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2001 DIGILAW 486 (KAR)

State of Karnataka v. Yellappa Vishwanathasa Magajikondi

2001-06-27

MOHAMED ANWAR

body2001
JUDGMENT Mohamed Anwar, J.—Heard the arguments of both sides with their consent for final disposal of the appeal on merits. 2. This appeal by the State is directed against the judgment of acquittal dated 8.8.1997 of the learned Sessions Judge, Dharwad, made in S.C. No. 8 of 1995 acquitting Respondents-accused of the charges under Sections 498-A and 306 of Indian Penal Code. 3. Few material undisputed facts of the prosecution case are as stated under: Respondents-1 to 3 were the three accused persons, who are hereinafter referred to as A-1, A-2 and A-3 respectively. The deceased Rekha was the daughter of PW-3 Shankarsa Narayanasa Marmadi and PW-5 Kasturibai Shankarsa Marmadi, who are the residents of Hubli City in Dharwad District. She was married to A-1 Yellappa Vishwanathasa Magajikondi on 27.5.1993. He is the son of A-2 and A-3. The accused were also living together in their house in Hubli City. After marriage, the deceased was living with her husband in her in-laws' house. It was her case that during her stay for few months with them, she was being harassed and troubled on one pretext or the other. Therefore, she had been to her parents' house and was staying with them. As she was not willing to go back to her husband and live with the accused despite several persuasions made by A-1, the latter had given a petition dated 24.11.1993 at Ex.D-1 to PW-11 Ramasa Tulajasa Niranjan, who was the President of S.S.K. Samaja Trust, Hubli, stating that his wife Rekha, after living with him for seven months, had gone away to her parents and was refusing to join him. It was thereafter requested that the deceased and her parents may be suitably advised and she may be sent over to him. Accordingly, a panchayathi was convened within 8 or 10 days of A-1's petition, by PW-11 where the deceased, her parents and A-1 were summoned and they were all advised suitably by panchas, and then the deceased was sent to the accused's house to lead her marital life with A-1. 4. Thereafter, when the deceased was leading her matrimonial life in the house of the accused, she consumed poison in the morning of 24.2.1994 and was immediately taken by A-3 Vimalabai to the private clinic called 'Azad Clinic' of PW-10 Dr. Shamshuddin A. Azad at about 11.00 a.m. and was admitted there. 4. Thereafter, when the deceased was leading her matrimonial life in the house of the accused, she consumed poison in the morning of 24.2.1994 and was immediately taken by A-3 Vimalabai to the private clinic called 'Azad Clinic' of PW-10 Dr. Shamshuddin A. Azad at about 11.00 a.m. and was admitted there. As it was a medico-legal case, PW-10 wanted to refer the patient to the Government K.M.C. Hospital, Hubli. But, her relatives requested him to continue his treatment as her condition was improving. 5. On the following day i.e., on 25.2.1994, at about 9.30 a.m. PW-15 C.P.I. of Hubli Town Police Station, appeared in the clinic of PW-10 and recorded the statement at Ex.P-2 of the deceased Rekha. On the basis of Ex.P-2, Crime No. 28 of 1994 of the said Police Station under Section 498-A of Indian Penal Code was registered by him against A-1 to A-3 and Ex.P-15 F.I.R. was despatched to the jurisdictional Magistrate. Thereafter, the deceased was discharged at about 1.00 p.m. by PW-10 with advice to get herself treated in the K.M.C. Hospital. Accordingly, she was shifted to the said hospital where she died on the following day i.e., on 26.2.1994 at about 10.10 a.m. Ex.P-16 - Death Report of that hospital was then despatched to the Hubli Town Police Station. Then, the inquest per Ex.P-8 on the dead body was conducted by PW-16, who was the in-charge Tahsildar-cum-Taluka Magistrate of the concerned area. Ex.P-8 was attested by PW-2 and another. The dead body was then subjected to post-mortem by PW-9-Dr. Sharanamma C. Pattanashetty of K.M.C. Hospital, who conducted autopsy on it and prepared Ex.P-9 P.M. Report. The viscera of the deceased was collected by her in sealed bottles and was given to the investigating police, who had the same examined by Chemical Examiner at F.S.L., Bangalore. Chemical Examiner's report Ex.P-20 stating that the organo phosphorus insecticide was detected in the viscera, was also secured by the I.O. On the basis of Ex.P-20, PW-9 furnished her opinion that the death of the deceased was due to said poison. 6. After registration of the crime, PW-15 visited the accused's house of offence, inspected the scene of occurrence and prepared Ex.P-1 - spot mahazar. MO-1 - Spanner, and MO-2 - plastic bottle containing 5 ml of oil were seized thereunder. On 26.2.1994, further investigation was taken over by PW-17 - Suresh Naidu, Police Inspector, Hubli. 6. After registration of the crime, PW-15 visited the accused's house of offence, inspected the scene of occurrence and prepared Ex.P-1 - spot mahazar. MO-1 - Spanner, and MO-2 - plastic bottle containing 5 ml of oil were seized thereunder. On 26.2.1994, further investigation was taken over by PW-17 - Suresh Naidu, Police Inspector, Hubli. He sent a report to the Magistrate Court requesting to include the offence under Section 306 Indian Penal Code in Ex.P-15 F.I.R. on the death of the deceased. The parents of the deceased - P Ws 3 and 5, cousin of the deceased's father - PW-12 Narayanasa Marmadi, PW-6 Tulajabai, and others were examined and their statements were recorded by him. During his further investigation, he collected the medical certificate Ex.P-11 from PW-10 with respect to the treatment of the deceased, Ex.D-1 - A-1's representation dated 24.11.1993 from PW-11, and Ex.P-9 - P.M. Report of PW-9. The said viscera bottles were collected from the F.S.L., Bangalore on 15.3.1994. On 13.4.1994, further investigation was handed over to PW-18. He secured Ex.P- 20 - C.E's report, as also the final opinion of PW-9 as regards the cause of death of the deceased. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was laid by him. 7. At the trial, on the accused pleading not guilty to the charge, the prosecution adduced its evidence in its attempt to prove the same which consists of PWs. 1 to 18, documents Exs. P-1 to P-20 and M.O. Nos. 1 and 2. Through PW-11, Ex.D-1 was brought on record for the defence. Exs. D-2 to D-4 are the contradictory statements in the statements of PWs. 4 and 7 made before the I.O. under Section 161 Code of Criminal Procedure 8. There is no dispute that the evidence of PW-9, and the contents of Ex.P-20 - C.E's report undoubtedly establish the death of the deceased as due to consumption of organo phosphorus insecticide. However, the evidence of PWs. 4 and 6, who are the neighbours of the accused as also of PW-10 establishes the fact that the deceased committed suicide in the house of the accused by consuming poison on the morning of 24.2.1994. However, the evidence of PWs. 4 and 6, who are the neighbours of the accused as also of PW-10 establishes the fact that the deceased committed suicide in the house of the accused by consuming poison on the morning of 24.2.1994. But, then the material question for determination before the learned trial Judge was whether the deceased was subjected to cruelty by the accused in their house within the meaning of Section 498-A of Indian Penal Code and, if so, whether by reason of such cruelty, she was driven to commit suicide. 9. The principal evidence on which heavy reliance was placed by the prosecution is Ex.P-2, statement of the deceased which was recorded by PW-15 - Police Inspector, on the next day of the incident i.e., on 25.2.1994 in the private clinic of PW-10 - Dr. Shamshuddin A. Azad. Since on the following day, the deceased breathed her last in the K.M.C. Hospital, it was rightly contended by the prosecution that Ex.P-2 happens to be her dying declaration in law and it contains the cause of her death implicating the accused. Therefore, this important piece of documentary evidence, according to the prosecution, was itself sufficient to base conviction of the accused for the aforesaid charge. But, this has been repelled by the learned trial Judge, who has held Ex.P-2 as an unreliable piece of documentary evidence. On re-appreciation of evidence relating to Ex.P-2, I find the learned trial judge justified in his conclusion. One of the most material infirmity which demolishes the authenticity and credibility of Ex.P-2 - Dying Declaration, is to be found in the evidence of PW-15. He has stated that he gave his letter at Ex.P-10 to PW-10 requesting him to furnish his opinion if the deceased was in a fit condition to make her statement. Accordingly, PW-10 gave his positive opinion at Ex.P-10(a) in Ex.P-10 itself. Then, he examined the deceased in the ward of PW-10's private nursing home and got her statement recorded by his writer. Therefore, it is an undisputed fact that the statement in Ex.P-2 was not recorded by PW-10 personally. On the other hand, it was taken down by the writer of PW-10. As to who is that writer is not disclosed by him. That scribe of Ex.P-2 has remained unknown on record. Therefore, it is an undisputed fact that the statement in Ex.P-2 was not recorded by PW-10 personally. On the other hand, it was taken down by the writer of PW-10. As to who is that writer is not disclosed by him. That scribe of Ex.P-2 has remained unknown on record. He was the most competent witness for the prosecution to prove the contents of Ex.P-2, being the scribe thereof. His non-examination at the trial is a strong suspicious circumstance as regards the genuineness of the contents of Ex.P-2. What aggravates this suspicion is the evidence of PW-10 doctor, who has stated that when he too wanted to remain present by the side of the deceased at the time when Ex.P-2 was purported to have been recorded, he was not permitted by PW-15 to enter the ward of the deceased. Furthermore, it is not the case of PW-10 - Doctor, that any time between the admission of the deceased at about 11.00 a.m. on 24.2.1994 in his hospital and till her discharge on the next day i.e., 25.2.1994 at 1.00 p.m., the deceased gave the history of incident before him. In fact, in the normal circumstance, if the deceased was forced to consume poison with intention to commit suicide on account of unbearable torture and harassment at the hands of the accused, she would have not failed to narrate the same before PW-10 at the earliest possible opportunity. Besides, there is no any explanation whatever from the prosecution why the police did not take any measure to get the victim - deceased examined and her statement recorded by any Magistrate though ample time was available to them for this purpose. Since Ex.P-2 suffers from these salient vital infirmities, the learned trial Judge has rightly held the same unworthy of trust and reliance. 10. When the principal evidence of the prosecution relating to Ex.P-2 - dying declaration of the deceased is discarded from consideration, then what remains for it to prove the charge on the counts under Sections 498-A and 306 of Indian Penal Code is the mere oral evidence of her parents PWs. 3 and 5, neighbours PWs. 4 and 6, and PW-11 - President of the said S.S.K. Samaja. In fact, PWs. 3 and 5, neighbours PWs. 4 and 6, and PW-11 - President of the said S.S.K. Samaja. In fact, PWs. 4 and 6, being the neighbours of the accused, were the independent and competent witnesses to speak to the fact of ill-treatment and cruelty which was being meted out to the deceased by the accused in their house during her stay there. They were examined by the prosecution to prove this material fact. But, they have turned hostile stating that none of them had any personal knowledge of any such torture, ill-treatment or harassment of the deceased at the hands of the accused in their house. PW-11 was a respectable and independent witness, who was the President of the said S.S.K. Samaja Trust at Hubli. It transpires from his evidence that this Trust Samaja was the Samaja of the community of the accused and the deceased people in Hubli city and that it was engaged in resolving disputes amicably between the litigant parties of that community. Accordingly, on Ex.D-1 requisition of A-1, a panchayathi was convened at the premises of the Trust in Hubli, where all the Trustees of the Trust were present and the attendance of both parties was also secured. All that he has stated in this regard is that both the parties were advised suitably and Rekha was sent to the accused's house to continue her marital life there in a normal way. There is not a whisper in his evidence that there was any complaint from the deceased or her parents made in the said panchayath against any of the accused that she was subjected to any sort of ill-treatment, harassment or cruelty whatsoever during her previous stay in their house after her marriage with A-1. This circumstance also seriously reflects on the veracity of the evidence of PWs. 3 and 5, who have deposed at the trial that during her previous stay in her in-law's house, the deceased was subjected to such cruelty and harassment as a result of which she was not willing to go back and join her husband after she came over to her parents house. However, the statements of PWs. 3 and 5, who have deposed at the trial that during her previous stay in her in-law's house, the deceased was subjected to such cruelty and harassment as a result of which she was not willing to go back and join her husband after she came over to her parents house. However, the statements of PWs. 3 and 5 as regards the deceased's complaint before them relating to the nature of cruelty meted out to her by the accused, is that she was being rebuked by them quite often stating that she was not attending to the household work properly and that she was looking for friends and she should mend herself. At the worst, such abuse to a daughter-in-law by her husband and in-laws could be the serious advice made with a view to set right her conduct, and that by no stretch of imagination, it could be stated as constituting cruelty within the meaning of Section 498-A of Indian Penal Code, the explanation of which states: 498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.... Explanation.-For the purpose of this section, "cruelty" means- (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. 11. For our purpose, the kind of cruelty stipulated in Sub-clause (b) of the explanation appended to Section 498-A is immaterial because it is nobody's case that the deceased was being ill-treated or harassed in order to coerce her to fulfil the demand of dowry by the accused. The cruelty envisaged in Sub-clause (a) of the explanation is relevant in the instant case. The cruelty envisaged in Sub-clause (a) of the explanation is relevant in the instant case. The kind of cruelty contemplated by this provision so as to make it an offence punishable under Section 498-A Indian Penal Code must be of such a grave nature that in all human probability, it is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health, whether mental or physical, of the woman, and that such type of cruelty must be shown to have been wilfully perpetrated against the woman by her husband or the relatives of the husband. In other words, even if it is proved by the prosecution that the type of cruelty envisaged in Sub-clause (a) of the explanation to Section 498-A was, in fact, perpetrated on the deceased, that by itself will not be sufficient to bring the same within the ambit of the offence under Section 498-A, since what is further required to make it an offence is that the prosecution must prove that such cruelty was meted out to the victim woman by the accused wilfully. It means that, the said cruelty was caused to her with the evil intention to compel or force the deceased to commit suicide. The presence of both these ingredients in the instant case is singularly lacking. Besides, it is significant to note that there is not an iota of prosecution evidence on record to prove the further material fact that the deceased was ever subjected to any type of ill-treatment, harassment or cruelty by the accused people during her stay in their house from the time she was sent back to their house as a result of the said panchayath i.e., from December 1993, till the date of incident i.e., 24.2.1994. Therefore, the learned Magistrate has justifiably recorded his negative findings on the aforestated material questions bearing on the alleged guilt of the accused. In that view of the matter, this appeal is devoid of merit. 12. Hence, the appeal is dismissed.