Judgment :- The Order of the Court is as follows :- The Revision Petitioners are the accused. This Criminal Revision Petition is directed against the order, dated 21-10-1999 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Chengalpattu in C.A. No. 135 of 1995. 2.The accused stood charged for an offence under Section 135(1)(a)(ii) of the Customs Act, 1962. 3.The facts, which are necessary to dispose of this revision case are :- On 14-12-1986, as per the instructions of the Assistant Collector of Customs, P.W. 1, Benjamin Walter reached Air Cargo Complex movement area by 03.45 A.M. and he had seen three persons (A.1 to 3) entering into the movement office and A.2 and A.3 were loading three suitcases in a taxi bearing No. TSC 3390 standing outside the movement office and A.1 was watching the same. P.W. 1 along with his party intercepted the persons along with their suitcases and the same were seized in the presence of Rajamani, P.W. 2 and when the suitcases were opened, they found that each suitcase contained synthetic diamonds in eight packets and the total weight of the synthetic diamonds was 106 kgs, and the same were seized under a mahazar. On enquiry, it was revealed that A.1 was working as a store keeper in Indian Airlines, A. 2 is a Loader and A. 3 is a canteen supplier. When the accused were interrogated, they have given statements voluntarily confessing that those suitcases M.Os. 1 to 3 were transit package scheduled to go to Bangalore and they were substituted by another set of packages, which were marked as M.Os. 4 to 6, giving the same air cargo bill number. P.W. 2 also corroborates the seizure and about the contents in the packages seized from A. 1 to A. 3 and the accused have not given any explanation for the possession of those cargo nor they have produced any valid document for possession of the same. P.W. 8, Balaji Srinivasan searched the residence of P.W. 1 at Nanganallur and seized incriminating documents related to the cargo seized from A. 1 to A. 3. 4.lacing reliance upon the evidence of P.Ws 1 to 9 and also M.Os. 1 to 3, recovered from the accused and the confessional statements given by the accused, the Trial Court found them guilty and convicted and sentenced to undergo R.I., for one year and also to pay a fine of Rs. 4.lacing reliance upon the evidence of P.Ws 1 to 9 and also M.Os. 1 to 3, recovered from the accused and the confessional statements given by the accused, the Trial Court found them guilty and convicted and sentenced to undergo R.I., for one year and also to pay a fine of Rs. 1, 000/-, in default to undergo S.I., for six months. But, however, the Trial Court has found injuries in the body of the accused, when they were produced before the Court and has recorded the injuries, which are as follows : "A. 1 to 4 produced and examined in Tamil. A.4 has no complaint of ill treatment. A.1 to 3 alleged, that they were beaten with hands and ruler sticks by about 15 officials of Customs Department. A.1, A.2 have visible marks of violence on them, but not A. 3, who is dark in colour than A.1, A.2, A.1 to A.4 remanded to custody till 29-12-1986." 5.On appeal before the Additional Sessions Judge, Chengalpattu in C.A. No. 135 of 1995, the learned Judge has retained the conviction as well as the sentence. But, however, he has observed that the confessional statements said to have been given by the accused were not voluntary confession and the same were extracted under coercion, and that therefore, they cannot be relied upon. 6.The petitioners have contended that the alleged confessional statement was not voluntary and the same was obtained by duress and also relied upon the case S.K. Modi v. State of Maharashtra - to sustain their contentions, wherein the Supreme Court held :- "that accused No. 15 received his injuries at the hands of the Customs staff; and there being no explanation on the part of the prosecution as to the situation in which he was beaten, it is reasonable to presume that the stand taken by him is correct and that the injuries were inflicted on him as a measure of coercion adopted to secure his confession and further held that taking note of these circumstances would consider it extremely unsafe to regard the confession Ex. Z 383 signed by the appellant as having been made by him voluntarily and therefore trustworthy, the appellant, in our opinion has shown the existence of circumstances which make it appear to the Court that the confession may well have been obtained in a manner which would bring it within the ambit of Section 24 of the Evidence Act." 7.The lower appellate Court, on the basis of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, referred to above came to the conclusion that in the absence of any explanation not having been offered by the respondent for the injuries found on A.1 to 3, when they were in their custody, the confessional statements obtained during the said period were not safe for the court to rely upon the so called confessional statements given by the accused. The petitioners are trying to take advantage of the above said observations of the lower appellate Court and tried to justify that in the absence of any confessional statement, the conviction accorded by the Trial Court, affirmed by the appellate court is not proper. 8.It is the contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioners that the person who gave the complaint was not examined; (2) there is no independent witness to support the case of the prosecution. 9.The first contention of the petitioners is that the person who lodged the complaint has not been examined is not correct. P.W. 1 is the person, on whose complaint, the case was registered and he was examined and that therefore, there is no substance in the said contention of the petitioner. 10.With regard to the other contention of the petitioners that there is no independent witness to support the case of the prosecution is concerned, it would pale into insignificance, if we look in the background of the case. The occurrence had taken place at 3.45 a.m. in the early hours and we cannot expect the independent persons to be present at the spot to have their assistance. Nothing has been said with regard to the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 and not even a motive has been suggested and in the absence of the same, the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 are more than sufficient to warrant a conviction. Nothing has been said with regard to the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 and not even a motive has been suggested and in the absence of the same, the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 are more than sufficient to warrant a conviction. 11.To support his contentions, learned Advocate for petitioners relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Anil Phukan v. State of Assam - 1994 (1) L.W. 13 wherein the Apex Court has held : "So long as the single eyewitness is a wholly reliable witness the Courts have no difficulty in basing conviction on his testimony alone. However, where the single eyewitness is not found to be a wholly reliable witness, in the sense that there are some circumstances which may show that he could have an interest in the prosecution, then the Courts generally insist upon some independent corroboration of his testimony, in material particulars, before recording conviction. It is only when the Courts find that the single eye witness is a wholly unreliable witness that his testimony is discarded in toto and no amount of corroboration can cure that defect." This decision is squarely against the contention of the petitioner and the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 are left unchallenged in all respects and therefore, the contention of the petitioners is rejected. 12.Learned Advocate for the petitioners also relied upon few more judgments with regard to this aspect and the facts in the said cases are different from the facts in the this case. 13.On the other hand, the learned Advocate for the respondent has submitted that the conviction is not purely based upon the confession made by the accused, but based on the other materials and the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 and argued in support of the conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court and affirmed by the Lower Appellate Court. 14.Learned Advocate for the respondent has pointed out that the Lower Appellate Court is completely satisfied with the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 which corroborates each other and the evidence is also cogent, convincing and acceptable and therefore, the order passed by the Lower Appellate Court is vitiated as contended by the petitioners. 14.Learned Advocate for the respondent has pointed out that the Lower Appellate Court is completely satisfied with the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 which corroborates each other and the evidence is also cogent, convincing and acceptable and therefore, the order passed by the Lower Appellate Court is vitiated as contended by the petitioners. 15.We are conscious of the fact that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is to be exercised only in exceptional cases when there is clear defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error of point of law and consequently, there has been miscarriage of justice. The High Court is not expected to act as the Court of appeal in deciding the revisional cases. 16.It has been repeatedly pointed out and held by this Court and also by the Apex Court that the revisional jurisdiction of this Court is that of a supervisory jurisdiction and the same cannot be equated with the appellate jurisdiction. The Apex Court in the case of State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri - held that : "In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But, the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an Appellate Court nor can it be treated even as second appellate jurisidiction. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But, the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an Appellate Court nor can it be treated even as second appellate jurisidiction. Ordinarily therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice." 17.On examining the impugned judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge with the above said background and the principles laid down by the Apex Court, it is manifestly clear that the Courts below have concurrently come to the conclusion that the evidence placed before the Court, are sufficient to come to the conclusion that the accused have committed the offence and I do not find any error or illegality, in the said finding which warrants any interference by this Court. 18.In the result, the Criminal Revision Petition is dismissed.