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Madras High Court · body

2001 DIGILAW 475 (MAD)

K. Manavalan v. Eswari and another

2001-04-16

P.THANGAVEL

body2001
Judgment : These civil revision petitions were filed by the tenant as revision petitioner in both the civil revision petitions against the common judgment and decree dated 6.7.2000 and made in R.C.A.Nos.724 and 805 of 1996 on the file of the learned VIII Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras, confirming the eviction ordered on the ground of sub letting and setting aside the order passed negativing the claim made for eviction on the ground of wilful default in R.C.O.P.No.3244 of 1991 on the file of the learned XI Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras. 2. The facts that are necessary for disposal of these civil revision petitions are as follows: The premises described in the rent control original petition belongs to the first respondent in both the civil revision petitions, who is the petitioner/ landlady before the Rent Control Court. The revision petitioner in both the civil revision petitions, who is the first respondent before the Rent Control Court is tenant of the southern portion in the ground floor on a monthly rent of Rs.450 under the 1st respondent herein. The premises was let out for non-residential purpose and the revision petitioner was running a cool drink shop under the name and style of “Anna Cool Bar” in the demised premises. The revision petitioner has sublet the demised premises to the second respondent herein and he is running business under the name and style of “Metro Footwear” in the demised premises. The subletting was without the consent of the 1st respondent herein. The revision petitioner has committed wilful default in payment of rent from August, 1991 to October, 1991. Therefore, the 1st respondent herein has sought for eviction of the revision petitioner and the second respondent herein on the abovesaid grounds. 3. The revision petitioner as 1st respondent before the Rent Control Court has resisted the claim made by the 1st respondent herein as petitioner/ landlady before the Rent Control Court as follows: The revision petitioner was running Anna Cool Bar in the demised premises and there was no profit out of the above said business. Therefore, he switched over the business for sale of footwears under the name and style of “Metro Footwear”. The revision petitioner had paid rent upto July, 1991. There was demand for increase in rent in August, 1991 and this revision petitioner was not agreeable for the same. Therefore, he switched over the business for sale of footwears under the name and style of “Metro Footwear”. The revision petitioner had paid rent upto July, 1991. There was demand for increase in rent in August, 1991 and this revision petitioner was not agreeable for the same. The son of the 1st respondent, who used to come and collect rent, refused to receive the rent from August, 1991. He also stopped coming to collect rent from August, 1991. The rent of Rs.1,800 for the period from August, 1991 to November, 1991 was sent by money order on 11.12.1991 and the same was returned as refused by the 1st respondent herein. This revision petitioner filed a petition in R.C.O.P. No.692 of 1992 on the file of the Rent Control Court for permission to deposit the rent and the same is pending. This revision petitioner has not sublet the demised premises to the 2nd respondent herein. Therefore, the revision petitioner has sought for dismissal of the petition filed for eviction. 4. The second respondent herein, who is the second respondent before the Rent Control Court resisted the claim made by the 1st respondent herein on the ground that the second respondent herein is only a worker in the shop run by the revision petitioner and he is not a sub tenant. It is on this ground the second respondent has sought for dismissal of the petitioner filed by the 1st respondent herein for eviction. 5. C.S.Ragavan, son of the 1st respondent herein was examined as P.W.1 and Exs.P-1 to P-8 were marked before the Rent Control Court on the side of the 1st respondent herein. The revision petitioner and the 2nd respondent herein were examined as R.Ws.1 and 2 and Exs.R-1 to R-5 were marked in support of their case before the Rent Control Court. After considering the material evidence available on record, the learned Rent Controller has come to the conclusion that the revision petitioner has sublet the demised premises to the 2nd respondent herein without the consent of the 1st respondent, the landlady and therefore, he is liable to be evicted from the demised premises. The learned Rent Controller has also found that eviction sought for on the ground of wilful default is not true and therefore, the revision petitioner is not liable to be evicted from the demised premises on the above said ground. The learned Rent Controller has also found that eviction sought for on the ground of wilful default is not true and therefore, the revision petitioner is not liable to be evicted from the demised premises on the above said ground. Aggrieved at the order and decretal order dated 13.3.1996 and made in R.C.O.P.No.3244 of 1991 on the file of the learned XI Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras, the revision petitioner/ tenant filed an appeal in R.C.A.No.724 of 1996 while the 1st respondent/ landlady filed the appeal in R.C.A.No.805 of 1996 on the file of the VIII Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras. After hearing the submission made on both parties in the light of the material evidence available on record, the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority has concurred with the finding of the learned Rent Controller with regard to subletting the premises without the consent of the 1st respondent/ landlady and accordingly dismissed the appeal in R.C.A.No.724 of 1996 on his file. The learned Rent Control Appellate Authority found that the revision petitioner has committed wilful default in payment of rent and accordingly allowed the appeal in R.C.A.No.805 of 1996 on his file there by setting aside the finding of the learned Rent Controller with regard to the ground of wilful default. Aggrieved at the common judgment and decrees dated 6.7.2000 and made in R.C.A. Nos.724 of 1996 and 805 of 1996 on the file of the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority referred to above, the tenant as revision petitioner filed the civil revision petitions in C.R.P. Nos.797 of 2001 and 829 of 2001 on the file of this Court. The material records available before the Courts below were called for consideration in these civil revision petitions. 6. The fact remains that the 1st respondent herein is the landlady of the premises described in the rent control original petition and the revision petitioner herein is the tenant of the said premises on a monthly rent of Rs.450 for non-residential purposes. Admittedly, the revision petitioner was running cool Drink shop under the name and style of “Anna Cool Bar” in the demised premises upto July, 1991. According to the 1st respondent herein the revision petitioner has sublet the demised premises to the 2nd respondent to run business in footwear under the name and style of “Metro Footwear”. Admittedly, the revision petitioner was running cool Drink shop under the name and style of “Anna Cool Bar” in the demised premises upto July, 1991. According to the 1st respondent herein the revision petitioner has sublet the demised premises to the 2nd respondent to run business in footwear under the name and style of “Metro Footwear”. The revision petitioner denies subletting the demised premises to the 2nd respondent herein, but would claim that the 2nd respondent is working as an employee in “Metro Footwear” run by him on a monthly salary of Rs.450 per month. The 2nd respondent, who was examined as R.W.2 before the Rent Control Court has also taken a supporting stand in favour of the revision petitioner. It is evident from the submission made on both sides that “Anna Cool Bar” run by the revision petitioner is not continued in the said premises and “Metro Footwear” is run for sale of footwears in the demised premises. It is also not disputed that R.W.2 is selling footwears by remaining in the demised premises. The question that has to be considered in this matter is as to whether the 2nd respondent herein is running the Metro Footwear as owner thereof or whether he is working as an employee under the revision petitioner by selling footwears in the Metro Footwear situated in the demised premises. It is clear from the material evidence available on record that the 2nd respondent is in possession of the demised premises and selling footwears under the name and style of “Metro Footwear”. It is also evident from the admission made by R.W.2 that he is experienced in sale of footwears for about 10 years earlier to August, 1991. It is also an admitted fact that the revision petitioner has no experience in the business in footwear at any time before. It is also evident from the evidence of the revision petitioner that his father and members of the family are trained in preparing sweets and selling the same. Admittedly, the above said sweet selling business was carried on by his father and after his death by his brother at door No.22, Mannadi Street, Madras. It is also evident from the evidence of the revision petitioner that his father and members of the family are trained in preparing sweets and selling the same. Admittedly, the above said sweet selling business was carried on by his father and after his death by his brother at door No.22, Mannadi Street, Madras. Therefore, it is evident that the revision petitioner who has no experience in sale of footwears business would not have entered into such business while he himself had sustained loss in Cool Drink business run under the name and style of “Anna Cool Bar” at the demised premises. 7. Therevision petitioner, who claims that the 2nd respondent herein is only an employee, in Metro Footwear on a monthly salary of Rs.450 has not chosen to produce any material to show that the 2nd respondent is working as an employee under the revision petitioner. No reason was given as to why the acquittance roll maintained in the shop was not produced before the Court. The revision petitioner would also admit during cross examination, while he was examined as R.W.1, before the Rent Control Court that there is no accounts maintained in the footwear shop and he has not submitted sales-tax or income-tax return in connection with the said business. He has also admitted during cross examination that there is no record in writing to show that he is running footwear business in the demised premises. To run a business of the nature in the city of Madras, the revision petitioner ought to have obtained valid license from the Corporation Authorities and other authorities. The fact of not obtaining any such licence from the authorities concerned would also lead to conclude that he might not be running the footwear business in the demised premises. R.W.2 would admit during cross examination that cash bills will be issued as seen in Ex.B-8 for sale of footwears and there are bill books, account books and invoice in the shop for running the said business. R.W.2 further would admit that the revision petitioner alone will write account books daily and the bill books and invoices will be given only to the revision petitioner. R.W.2 would also admit that there is no record for receipt of salary by him from the revision petitioner herein. R.W.2 further would admit that the revision petitioner alone will write account books daily and the bill books and invoices will be given only to the revision petitioner. R.W.2 would also admit that there is no record for receipt of salary by him from the revision petitioner herein. It is not known as to why the revision petitioner has denied the existence on the above said documentary evidence before Court and has chosen not to file the above said documentary evidence to establish that he is the owner of Metro Footwear and not the 2nd respondent herein. 8. In I.Subramaniam and others v. Malar Selvi and another I.Subramaniam and others v. Malar Selvi and another I.Subramaniam and others v. Malar Selvi and another 1986 T.L.N.J. 187, the Honourable Chief Justice M.N.Chandurkar, has held as follows: “The relationship between the tenant and the alleged sub tenant is within the special knowledge of either the tenant or the sub tenant. Unless, therefore, a tenant, or sub-tenant satisfactorily explains the presence of the alleged sub tenant in the premises the Court is entitled to draw the inference in a case where an utter stranger is found in the premises running a new business that the premises must have been sub-let. Such an inference is clearly permissible in law.” In Smt.Rajbir Kaur and another v. M/s.S.Chokosiri and Co. Smt.Rajbir Kaur and another v. M/s.S.Chokosiri and Co. Smt.Rajbir Kaur and another v. M/s.S.Chokosiri and Co. A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1845, it has been held by the Honourable Apex Court as follows: “The High Court, did not examine this aspect of the matter, as according to it, one of the essential ingredients, viz., of exclusive possession had not been established. If exclusive possession is established, and the version of the respondent as to the particulars and the incidents of the transaction is found unacceptable in the particular facts and circumstances of the case, it may not be impermissible for the Court to draw an inference that the transaction was entered into with monetary consideration in mind. It is open to the respondent to rebut this. Such transactions of subletting in the guise of licenses are in their very nature, clandestine arrangements between the tenant and the subtenant and there cannot be direct evidence got. It is not, unoften, a matter for legitimate inference. It is open to the respondent to rebut this. Such transactions of subletting in the guise of licenses are in their very nature, clandestine arrangements between the tenant and the subtenant and there cannot be direct evidence got. It is not, unoften, a matter for legitimate inference. The burden of making good a case of subletting is, of course, on the appellants. The burden of establishing facts and contentions which support the partys case is on the party who takes the risk of non-persuasion. If at the conclusion of the trial, a party has failed to establish these to the appropriate standard, he will lose. Though the burden of proof as a matter of law remains constant throughout a trial, the evidential burden which rests initially upon a party bearing the legal burden, shifts according as the weight of the evidence adduced by the party during the trial. In the circumstances of the case, we think, that, appellants having been forced by the Courts below to have established exclusive possession of the ice-cream vendor of a part of the demised premises and the explanation of the transaction offered by the respondent having been found by the Courts below to be unsatisfactory and unacceptable, it was not impermissible for the Courts to draw an inference, having regard to the ordinary course of human conduct, that the transaction must have been entered into for monetary considerations. There is no explanation forthcoming from the respondent appropriates to the situation as found.” In Shah Phoolchand Lalchand v. Parvathi Bai A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 865, the Honourable Apex Court was pleased to hold as follows: “There is evidence to show that M/s.Adeshwar Glass Mart was carrying on business at the said premises and that firm was carried on in the said premises even for some time during which the appellants- firm had ceased to carry on the business there. Moreover, although a notice was given by the respondent to the appellants and M/s.Adeshwar Glass Mart to produce their income-tax returns, assessment orders as well as account books and ledgers for the relevant period these were not produced. Moreover, although a notice was given by the respondent to the appellants and M/s.Adeshwar Glass Mart to produce their income-tax returns, assessment orders as well as account books and ledgers for the relevant period these were not produced. It was surely open to the trial Court from these circumstance to come to the conclusion that had the account books and ledgers been produced, they would have shown that rent was received by the appellants from M/s.Adeshwar Glass Mart which would justify the finding of subletting.” In Malliga v. A.P.Kathija Beevi and others Malliga v. A.P.Kathija Beevi and others Malliga v. A.P.Kathija Beevi and others (1998)1 MLJ. 302 , a learned single Judge of this Court has held that when the landlord has proved that a stranger is in possession and is doing business in the premises, it is for the tenant to substantiate the circumstances under which the stranger came into occupation. Mere denial may not be sufficient. The arrangement between the tenant and the sublessee is a secret arrangement and the details of the same can be spoken to only by them. Burden on the landlord is changed when he proves that a stranger is in inclusive possession at least in respect of a portion of the premises. The case law cited above in the light of the non production of bills, vouchers, account books, sales-tax return and income-tax return, apart from non-production of any record for showing payment of salary to the 2nd respondent herein would disclose that the revision petitioner was not running the business under the name and style of “Metro Footwear” and the said business was carried on only by the 2nd respondent herein and therefore he could not only could not produce the above said documents, but also gone to the extent of denying the existence of such documents even while it was admitted by R.W.2 in cross-examination. In the light of the material evidence available on record, this Court if of opinion that the Courts below have concurrently come to the correct conclusion that the demised premises was let out by the revision petitioner to the 2nd respondent herein for rent or for compensation. 9. In the light of the material evidence available on record, this Court if of opinion that the Courts below have concurrently come to the correct conclusion that the demised premises was let out by the revision petitioner to the 2nd respondent herein for rent or for compensation. 9. In R.Pappathiammal and two others v. Nachammal and others R.Pappathiammal and two others v. Nachammal and others R.Pappathiammal and two others v. Nachammal and others (2001)1 C.T.C. 160 , a learned single Judge (R.Balasubramanian, J.) of this Court, has held as follows: “It is clear from the decided cases that the Court exercising jurisdiction under Sec.25 of the Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act re-appreciate the evidence and record a finding contrary to those of the lower Courts, if the finding arrived at by the Courts below is supported by materials.” In T.S.Subramania Aiyer v. P.K.Srinivasan by Power Agent, B.Ramu T.S.Subramania Aiyer v. P.K.Srinivasan by Power Agent, B.Ramu T.S.Subramania Aiyer v. P.K.Srinivasan by Power Agent, B.Ramu (1999)3 MLJ. 391 , a learned single Judge (S.S.Subramani, J.) of this Court, has held that from the recent decisions of the Supreme Court, it is clear that while exercising its revisional powers under Sec.25 of the Rent Control Act, even though the High Court is entitled to look into the evidence, that can only be for the purpose of considering whether the authorities below has exercised discretion properly and whether the reasoning of the Appellate Authority in the circumstances of the case, is reasonable. It has also been held that merely because the High Court, on a re-appreciation of evidence, can come to a different conclusion it cannot be held that the judgment of the Appellate Authority is not correct, if the view taken by the Appellate Authority is also possible. Then the powers under Sec.25 of the Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act need not be exercised. In view of the decisions referred to above, this Court sitting in revisional jurisdiction under Sec.25 of the Tamil Nadu Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, herein after referred to as “the Act”, cannot reassess the evidence to come to a different conclusion thereby interfering with the concurrent findings of the Courts below. In view of the decisions referred to above, this Court sitting in revisional jurisdiction under Sec.25 of the Tamil Nadu Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, herein after referred to as “the Act”, cannot reassess the evidence to come to a different conclusion thereby interfering with the concurrent findings of the Courts below. In view of the factual and legal positions referred to above, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner relying on the decisions reported in M/s.Delhi Stationers and Printers v. Rajendra Kumar M/s.Delhi Stationers and Printers v. Rajendra Kumar M/s.Delhi Stationers and Printers v. Rajendra Kumar A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1208 and in P.Senniappan and others v. Kannammal and two others P.Senniappan and others v. Kannammal and two others P.Senniappan and others v. Kannammal and two others (1998)2 MLJ. 509 , that there cannot be subletting of premises by a tenant to sub-tenant, if the tenant is retaining legal possession, cannot be sustained. In view of the facts and circumstances stated supra in the case, this Court is of clear opinion that the Courts below have correctly and concurrently found that the demised premises was sublet by the revision petitioner to the 2nd respondent herein without the knowledge and consent of the 1st respondent, the landlady and therefore, the revision petitioner and the 2nd respondent are liable to be evicted from the demised premises. Accordingly, the concurrent finding of the Courts below are confirmed. 10. The next contention raised by the first respondent herein is that the revision petitioner has committed wilful default in payment of rent from the month of August, 1991 to October, 1991. The learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner herein contends contra relying on Ex.P-2, dated 1.12.1991. It is an admitted fact that the demised premises was leased out to the revision petitioner by the first respondent herein on a monthly rent of Rs.450. There is no dispute that the rent for the demised premises was paid by the revision petitioner to the first respondent herein upto July, 1991. Admittedly the rent for the months of August, 1991 to October, 1991 was not paid by the revision petitioner to the 1st respondent herein. There is no dispute that the rent for the demised premises was paid by the revision petitioner to the first respondent herein upto July, 1991. Admittedly the rent for the months of August, 1991 to October, 1991 was not paid by the revision petitioner to the 1st respondent herein. The reason given for non-payment of the rent by the revision petitioner to the 1st respondent herein was that P.W.1 who used to come and collect rent did not come to the premises to collect rent and therefore, the rent could not be paid for the relevant period. It is also contended that the rent paid by the revision petitioner to P.W.1 was refused and therefore, he was constrained to send the rent by money order after receipt of notice Ex.P-2, dated 1.12.1991 wherein the revision petitioner was directed to pay the rent within a period of one week from the date of receipt of the said notice. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner that the revision petitioner could not pay the rent because P.W.1 who used to collect rent had not come to collect rent cannot be admitted in the light of the subsequent contention raised that the rent which was tendered by the revision petitioner was not accepted by P.W.1. In short such contention is contradictory. Therefore, the reason given for not paying the rent for the period from August, 1991 to October, 1991 cannot be accepted. Likewise, the contention raised by the revision petitioner that there was demand for enhancement of rent, that the revision petitioner was not agreeable for payment of higher rent and that therefore, the revision petitioner could not pay the rent to the first respondent herein, cannot also be accepted, since there is no proof for demand of higher rent by the 1st respondent from the revision petitioner. 11. The learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner strongly relied on the averments made in Ex.P-2 to contend that the revision petitioner has not committed wilful default in payment of rent for the period from August, 1991 to October, 1991. Ex.P-2, dated 1.12.1991 is the notice sent by the 1st respondent through counsel and Ex.R-3, dated 3.1.1992 is the reply sent for Ex.P-2 denying the averments in the notice Ex.P-2. Ex.P-2, dated 1.12.1991 is the notice sent by the 1st respondent through counsel and Ex.R-3, dated 3.1.1992 is the reply sent for Ex.P-2 denying the averments in the notice Ex.P-2. In last paragraph of Ex-P2, the learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent has stated as follows: “This is to call upon him to vacate and handover vacant possession within two weeks from the receipt hereof and also pay all the arrears of rents and indicated your willingness within one week from the receipt hereof failing which necessary and appropriate legal proceedings will be taken holding you liable for all costs and consequences.” A careful reading of the above said operative portion of the notice would disclose that it is not a notice sent as contemplated under the Act to decide the non payment as wilful default. In this notice the 1st respondent has asked the revision petitioner to vacate and deliver possession within two weeks and has also asked the revision petitioner to pay all the arrears of rent within one week and also indicate the willingness of the revision petitioner within one week from the date of receipt of the notice with regard to vacating of the said premises. This will certainly lead to conclude that the revision petitioner herein was called upon to pay the arrears of rent within one week from the date of receipt of the abovesaid notice, apart from asking him to indicate his willingness to deliver vacant possession of the demised premises within one week from the date of receipt of the said notice. The fact remains that the said notice Ex.P-2 was served on the revision petitioner on 4.12.1991. The revision petitioner has sent the rent by money order on 11.12.1991, as seen in Ex.P-5. Admittedly, the said money order was refused by the 1st respondent herein. The fact of sending the rent by money order on 11.12.1991 will lead to hold that the revision petitioner has complied with the requirement of the notice issued by the 1st respondent that the arrears of rent should be sent within one week from the date of receipt of the notice Ex.P-2 from 4.12.1991. The fact of not receiving the rent after issuing notice Ex.P-2 is a mistake on the part of the 1st respondent and the revision petitioner cannot be blamed for the same. The fact of not receiving the rent after issuing notice Ex.P-2 is a mistake on the part of the 1st respondent and the revision petitioner cannot be blamed for the same. It is not in dispute that the revision petitioner, as petitioner has approached the Court by filing a petition under Sec.8(5) of the Act, in R.C.O.P.No.692 of 1992 on the file of the Rent Control Court (Court of Small Causes), Madras on 3.1.1992. The filing of the petition was contemplated under Sec.8(5) of the Act will show the bona fide intention on the part of the revision petitioner to deposit the arrears of rent which the 1st respondent herein had refused to receive even though it was sent by money order on 11.12.1991. 12. The learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner has brought to the notice of this Court the decision reported in M.K.Ramaswamy v. Krishna Menon M.K.Ramaswamy v. Krishna Menon M.K.Ramaswamy v. Krishna Menon (1994)2 MLJ. 7 , wherein a learned single Judge Thanikkachalam, J. (as he then was) has held as follows: “Considering the facts arising in the present revisions in the light of the judicial pronouncements cited supra, especially in view of the decision rendered by S.Sundaram v. V.R.Pattabiraman S.Sundaram v. V.R.Pattabiraman S.Sundaram v. V.R.Pattabiraman A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 582, I hold that there is no wilful default in payment of rent committed by the tenants as alleged by the landlord, since the arrears of rent as claimed by the landlord was tendered within 15 days from the date of receipt of the notices issued by the landlord. In the notices issued by the landlord, the landlord stated that the arrears of rent should be paid and the vacant possession should be delivered within 15 days from the date of receipt of the notices. Accordingly, the arrears of rent was tendered by the tenants within 15 days as stated in the notices issued by the landlord. Hence, it cannot be said that the tenants committed wilful default in payment of rent as contemplated under the provisions contained in Sec.10(2)(1) of the Act read with the explanation thereunder. Accordingly, I hold that the order passed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority in dismissing the petitions filed under Sec.10(2)(1) of the Act in the case of both the tenants are in order. Accordingly, I hold that the order passed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority in dismissing the petitions filed under Sec.10(2)(1) of the Act in the case of both the tenants are in order. Therefore, I am not inclined to interfere with the same.” The facts and circumstances of the case cited above and the facts and circumstances of these cases with regard to committing wilful default is same. If this Court sitting in revisional jurisdiction under Sec.25 of the above said Act found that there was irregularly of processing or the correctness, legality or propriety of the decision or order passed therein was flouted, this Court has got right to interfere with such decision in order to render justice to the aggrieved party. In these cases, the Court below has committed an error in interpreting Ex.P-2 and applying the above said facts correctly to arrive at a correct conclusion. In doing so, the settled legal position of this Court has also not been followed. In view of the said position, this Court has got every right to interfere with the conclusion of the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority in holding that the revision petitioner has committed wilful default in payment of rent. 13. Of course, the learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent has relied on the decisions reported in C.K.R.Murugan v. T.S.Arunagiri and another C.K.R.Murugan v. T.S.Arunagiri and another C.K.R.Murugan v. T.S.Arunagiri and another (1999)1 L.W. 100 , T.Easwara Rao and Nilgiris Co-operative Marketing Society etc. v. C.T.Uthandi Nilgiris Co-operative Marketing Society etc. v. C.T.Uthandi Nilgiris Co-operative Marketing Society etc. v. C.T.Uthandi (1998)2 L.W. 216 to contend that the non-payment of rent for the period from August, 1991 to October, 1991 will amount to wilful default. Of course, there is a statutory obligation on the part of the tenant to tender or pay rent within 15 days from the date on which the rent accrues in the event of agreement in writing is available or on the last date of the succeeding month if there is no agreement in writing. But in this case, the 1st respondent has chosen to give on week time for payment of arrears of rent from the date of receipt of notice Ex.P-2, dated 1.12.1991 and the above said time given by the landlady, the 1st respondent herein was complied with by the revision petitioner. But in this case, the 1st respondent has chosen to give on week time for payment of arrears of rent from the date of receipt of notice Ex.P-2, dated 1.12.1991 and the above said time given by the landlady, the 1st respondent herein was complied with by the revision petitioner. In the said position, the case laws relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent as mentioned above will not come to the rescue of the 1st respondent who has committed in Ex.P-2 to receive arrears of rent from the revision petitioner in the event of tendering the same within a week from the date of receipt of the said notices. Hence, this Court holds that the revision petitioner has not committed wilful default in payment of rent. In view of the said position this Court is not able to agree with the conclusion arrived at by the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority that the revision petitioner has committed wilful default in payment of rent thereby reversing the contra finding of the learned Rent Controller. Accordingly the conclusion arrived at by the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority with regard to wilful default is set aside and the finding of the learned Rent Controller is restored. 14. In fine, the concurrent finding of the Courts below that the revision petitioner has sublet the demised premises to the 2nd respondent herein is confirmed and the finding of the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority that the revision petitioner has committed wilful default in payment of rent is set aside. Accordingly, the petition in C.R.P. No.797 of 2001 is dismissed and the petitioner in C.R.P. No.829 of 2001 is allowed thereby setting aside the finding in R.C.A. No.805 of 1996 on the file of the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority (VIII Judge, Court of Small Causes), Madras. In the circumstances of these cases, there will be no order as to costs. In view of the disposal of the main civil revision petitions, the petitions in C.M.P. Nos.4243 and 5032 of 2001 are closed as unnecessary. 15. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner in both civil revision petitions submits that the revision petitioner may be given six months time to vacate irrespective of the finding given by the Court that the 2nd respondent is a sub-tenant under the civil revision petitioner. 15. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner in both civil revision petitions submits that the revision petitioner may be given six months time to vacate irrespective of the finding given by the Court that the 2nd respondent is a sub-tenant under the civil revision petitioner. The learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent even though reluctant to give more than 3 months, was willing at least to give 6 months time for vacating the demised premises by the revision petitioner and the second respondent herein. In view of the said position, the revision petitioner as well as the second respondent are here by given time upto 16.10.2001 to vacate the said premises on the following conditions: • (i) The revision petitioner, inclusive of the sub tenant, the second respondent herein, should pay rent regularly every month till vacating from the demised premised and arrears of rent, if any, should also be paid on or before 31.5.2001. • (ii) The revision petitioner or the sub tenant, the second respondent should not allow third party to enter in possession of the demised premises during the said period. An affidavit of undertaking should be filed by the revision petitioner within 15 days from this date i.e., on or before 30.4.2001. • (iii) The revision petitioner and the second respondent should not drag the landlady to the execution Court to take delivery of possession of the demised premises and should deliver possession on or before 16.10.2001.