her husbands death which took place after the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937 came into force. ( 6. ) IN V. Tulasamma Vs. V. Sesha Reddi ( AIR 1977 SC 1944 ) the Supreme Court interpreting Section 14 of the Act has held that sub-section (1) of Section 14 is large in its amplitude and covers every kind of acquisition of property by a female Hindu including acquisition in lieu of maintenance and where such property was possessed by her at the date of commencement of the Act or was subsequently acquired and possessed, she would become the full owner of the property. Sub-section (2) is more in the nature of a proviso or exception to sub-section (1 ). It excepts certain kinds of acquisition of property by a Hindu female from the operation of sub-section (1) and being in the nature of an exception to a provision which is calculated to achieve a social purpose by bringing about change in the social and economic position of woman in Hindu society, it must be construed strictly so as to impinge as little as possible on the broad sweep of the ameliorative provision contained in sub-section (1 ). It cannot be interpreted in a manner which would rob sub-section (1) of its efficacy and deprive a Hindu female of the protection sought to be given to her by sub-section (1 ). Sub-section (2) must, therefore, be read in the context of sub-section (1) so as to leave as large a scope for operation as possible to sub-section (1) and so read, it must be confined to cases where property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first time as a grant without any pre-existing right, under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award, the terms of which prescribe a restricted estate in the property. Where, however, property is acquired by a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of right of maintenance, it is in virtue of a pre-existing right and such an acquisition would not be within the scope and ambit of sub-section (2), even if the instrument, decree, order or award allotting the property prescribes a restricted estate in the property. ( 7. ) IN Gulwant Kaur Vs. Mohinder Singh ( AIR 1987 SC 2251 ) the Supreme Court emphasised that Section 14 is aimed at removing restrictions or limitations on the rights of a female Hindu to enjoy as a full owner the property possessed by her so long as her possession is traceable to lawful origin, that is to say, she has a vestige of title. ( 8. ) IN C. Masilamani Mudaliar Vs. Idol of Sri Swaminathaswami ( AIR 1996 SC 1697 ) the Supreme Court reiterated the principles laid down in the earlier cases. It has been held that a widow who had got the property in lieu of her right to maintenance will have absolute right in it under Section 14 (1) of the Act. It has been pointed that the widow under Shastric law had a right to maintenance from the property left by her husband and the property allotted to her would be in recognition of her pre-existing right to maintenance. The same view has been taken in Ram Kali Vs. Choudhri Ajit Shankar, (1997) 9 SCC 613 and Mangat Mal Vs. Punni Devi ( AIR 1996 SC 172 ). ( 9. ) THELEGAL position has been made crystal clear by the Supreme Court in Raghubar Singh Vs. Gulab Singh ( AIR 1998 SC 2401 ). It has been clarified that the right to maintenance of a Hindu female flows from the social and temporal relationship between the husband and the wife and that right in the case of a widow is "a pre-existing right", which existed under the Shastric Hindu law long before the passing of the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937 and Hindu Married Womens Right to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act, 1946. Those Acts merely recognised the position as was existing under the Shastric Hindu law and gave it a "statutory backing". The property given to a widow in lieu of her pre-existing right to maintenance becomes her absolute property under Section 14 (1) of the Act. ( 10. Those Acts merely recognised the position as was existing under the Shastric Hindu law and gave it a "statutory backing". The property given to a widow in lieu of her pre-existing right to maintenance becomes her absolute property under Section 14 (1) of the Act. ( 10. ) AGAIN in Beni Bai Vs. Raghubir Prasad ( AIR 1999 SC 1147 ) it has been made clear that the limited interest conferred upon the widow by virtue of the will being in lieu of maintenance and in recognition of her pre-existing right, the said right was transformed into an absolute right by virtue of Section 14 (1) of the Act. The said right was not conferred on her for the first time, Thus sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act has no application. ( 11. ) IN the present case the suit land was given to the two widows under an Award in lieu of their pre-existing right to maintenance and therefore they became full owner of that land under Section 14 (1) of the Act. Bhagwatibai did not leave any child of her own when she died in 1972 and her husband had already died. Therefore, Section 15 (1) (a) of the Act is not attracted. Her share would devolve upon the "heirs of her husband" as per Section 15 (1) (b) of the Act. As per Section 16 the devolution upon the heirs of the husband of the female intestate shall be in the same order and according to same rules as would have applied if the property had belonged to the husband and he had died intestate in respect thereof immediately after her death. In case of a female intestate who dies without leaving any issue or her husband, the terminus a quo will be the husband of the intestate as if he were the propositus and the ascertainment of the heirs will once again commence from Class I of the Schedule. According to this Schedule to Section 8 of the Act widow of a predeceased son has equal share as a son. That is also the view taken in Seethalakshmi Ammal Vs. Muthuvenkatarama Iyengar ( AIR 1998 SC 1692 ). Therefore, the share of deceased Bhagwatibai is to be divided half and half and exactly that has been done by the First Appellate Court. That is also the view taken in Seethalakshmi Ammal Vs. Muthuvenkatarama Iyengar ( AIR 1998 SC 1692 ). Therefore, the share of deceased Bhagwatibai is to be divided half and half and exactly that has been done by the First Appellate Court. The answer to the questions referred at the outset is that the First Appellate Court was right in modifying the decree of the Trial Court, The land which was given to the two widows under the award for their maintenance became their absolute property under Section 14 (1) of the Act.