JUDGMENT : - Samaresh Banerjea, J.: The present appeal has been preferred by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Traffic and Railways, Superintendent of Police, Government Railway Police and State of West Bengal, against the judgment and order dated 24th June, 1992, passed by K.M. Yusuf, J. (as his Lordship then was) in C.R. 5519 (W) of 1977 whereby the learned Judge has allowed the writ application and set aside the final order of dismissal, and the petitioner has been directed to be re-instated in service. 2. The petitioner was a constable in the Government Railway Police, A disciplinary proceedings was initiated against the petitioner on the following charges ;- 1. On 4.1.75 at about 19-40 his. you in uniform and with a lathi in hand though you were off duty at that time behaved in a rowdy manner and shouted calling people names under the influence of alcohol in a public place like the III/I class waiting hall of Howrah Railway Station and this invited bitter public criticism on the entire Police force. 2. On the same date and at the same time and place you dragged one Shyamal Roy S/O Lt. Sudhir Roy of 69, Bartala Chakpara, Liluah, Howrah, by the collars of his wearing shirt and attempted to assault him without any provocation and for no fault of that person. 3. On the same date and at the same time and place you demanded illegal gratification from one Shyamal Roy, S/O Lt. Sudhir Roy of Bartala, Chakpara, Liluah, Howrah, whom you wrongfully confined for setting him at liberty. 4. On the same date and at the same time and place you being detected by P.W.(i) and other members of the police force while committing the misdeeds mentioned in charges 1 to 3 above, were sent to Howrah General Hospital for medical examination at 8 P.M. and where you are admitted for suspected alcohol poisoning. But you had to be discharged from hospital at 9.10 P.M. on the same date by the D.M.O. Howrad, with advice to keep you in people lock up under the police custody as you were shouting in the ward and rebuking all female sisters and staff, refused to lie down in the bed and prevented by force introduction of stomach tube. You are hereby directed to report in writing within 7 days from the date of receipt of this charges if you plead guilty to the charges or desire an enquiry to be held as also if you want to be heard in person. 3. The Enquiry Officer submitted report finding the petitioner guilty of misconduct. 4. Thereafter, a second show cause notice was issued proposing an order of dismissal to which the petitioner submitted his reply. Thereafter, by the final order passed in the said disciplinary proceedings dated October 21,1975, the Superintendent of Police, Government Railway Police, Howrah, dismissed the petitioner from service. 5. The petitioner, thereafter preferred a departmental appeal against the aforesaid final order. The said appeal was also rejected. Thereafter, the writ application was moved by the writ petitioner challenging the final order. It may be recorded that although the petitioner made his grievance contending that the appellate order was never served upon him, but the result of the appeal was merely intimated to him, he did not, in the writ application challenge the aforesaid order. 6. After considering the respective submission of the parties and the materials on record, we are of the view that the order of the trial Court cannot be sustained. Although it is well settled because of series of decisions of the Apex Court that a writ court cannot sit in appeal over the finding of the disciplinary enquiry nor it can substitute its own finding for that of the Enquiry Officer, it appears to us, that is exactly what has been done by the trial Court. 7. It appears to us that the trial Court like the court of appeal has examined the evidence on record and has come to a finding that on such evidence the charges could not have been held to be proved. 8. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner/respondent has submitted that the writ Court has power to interfere with the finding of the Enquiry Officer in a disciplinary proceedings if such finding is perverse. There is no dispute to such proposition of law, but in the instant case we do not find that the trial court interfered with the finding of the Enquiry Officer on such perversity but it actually re-appraised the evidence on record and came to its own finding which wholly is impermissible. There is no dispute to such proposition of law, but in the instant case we do not find that the trial court interfered with the finding of the Enquiry Officer on such perversity but it actually re-appraised the evidence on record and came to its own finding which wholly is impermissible. It has also been held by the trial court after re-appraising such evidence that on the basis of such evidence the charges against the petitioner was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. 9. The learned Judge overlooked that in a disciplinary enquiry it is not necessary for the disciplinary authority to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt like criminal trial but the delinquent can be held to be guilty of the charges on the basis of available evidence on preponderance of probability. 10. Learned Judge was of the view that the fact that delinquent took alcohol was not proved as the same has not been proved by medical test, completely overlooking the evidence of doctors including D.M.O that he was smelling alcohol and although he was asked to, lie down on the bed so that his stomach could be washed out of alcohol, the delinquent refused to do so, and he behaved in a disorderly manner in the hospital. Learned Judge has also held that delinquent admittedly was not on duty at the relevant point of time and taking of alcohol is not an offence. One of the charges against the petitioner was that the delinquent although was not on duty was wearing uniform and in a state of intoxication in public place asked for illegal gratification from a vegetable seller and he was forcefully dragging him because of his refusal to pay such amount and thereby in uniform he was behaving in a dis-orderly manner in a public place which resulted in public criticism of the behavior of the police. 11. The learned Judge failed to consider that a member of the Police force under the provision of the Police Act, 1861, will also be deemed to be in duty, even if he may not be on duty, if he is in uniform and in a public place, being a member of the disciplined force he cannot behave in a manner unbecoming of a member of such disciplined force. 12. 12. It may be noted in this connection that the learned Judge also unnecessarily made a number of observations in the judgment which, in our view, were wholly uncalled for while deciding a case of such a nature. Be that as it may, it is not necessary for us to refer to such judgment any further in detail as we are of the view that the learned Judge went wrong in reappraising the evidence and seeking to act as an appellate authority on the finding of fact arrived at by the Enquiry Officer. 13. Learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner/respondent, however, tried to contend that such interference was called for as the finding of the Enquiry Officer was perverse. We are, however, unable to agree with such contention. We have gone through the report of the Enquiry Officer and we find that the Enquiry Officer has come to his finding as to the mis-conduct of the petitioner based on evidence and not on extraneous material. Much has been said by Mr. Verma, learned Counsel for the writ petitioner that although there is evidence that the delinquent took alcohol and was in public place, but there is no evidence that he was forcibly dragging the vegetable seller or he attempted to take illegal gratification from him. True that the two constables who deposed before the Enquiry Officer for the disciplinary authority did not depose to that effect. But it was the specific complaint of the vegetable seller was on the basis of which ultimately the disciplinary proceeding was started, and the vegetable seller who was a witness for the disciplinary authority dearly deposed that the petitioner asked for illegal gratification from him and on his refusal he was being forcibly dragged and that the petitioner was intoxicated, we, therefore, do not find any merit in the submission made on behalf of the writ petitioner that the finding of the Enquiry Officer is perverse and it is not based on any evidence. 14. We also do not agree with Mr. Verma that on that basis of available evidence, no reasonable man could have come to the conclusion as arrived at by the Enquiry Officer and therefore his finding was perverse. 14. We also do not agree with Mr. Verma that on that basis of available evidence, no reasonable man could have come to the conclusion as arrived at by the Enquiry Officer and therefore his finding was perverse. On the contrary, after going through the evidence it appears to us that finding arrived at by till' Enquiry Officer was quite reasonable and any reasonable man would have come to the same conclusion after going through such evidence. 15. We, however, find substance in the submission of Mr. Verma, appearing for the writ petitioner/respondent that the final order passed by the disciplinary authority is a non-speaking order as no reason therefore was recorded. It was certainly incumbent upon the disciplinary authority while passing final order to apply his own independent mind and come to his finding stating therein of what basis he has come to his conclusion, which the disciplinary authority has not done. We also find substance in the connection of Mr. Verma that while passing final order the disciplinary authority has not considered the points raised by the petitioner in his reply to the second show cause notice. 16. In his reply to the seconds how case notice, the petitioner after analysing the evidence on record tried to establish that on the basis of the evidence he cannot be held to be guilty of mis-conduct. For the aforesaid purpose he has analysed the evidence. He also made a grievance that all the points raised by him in his statement of defence were not considered by the Enquiry Officer. 17. In such view of the matter, it was incumbent upon the disciplinary authority to consider such representation and come to his own independent finding, which, however, the disciplinary authority has failed to do. He has merely stated that he has gone through the reply to the second show cause notice and he did not find any reasonable ground to change the provisional order. The same can hardly be said to be a speaking order. Such order also does not indicate at all that there was any application of mind by the disciplinary authority. 18. Such application of mind was indeed necessary because it was also sought to be contended by the petitioner that even if he is guilty of charges, the proposed punishment of dismissal will be dis-proportionate to the gravity of the charges and lesser punishment was warranted. 18. Such application of mind was indeed necessary because it was also sought to be contended by the petitioner that even if he is guilty of charges, the proposed punishment of dismissal will be dis-proportionate to the gravity of the charges and lesser punishment was warranted. Nothing has been discussed by the disciplinary authority. 19. Notwithstanding such fact we are not inclined to set aside the final order in view of the fact that admittedly the appeal was preferred by the delinquent against the same and it was subsequently 'reflected and therefore, final order passed in the disciplinary proceedings merged with the appellate order. Such appellate order unfortunately has not been challenged in the writ petition at all, perhaps because the copy of the order was not served upon the writ petitioner. 20. In course of hearing, we asked the learned counsel for the appellant to produce before us the appellate order as we thought it fit that instead of remanding the matter back to the trial court for considering the question, we may examine ourselves the said appellate order. On such examination it appears to us that the appellate order dated 27.1.77 passed by R.N. Bhattacharyya, Deputy Inspector General of Police, Traffic and Railways, West Bengal, has not been passed after proper application of mind. 21. It appears to us that one of the contentions of the petitioner viz. that he committed alleged mis-conduct under the influence of liquor which was administered to him by a medical practitioner which resulted in poisoning was never considered. The other contentions raised in the petition of appeal was also not considered by the appellate authority. 22. We find in the petition of appeal which is Annexure 'X' to the affidavit-in-reply, that after making analysis of evidence, the delinquent attempted to establish that the mis-conduct was not proved against him. 23. It was necessary for the appellate authority, therefore, not only to consider the contention raised by the writ petitioner but also to come to its independent finding after analysing the evidence which, however, he failed to do. In our view the same is even more necessary in the instant case as the final order passed by the disciplinary authority is not a speaking order. In our view the same is even more necessary in the instant case as the final order passed by the disciplinary authority is not a speaking order. In such view of the matter we are inclined to set aside the order of the appellate authority and remand the matter back to the appellate authority for consideration of the appeal afresh. 24. We, therefore, dispose of the appeal by passing the following order. The judgment and order of the trial court is hereby set aside. The appellate order dated 27.1.77 is hereby set aside. The appellate authority is directed to consider the appeal preferred by the writ petitioner against the final order of dismissal afresh in accordance with law. 25. It is, however, made clear that the appeal shall be disposed of within a period of two months from the date of communication of the order by passing a reasoned and speaking order. It is further made clear that the appellate authority while disposing of the appeal shall consider all the points raised in the petition of appeal and shall come to its own independent finding after analysing the evidence and shall give reasons if he does not accept the contention raised by the petitioner in the petition of appeal. 26. Learned counsel for the appellant is directed to file a xerox copy of the original appellate order which shall be kept with the record. 27. There will be no order as to costs. 28. As prayed for, let xerox certified copies of the order be handed over to the learned Advocates for the parties within a period of fortnight from the date of the application. Appeal disposed of with order.