JUDGMENT 1. - This second appeal arises out of judgment whereby the District Judge Merta while dismissing plaintiff's first appeal upheld the judgment of the Civil Judge (JD) Merta who dismissed plaintiff's suit for permanent injunction having been filed by the present appellant and wherein cancellation was sought for a sale deed executed on 17.5.1980 by Sujaram (plaintiff's father who was impleaded as defendant No. 2 and died pendente suit) in favour of Shankarram (defendant No. 1 now one respondent). The plaintiff claimed the suit property as co-parcenary on the basis of a settlement alleged to have been executed on 31.12.1936 (Budi 3 Samwat Year 1993) whereby Tikuji grand father of the appellant & his co-sharer Bhagu son of Bhagwan had allegedly partitioned their joint property. It was the plaintiffs (appellant) case that he became a co-parcenary by virtue of his birth and thereby got vested right in the co-parcenary property and that after the death of his grand father (Tikuji) when he was two years old child, he and his father (Sujaram son of Tikuji) constructed co-parcenary & joint Hindu Family. It was also his case that during lifetime of Tikuji (his grand father) he (Tikuji) was the Karta and after death of Tikuji, Sujaram (his father) became the Karta while he was a member of coparcenary of aforesaid joint Hindu Family and thereby he (appellant) had been in exclusive possession of the suit land and even cultivating it for 15 years during lifetime of Sujaram (his father) prior to the institution of the suit. It was his further case that his father (Sujaram) and Baluram (real brother of Sujaram) both were maternal grand son of Tikuji whose daughter was natural mother of Sujaram & Baluram and who had no male issue, he (Tikuji) had adopted his maternal grand son Sujaram (appellant's father) in the year 1936 (Samvat Year 1993). The appellant also averred in the plaint that upon death of his mother. The appellant also averred in the plaint that upon death of his mother. Sujaram (his father) while leaning interest to his own younger brother (Baluram) & Family, started neglecting him & his wife inasmuch as his father by virtue of his mental weakness & corrupt character, had indulged in causing ancestral joint Hindu property for plundering, to which he objected and whereby his father got annoyed and under misguidance of younger brother, his father executed the impugned 'sale deed' in favour of Shankarram (son of Baluram who was brother of Sujaram his father) in respect of the suit property as described in para 5 of the plaint without any consideration and his knowledge besides consent, against which the suit for cancellation has been filed out of which this appeal has arisen. 2. In written statement, the facts stated in the plaint as to the relationship between the parties were admitted but the defendants denied to the formation of joint Hindu family between plaintiff, Sujaram & Tikuji, Tikuji is alleged to have died in 1940 and after his death, there was no joint Hindu family between plaintiff and his father (defendant No. 2) inasmuch as the plaintiff used to reside separately from his father for last 10-12 years with his family at his in-law's village Khakarki. The defendant asserted that only two years before, the plaintiff & his father in-law forcibly took possession of the house of Sujaram (defendant No. 2) in village Ladwa where he has been residing for last two years. Criminal cases between the plaintiff & his father are alleged to have been pending. The field and the suit property are claimed by the defendant No. 2 as self acquired because at the time his adoption, Tikuji being not only old but also weak & infirm was not in an ownership & cultivatory possession of agricultural land and accordingly, the plaintiff had no vested right over the suit property, inasmuch as the suit property being self acquired, the defendant No. 2 had every right to dispose off it through the impugned sale deed. On the, basis of the pleadings of both the parties, the trial Court framed following issues (translated by the appellant of memo of appeal) : 1. Whether the plaintiff is natural born son of the defendant No. 2-Mj0 and Suja went in adoption to Tiku, resident of Ladwa? 2. On the, basis of the pleadings of both the parties, the trial Court framed following issues (translated by the appellant of memo of appeal) : 1. Whether the plaintiff is natural born son of the defendant No. 2-Mj0 and Suja went in adoption to Tiku, resident of Ladwa? 2. Whether there is joint Hindu family of the plaintiff and Sujaram Tiku and they all which coparceners? 3. Whether fields described in Para 2 of the plaint are joint property of joint Hindu family from the time of late Tiku? 4. Whether the defendant No. 2 by getting annoyed, under the misleading of his younger brother and his wife and defendant No. 1 executed 1 sale deed dated 17.5.1980 illegally without consideration, wrong and without rights in favour of the defendant No. 1 regarding the disputed property, which is illegal, null and void ab initio and is liable to be cancelled as ineffective against the plaintiff? 5. Whether plaintiff's consent was necessary to be taken before the above sale deed by defendant No. 2 ? 6. Whether above sale deed is ineffective against the plaintiff on the basis of reasons mentioned in para 7 of the plaint? 7. Whether the plaintiff alone is in possession and cultivation over the disputed field, bara and well for last 15 years till today, if yes, then what is its effect on the sale? 8. Whether disputed property was self acquired property of defendant No. 2 and he had full right to sell his property? 9. Relief? 3. In support of his case, plaintiff examined himself as F VV 1, and Hari 5ingn (PW 2), Bhanwardas (PW 4) and Ramkaran (PW 5) whereas the defendant appeared as DW 1 and has produced Jairam (DW 2), Ramuram (DW 3), Shankarlal (DW 4) and Banshilal (DW 5). After hearing both the parties, and considering the evidence on record-the learned trial Court under its judgment dismissed the plaintiff's suit deciding issue No. 1 in favour and other issues Nos. 2 to 9 against the plaintiff. Against which, the plaintiff preferred first appeal which too was dismissed by the first appellate Court. Hence, this second appeal. Mr. G.R. Punia entered a caveat on behalf of the sole respondent. Accordingly, the appeal was heard finally at admission stage. 4. 2 to 9 against the plaintiff. Against which, the plaintiff preferred first appeal which too was dismissed by the first appellate Court. Hence, this second appeal. Mr. G.R. Punia entered a caveat on behalf of the sole respondent. Accordingly, the appeal was heard finally at admission stage. 4. Shri R.K. Soni, learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant contended that both the Courts below have erred in law in not accepting the agreement dated 31.12.1936 executed before the birth of a party producing it, which was entered into between his grand father & other co-sharers whereas such an agreement more than 50 years old was/is admissible in evidence under Chapter V of the Indian Evidence Act without leading any oral evidence to prove it by a party from whose custody it has been produced. Shri Soni further contended that both the Courts below committed an error of law in totally ignoring aforesaid agreement merely on the ground that it was not exhibited not tendered in evidence notwithstanding it was allowed to be taken on record u/ Order 13, Rule 2 CPC. Shri Soni then contended that coparcenary was constituted by virtue of aforesaid settlement by a father & son (Tikuji & Sujmam) and even hereafter diminishing on the death of Tikuji (father) would continue to remain coparcenary of sole surviving son Sujaram and further resulted in increasing with birth of male child like plaintiff to Sujaram (sole surviving son member to the coparcenary) and thereby the plaintiff would have all rights, title & interest in the ancestral property as a coparcener. 5. Shri Soni contended that without any issue having been framed as to when the plaintiff was born either before or after death Tiku Ji, for which the parties did not lead any evidence, the learned first appellate Court ought not to have recorded finding that the plaintiff was born after the death of his grand father Tikuji, and that apart merely because the plaintiff was not born during life time of his grand father Tikuji hence he did not constitute any coparcenary in the joint property of Tikuji. According to Shri Soni no person on the earth can say that he was born on such and such date to such and such lady and man. According to Shri Soni no person on the earth can say that he was born on such and such date to such and such lady and man. These facts can be derived from information furnished by his parents or others and therefore, such information furnished by parents of a child are relevant facts being admissible under section 32(5) of the Indian Evidence Act in the absence of parents. 6. Shri Soni also contended that the property of a joint Hindu family is presumed to be jointed in law and in the instant case since heavy burden was on the defendant to prove on having been asserted in written statement that the suit property was self acquired property of Sujaram and not the ancestral of joint Hindu family property originally belonging to Tiku ji. 7. On the other hand Shri G.R. Punia learned counsel appearing for caveator Shankar (defendant) contended that fate of the suit hinged on issue Nos. 2, 3 & 8 which were framed entirely on the basis of pleadings as averred by the plaintiff in the plaint but also by the defendants in their written statement claiming their' respective, and while deciding these issues both the Courts below have concurrently concluded (1) that the plaintiff had failed to establish that he was born during life time of his grand father Tikuji; and further failed to establish the basis of his personal knowledge about his age and possession over the suit land; (2) that the 'Bahi' of "Rao' placed by the plaintiff is a loose leaf not stitched with other pages of Bahi inasmuch as it is yellow in colour whereas other stitched leaf of Bahi has been in white colour thereby this evidence of document was held by both the Courts below concurrently as forged having been engineered with a view to create an evidence, (3) that there has been no proof that the suit land had ever been remained in ownership of Tikuji, rather it stood proved on record that the suit and was self 'u acquired property- of Sujaram who had every right to sell out such self acquired I property. In this view of concurrent findings of two Courts below, especially whgn. no substantial questions of law are involved this Court has got restricted jurisdiction to interfere with concurrent conclusions by invoking Section 100 CPC. 8. In this view of concurrent findings of two Courts below, especially whgn. no substantial questions of law are involved this Court has got restricted jurisdiction to interfere with concurrent conclusions by invoking Section 100 CPC. 8. Though various questions have been raised during the course of arguments at the admission stage but in my considered view all are not material bearing.on the decision of the case, and in other words, except following none are substantial. It is trite law that a point of law though admits of no two opinions and may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be 'substantial' a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case if answered either way in so far as the eights of the parties before it are concerned. And to be a question of law 'involving in the case' there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by the Courts of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. My view is fortified by principles of law laid down in Santosh Hazari v. Purushottanm Tiwari, 2001 (2) JT (SC) 407. Therefore, in my view this appeal deserves to be disposed of on the following questions of law which I feel to be substantial and formulate as per requirement under section 100 CPC. 1. Whether the Courts below were right without any specific issue as to the birth in holding that the plaintiff was not born during lifetime of his grand father Tikuji thereby he did not constitute any coparcenary in the joint Hindu family of Tikuji? 2. Whether on the pleadings and the material on record the Courts below were right in holding the suit land not joint Hindu Family Property of late Tikuji but self acquired property of Sujaram (defendant) and the suit filed by the plaintiff was liable to be dismissed? 9. Now I may advert first to have a look at the decision cited at the bar. 9. Now I may advert first to have a look at the decision cited at the bar. As expounded in Bhagwan Dayal v. Reoti Devi, AIR 1962 SC 287 , every Hindu family is presumed to be joint unless the contrary is proved but this presumption can be rebutted by direct evidence or by course of conduct. If a joint Hindu family separates, the family or any members of it may agree to reunite as a joint Hindu Family but such a reuniting is for obvious reasons which would apply in many cases under the law of the Mitakshara of every rare occurrence, and when it happens it must be strictly proved as any other disputed fact is proved. As the burden is heavy on a party asserting reunion, ambiguous pieces of conduct equally`consistent with a reunion. 10. Similarly coparcenary is a creature of Hindu Law and cannot be created by agreement of parties except in the case of reunion. Further if a property was jointly acquired by the member of that family it would not be governed by the law of joint family; for Hindu law does not recognise some of the members of a joint family belonging to different branches, or even to a single branch, as a corporate unit. Therefore the rights inter se between the members who have acquired the said property would be subject to the terms of the agreement where under it was acquired, because the acquisitions made by the members of different branches -jointly cannot be impressed with the incidents of joint family property and they can only be co-sharers or co-tenants with the result that their properties pass by inheritance and not by survivorship. 11. In Raghavamma v. Chenchamma, AIR 1964 SC 136 , it has been held by the Apex Court that there is an essential distinction between burden of proof and onus of proof; burden of proof lies upon the person who has to prove a fact and it never shifts but the onus of proof shifts; and such a shifting of onus is a continuous process in'"the evaluation of evidence. The Apex Court had also held that a Hindu family is presumed to be joint unless the contrary is proved but where it is admitted that one of the coparceners did separate himself from the other members of-the joint family 4 , and had his share in the joint property partitioned off for him, there is no presumption that the rest of the coparceners continued to be joint. The Apex Court also held that it would be a question of fact to be determined in each case upon the evidence relating to the intention of the parties whether there was a separation amongst the other coparceners or that they remained united, and the burden is certainly on the person who sets up partition to prove the said fact. 12. In Guranmma v. Mallappa, AIR 1964 SC 510 the Apex Court held that a coparceners, whether he is natural born or adopted into the family, acquires an interests by birth or adoption, as the case may be, in the ancestral property of the family. It was a case where the alienations were made by the father at a time when the 4th plaintiff was in the womb i.e. at a time when the father had only a limited right of disposal over the joint family property. 13. In M. Shanmugha Udayar v. Shivanandam, AIR 1994 Madras 123 while dealing suit for partition of Joint family property the High Court held that Manager of family claiming certain item as his separate property then onus lies on him to prove it and in absence of positive proof it cannot be considered to have been purchased from his separate income. 14. In Wealth Tax Commissioner Kanpur v. Chander Sen, AIR 1986 SC 1753 , the Apex Court observed that under the Hindu Law the son would inherit the property of his father as Karta of his own family but the Hindu Succession Act has modified the rule of succession. The Act lays down the general rule of succession in the case of males. The first rule is that the property of a male Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to the provisions of Chapter II and Class I of the Schedule provides that if there is a male heir of Class I then upon the heirs mentioned in Class I of the Schedule. The first rule is that the property of a male Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to the provisions of Chapter II and Class I of the Schedule provides that if there is a male heir of Class I then upon the heirs mentioned in Class I of the Schedule. The Apex Court after bearing in mind the preamble to the Hindu Succession Act, held that the property which devolved on a Hindu under section 8 .of the Hindu Succession Act would be HUF in his hand vis-a-vis his own son; that would amount to creating two classes among the heirs mentioned in Class I, the male heirs in whose hands it will be joint Hindu Family property and vis-a-vis son and female heirs with respect to whom no such concept would be applied or contemplated, and heirs in Class I of Schedule under section 8 of the Act included widow, mother, daughter of predeceased son etc. According to the Apex Court, the express words of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act cannot be ignored and must prevail and with that background the express language which excludes son's son but included son of a I predeceased so cannot be ignored. It was a case where there was a partition of joint family business between father and his only son and therefore they continued the business in the name of partnership firm. The son formed a joint family with his own sons. The father died and amount standing to the credit of the deceased in the account of the firm devolved on his son. The Wealth Tax authorities while assessing the wealth tax in respect of the family of the son i.e. the assessee included the amount in computing wealth. The Apex Court held that the son inherited the property as an individual and not as karta of his own family and therefore, it could not be included in computing the assessee's wealth. 15. In Madan Singh v. State, AIR 1954 Raj. 38 this Court observed that there is nothing in the language of Section 32 of the Evidence Act which would bar a .statement on the ground of hearsay if the statement is otherwise admissible under the provisions of that section. 16. In Mohd. 15. In Madan Singh v. State, AIR 1954 Raj. 38 this Court observed that there is nothing in the language of Section 32 of the Evidence Act which would bar a .statement on the ground of hearsay if the statement is otherwise admissible under the provisions of that section. 16. In Mohd. Zaki v. Lekhraj, 1987 (2) RLR 159 while considering probative value of a document more than 30 years old coming from custody of Court, this Court held that it certainly inspires confidence and, however, it is a different thing whether merely on such document a conclusion of tenancy can be arrived at, as for that purpose evidence has to be seen in its entirety and one document cannot be conclusive. 17. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival contentions so also perused the record alongwith impugned judgments of Courts below, in my considered view, once the plaintiff has sought cancellation of the sale of the suit land executed by Sujaram (defendant & father of plaintiff) in favour of other defendant-Shankar (sole respondent herein), claiming the suit land as property of joint Hindu family whereas the defendant-Sujaram claimed in his written statement as property being self acquired by him, then in this view of pleadings on record,issue& Nos. 2 & 3 were rightly framed covering the factum of age of the plaintiff without framing specific issue to that effect, because admittedly it was not the plaintiff's case in the plaint that he was born during lifetime of his grand father Tikuji to whom his father (Sujaram) has gone in adoption, whereas he had claimed coparcenary on the basis of a settlement alleged to have been executed on 31.12.1936 (Budi 3 Samwat year 1993) whereby Tikuji grand father & his co-sharer Bhagu son of Bhagwan had partitioned their joint property. It is plaintiff's case that thereafter he became a co-parcenar by virtue of his birth in the family of Sujaram (who though was maternal grandson to Tikuji but was adopted as son by Tikuji) to the property of Tikuji who had as alleged in the settlement executed on 31.12.1936, partitioned from his joint property of Hindu family. It is plaintiff's case that thereafter he became a co-parcenar by virtue of his birth in the family of Sujaram (who though was maternal grandson to Tikuji but was adopted as son by Tikuji) to the property of Tikuji who had as alleged in the settlement executed on 31.12.1936, partitioned from his joint property of Hindu family. It is further plaintiff's case that after the death of Tikuji (who had adopted Sujaram (his father) when he (Pema) was two years' old child, his father Sujaram (defendant) created coparcenary alongwith him in joint Hindu family in the property of Tikuji. Thus viewed from these pleadings of the plaintiff averred in his plaint, the burden of proof in the present case undoubtedly lies upon the plaintiff to establish the factum of (1) joint Hindu family of Tikuji with his son Sujaram after his partition with his co-sharer Bhagu under the said settlement dated 31.12.1936, (2) creature of coparcenary right during lifetime of Tikuji in his property, (3) after death of Tikuji creature of his coparcenary right alongwith formation of jointing Hindu family of Sujaram, and (4) his birth creating coparcenary right in the joint family of Tikuji and after his death, in the family of his son Sujaram. That being so, to decide these circumstances, issue Nos. quoted above were rightly framed by the trial Court without framing of specific issue as to the factum of birth of plaintiff either during lifetime or after death of Tikuji because it is settled law that a person like the plaintiff who seeks to displace natural succession to property by alleging coparcenary right in the family of Tikuji whose son is his father Sujaram must discharge the burden that lies upon him by proof of )the factum of his birth creating coparcenary right of joint Hindu family of Tikuji during his jifetime. The burden of proof has rightly been placed on the plaintiff. Coparcenary right-is alleged to have created on the birth of plaintiff. Therefore, the burden lies upon him by proof of the factum of his birth creating coparcenary right in joint family of Tikuji and Sujaram (father and son respectively), because a coparceners acquires an interest by birth or adoption as the case may be in the ancestral property of the family. Therefore, the burden lies upon him by proof of the factum of his birth creating coparcenary right in joint family of Tikuji and Sujaram (father and son respectively), because a coparceners acquires an interest by birth or adoption as the case may be in the ancestral property of the family. Similarly it was plaintiff's case that suit land was - joint Hindu family and ancestral property of his grand father Tikuji who acquired the property by virtue of his partition with Bhagu under settlement dated 30.12.1936. For such assertion made in the plaint, issue Nos. (supra) was rightly framed and the burden of proof was rightly placed on the plaintiff as it lies upon him by proof of the factum of the suit land being ancestral property of Tikuji. Thus the burden would undoubtedly lie on the party who asserts the existence of a particular state of things on the basis of which he claims relief. 18. It must be borne in mind that whether there is Hindu Joint Family or not, whether there is a partition in a Hindu joint family is, therefore, a question of fact; notwithstanding the fact that one or more of the members of the joint family were separated from the rest, the plaintiff who seeks to get a specific extent of land on the ground that it fell to the share of the testator, has to prove that the said extent of land fell to his share as coparcaner of the joint family. It is trite law and explicitly clear that under the Hindu Law, the moment a son is born, he gets a share in the father's property and becomes part of the coparcenary. His right accrues to him not on the death of the father or inheritance from the father but with the very fact of his birth. Since in the present case the plaintiff claims coparcenary as coparcener in the joint Hindu family of his grandfather and father (Tikuji and Suja), therefore, it was necessary for him to prove that he was born during lifetime of his grand father (Tikuji) and became part of joint Hindu family of his grand father and father creating his right of coparcenary by virtue of his birth. However, after analysing and proper appreciation of the plaintiff's evidence on record, both the Courts below have concurrently arrived at the conclusion that the plaintiff failed to prove that he was born during lifetime of his grand father Tikuji thereby he did not constitute any coparcenary to joint Hindu Family of his grand father Tikuji and his father Sujaram' (defendant). During analysis of the plaintiff's evidence the Courts below have considered that though the plaintiff has merely stated that he was two years' old when Tikuji had died, whereas the has specifically stated not only in written statement but during trial that Tikuji died in Samwat Year 1997. In this view of the evidence the Courts below found that since the plaintiff stated-his age 48 years in the year 1996 equivalent to Samwat year 2054 when his statement was recorded, then according to the death year of Tikuji as stated by the defendant in the their pleadings and evidence, i.e. Samwat year 1997, the plaintiff cannot held to have born during lifetime of Tikuji but he can be said to have born in the Samwat year 2006 During cross-examination the plaintiff admitted that he did not know and remember the year of death of Tikuji and further he did not know as to after how many years of adoption of his father Sujaram by his grandfather Sujaram in written statement specifically stated that his father Tikuji had died in Samwat Year 1997, but the plaintiff failed to controvert the factum of death of Tikuji so as to prove his birth during lifetime of Tikuji. 19. Therefore in my considered opinion, the Courts below were right without any specific issue as to the birth in holding that the plaintiff had not born during life time of his grand father Tikuji and accordingly he did not constitute any coparcenary in the joint Hindu family of Tikuji. 20. As regards other question, it was plaintiff's case that the suit land bearing Khasra Nos. 239, 241, 372, 280, 245, 283, 276 & 273 were of his grand father Tikuji and after his death, of his father Sujaram (defendant). As per his case, he derived information and knowledge as to the factum of the suit land belonging to his grand father Tikuji, because it came to his notice from the 'Bahi' of Raoji that Tikuji was having ownership of the suit land. As per his case, he derived information and knowledge as to the factum of the suit land belonging to his grand father Tikuji, because it came to his notice from the 'Bahi' of Raoji that Tikuji was having ownership of the suit land. Thus his claim is based on hearsay evidence. The Bahi' of Raoji's son loose leaf has been produced as Ex. 4 - its genuineness and existence was held as doubtful after considering the fact on record that Ex. 4 was not only a loose leaf but also having no similarity in the papers/sheets stitched to the register which contained all papers in white colour whereas Ex. 4 loose leaf had no similarity to the paper being yellow in colour also. Moreover, the contents of Ex. 4 are admitted by Babu Singh (PW 4) to have been written who has also admitted 'that.other papers to the 'Bahi' were in white colour whereas Ex. 4 is a detached paper of,the 'Bahi' having different paper being of yellow colour, inasmuch as the contents of Ex. 4 do not establish that the suit land was of Tikuji but it established merely that defendant No. 2 had gone in adoption to Tikuji. No other evidence has ever been adduced by the plaintiff to prove that the suit land had ever belonged to Tikuji, whereas according to the documents produced in evidence by the plaintiff as Ex. 2, 3, 5 & 6 which pertain to revenue record but on the contrary established that these documents belonged to the year 1952; that the possession was of Suja and it did not mention about Tikuji's ownership and possession; that according to these documents it pertained to settlement of 'Lagaan' (rent) for the period from Samvat 2008 to.2027. 2, 3, 5 & 6 which pertain to revenue record but on the contrary established that these documents belonged to the year 1952; that the possession was of Suja and it did not mention about Tikuji's ownership and possession; that according to these documents it pertained to settlement of 'Lagaan' (rent) for the period from Samvat 2008 to.2027. Further in the evidence the plaintiff admitted that the suit land of agricultural fields was situated in village Laadva and at the time of death of Tikuji this village Laadva was under the Jagirs and according to the Jagir law prevalent at that time, all lands vested in the Jagirs and without permission of the Jagirdars none could have cultivated the fields, and even otherwise though there has been no evidence on record to prove that the suit lands were in possession of Tikuji during the Jagirs, but as per conclusions of the Courts below, it could reasonable be presumed that upon abolition of the Jagirs and enforcement of the Resumption of Jagir Act, during settlement the khatedari rights were assigned and vested in those persons who were in cultivatory possession over the respective agricultural lands. Since as is admitted on record, upon abolition of the Jagirs, the possession was of Suja over the agricultural lands thereby khatedari rights thereof vested in him. Similarly the plaintiff has also failed to produce any document of earlier years to prove the factum of the suit land of Tikuji prior to even abolition of the Jagirs, had Tikuji been having any vested right or title over the suit land. 21. In my considered view the Courts below have rightly come to the conclusion that the plaintiff has utterly failed to prove that:- (1) the suit land was ever owntd or possessed having right of title by Tikuji; (2) Suja had acquired the suit land upon development from either his father Tikuji or grand father; and (3) the suit land cpn. never be proved to be joint Hindu family, inasmuch as earlier discussed and held, once it stands proved that during lifetime of Tikuji the plaintiff had never born then also the plaintiff has got no vested right of coparcenary in the case Suja had devolved the heritance for the property from Tikuji. never be proved to be joint Hindu family, inasmuch as earlier discussed and held, once it stands proved that during lifetime of Tikuji the plaintiff had never born then also the plaintiff has got no vested right of coparcenary in the case Suja had devolved the heritance for the property from Tikuji. Moreover, the defendant's witness Jairam (DW 2) admitted that Tikuji died in Samvat 1997 when there was Jagirdari of Susainji Maharaj and during the Jagirs none of the cultivator has any patta or right and title over the agricultural fields. Thus after having concurrently concluded the Courts below decided issue Nos. 2, 3 & 8 against the plaintiff holding that the suit land was self acquired property of Sujaram (defendant No. 2) who had every right to sell out his self acquired property and further holding that there was no proof laid by the plaintiff in his evidence that the suit land was ever joint Hindu Family of Tikuji and after death of Tikuji it inherited to Sujaram creating any coparcenary right in favour of the plaintiff inasmuch as the plaintiff did not constitute any copareenary right in the joint Hindu family of Tikuji or after his death, in the property of Sujaram obviously because the plaintiff has completely failed to establish that he had born during the life time of Tikuji creating coparcenary right in the joint family of Tikuji. 22. Be that as it may, in my considered view, whether a finding of fact reached by Courts below is against the weight of evidence or not is a question which will remain in the realm of appreciation of evidence and does not project any question of law, matchless, any substantial question of law which can enable this Court in second appeal to upset such a finding of fact. 23. That apart, whatever the findings arrived at by two Courts below in the present case are of facts rested on the evidence on record. Finding of fact is not open to challenge in second appeal inasmuch as sufficiency or adequacy of evidence to support a finding of fact is not a ground for interference [See : Bhanwaru v. Jeevani, 1991 (1) RLW 105]. Finding of fact is not open to challenge in second appeal inasmuch as sufficiency or adequacy of evidence to support a finding of fact is not a ground for interference [See : Bhanwaru v. Jeevani, 1991 (1) RLW 105]. Similarly interference with the concurrent findings of the Courts below by this Court under section 100 CPC should be avoided unless warranted by compelling reasons, because in any case, this Court is not expected to reappreciate the evidence just to replace the findings of the lower Courts, even assuming that another view is possible on a reappreciation of the same evidence, which cannot be done by this Court as it cannot be said that the view taken by the first appellate Court was based on no material. [See : Navanethmma v. Arjuna Chetty, (1996) 6 SCC 166 ]. By way of this second appeal the learned counsel for the appellant has raised questions disputing finding of fact laying much emphasis to reappreciate the entire evidence taking another possible view than arrived at by Courts below. Since the second appeal findings of fact howsoever may be disputed or question with a view to reappreciate evidence so as to arrive at a different possible view than taken by the Courts below, do not involve substantial question of law. [See : D.B. Shemade v. Maroti Bhaurao, 1999 DNJ (SC) 131]. 24. The findings of fact recorded by the two Courts below are based on proper appreciation of evidence and the material on record. On the pleadings and material on record the Courts below were right in holding the suit land not joint Hindu Family property of Late Tikuji but self acquired property of Sujaram,(defendant) and the suit filed by the plaintiff was liable to be dismissed. There was no perversity,, illegality or irregularity in those findings. Hence, I do not find any justification for taking a contrary view of the matter so as to call for any interference with concurrent findings of fact. The findings, therefore, do not require to be upset in a second appeal under section 100 CPC. Further the questions of law so raised by the learned counsel for the appellant in memo of second appeal do not fall within the ambit and scope under section 100(1) CPC and therefore, I am satisfied that the case does not involve any substantial question of law. 25. Further the questions of law so raised by the learned counsel for the appellant in memo of second appeal do not fall within the ambit and scope under section 100(1) CPC and therefore, I am satisfied that the case does not involve any substantial question of law. 25. As a result of the above discussion, this second appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs. Interim stay order dated 22.11.2000 stands vacated. Relevant records Jot Courts below be sent back forthwith.Second appeal dismissed. *******