M. K. BASU, J. ( 1 ) THIS revisional application has arisen out of the order No. 56 dated 24th June, 1994 passed by the learned Munsif, First Court Sealdah in Title Suit No. 64/85 under which the learned Munsif rejected the petition under section 151 of the CPC filed by the present revisional applicant who was the defendant in the original suit praying for an order allowing him three months time for ascertaining the exact period for which the alleged default in payment of rent had taken place and thus enabling him to make payment of the entire rent falling in arrears due to such alleged default. The case of the revisional applicant-defendant is that the O. P. plaintiff filed Title suit No. 64/85 against him a tenant under the O. P. in respect of the suit premises at a monthly rental of Rs. 600, for eviction on the ground of default, subletting etc. In view of an order passed by the learned Munsif in that suit under section 17 (1) of the W. B. P. T. Act he went on depositing arrears rent and also the current rents before the Court by instalments as per the order of the Court under section 17 (2a) (b) of the W. B. P. T. Act. While the defendant tenant went on depositing rents by instalments in this way he came to know from an application filed by the plaintiff landlord under section 17 (3) of the P. T. Act alleging that the defendant (tenant) had failed to comply with the provisions of section 17 (1) and 17 (2a) (b) of the Act and praying for striking out of his defence. It was at this time that this applicant came to know for the first time that the deposit which he had so long made before his learned Advocate in good faith for the purpose of making payment of rent as per the above order of the Court had not been actually deposited and, instead, his learned Advocate had misappropriated the money by creating some forged challan and filing them before the Court. Immediately he changed his advocate and his newly appointed learned advocate made an enquiry into the matter and found that his erstwhile learned advocate, Subhas Chandra Chakraborty, having accepted the money from him did not actually deposit the same before the Court and one Kalidas Chakraborty, the son of his learned Advocate Subhas Chandra Chakraborty swore an Affidavit to the effect that after taking the money he gave the same to one A. Routh who described himself as a mohorar of the Court of Sealdah for depositing it before the Court, but subsequently it revealed that the challans through which such deposit allegedly had been made by that Mr. Routh were forged one and actually he did not deposit the money in question before the Court. Under such circumstances the applicant-defendant filed a petition before the learned Munsif stating the above facts and praying for time to make payment of the amount of arrears of rent in respect of which such default had taken place due to fraud being committed from the side of his Advocate and also expressing his willingness to deposit the entire arrears of rent if such an opportunity was given to him. ( 2 ) AFTER hearing both sides the learned Munsif passed the impugned order dated 24th June, 1994 rejecting that prayer of the defendant applicant on the ground that he had not deposited any portion of the amount falling in arrears to show his bonafides and on the further ground that he had not named the learned Advocate who allegedly was responsible for such a fraud not had taken any legal action against that learned Advocate at fault. ( 3 ) AFTER admitting this revisional application this Court passed an order dated 9th January, 1995 directing Sri Kalidas Chakraborty, advocate to appear before this Court personally. This Court also stayed the further proceedings of the Title Suit No. 64/85 pending before the Court of Munsif, Sealdah. But since thereafter the said Sri Kalidas Chakraborty has not appeared before this Court in compliance with that order. This Court also stayed the further proceedings of the Title Suit No. 64/85 pending before the Court of Munsif, Sealdah. But since thereafter the said Sri Kalidas Chakraborty has not appeared before this Court in compliance with that order. An affidavit sworn by the said Sri Chakraborty has been filed before this Court wherefrom it appears that his father Sri Subhas Chandra Chakraborty was the Advocate on record for the defendant-applicant in respect of the Title Suit No. 64/85 in question and he asked him (this deponent) to make for deposit of money towards the rent in the Court in respect of this suit and accordingly in order to discharge that duty he (Kalidas Chakraborty) entrusted one A. Routh, who described himself to be a mohorar of the Court at Sealdah for depositing the said money as rent and Sri Routh went on giving him challans every month showing such deposit of rent but subsequently on enquiry from the Court he came to learn that those challans bearing the seal of the Court and signature of the cashier were forged and thus he had been befooled and then he tried to trace out the said Sri Routh but could not find him. Thus from the sworn statement of Sri Kalidas Chakraborty who being an advocate and being the son of the advocate-on-record for the defendant it appears that he (Kalidas Chakraborty) was encrusted with the entire money paid to him by the defendant to deposit the same in the Court but he didnot actually so deposit. This has also been averred by the defendant-applicant in the revisional application before this Court and conspicuously enough, this statements on oath have not been controverted by the said landlord. That being so, there is no denying the fact that this statement remains practically unchallenged and this shows' and supports the contention of the revisional applicant that he had no laches in the matter of default which took place. That being so, there is no denying the fact that this statement remains practically unchallenged and this shows' and supports the contention of the revisional applicant that he had no laches in the matter of default which took place. The question whether the said Kalidas Chakraborty, or, for that matter, Sri Subhas Chandra Chakraborty, learned advocate on Records, had actually committed fraud or he has been defrauded by any person named A. Routh, is not at all relevant for the purpose of the present revisional application where an order of the learned Munsif allowing a petition of the landlord under section 17 (3) of the P. T Act has been made and the tenant's petition under section 151 getting three months' time to make payment of the amount in respect of which the alleged default had taken place was rejected. We are concerned with the question whether the Court below ought to have exercised its discretion in favour of the petitioner-tenant by giving him three months' time to enable him to deposit the amount of arrears and not to allow the petition for striking out his defence. ( 4 ) MR. Ganguli, learned Advocate has referred to a number of decisions of the apex Court in respect of his contention that this is a fit case where the Court was under an obligation to exercise its discretion in favour of the tenant. Thus Mr. Ganguli cites, the decision reported in AIR 1980 SC 1664 (Santosh Mehta v. Om Prokash and others) wherein under similar circumstances their lordships of the apex Court held that defence was not to be struck out. In this case under reference the appellant tenant engaged an Advocate to appear on her behalf and take all necessary steps to protect her interest and in good faith she paid either by cheque or by cash to that Advocate all the moneys to be paid as rent or arrears of rent, but, unfortunately, this amount received by the Advocate was not actually deposited in the Court or paid to the landlord and when such a flaw on the part of the Advocate came to her knowledge, she made a complaint to the Bar Council of Delhi. In such circumstances their lordships observed that the tenant had failed to pay and in any case the exercise of judicial discretion must persuade the Court in such a case not to strike out the defence of the tenant but to give her fresh opportunity to make deposit of entire arrears due, because the tenant went on paying to the Advocate the sums regularly, but if the latter betrayed her what she could do. Their lordships enunciated the principle that no party could be punished because her Advocate's behaved unprofessionally and that sensitised the judicial appreciation was missing since the prayer of the innocent tenant was disallowed by the trial Court and the petition under section 17 (3) was allowed. Similarly in AIR 1980 SC 287 the apex Court took similar view particularly under the circumstances that the rent for the period prior and subsequent to the period in question having been accepted by the landlord it should not escape the notice of the Court that such conduct of the landlord is an index of his true intention and for such default tenant should not be held liable to the rigours of the Provision of section 17 (3) of the Act. ( 5 ) THE third decision relied upon by Mr. Ganguli is one reported in AIR 1987 SC 1010 wherein it has been held that having regard to the intendment of the Act and nature of the provisions it can never be said that the defaults on the part of the tenant were of such a nature as can warrant the Court to refuse to exercise its discretion and feel constrained to strike out the defence. ( 6 ) IN the present case as I have indicated above, from the Affidavit (annexure-B) and the sworn statement of the petitioner lying totally un-challenged and uncontroverted, it is clear that the tenant defendant had no responsibility for the alleged default in the payment of arrears of rent, but, on the other hand, he went on depositing the same to his Advocate in good faith. Therefore there cannot be any impediment in the way of the learned Munsif's exercising his discretion in favour of the tenant by condoning the delay and allowing him time and opportunity for making payment of the amount in question. In this connection Mr. Therefore there cannot be any impediment in the way of the learned Munsif's exercising his discretion in favour of the tenant by condoning the delay and allowing him time and opportunity for making payment of the amount in question. In this connection Mr. Ganguly submits that his client is ready to make payment of the entire amount lying in arrear in respect of which the default has been detected, if he is granted one month's time. In support of his submission he refers to an unreported judgment of a single Bench of this Court in S. A. 466/96 dated 19th January, 2000 (xerox copy of which filed ). He draws my attention to the last two paragraphs of this judgment wherein his Lordship has been of the opinion that in view of the fact that the tenant had complied with the provisions contained in section 17 (2) of the Act and the delayed deposits were for the subsequent period, the application filed by the appellant herein should be allowed by relying upon all the decisions of the apex Court in B. P. Khemka Pvt. Ltd. v. Birendra Kumar Bhowmik and another reported in AIR 1987 SC 1010 . ( 7 ) REGARD being had to the above discussion I am inclined to hold that this is a fit case where the Court should exercise its discretion under section 17 (3) of the Act liberally in favour of the tenant by condoning the delay and allowing him an opportunity to make payment of the entire amount in default particularly when it is clear from the materials on record that he had absolutely no fault in the matter and he was expressing his eagerness to make such payment and seeking time for that purpose. Therefore the tenant applicant be given an opportunity and be directed to pay the entire arrears in question along with the interest on it at the rate of 8. 33% before the trial Court within the time as fixed by that Court, failing which his defence shall be struck out under section 17 (3) of the Act. Therefore the tenant applicant be given an opportunity and be directed to pay the entire arrears in question along with the interest on it at the rate of 8. 33% before the trial Court within the time as fixed by that Court, failing which his defence shall be struck out under section 17 (3) of the Act. ( 8 ) AS regards the allegations that the amount deposited by the defendant tenant with his learned Advocate was misappropriated and certain forged challans had been placed before the Court fraudulently, let there be an enquiry by the learned Munsif separately and to take necessary action in accordance with law as deemed proper by him. ( 9 ) SINCE the matter has become very old the suit shall be tried as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of six months from the date of communication of this order and the abovementioned enquiry to be held by him will be independent of the proceeding of this suit. In the result, the revisional application stands allowed and the impugned order be set aside. Let plain copy of the relevant portion of containing instructions for payment of arrears of rent countersigned by the Assistant Registrar (Court) be handed over to the learned Advocates for both sides for immediate compliance. Application allowed.