DILIP KUMAR SETH, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition was dismissed as infructuous on 5th July, 2001. An application for recalling of the said order has since been filed. After hearing Mr. Chowdhury and Mr. Samaddar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, it appears that the writ petition has not become infructuous. Accordingly, the order dated 5th of July, 2001 is hereby recalled. ( 2 ) AFTER the above order was passed, by consent of parties, the writ petition is treated as on day's List and is taken up for hearing. Both the learned Counsel have addressed the Court on merits. ( 3 ) THE bone of contention in the present writ petition is as to whether tyre warps would be excisable under Item 18 or under Item 22. In the present case the tyre warps have been sought to be included in Item 22 and accordingly, a demand was levied on the petitioner. In the ensued proceeding petitioner had participated in the hearing and before any order was passed this writ petition was moved and certain interim orders were obtained. However, there was no interim order restraining the authorities from passing order in the proceedings, the hearing of which was concluded. Be that as it may, the learned Counsel for the respondents Mr. Samaddar has no instruction with regard to the outcome of the proceedings. However, Mr. Chowdhury submits on instruction that no order has since been passed even after closure of the hearing and though there was no interim order restraining the passing of such order. ( 4 ) MR. Samaddar had taken a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that the petitioner having participated in the proceedings till conclusion of hearing, he could not have pursued a parallel proceeding in this writ jurisdiction. Therefore, this petition should be dismissed. Only after an order is passed in the proceedings, if it is adverse, then, the petitioner could be at liberty to challenge the same. According to him, it is not known that whether the order that would be passed would be adverse to the petitioner or not. ( 5 ) MR. Therefore, this petition should be dismissed. Only after an order is passed in the proceedings, if it is adverse, then, the petitioner could be at liberty to challenge the same. According to him, it is not known that whether the order that would be passed would be adverse to the petitioner or not. ( 5 ) MR. Chowdhury, however, contended that since the writ petition is pending for almost seventeen years and that the matter is already concluded in an earlier proceedings between the parties wherein tyre warps were held to be yarn by the learned single Judge which was affirmed by the Division Bench in Collector of Central Excise, Calcutta and Ors. v. Madura Coats Ltd. , Serampore, 1982 (10) E. L. T. 129 (Calcutta), the special leave petition against which was not admitted. Therefore, this question is no more open to be agitated in between the parties though might be for subsequent years in view of the decision in the case of Chiranji Lal Ramji Doss v. Income-Tax Officer, Central Circle XIV, New Delhi and Ors. , reported in 1978 (115) I. T. R. 842. ( 6 ) IN elaborating his submission, Mr. Chowdhury had pointed out that tyre warps are held yarns in a particular pattern which is used for manufacture of tyres and at the time of such manufacture the cotton threads that hold the yarns are destroyed. Therefore, it was something other than tyre fabric. Then again, this very question was decided in between the parties in the earlier proceedings. Therefore, it falls under Item 18 and not under Item 22. Therefore, this writ petition should be allowed. He then contends that the authority was free to pass an order and if it had passed the order, the same could have been challenged in this petition but even in the absence of any interim order the authority had chosen not to pass the order after long 17 years and thereby it deprived the petitioner of any liberty to challenge the said order in the present proceeding. In view of the delay that has been sought, this petition should not be thrown out on the preliminary objection of Mr. Samaddar. ( 7 ) I have heard the respective submissions of the learned Counsel at length. In view of the delay that has been sought, this petition should not be thrown out on the preliminary objection of Mr. Samaddar. ( 7 ) I have heard the respective submissions of the learned Counsel at length. ( 8 ) IN the decision in the case of Madura Coats Ltd (supra) this Court had occasion to deal with the important same question once again raised in this petition. May be this question had arose in course of subsequent assessment but still then, it is in respect of character in the item which was sought to be assessed under an excisable item other than yarn even in the earlier year which was involved in the said decision. Thus, a particular decision on the character of a particular product which was held to be yarn and excisable under a particular item cannot be reopened in the subsequent years when it is a decision by a Court between same parties in respect of selfsame products. Inasmuch as the character is not changed it remains the same character and the cause of action though arose in subsequent years remain the same cause of action that the product is excisable under Item 18 and not under Item 22. Untill there is a change in legislation making a distinction between yarn and warps and made excisable in a different item the said decision will operate. However, subject to rights of the petitioner to challenge such legislation if occasion so arise, and such decision will operate as res judicata in between the parties in respect of same question even though for subsequent years. Such a question was considered in Chirnnji Lal Ramji Dass (supra ). Where a question of law determined by Court was held to be res judicata even though it was in respect of subsequent year when the decision was not challenged in a forum to which the principle of res judicata does not apply. Thus, the question cannot be reopened any further. ( 9 ) SO far as the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Samaddar is concerned, it was open to the authority to pass appropriate order after hearing was concluded since there was no interim order restraining the authority from passing any order. Thus, the question cannot be reopened any further. ( 9 ) SO far as the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Samaddar is concerned, it was open to the authority to pass appropriate order after hearing was concluded since there was no interim order restraining the authority from passing any order. Because of the delay the matter will again come up if any adverse order is passed, and no useful purpose will be served on the face of the proposition of law as settled in the decision above and as such it would be wholly infructuous an exercise by the authority to pass an order. Since they are bound by the decision, they cannot pass any order other than the order that has to be passed following the decision in Madura Coats (supra ). In case any other order is passed, even then they could have been examined by this Court in the light of the said decision. As I have already held that it could not have been excisable other than Item 18 therefore, the remand to the authority once again would be wholly infructuous exercise which the Court does not exercise. Then again, the matter was moved sometimes in 1983. It was open to the authority to come and obtain proper order in respect of vacating the interim order or could have asked for direction for affidavits or take the preliminary objection at the very outset. Such preliminary objection cannot be allowed to be taken after the matter remained pending for such a long years unless it hits at the root of the jurisdiction or otherwise. The ground that the petitioner had participated in the proceeding and that there was an alternative remedy not being an absolute alternative bar, cannot be allowed to be raised after such a long time. The Court having entertained the petition now cannot refuse to exercise jurisdiction only on such ground at such a late stage and that too for a purpose which would be infructuous and if adverse order is passed to exercise the same jurisdiction once again in repeating and following the earlier decision. ( 10 ) FOR all these reasons, I am not inclined to agree with the contention of Mr. Samaddar. However, the contention raised by Mr. Samaddar with regard to the merits as contended by Mr. ( 10 ) FOR all these reasons, I am not inclined to agree with the contention of Mr. Samaddar. However, the contention raised by Mr. Samaddar with regard to the merits as contended by Mr. Chowdhury though argued vehemently, I am unable to agree with the proposition as advanced by him in view of the reasons that I have recorded above having regard to the decision of Madira Coats (supra) and Chiranji Lal Ramji Dass (supra ). ( 11 ) IN the circumstances, writ petition is allowed and the proceedings is hereby quashed. Let there be a writ of Certiorari in terms of prayer (a) to the petition. The Bonds or Guarantees furnished by the petitioner shall stand discharged. The amount if so deposited with the Bank, the petitioner shall be at liberty to withdraw the same. ( 12 ) WITH the aforesaid observations, this writ application is disposed of. There will be no order as costs.