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2001 DIGILAW 478 (MAD)

J. Antony Alexandar Pushparaj alias Alex v. The Inspector of Police, C-4, Turaipakkam Police Station, Chengalpattu East District and another

2001-04-17

K.NATARAJAN

body2001
ORDER: In this Criminal O.P. filed under Sec.482, Crl.P.C., the prayer is to transfer and entrust the investigation of the case in Crime No.455 of 2000, on the file of the first respondent to the file of the second respondent. 2. The genesis of the case is referred to a major fire accident that occurred on 15.6.2000 at about 11.00 hours at Burma Colony, Palavakkam, Perungudi, Chennai in which 300 huts were burnt, causing the death of 3 innocent young female children. Further, several people were seriously injured. About 800 families who lived in those three hundred huts lost all their valuable house hold articles. 3. In the year 1968, about 25 acres of land were allotted to 318 Burma repatriates by the Government of India. In the year 1985, the State Government offered the said place to 50 Srilankan refugees, temporarily. Taking advantage of the above situation, in the year 1989, a slum grabber by name P.S.Arumugam, started encroaching the land allotted to the Burma repatriates. Finally, he put up hundreds of huts and thereby made a huge profit. Inspite of the above land grabbing, in the year 1996, the Government issued pattas to the Burma repatriates. The slum grabber P.S.Arumugam gave many problems to the Burma repatriates and he also succeeded in evicting some of them from the said place by forcing them to sell their allotted placed at rock bottom price to him. The petitioner and his brother lodged a complaint to the local C-4 Thoraipakkam Police Station. The said Arumugam became very angry at the petitioner and his brother and on 14.12.1998, he came with 20 goondas to the residence of the petitioner and his brother and ransacked the same, and assaulted them. The mother of the petitioner, Tmt.Vimala, gave a complaint against the said P.S.Arumugam and his companions to the then Inspector of Police, Thoraipakkam Police Station. However, the then Inspector, Mugilam, who was making an impartial investigation has been transferred due to the political intervention. On 15.6.2000, at about 14.30 hours, the first respondent came to the resident of the petitioner and his brother and asked the petitioner to come to the police station for inquiry to be conducted by the District Collector regarding the fire accident. The brother of the petitioner, John Britto accompanied the petitioner, as desired by the members of the family. On 15.6.2000, at about 14.30 hours, the first respondent came to the resident of the petitioner and his brother and asked the petitioner to come to the police station for inquiry to be conducted by the District Collector regarding the fire accident. The brother of the petitioner, John Britto accompanied the petitioner, as desired by the members of the family. The first respondent without taking the petitioner and his brother to the place of occurrence, took them to the Thoraipakkam Police Station and told them that they were arrested in connection with the fire accident and that he himself felt very sorry for arresting them, as he was acting under the command of higher-ups on the pressure of P.S.Arumugam. The investigation by the first respondent is totally tainted, partial and is fully biased. It is submitted that the investigation of the first respondent is only to cloud the entire sue and to save the land grabber, P.S.Arumugam and his companions. Hence, it is prayed that the investigation has to be transferred from the file of the first respondent to that of the second respondent for bringing the real accused to book by making an impartial investigation. 4. No counter has been filed on behalf of the prosecution except stating that investigation by the first respondent is almost complete and the laying up of charge sheet alone is pending and therefore the prayer of the petitioner cannot be granted. 5. The point for consideration is whether the facts and circumstances of the case call for interference of the investigation conducted by the first respondent and justify the transfer of the investigation to the second respondent, as per law. 6. Three important contentions were raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner to justify that there is every possibility of screening the real culprits and investigation conducted by the first respondent also cannot be on proper lines, as required by law. (a) The signature of the de facto complainant namely, the Revenue Inspector, Pallikaranai, is not found in the First Information Report, which is mandatory under Sec.154,Crl.P.C. (b) The inquest over the bodies of the three children who died in the fire accident was not conducted by an Executive Magistrate, namely, the Tahsildar and officers above his rank, but by the Revenue Inspector, who is not an Executive Magistrate. (c) Inquest report was not sent to the Court immediately, but only after a long delay. 7.Points 1 to 3: The original records in this case has been summoned from the Court of the District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate, Alandur, as requested by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the Government Advocate for the prosecution. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the fire accident took place at 11.00 hours on 15.6.2000 and even though the First Information Report has been registered at 12.00 hours, strangely, the complaint has not been lodged by any eye-witness to the fire accident or by the members of the family of the three children who died in the fire accident but by the Revenue Inspector. Pallikaranai, whose place is at a distance of more than 18 kilometers. Mysteriously, the signature of the said Revenue Inspector is not found in the First Information Report and no explanation is offered by the prosecution as to why the signature of the de facto complainant has not been obtained or the case has been registered on the statement given by the eye witness to the occurrence. 8. Sec.154, Crl.P.C. Sub clause 1 and 2 reads as follows: (1) Every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in charge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and be read over to the informant; and every such information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf. (2) A copy of the information as recorded under Sub-sec.(1) shall be given forthwith, free of cost, to the informant. 9. In the decision reported in State of Maharashtra v. Ahmed Gulam Nabi Shaikh, 1997 Crl.L.J. 2377, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held in paragraphs 15 to 25 as follows: 15. “We may straight away mention that the expression "Officer in charge of a police station" used in Sec.154(1), Crl.P.C. includes any officer who records the F.I.R. under the directions of such an officer. “We may straight away mention that the expression "Officer in charge of a police station" used in Sec.154(1), Crl.P.C. includes any officer who records the F.I.R. under the directions of such an officer. Therefore, the mandate of this Section would apply to any officer who records the F.I.R. Apart from such a construction being in consonance with common sense, it is backed by the observations contained in the decision of a Division Bench of our Court in the case reported in Dasu v. State of Maharashtra. 1985 Crl.L.J. 1933. In paragraph 9 of the said decision, it was observed thus "Under the provisions of Sec.154, Crl.P.C. it is not incumbent that the Station House Officer himself should record the F.I.R. It can be written by him or by any other officer under his direction.” 16. A perusal of Sec.154(1), Crl.P.C. would show that the said provision would only be applicable if the F.I.R. pertains to a cognizable case. In the instant case, since the F.I.R. was registered under Sec.326/114, I.P.C., which is a cognizable offence, S.I. Waghmare who recorded it was duty bound to carry out the mandatory obligations contained in Sec.154(1), Crl.P.C. 17. The mandatory obligation cast on the Officer recording the F.I.R. under Sec.154(1), Crl.P.C. is after recording it and reading it to the informant, is to take the signatures of the informant on it. 18. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that the word signature as used in Sec.154(1), Crl.P.C. would also include thumb impression. ‘Signature’ in dictionaries has also been defined as a distinctive mark or sign. 19. In the instant case, S.I. Waghmare did not take either the signature or thumb impression of Mohis on the F.I.R.. In this context, it would be necessary to refer to the evidence of P.W.8 Dr.Bhansali who had medically examined Mollis in Cooper Hospital. In his examination-in-chief (para 6) he stated “Although the patient was not in a fit condition to make a signature at the time when I made the endorsement, his thumb impression could have been taken by someone if desired”. 20. We would like to emphasize that where a mandatory obligation is cast by a statute on an authority to record a document in a certain manner, it should be recorded in that manner alone and in no other manner. 20. We would like to emphasize that where a mandatory obligation is cast by a statute on an authority to record a document in a certain manner, it should be recorded in that manner alone and in no other manner. If the requirement in Sec.154(1), Crl.P.C. was to take the signature or thumb impression of the informant, after recording it, S.I. Waghmare should have taken the informant’s thumb impression on it because he was not in a fit position to affix his signatures. We are fortified in our view by the oft-quoted authority of the Privy Council reported in Nazir Ahmed v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 253. In the said decision, in para 2, their Lordships have observed thus: “Where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden”. 21. We would like to emphasis in unequivocal terms that whenever an authority departs from discharging a mandatory obligation enjoined on it by a statute, the onus is for it to furnish an explanation for not discharging the same. In our view, it was incumbent on the prosecution to show as to why the thumb impression of Mohis alias Mohiz was not taken on the F.I.R. after it had been recorded. This onus should have been discharged by S.I. Waghmare P.W.12 who recorded the F.I.R., in his examination-in-chief itself. In the instant case, no explanation is forthcoming from the side of the prosecution for not taking thumb impression of the informant on the F.I.R. We would like to point out the fallacy of a stock argument made on behalf of the prosecution in situations such as this namely that it is open for the defence to elicit an explanation from the concerned Officer as to why he has not discharged stipulated mandatory statutory obligation. Such an argument deserves to be straight away rejected. To repeat, when a statute casts as obligation on an authority to do a thing in a specified manner and the authority does not do it in that manner, it is for the authority to explain. 22. Such an argument deserves to be straight away rejected. To repeat, when a statute casts as obligation on an authority to do a thing in a specified manner and the authority does not do it in that manner, it is for the authority to explain. 22. In our view, the failure of the prosecution to show as to why the thumb impression of the informant was not taken on the F.I.R. after it had been recorded may give rise to an inference that the F.I.R. was not dictated by the informant but was written down by the Police Office at the behest of someone else. In the instant case, it was suggested to S.I. Waghmare, though denied by him, that the F.I.R. was actually dictated by Mamu (brother of Mohis) and not by Mohis. We find merit in this suggestion because the recitals in the F.I.R. are at variance with the EPR entry which was also prepared on the information given by Mohis; whereas in the F.I.R., it is alleged that respondents Ahmed Shaikh and Salauddin Qureshi, a bhayya and Gullu’s brother with choppers assaulted the informant, the EPR entry mentions that 5/6 persons who also included Pinto and Aiya with choppers and swords assaulted him. Had the informant been the author of both the F.I.R. and the EPR entry then in the F.I.R. also, the names of Pinto and Aiya and the weapon sword would have been mentioned. Another circumstance which negatives the prosecution claim of the F.I.R. being lodged by the informant is that in the same, name of Ali Nimachwala P.W.3 is not mentioned. The evidence of Ali Nimachwala is that along with the informant he had gone to the place of the incident; on the way he had conversation with him, he was present there when the informant was assaulted; and he accompanied him to the hospital. On the face of this evidence, it is impossible to conceive that had the informant himself been the author of the F.I.R., name of Ali Nimachwala would not have been mentioned therein. It appears to us that after sustaining as many as 24 injuries which also included six fractures the informant must have become unconscious and therefore as suggested to S.I. Waghmare P.W.12 in paragraph 20, during his cross-examination, though denied by him he must have prepared the F.I.R. on the information given by Mamu. 23. It appears to us that after sustaining as many as 24 injuries which also included six fractures the informant must have become unconscious and therefore as suggested to S.I. Waghmare P.W.12 in paragraph 20, during his cross-examination, though denied by him he must have prepared the F.I.R. on the information given by Mamu. 23. In our view, the F.I.R. of the instant case was not lodged by the informant Mohis alias Mohiz, but instead was lodged by Mamu the twin brother of Mohis who on account of the circumstance that respondent Ahmed Shaikh was the brother of Ibrahim with whom he had enmity and respondent Salauddin Qureshi was Ahmad Shaikh’s friend falsely nominated them therein. 24. We would like to emphasise that the provisions contained in Sec.154(1), Crl.P.C. to the effect that after recording the F.I.R., signatures of the informant, which also include his thumb impression, have to be taken is a very statutory provision. If it is not strictly observed, dangerous consequence may ensue. Police Officers may prepare a F.I.R. at the instance of an arch-enemy of an accused and falsely show it to be that of the informant. The object of having the signatures or thumb impression of the informant on the F.I.R. after reading over the same to him is the thwart the possibility of such a malaise creeping in. Another object of this is to ensure that in case there is an omission in the F.I.R. or the informant’s statement in the trial Court is contrary to the recitals in the F.I.R., he may not be able to state that the F.I.R. was not lodged by him and does not contain his version of the incident. 25. However, in connection with the mandatory obligation on the part of the Officer who records the F.I.R. under Sec.154(1), Crl.P.C. to have the signatures or thumb impression of the informant on it, after recording it, we would like to point out that there is no inflexible requirement in law having universal application to all situations that it is always imperative to do so. Such an obligations has to be discharged by an Officer only if the informant is in a position to either sign or affix his thumb impression on the F.I.R.. Such an obligations has to be discharged by an Officer only if the informant is in a position to either sign or affix his thumb impression on the F.I.R.. Assuming in a given case, the evidence is that after dictating the F.I.R., the informant became unconscious or his hands and legs, including his palms, soles and all the fingers and thumbs attached to them were bandaged then on the principle that the law does not compel the performance of the impossible Court would not fault the officer for not taking signatures or thumb impression on the F.I.R.. But as said earlier it is for the officer who records F.I.R. and the prosecution to squarely satisfy the Court as to why in a given case the statutory obligation of taking signatures or thumb impression of the informant on the F.I.R. has been given a go by. 10. In the Division Bench reported in V.S.Krishnan and another v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others, 2000 Crl.L.J. 4498, the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court have held in paragraph 15 as follows; “15. From a conspectus of the different provisions of the Code and keeping in mind, the dictum’s of the Supreme Court referred to above, the irresistible conclusion is that the power of investigation of a cognizable offence is exclusively in the domain of the police and so long as the same is exercised in strict compliance of law, the Court would not be justified to interfere with the same in exercise of extraordinary writ jurisdiction conferred by Art.226 of the Constitution. However, if the Court is convinced from the materials that there is no motion or slow motion in the investigation or that the investigation is not free and fair, inasmuch as, the police officer being influenced either by the accused or otherwise has been trying to hush up the case which may ultimately affect the cause of justice, the Court would be competent to issue him necessary direction to proceed with the investigation in order to bring the offender to book, similarly, where allegation of mala fide and bias is made against the police Officer by the accused that attempt has been to rope him in the crime and the same is established and proved from the facts and circumstances, the Court in order to protect the accused from harassment can issue necessary direction restraining the police officer from misusing his legal powers.” 11. In the Division Bench decision reported in People’s Union for Civil Liberties and another v. State of Maharashtra and others, 2000 Crl.L.J. 2138, the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court have answered the objection of the learned counsel for prosecution for transferring the investigation from one agency to another, in paragraph 2, which is as follows. "Mr.Manohar strenuously urged that when the lives of many innocent people are at the mercy of the gangsters and the police of the State is making sincere efforts to protect the innocent citizens, if the Court will direct for investigation of the cases concerning the incidents in question, the police will have apprehension that even though they act in accordance with law and for the protection of the law-abiding people, they have to face inquiries for finding out the truth or otherwise of their acts and omissions in connection with the alleged occurrence. We fail to see how a law binding and law enforcing agency shall even have any apprehension that a fair and impartial inquiry by a judicial authority to find out the truth or otherwise of those incidents, in any way, cause any prejudice to them or shall bring to their name any disrepute. No person in authority who discharges his duties honestly and fairly should ever have any apprehension in placing all that is true about his activities before any authority. Mr.Manohar also urged that in a similar case the Division Bench comprising of Justices A.C.Agarwal and F.I. Rebello directed an inquiry before the District Magistrate. No person in authority who discharges his duties honestly and fairly should ever have any apprehension in placing all that is true about his activities before any authority. Mr.Manohar also urged that in a similar case the Division Bench comprising of Justices A.C.Agarwal and F.I. Rebello directed an inquiry before the District Magistrate. In our considered opinion, such an enquiry is of no use in the present case since the Government Officials at the highest level have taken a stand that these encounters are genuine encounters. It is futile to accept an independent and a wholly objective investigation by the said authorities. Even otherwise, people will have little confidence in the investigation no matter how honest and objective the investigation be. We, therefore, deem it necessary to order an independent inquiry by a Judicial Officer." 12. In the Division Bench decision of Bombay High Court, reported in Dayaram Chandramohan Kanswal v. Inspector of Police Kapurbawdi Police Station, Thane, 1997 Crl.L.J. 2713, the interpretation in respect of Sec.174, Crl.P.C. has been given in the following terms in paragraphs 8, 11, beginning of paragraph 13 and sub paragraphs (i) and (v) and paragraphs 14 and 15. "8. In reply to the contention raised in grounds C and D of the petition alleging failure to comply with the mandatory provisions of Secs.174 and 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. P.S.I. Jadhav has stated in para 12 of his affidavit dated 21st February 1996 that despite the mandatory provisions contained in Sec.174, there was no such practice followed by the police officers in Bombay or in Thane. Since we were not happy with this affidavit, we enquired with the learned Public Prosecutor Shri Tulpule, who stated before us on 14th March, 1987 that the principal Secretary, Home Department, Government of Maharashtra would personally file an affidavit in this Court by Tuesday the 18th March, 1997 pointing out the practice that was followed in Bombay and Thane in connection with the mandatory provisions of Secs.174 and 176 of the Code of Criminal procedure. We, therefore, passed a brief order on 14th March, 1997 expressing our disapproval of the affidavit made by P.S.I. Jadhav and directing the Principal Secretary, Home Department to personally file an affidavit by 18th March, 1997. We, therefore, passed a brief order on 14th March, 1997 expressing our disapproval of the affidavit made by P.S.I. Jadhav and directing the Principal Secretary, Home Department to personally file an affidavit by 18th March, 1997. We referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Shri Bhagwant Singh v. Commissioner of Police, Delhi, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 826: 1983 Crl.L.J. 1801, where dealing with the increase in number of dowry deaths, the Supreme Court expressed its concern over the faulty investigation that was carried out in the facts of the case before it. We then referred to the suggestions made by the Supreme Court in paras 18 and 21 of its judgment. We find it convenient to reproduce them since they are apposite here, at page 831 of AIR. 18. We believe it would be appropriate to make a few further observations at this stage. It is impossible to escape the conclusion that, in a case such as this, the death of a young wife must be attributed either to the commission of a crime or to the fact that, mentally tortured by the suffocating circumstances surrounding her, she committed suicide. Young women of education, intelligence and character do not set fire to themselves to welcome the embrace of death unless provoked and compelled to that desperate step by the intolerance of their mystery. It is pertinent to note that such cases evidence a deep seated malady in our social order. The greed for dowry, and indeed the dowry system as an institution, called for the severest condemnation. It is evident that legislative measures such as the Dowry Prohibition Act have not met with success for which they were designed. Perhaps, legislation in itself cannot succeed in stamping out such an evil and the solution must ultimately be found in the conscience and will of the social community and in its active expression through legal and constitutional methods. 21. Another suggestion which as found with us is the need to extend the application of the Coroners Act, 1871 to other cites besides those where it operates already. The application of the Coroners Act will make possible an immediate inquiry into the death of the victim, whether it has been caused by accident, homicide, suicide or suddenly by means unknown. Another suggestion which as found with us is the need to extend the application of the Coroners Act, 1871 to other cites besides those where it operates already. The application of the Coroners Act will make possible an immediate inquiry into the death of the victim, whether it has been caused by accident, homicide, suicide or suddenly by means unknown. It contains provisions which are entirely salutary for the purpose of such inquiry, and we have little doubt that on inquiry under that enactment would be more meaningful and effective and complete in the kind of case before us. We are aware that the Crl.P.C. 1973 contains, in Secs.174 and 175, provision for a police inquiry pursuant to an information that a person has committed suicide or has been killed by another or by an animal or by machinery or by an accident or has died under circumstances raising reasonable suspicion that some other person has committed an offence. In such a case the police officer makes an investigation and submits a report to the District Magistrate or the Sub Divisional Magistrate or other Executive Magistrate empowered in that behalf is required to hold an inquest. The police officer making an investigation is entitled to summon two or more persons for the purpose of the investigation and any other person who appears to be acquainted with the facts of the case to attend and answer truly all questions other than questions the answer to which would have a tendency to incriminate him. We think that in the category of cases we have in mind the more appropriate and effective procedure would be that contemplated by the Coroners’ Act, which ensures that the inquiry into the death is held by a person of independent standing and enjoying judicial powers, with a status and jurisdiction commensurate with the necessities of such cases and the assistance of an appropriate machinery." 13. Thus, there is no denial of the fact that there is a failure to comply with the mandatory provisions of Secs.174 and 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Admittedly this is a case where a woman had died in suspicious circumstances. Thus, there is no denial of the fact that there is a failure to comply with the mandatory provisions of Secs.174 and 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Admittedly this is a case where a woman had died in suspicious circumstances. Even if it were treated to be a case of suicide by a woman within seven years of her marriage, in suspicious circumstances that some other person had committed an offence in relation to such a woman, the provisions of Sec.176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were clearly attracted since either of the two situations would be governed by Clause (i) or Clause (ii) of Sub-sec.(3) of Sec.174 of the Code. Since it transpired during the course of hearing before us, that P.S.I. Jadhav was acting under instructions of the concerned Assistant Commissioner of Police to file an affidavit in this Court, accordingly, Shri V.C.Marathe, the concerned Assistant Commissioner of Police has made an affidavit on 21st March, 1997. Unfortunately, his affidavit contains so many mistakes and inaccurate statements that we are distressed at the manner in which the Assistant Commissioner of Police has chosen to make an affidavit and what is worse to swear it without having read it and corrected the obvious mistakes. It is difficult to appreciate how the senior police officer could gloss over so many mistakes in a short affidavit of hardly 4 pages. 13. In our view, the petitioner has every justification to feel aggrieved about the manner in which the police have carried out the investigation. It is discrepant in more than one ways...... (i) Despite the mandatory provisions of Secs.174 and 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, no information was given to the nearest Executive Magistrate, though admittedly it was a case of death of a woman within seven years of marriage and no less than the petitioner, father of the deceased, had alleged harassment and case of dowry death. (v) The affidavits filed before us leave no doubt in our mind that the investigation is not only not satisfactory but is clearly faulty. The petitioner is justified in making the allegation that the police officers wanted to oblige the accused whosoever the accused may be. We are not indicating anything on the merits of the investigation which are inclined to order to be held by an independent agency namely by D.C.P. Crime Branch, Thane. 14. The petitioner is justified in making the allegation that the police officers wanted to oblige the accused whosoever the accused may be. We are not indicating anything on the merits of the investigation which are inclined to order to be held by an independent agency namely by D.C.P. Crime Branch, Thane. 14. In view of the above, we make the rule absolute in terms of prayer (a) We, therefore, direct that the investigation into the death of the petitioner’s daughter Mangaleswari which is now the subject matter of C.R.No.I-211/96 of Kapurbawdi Police Station, Thane, will stand transferred to the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Crime Branch, Thane who will be the overall incharge of the investigation and will personally supervise the investigation. Having regard to the delay so far caused, we further direct the D.C.P. Crime Branch Thane to complete the investigation as expeditiously as possible and file the charge sheet in accordance with law. 15. We are told that the charge sheet for the offences punishable under Secs.302, 321 read with Sec.34 of I.P.C. has been filed in the Court of II J.M.F.C., Thane, which is the subject matter of Case No.427 of 1996. Needless to say that in view of the directions given above, the learned Magistrate will stay further proceedings in the said case and await result of the investigation which we have directed. On completion of the investigation, DCP, Crime Branch, Thane is directed to take necessary steps in accordance with law in the appropriate Court." 14. In the case on hand, the learned Government Advocate for prosecution is unable to give any justifiable reason, as to how the Revenue Inspector, Pallikaranai, whose office is said to be located at Tambaram, got the information about the fire accident, rushed to the Thoraipakkam Police Station and lodged a complaint, within one hour of the occurrence. It is also pertinent to note that the name of the Revenue Inspector has not been given in the First Information Report. It is not denied the Revenue Inspector is not an Executive Magistrate and in such circumstances how he was permitted to conduct the inquest in respect of the three children who died in the fire accident is also not properly explained. It is not denied the Revenue Inspector is not an Executive Magistrate and in such circumstances how he was permitted to conduct the inquest in respect of the three children who died in the fire accident is also not properly explained. Why information was not given to the Tahsildar or the other higher officials and why they have not been requested to rush to the place of occurrence to conduct the inquest is also not known. In my opinion, if all the facts of the case are analysed with the principles of law laid down in the Division Bench rulings extracted above, which apply to the facts of the present case, I am satisfied that despite mandatory provisions of Secs.154, 174 and 176 of the Crl.P.C., the signature of de facto complainant namely, the Revenue Inspector, Pallikaranai has not been mentioned in the First Information Report and to information was given to the Executive Magistrate, though admittedly the death of the three children have occurred under suspicious circumstances, which raises considerable doubt whether the Revenue Inspector is really the informant or somebody else, and the inquest have been conducted as required by law. The investigation conducted by the first respondent leaves no doubt in my mind that the investigation is not only unsatisfactory but partial and is also clearly faulty and therefore the petitioner cannot be found fault with in making the allegation that the Inspector of Police, Thoraipakkam Police Station wanted to oblige the real accused, whoever they may be. Transfer of investigation from the local police though not always desirable, but where the investigation is not in proper lines and desultory and lackadaisical, in order to install confidence in the mind of the people, as has been held in Kashmiri Devi v. Delhi Administration, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1323, transfer of investigation of case is inevitable. In may opinion, though this is a fit case to be referred to the Home Secretary, Government of Tamil Nadu, Ft. Saint George, Chennai-9, for taking proper disciplinary action against the police officers who conducted the investigation, I do not desire making such a reference, in order to give an opportunity to the police officers to mend their ways and they are cautioned to be extremely careful in future without giving room to such allegations, as made in this petition and to do their duties as per law. However, a copy of this judgment shall be sent to the Director General of Police to keep watch in the matter of investigation by the said Inspectors in future cases and if any lapse is found the Director General of Police shall take suitable disciplinary action. I have not indicated anything on the merits of the investigation done so far and this Court is inclined to order investigation to be held by an independent agency, namely, the second respondent. 15. In the result, I direct the investigation in respect of the fire accident that took place on 15.6.2000, in Crime No.445 of 2000 on the file of the first respondent, be transferred to the second respondent, namely, the Inspector General of Police, Crime Branch, CID Chennai. The Inspector General of Police, CBCID., shall monitor the said investigation and he shall see to it an in-depth, impartial and a thorough investigation is done on proper lines in accordance to law, de novo, without being guided by the investigation already done by the local police namely the first respondent. As the occurrence took place in June, 2000, it is directed that the second respondent shall complete the investigation, and file the final report within a period of four months form the date of receipt of a copy of this order, without fail. 16. The Criminal O.P. is ordered in the above terms.