Judgment : This appeal suit is directed against the judgment and decree dated 19.8.1986 rendered in O.S.No.487 of 1983 by the Court of Subordinate Judge, Madurai thereby dismissing the suit filed by the appellants herein against the respondents 1 to 8 praying to (a) confirm allotting the property described in ‘E’ schedule in the partition deed dated 6.9.1946 to the plaintiffs, (b) order partition and separate possession by metes and bounds of the properties described in schedules ‘D’ and ‘F’ of the partition deed dated 6.9.1946 into four shares and allot a portion of such share to the plaintiffs, (c) partition and separate possession by metes and bounds of the lands described in ‘B’ schedule of the plaint, (d) appoint a commission for the said purpose, (e) direct the defendants to pay the mesne profits and costs of the suit. 2. The plaint averments are that the properties mentioned in ‘A’ schedule are the houses bearing door No.80 in T.S.No.157/2 and door No.81 in T.S.No.157/1of East Marret Street inMadurai Town: that the properties mentioned in B schedule are the lands situate in Kodikkulam village: that the first plaintiff and defendants 1, 7 and 8 are the brothers: that the defendants 4 to 6 are the undivided sons of the 7th defendants: that defendants 2 and 3 are the alieniees of the 8th defendant: that the first plaintiff and his sons the second and third plaintiffs constitute a Hindu Joint Family and first plaintiff is the Manager of the said family. 3. The further averments of the plaint are that the properties shown in ‘A’ and ‘B’ schedules originally belonged to the joint family consisting of the first plaintiff, defendants 1, 7 and 8 and the late Lakshmana Iyer and their father Vasudeva Iyer and mother Kaveri Ammal: that Vasudeva Iyer effected partition of their properties under registered partition deed dated 6.9.1946 as per which ‘B’ schedule properties were allotted to the share of the first plaintiff. ‘F’ schedule properties were allotted to the parents with life estate and after their lifetime to be divided among their five sons viz., the first plaintiff and defendants 1, 7 and 8 and Lakshmana Iyer ‘D’ schedule properties were allotted to the share of Lakshmana Iyer. 4. ‘F’ schedule properties were allotted to the parents with life estate and after their lifetime to be divided among their five sons viz., the first plaintiff and defendants 1, 7 and 8 and Lakshmana Iyer ‘D’ schedule properties were allotted to the share of Lakshmana Iyer. 4. The further case of the plaintiffs is that as per the terms of the said partition deed, E schedule property was allotted to the first plaintiff, who has been in possession and enjoyment of the same effecting the payment of taxes: that Lakshmana Iyer died a Bachelor and intestate in the year 1947 and the father Vasudeva Iyer died in 1955 and the mother Kaveri Ammal also died in 1962: that after the death of parents, the plaintiffs alone continued to be in possession and enjoyment of the whole house including ‘D’ Schedule and ‘F’ schedule properties: that on the death of Lakshmana Iyer, the first plaintiff and defendants 1, 7 and 8 are each entitled to 1/4 share in ‘D’ schedule: that the first plaintiff, defendants 1, 7 and 8 and their father Vasudeva Iyer were carrying on business in textiles under the name and style of “L.S.Vasudeva Iyer and Sons” as a partnership concern till 1978: that defendants 1, 7 and 8 were residing in different houses since they were not given any portion in the suit properly in the partition. 5. 5. The further case of the plaintiffs as per the plaint averments is that during mid 1970, the defendants 1, 7 and 8 demanded their share in ‘D’ and ‘F’ schedule properties for which the first plaintiff agreed for the defendants 1, 7 and 8 respectively to reside in the Southern, Eastern and North-Eastern portions and that ‘D’ and ‘F’ schedules be divided by metes and bounds by separate document: that they started occupying those portions in the middle of 1970: that due to differences that arose among the ladyfolks in the family, they erected a wall North to South about the Deepavali time of 1971: that the contention of the defendants 1, 7 and 8 that they re-united mixed ‘D’, ‘E’ and ‘F’ schedule properties and divided them into four shares each taking such a divided share is false and untenable: that the alleged oral partition itself is false: that the first plaintiff never intended to part with any portion of ‘E’ schedule allotted to him in the partition to defendants 1, 7 and 8 which he keeps in his possession and enjoyment but when he demanded defendants 1, 7 and 8 to effect partition of ‘D’ and ‘F’ Schedule properties, they evaded and hence they have to be divided by metes and bounds between himself and the defendants 1, 7 and 8: that the 8th defendant appears to have brought into existence two sale deeds dated 6.2.1982 in favour of defendants 2 and 3 which is not supported by any consideration and hence illegal and untenable in law and are not binding on the plaintiffs: that the allegation that after the death of the parents there was an oral partition of the properties allotted to the first plaintiff and the shares of the parents and Lakshmana Iyer 16 years back is a deliberate falsehood: that the defendants 1, 7 and 8 are each entitled to an extent of 158.60 sq.ft. in D schedule and 195.27 sq.ft. in D schedule and 195.27 sq.ft. in ‘F’ schedule thus totalling 353.87 sq.ft and since 8th defendant has sold an extent of 964.85 sq.ft under the two sale deeds dated 6.2.1982 in favour of the second and third defendants, they are bound to return the excess extent: that even the attempt of defendants 1 and 4 to 6 to sell their shares has been stopped by paper publication alerting the public: that the 7th defendant contends that he had transferred his rights to defendants 4 to 6 on 19.2.1972 which is false and the same is not binding on the plaintiffs: that since it is learnt that the 7th defendant has created insolvency in I.P.No.14 of 1976 on the file of the Court of Subordinate Judge, Madurai, to avoid unnecessary objections, defendants Nos.4 to 6 are impleaded to the suit. With such allegations and further alleging that it is not possible for them to enjoy the properties in common with the defendants, the plaintiffs would ultimately pray to effect a clear partition by metes and bounds and allot the plaintiffs share in E schedule and F and D schedules as per the partition deed dated 9.6.1946. 6. In the written statement filed on behalf of defendants 1, 7 and 8, besides generally denying the allegations of the plaint to be false and incorrect, they would also specifically admit the relationship of the first plaintiff, defendants 1, 7 and 8 brothers but divided brothers by virtue of registered partition deed dated 6.9.1946: that the allegation that the defendants 4 to 6 are the undivided sons of 7th defendant is incorrect and false since they became divided even as early as on 26.1.1972 by means of an unregistered partition list. 7. These defendants would admit the registered partition deed dated 6.9.1946 executed between the father and Vasudeva Iyer and his sons regarding their family properties then available for partition allotting the ‘A’ schedule to the 7th defendant ‘B’ schedule to the 8th defendant, C schedule to the first defendant. D schedule to the late L.V. Lakshmana Iyer, ‘E’ schedule to the first plaintiff. D schedule to the late L.V. Lakshmana Iyer, ‘E’ schedule to the first plaintiff. ‘F’ schedule to their parents Vasudeva Iyer and his wife Kaveri Ammal: that further according to the registered partition deed, the building bearing door Nos.80 and 81 were allotted to late Lakshmana Iyer, the first plaintiff and the parents and they were divided into three shares allotting the Northern portion to the parents, middle portion to the first plaintiff and the Southern portion to late Lakshmana Iyer and since defendants 1, 7 and 8 were not given any share in these two houses, they were given cash, but the partnership business in textile continued under the name and style of “L.S. Vasudeva Iyer and Sons”: that after the said partition, defendants, 1, 7 and 8 had separate living and mess: that the first plaintiff was living along with his parents since being a minor: that during the lifetime of the father, the textile business was conducted by himself and his five sons but after his death, it continued as a partnership business among the remaining four sons till 2.5.1966: that subsequently the defendants No.7 and 8 retired from the partnership firm and later it was continued by the first plaintiff and the first defendant from 2.5.1966 to 1978 which met with loss and hence another firm called ‘M.S.M. Textiles’ was constituted in the means of the wives of the first plaintiff and the, first defendant and one Manickam Ammal, wife of Subramanian Chettiar from 4.9.1978 to 9.3.1983: that after Deepavali of 1964, the first plaintiff and defendants 1, 7 and 8 had expressed their desire to divide door Nos.80 and 81 into four portions since Lakshmana Iyer and their parents were dead and their portions have to be divided among the surviving four brothers: that the first plaintiff informed that he had no funds to erect partition wall and the defendants 1, 7 and 8 promised to pay a sum of Rs.8,300 being the value mentioned in the partition deed towards the value of the share of the first plaintiff for door Nos.80 and 81 and the first plaintiff and defendants 1, 7 and 8 have agreed for the said course and the sum of Rs.8,300 was paid by the defendants 1, 7 and 8 to the first plaintiff immediately after Deepavali of 1964 and each of the four had also contributed a sum of Rs.2,000 towards the erection of the partition wall effecting necessary entries in the account books for this contribution thus door Nos.80 and 81 coming to be divided by metes and bound between the four sharers and after such division, they were all living separately in the respective portions each contributing 1/4 share of the property tax payable for both door Nos.80 and 81. 8. The further case of these defendants is that the electrical services were obtained separately in the name of each of the brothers and the parties paid their bills according to the meter reading: that each of them having been provided with separate staircases, latrine bathroom, drainage etc., nothing was enjoyed in common among them thus enjoying their respective portions exclusively and secondly, each of them perfecting their title to their respective shares by adverse possession: that the first plaintiff and his sons have been ousted from enjoyment of the other portions occupied and enjoyed by defendants 1, 7 and 8: that the plaintiffs are estopped from denying the title of the defendants 1, 7 and 8 and that the first plaintiff was fully aware of the said division and reallotment and the same had been purposely and fraudulently suppressed in the plaint. 9. These defendants would also refute the other allegations of paragraph No.10 of the plaint and would further submit that in the middle of the year 1970, defendants 1, 7 and 8 demanded their share in ‘D’ and F scheduled properties of the partition deed dated 6.9. 1946: that there was no such move or representation by the defendants 1, 7 and 8 in the middle of the year 1970 but instead the first plaintiff, defendants 1, 7 and 8 are in occupation of their own portions in their own right in pursuance of the divisions made in the year 1964: that only to circumvent the limitation and adverse possession, purposely the mention of the year 1970 is made: that the first plaintiff having agreed for the division and reallotment of door Nos.80 and 81 East Marret Street in 1964 is estopped from denying the division by metes and bounds. 10. 10. These defendants would further submit that the reasons alleged in para No.14 of the plaint for selling the share of the 8th defendant in favour of the defendants 2 and 3 are incorrect, false and without any basis: that the 8th defendant had rightly sold the property belonging to him viz., the portion marked EFBGJK in favour of defendants 2 and 3 under two registered sale deeds both dated 6.2.1982 and the plaintiffs were fully aware of the sale negotiations: that the sales in favour of defendants 2 and 3 are proper, legal and just and the plaintiffs are not entitled to challenge the same: that the second and third defendants are in possession and enjoyment of the portion indicated above changing the house tax register, receipts etc. and it is atrocious to allege that they are trespassers: that the calculation memo, mentioned in paragraph No.16 of the plaint is irrelevant, incorrect and false: that it is further incorrect and false to state that the defendants 4 to 7 are attempting to sell their shares: that the 7th defendant had transferred the portion allotted to him in favour of his sons viz., the defendants 4 to 6 in 1972 itself: that the B schedule Nanja lands situate in Kodikulam village and defendants 1, 7 and 8 under five registered sale deeds dated 28.6.1958, 10.10.1958, 10.10.1958, 25.8.1960 and 25.8.1960 and hence a schedule lands are not available for partition and the claim is false, fraudulent and imaginary: that the plaintiffs are not entitled to any relief as prayed for in the plaint nor for many mesne profits either past or future nor are they entitled to any confirmation of allotment of property of E schedule to the partition deed dated 6.9.1946: that the first plaintiff having agreed for an amicable division and reallotment of door Nos.80 and 81 as early as in the year 1964, is estopped from claiming relief of partition in this suit: that these defendants are in exclusive and separate possession and enjoyment of their respective portions: that the plaintiffs are not entitled to any division of even the A schedule property since the division had already taken place and the parties are in separate possession and enjoyment of the respective portions: that the suit has been filed with ulterior motives of extracting premium from the defendants 1 to 8; that the suit is also hopelessly barred by limitation and that the defendants had perfected their title to their respective portions by adverse possession. On such and such other averments, these defendants would pray to dismiss the suit with exemplary costs. 11. On such and such other averments, these defendants would pray to dismiss the suit with exemplary costs. 11. In the written statement filed on behalf of defendants Nos.2 and 3, these defendants also besides generally denying the allegations of the plaint would further allege that they purchased the building bearing door No.80, East Marret Street, Madurai under two registered sale deeds both dated 6.2.1982 for valuable consideration of Rs.45,000 each from the 8th defendant: that only on bona fide enquiries made regarding the title of the 8th defendant and on perusal of the title deeds and having become satisfied, they purchased the said property and also got inducted into possession of the same and continued to be in enjoyment till date: that at the time of purchase, no portion was enjoyed in common and the same was in exclusive possession and enjoyment of the 8th defendant and the portion is now occupied by the first plaintiff: that this transaction was done open to the knowledge of the plaintiffs and they did not raise any objection, as such the plaintiffs have no right to challenge the sale in favour of these defendants and that the house tax having been changed in the name of these defendants, they are paying the property tax to Madurai Corporation. 12. These defendants would further allege that the said property is now being used as a godown for the onion business keeping the same in their possession and enjoyment and the said business is run by the father of the second defendant: that they have also made vast improvements in the property to the knowledge of the plaintiffs. For other allegations contained in the plaint, these defendants would adopt the written statement filed by the defendants 1, 7 and 8. They would further allege that they have perfected title also by means of adverse possession. On such averments, the defendants Nos.2 and 3 would pray to dismiss the suit with costs. 13. Even though defendants Nos.4 and 5 have filed a separate written statement besides adopting the written statement filed by the defendants 1, 7 and 8, this written statement filed by them also contains the recitals almost similar to that of the written statement filed by defendants 1, 7 and 8 and therefore no elaborate tracing of those averments need be necessary. 14. 14. Besides all these, the plaintiffs would also file a reply statement reiterating what they have pleaded in the plaint and slightly enlarging the original contents of the plaint. 15. Based on these pleadings by parties, the trial Court would frame five issues for determination of the whole dispute raised in the suit, which are as under: • (1) • (2) Whether the plaintiffs are not entitled to partition of A schedule property? • (3) Whether defendants 1 and 4 to 7 and 8 have perfected their title by adverse possession? • (4) Whether the suit is barred by limitation? • (5) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for partition of the suit properties? If so, at what share and in respect of which of the properties? To what relief? Having framed the above issues, the lower Court has conducted a full trial in which the first plaintiff would examine himself as the sole witness on the side of the plaintiffs as P.W.1. But on the contrary, seven witnesses would be examined on the side of the defendants as D.Ws.1 to 7, of whom D.W.1 is the 7th defendant. D.W.2 is the first defendant, D.W.3 is the 8th defendant and D.W.5 is the 5th defendant. For documentary evidence, 38 documents would be marked on the part of the plaintiffs as Exs.A-1 to A-38, of which Ex.A-1 is the kist receipt dated 24.3.1982, Ex.A-2 is a tax receipt dated 8.7.1983, Ex.A-3 and A-4 are the newspaper publications: Ex.A-5 is a partnership deed dated 6.4.1955, Ex.A-6 is another partnership deed dated 2.5.1966, Ex.A-7 is the partition deed dated 6.9.1946, Exs.A-8 and A-9 are the representations made before the Deputy Registrar both dated 23.10.1964, Exs.A-10 to A-17 are the tax receipts bearing different dates from 11.3.1975 to 9.2.1983, Ex.A-18 is a notice dated 25.3.1999, Exs.A-19 to A-27 are the receipts bearing different dates from the year 1982. Ex.A-28 is the copy of the notice dated 3.10.1983 sent to the Corporation Commissioner, Ex.A-29 is the sketch issued by the Commissioner, Exs.A-30 to A-36 are the Water tax receipts of different dates from 1.10.1975 to 28.3.1985, Exs.A-37 and A-38 are the rent receipt book covering the period from 3.10.1971 to 16.11.1974 and 9.12.1974 to 16.9.1978. 16. Ex.A-28 is the copy of the notice dated 3.10.1983 sent to the Corporation Commissioner, Ex.A-29 is the sketch issued by the Commissioner, Exs.A-30 to A-36 are the Water tax receipts of different dates from 1.10.1975 to 28.3.1985, Exs.A-37 and A-38 are the rent receipt book covering the period from 3.10.1971 to 16.11.1974 and 9.12.1974 to 16.9.1978. 16. Likewise, the defendants on their part would also file 150 documents as Exs.B-1 to B-150, Ex.B-1 dated 7.8.1946 is a partnership deed, Ex.B-2 dated 20.12.1948 is another partnership deed, Exs.B-3 to B-5 are the invitations. Exs.B-6 to B-19 are the accounts maintained bearing different dates from 13.4.1964 to 12.4.1973, Exs.B-20 to B-23 are the receipts, Ex.B-24 is a pronote dated 12.6.1967, Ex.B-25 is an invitation, Exs.B-26 to B-28 are the letters, Ex.B-29 is the list of Councillors elected to the Madurai Sourashtra Sabha for the year 1967, Ex.B-30 is a letter sent to the 7th defendant dated 6.1.1969, Exs.B-31 to B-42 are all letters bearing different dates from 9.6.1967 to 12.6.1970, Exs.B-43 and B-44 are the marriage invitations, Exs.B-45 to B-49 are the receipts, Ex.B-50 is the letter received from L.I.C. Exs.B-51 and B-52 are the receipts Exs.B-53 and B-54 are the voters card, Ex.B-55 is the family card, Ex.B-56 is the list of selected Councillors for the Sourashtra College, Ex.B-57 is a letter, Ex.B-58 is voters card, Ex.B-59 is a receipt, Exs.B-60 and B-61 are the statements of defendants 7 and 8 and first plaintiff to the Taluk Special Revenue Inspector, Exs.B-62 to B-73 are the accounts maintained on different dates of 1962 to 1973. Exs.B-74 to B-134 are the receipts, letters and certain orders passed by the Corporation authorities, Exs.B-135 and B-136 both dated 6.2.1982 are the sale deeds executed by the 8th defendant in favour of the second and third defendants each for the consideration of Rs.45,000 Exs.B-137 and B-138 are the house tax receipts, Ex.B-139 is the Encumbrance Certificate and Exs.B-140 to B-150 are the receipts, letters and such materials received as communication from different persons. 17. Besides these exhibits marked in evidence on the part of the plaintiffs and the defendants, two documents would also be marked as Court documents as Exs.C-1 and C-2 both dated 6.12.1985 which are respectively the report and sketch of the Court Commissioner. 18. 17. Besides these exhibits marked in evidence on the part of the plaintiffs and the defendants, two documents would also be marked as Court documents as Exs.C-1 and C-2 both dated 6.12.1985 which are respectively the report and sketch of the Court Commissioner. 18. Having regard to all these materials placed on record and having extracted the facts and circumstances as pleaded by parties, the lower Court would have its own lengthy discussions on them in the context of the position of law and in the light of the evidence made available as aforementioned and in appreciation of the same in the manner expected by law, would ultimately arrive at the conclusion to dismiss the suit filed by the plaintiffs with costs as per its judgment and decree dated 19.3.1986. Aggrieved, the plaintiffs have come forward to prefer the above appeal suit on certain grounds as brought forth in the grounds of appeal. 19. During arguments, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants would submit that the plaintiffs are the appellants among whom the first plaintiff is the father and the second and third are his sons: that it is a suit for partition and separate possession of the suit schedule properties. With reference to the genealogical tree, the learned counsel would explain the relationship between parties. Then citing Ex.A-7 partition deed dated 6.9.1946, the learned senior counsel would say that the partition took place under the said document whereby each of the children was allotted specific portions in which D-7 was allotted. With reference to the genealogical tree, the learned counsel would explain the relationship between parties. Then citing Ex.A-7 partition deed dated 6.9.1946, the learned senior counsel would say that the partition took place under the said document whereby each of the children was allotted specific portions in which D-7 was allotted. A schedule D-8 was allotted B schedule D-1 was allotted C schedule D. Schedule was allotted to late Lakshmana Iyer, who died a Bachelor on 3.11.1947 and E schedule was allotted to the first plaintiff herein which is the subject matter of the controversy: that F schedule was allotted to Vasudeva Iyer and his first wife Kaveri Ammal: that after their death the property devolved on their children viz., the first plaintiff and defendants 1, 7 and 8 since Vasudeva Iyer and Kaveri Ammal were given only the life estate: that so far as D schedule belonging to Lakshmana Iyer is concerned, it devolved on his brothers viz., the first plaintiff and defendants 1, 7 and 8 and regarding this devolution of interest of Lakshmana Iyer D schedule, there is no controversy and regarding the remaining F Schedule, it is the case of the plaintiffs that they are entitled to 1/4th share in all the properties of D and F schedules. The learned senior counsel would further submit that the quantum is not in dispute but the dispute is only regarding the entitlement. 20. The learned senior counsel would further submit that the quantum is not in dispute but the dispute is only regarding the entitlement. 20. Continuing his arguments, the learned senior counsel would submit that the first plaintiff was laying with his parents and doing business when the other brothers stayed elsewhere: that after the death of the father, regarding E and F schedule properties, the other brothers suggested that they wanted to come and live in the heart of the premises and this request was made in the year 1970, therefore, till such time, they could divide the properties with metes and bounds for which there was no objection raised on the part of the plaintiffs: that in 1970, the other brothers started residing along with the first plaintiff: that under two sale deeds both dated 6.2.1982 which are marked as Exs.B-135 and B-136, the 8th defendant sold the property in Door No.80,East Marret Street,Madurai for a sale price of RS.45,000 each as if he was exclusively entitled to the said property: that it was where the trouble started and the paper publication was made which was covered by the reply etc. hence, the suit for a decree confirming the allotment of the property described in E schedule in the partition deed dated 6.9.1946 and for other reliefs. 21. The learned counsel would further argue that the second item of A schedule corresponds to E schedule in the partition deed: that in short, this second item of A schedule belongs exclusively to the plaintiffs: that the first item of A schedule corresponds to D schedule which was allotted to Lakshmana Iyer who dies a Bachelor in 1947 and therefore the first plaintiff is entitled to 1/4 share in it: that the third time of A schedule corresponds to F schedule in the partition deed and the same was retained by the parents and consequent to their death, they allowed on their four children and therefore the plaintiffs are entitled to 1/4th share in this item also: that the relief in the prayer column regarding B schedule lands has been given up and the plaintiffs are confined with the third item of A Schedule. 22. 22. The learned senior counsel would further submit that the defendants say that even in the year 1964, they moved into possession of the properties and an oral partition had taken place not only regarding exclusively allotted to the first plaintiff: that the defendants further contend that for convenient enjoyment, they were to raise walls at a cost of Rs.8,000 with the liability of each brother at Rs.2,000 that they would still go a step further and would say that the plaintiff was not in possession of his share and that he was not in a position to pay Rs.2,000 and it is the common construction and therefore he volunteered and agreed upon in giving up his share in E schedule, which was exclusively allotted in 1946 and that the first plaintiff agreed to receive a sum of Rs.8,300 being the value fixed for E schedule in relinquishing his rights in this property and accordingly they paid the amount of Rs.8,300 sometimes in 1964: that the further case of the defendants is that the present suit for partition and declaration is not maintainable, that even assuming for arguments sake, yet another aspect that should be considered is that the partition was an unequal and therefore he was not accepting or conceding the same: that the unequal partition is not valid in law and therefore has prayed for whether there was partition as pleaded by the defendants in 1964 and whether the alleged registration of ‘E’ schedule property is true and valid? 23. The learned senior counsel would then point out that item No.1 of A schedule suit properties which corresponds to D schedule of the partition deed was allotted to Lakshmana Iyer, item No.2 of A schedule suit properties which corresponds to E schedule of the partition deed was exclusively allotted to the first plaintiff. Item No.3 of A schedule suit properties which corresponds to F schedule of the partition deed was retained by the parents and item No.1 of A schedule of the suit properties which corresponds to D schedule devolved on the four brothers i.e., the first plaintiff and defendants 1, 7 and 8 after the death of the Lakshmana Iyer and the parents properties in Items C and F of the partition deed also, after their death, devolved on the four brothers and hence the first plaintiff is entitled to 1/4 share in Item Nos. 1 and 3 of the A schedule properties and exclusive right in item No.2 of the A schedule: that after the death of the father in 1955 and the mother in 1960, the first plaintiff continued to live: that the case of the defendants is that in 1964, after Deepavali, it was agreed to divide in order to have a convenient enjoyment raising a common wall and so far as item No.2 is concerned, Rs.8,000 was paid and hence plaintiffs were not having any right in this item and therefore for these items of properties, parties were divided even in the year 1964 by metes and bounds and hence the present suit is not maintainable: that the 8th defendants convention is that as the first time attempt to assert their rights, the plaintiffs have come forward with the present suit: that the plaintiffs case is that there was no division in item Nos.1 and 3 in 1964: that even assuming that there had been an inequal arrangement, inequal partition is not accepted by law: that the specific contention of the defendants is that the since the first plaintiff is not in a position to pay Rs.2,000 they paid a total amount of Rs.8,300 which he was prepared to take. At this juncture, the learned senior counsel would cite a recent judgment delivered by a single Judge of this Court in Guruvammal and another v. Subbiah Naicker and others Guruvammal and another v. Subbiah Naicker and others Guruvammal and another v. Subbiah Naicker and others (2000)1 L.W. 488 wherein it is held that “mere convenience in enjoyment will not be sufficient evidence as to partition having taken place.” 24. Citing the relevant extracts from the evidence Commissioners Report etc. the learned senior counsel would argue that it is not correct that the first plaintiff did not contribute for the construction of the wall. Citing the relevant extracts from the evidence Commissioners Report etc. the learned senior counsel would argue that it is not correct that the first plaintiff did not contribute for the construction of the wall. The learned senior counsel would further argue that their specific case was that during Deepavali of the year 1964, the partition took place and the case of the plaintiffs is in the year 1971: that so far as the defence is concerned, the second and third defendants would contend that they have purchased the house bearing door No.80 from 8th defendant in the year 1982 under the sale deeds for value and it was a bona fide purchase: that there is no documentary evidence for the payment of the amount of Rs.8,300 i.e. the value mentioned: that for this purpose, the registration is necessary: that one of the defendants would say by virtue of the sales, which the other defendants would say by virtue of release: that both these versions are not correct: that they may forget the date or month but not the year: that their evidence is in the month of Deepavali in March or April: that they agreed for the same value after 18 years which had been valued in the year 1947: that the payment, arrangement etc. had taken place after Deepavali and they themselves are not sure regarding the agreement: that the partition is not alleged to have taken place to the measurements: that there are inconsistencies regarding the time and nature of inspection: that the partition was inequal. With this arguments, the learned senior counsel would end up his argument praying for the relief sought for. 25. In reply, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents 4 to 8 would submit that as far as these respondents are concerned, they oppose even 1946 partition wherein actual division was not effected, but he accepts the factual position: that the theory of permission to occupy is not correct. 25. In reply, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents 4 to 8 would submit that as far as these respondents are concerned, they oppose even 1946 partition wherein actual division was not effected, but he accepts the factual position: that the theory of permission to occupy is not correct. The learned counsel would also cite a judgment of the Apex Court delivered in Kale and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others Kale and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others Kale and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 807 wherein their Lordships have referred to the observations made by Kerr at page No.364 in his “Kerr on Fraud”, as extracted hereunder: “Family arrangements are governed by principles which are not applicable to dealings between strangers. The Court, when deciding the rights of parties under family arrangements or claims to upset such arrangements, considers what in the broadest view of the matter is most for the interest of families, and has regard to considerations which, in dealing with transactions between persons not members of the same family, would not be taken into account. Matters which would be fatal to the validity of similar transactions between strangers are not objections to the binding effecting of family arrangements.” 26. The second judgment cited by the learned counsel for the respondents 4 to 8 is one delivered by a single Judge of this Court in G.Vasantha Pai v. Special Commissioner and Commissioner, (Land Reforms), Madras and another G.Vasantha Pai v. Special Commissioner and Commissioner, (Land Reforms), Madras and another G.Vasantha Pai v. Special Commissioner and Commissioner, (Land Reforms), Madras and another (1998)3 MLJ. 414 wherein it has been held: “According to Mitakshara Law, partition consists in defining shares of the co-parceners in the joint property and a physical division of the property is not necessary. Once the shares are defined, there is a severance of the joint status. Partition is a right incident to the ownership of property and once the parties are held as co-owners, their right to partition cannot be resisted.” 27. Once the shares are defined, there is a severance of the joint status. Partition is a right incident to the ownership of property and once the parties are held as co-owners, their right to partition cannot be resisted.” 27. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents 2 and 3 who are the subsequent purchasers from the 8th respondent would submit that the family was headed by Vasudeva Iyer, who had five sons: that the family got a partnership concern “Vasudeva Iyer & Sons: that a deed of partnership dated 6.9.1946 was executed under which the family properties became divided among the father and five sons and their mother and they know that Rs.4,070 was the share value and they were adjusting whether it was higher in value or lesser: that the business was carried on in the house bearing Door No.80 but the plaintiffs sketch that this was not acted upon and this fact was admitted by P.W.1 himself: that voluminous evidence is available that there was an oral partition for convenient enjoyment among the family members, but what the plaintiffs say is that there had been division but it was agreed subsequently: that the oral partition is pleaded by the defendants and the share value of the middle portion is also given: that the counsel for the other side would submit that the offer of Rs.8,300 being the value. Under Sec.17 of the Registration Act, it should have been registered and the failure to execute a sale deed renders the oral partition invalid. Under Sec.17 of the Registration Act, it should have been registered and the failure to execute a sale deed renders the oral partition invalid. But this is not the position: that if the plaintiff executes it is not relinquishment on defendant Nos.1, 7 and 8: that Sec.17 may apply in any other case but not in a family partition: that the partition in Ex.A-7 partition deed is not an inequal partition at all: that Exs.B-110 to B-114 which are the applications signed by the first plaintiff for loans in the Sourashtra Cooperative Bank on various dates are the admitted documents by the plaintiffs: that an Advocate- Commissioner was appointed and he filed the plan and the report: that for item Nos.8 and 9, there are separate doors, separate staircase and separate electric connection: that the second house consists of three portions bearing door Nos.10, 11 and 12 having such separate arrangement for doors, staircase and electric connection and the third house bearing door No.81/1 is also completely divided without having any interconnection between the other houses and now the plaintiffs come forward to say that disproportionate share have been given to them: that the documents exhibited on the part of the defendants numbering 150, particularly Exs.B-17 to B-24, Ex.B-84 and Exs.B-110 to B-115 would speak volumes against the case of the plaintiffs: that likewise, the oral evidence particularly the admission part of the evidence of P.W.1 would only to go to prove that the partition was acted upon: that the trial Court in paragraphs 11 and 12 of its judgment has clearly discussed and decided the main questions raised on the part of the plaintiffs whether oral partition is valid and whether it has been acted upon and unequal area of distribution rendering the oral partition null and void. On these questions, the learned counsel would cite four judgments. The first one is delivered by a Division Bench of this Court in Arumuga Udayar v. Swamiyar alias Ramasamy Udayar and others Arumuga Udayar v. Swamiyar alias Ramasamy Udayar and others Arumuga Udayar v. Swamiyar alias Ramasamy Udayar and others (1997)2 L.W. 769 wherein it has been held: “In the case of a family arrangement, it is not necessary that only the coparcenary properties should alone form subject of family arrangement. Properties belonging to all the members can be pooled together for amicable arrangement between the members of the family to avoid the existing and future disputes and to live happily and to ensure amity and good-will amongst the members of the family.” 28. The second judgment cited by the learned counsel is one delivered by the Apex Court in Tek Bahadur Bhujil v. Debi Singh Bhujil and others Tek Bahadur Bhujil v. Debi Singh Bhujil and others Tek Bahadur Bhujil v. Debi Singh Bhujil and others A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 292 wherein it has been held: “Family arrangement as such can be arrived at orally. Its terms may be recorded in wiring as a memorandum of what had been agreed upon. The memorandum need not be prepared for the purpose of being used as a document on which future title of the parties is to be founded. It is generally prepared as a record of what had been agreed upon, in order that there are no hazy notions about it in future. It is only when the family arrangement is reduced in writing with the purpose of using that writing as proof of what they had arranged and, where the arrangement is brought about by the document as such, that the document requires registration, because it is then that it would amount to a document of title declaring for future what rights and in what properties the parties possess. But a document which is no more than a memorandum of what had been agreed to between the parties does not require compulsory registration under Sec.17 of the Registration Act.” 29. The third judgment cited by the learned counsel is one delivered by the Apex Court in A.Raghavamma and another v. Chenchamma and another A.Raghavamma and another v. Chenchamma and another A.Raghavamma and another v. Chenchamma and another A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 136 wherein it has been held: “It is settled law that a member of a joint Hindu Family can bring about his separation in status by a definite and unequivocal declaration of his intention to separate himself from the family and enjoy his share in severalty. The Hindu Law texts support the proposition that severance in status is brought about by unilateral exercise of discretion.” 30. The last judgment cited by the learned counsel for the respondents 2 and 3 is one delivered by the Apex Court in SK.Sattar SK.Mohd. The Hindu Law texts support the proposition that severance in status is brought about by unilateral exercise of discretion.” 30. The last judgment cited by the learned counsel for the respondents 2 and 3 is one delivered by the Apex Court in SK.Sattar SK.Mohd. Choudhari v. Gundappa Amabadas Bhukate SK.Sattar SK.Mohd. Choudhari v. Gundappa Amabadas Bhukate SK.Sattar SK.Mohd. Choudhari v. Gundappa Amabadas Bhukate (1997)2 L.W. 648 wherein it has been held: “Sec.5 of the Transfer of Property Act contemplates transfer of property by a person who has a title in the said property to another person who has no title. A family arrangement, on the contrary, is a transaction between members of the same family for the benefit of the family so as to preserve the family property, the peace and security of the family, avoidance of family dispute and litigation and also for saving the honour of the family.” With such arguments, the learned counsel would end up his arguments praying to dismiss the appeal with costs. 31. In consideration of the pleadings by parties, having regard to the materials placed on record and upon hearing the learned counsel for both, the points that arise for consideration in the above appeal suit are: • (1) Whether the appellants are entitled to the relief confirming the allotting of the property described in E schedule in the partition deed dated 6.9.1946? • (2) Whether the appellants are entitled to partition and separate possession by metes and bounds of the properties in schedules D and F of the partition deed dated 6.9.1946 into four shares and to get a share in it? • (3) Whether the ‘B’ Schedule suit properties could be made subject matter of partition and separate possession by metes and bounds? • (4) Whether the appellants are entitled to question the validity of the transaction held in between defendants 2 and 3 and the 8th defendant regarding the sale of the property falling under D.No.80 ofEast Marret Street,Madurai as per Exs.B-135 and B-136 both dated 6.2.1982? • (5) What relief the appellants are entitled to? 32. • (4) Whether the appellants are entitled to question the validity of the transaction held in between defendants 2 and 3 and the 8th defendant regarding the sale of the property falling under D.No.80 ofEast Marret Street,Madurai as per Exs.B-135 and B-136 both dated 6.2.1982? • (5) What relief the appellants are entitled to? 32. Point No.1: It is a suit filed by the plaintiffs, among whom the first plaintiff is the father and the plaintiffs 2 and 3 are his sons praying to (a) confirm allotting the property described in ‘E’ schedule in the partition deed dated 6.9.1946 to the plaintiffs, (b) order partition and separate possession by metes and bounds of the properties described in schedules ‘D’ and ‘F’ therein into four shares and allot one such divided share to the plaintiffs and (c) partition and separate possession by metes and bounds of the lands described in B schedule of the plaint and allot one such divided share in favour of the plaintiffs and four mesne profits and costs. 33. For easy remembrance of the relationship of parties, it could be put in a nutshell that one Vasudeva Iyer had two wives viz., Kaveri Ammal and Lakshmi Ammal: that three sons were born through the first wife Kaveri Ammal viz., the defendants 1 and 3 and one L.V.Lakshmana Iyer and two sons were born through the second wife Lakshmi Ammal, who are the first plaintiff and the 7th defendant: that plaintiffs Nos.2 and 3 are none other than the sons of first plaintiff and defendants 4 to 6 are one other than the sons of the 7th defendant. All put together, the second wife had passed away long back and she is not at all considered for any purpose in the suit. It is only Vasudeva Iyer, his first wife Kaveri Ammal and the said five sons who are relevant for consideration so far as the averments and the prayer of the suit are concerned. Whether it is the first wife or the sons born through her or the second wife and the sons born through her are also not irrelevant since the first plaintiff is born through the second wife and the 7th defendant is also born thorough the second wife whereas he is treated as one of the main defendants along with the two sons born through the first wife i.e. defendants 1 and 3. The other son born to the first wife viz., L.V.Lakshmana Iyer died in the year 1947. 34. In this scenario, the curtain lifts in the year 1946 when excepting for the second wife, all other members of the family were present i.e. exactly on 6.9.1946 when the family partition took place among the members of the family in which A, B and C schedules of the partition deed were allotted respectively to the defendants 7, 8 and 1: that D schedule properties were allotted in favour of Lakshmana Iyer who died the following year, E schedule in favour of the first plaintiff and F schedule allotted in favour of the Vasudeva Iyer and his surviving first wife Kaveri Ammal with the life estate. So far as this partition of the family properties dated 6.9.1946 is concerned, it is admitted by all the parties concerned with this suit pertaining to which there is absolutely no controversy at all. 35. While so, on 3.11.1947 i.e., the year subsequent to the partition of the family properties, L.V. Lakshmana Iyer who was allotted with the ‘D’ schedule properties died a Bachelor followed by whom on 13.3.1955, the father Vasudeva Iyer died followed by whom the first wife Kaveri Ammal also died on 20.7.1960. The dispute is regarding the partition of ‘D’ schedule properties which were allotted to the deceased brother Lakshmana Iyer and the ‘F’ schedule properties which were segregated for the enjoyment of the parents till their lifetime: that long after the death of Lakshmana Iyer and the parents the present suit had come to be filed by one of the brothers as against not only the other brothers viz., the defendants 1, 7 and 8 but also against the alienees the second and third defendants, who are the main contestants of the suit. 36. The plaintiffs have come forward to file the suit not only offering the D schedule, which in the partition of the year 1946 was allotted to the deceased brother Lakshmana Iyer as item No.1 of the A schedule of the suit properties and the F schedule which in the said partition had been allotted for the enjoyment of the parents as item No.3 of the A schedule of the suit properties but also they would offer the E schedule of the said partition, which was allotted in his favour. While the plaintiffs have sought for confirmation of the allotment of the E schedule property in his favour as per the partition deed dated 6.9.1946 showing the same as item No.2 of the A schedule herein, they would seek division of the items No.1 and 3 of A schedule and the 3 schedule suit properties into four equal shares allotting one such share in his favour and putting him in separate possession of the same. 37. Two versions come forth regarding the enjoyment of these properties. The version of the plaintiffs is that so far as item No.1 of A schedule of suit properties which was allotted to one of the brothers viz. Lakshmana Iyer is concerned, after his death it was being maintained keeping the same in the custody by the father Vasudeva Iyer and that the first plaintiff being a minor at that time was lying along with the father and therefore so far as all the items in ‘A’ schedule properties are concerned, the first plaintiff had been living in the parental above along with the parents and that the defendants 1, 7 and 8 lived apart, having their own residential arrangements, on the part of the defendants 1, 7 and 8 it would be alleged that after the death of the parents, in the year 1964, there was an oral partition among the four brothers and that during the lifetime of the father, the textile business was conducted by himself and his five sons and after his death, it continued as a partnership business among the remaining four brothers till 2.5.1966 and subsequently defendants No.7 and 8 retired from the partnership firm and alter it was continued by the first plaintiff and the first defendant from 2.5.1966 and subsequently the defendants 7 and 8 retired from the partnership firm and later it was continued by the first plaintiff and the first defendant from 2.5.1966 to 1978, which met with loss and hence another firm called M.S.M. Textiles was constituted in the names of the first plaintiff and first defendant and one Manickam Ammal from 4.9.1978. 38. 38. So far as the A schedule suit properties are concerned, the version of the defendants 1, 7 and 8 is that after Deepavali in 1964, the first plaintiff and defendants 1, 7 and 8 expressed their desire to divide item Nos.1 and 3 of the suit properties wherein the houses bearing door Nos.80 and 81 situate, into four equal shares among the plaintiff and defendants 1, 7 and 8 allotting 1/4th share to each in those buildings and, since these two houses during the partition of the year 1946 got divided into three shares i.e. D, E and F and allotting one share to the deceased Lakshmana Iyer i.e. D and the second share in the E schedule having been allotted to the first plaintiff, the last share in F schedule had been put in possession of the parents for their enjoyment to their lives, the plaintiff has come forward to seek for declaration to the effect that he is independently entitled to the E schedule of the partition deed dated 6.9.1946 i.e. item No.2 of the suit A schedule properties and that he is entitled to 1/4th equal share along with defendants 1, 7 and 8 in schedules ‘D’ and ‘F’ of 1946 partition deed i.e. items No.1 and 3 of the suit a schedule properties and further becoming entitled to an equal share in the B schedule suit property. 39. 39. The counter pleading and the arguments put forth on the part of the defendants is that to compensate the loss that had occasioned in the partition of the year 1964 to the first plaintiff among the four brothers, they paid the amount of Rs.8,300 as fixed for the share of the first plaintiff i.e. the second item of A schedule suit properties and since for erecting the partition walls, the first plaintiff expressed his inability to contribute Rs.2,000 minimising that amount, he was paid an amount of Rs.6,300 as compensation which he too agreed and the entire door numbers 80 and 81 forming item Nos.1 to 3 of the A schedule got divided into four equal shares as it is shown in the rough sketch attached to the written statement and the portion marked in violet colour within the bounds of ABCD was allotted to the first defendant, the portion indicated in yellow colour falling within EFBA was allotted to the first plaintiff, the portion indicated in green colour falling within DCBGHI was allotted to the 7th defendant and the portion indicated in saffron colour falling within the bounds of KJBFE was allotted to the 8th defendant and thus the said two buildings were related among the brothers in the manner indicated in the rough sketch in the year 1964 and necessary partition walls were erected completely demarcating one portion from the other effecting necessary entries in the account books to show that each sharer had contributed a sum of Rs.2,000 for erecting partition wall thus dividing the item Nos.1 to 3 of the A schedule suit properties into four equal shares and allotting one such divided share in favour of each brother, the first plaintiff and defendants 1, 7 and 8. The defendants would also strongly contend that from the year 1964, they were living separately in their respective portions exclusively making use of the said portions for their purpose not only separately paying the house tax but also paying separate meter charges for the electricity consumption: that each sharer had been provided with separate staircase, latrine, bathroom, drainage etc. The defendants would also strongly contend that from the year 1964, they were living separately in their respective portions exclusively making use of the said portions for their purpose not only separately paying the house tax but also paying separate meter charges for the electricity consumption: that each sharer had been provided with separate staircase, latrine, bathroom, drainage etc. and that one has nothing to do with the other, thus each portion serving a separate and self-contained one thereafter enjoying nothing in common among themselves: that in respect of their separate portions, thereafter, they have also executed mortgage deeds in favour of Madurai Sourashtra Cooperative Bank Limited and borrowed loans as on 25.5.1968 and finally executing the mortgage deed on 21.1.1982: that the defendants 1, 7 and 8 have also perfected their title by adverse possession in respect of their separate portions being in separate enjoyment of the same for over the statutory period to the knowledge of the plaintiffs and therefore they would also plead that the plaintiffs have been ousted from enjoyment of the portions in the occupation and enjoyment of defendants No.1, 7 and 8. They would also plead estoppel from denying the title of these defendants with regard to their separate portions: that thereafter, the portions in occupation of the first plaintiff and the 8th defendant were given the door numbers of 80 and the portions in occupation of the first defendant was given door number 81 and that of the 7th defendant was given door No.81/1, the property tax having been separately assessed in such manner and in the said process at a later stage the 8th defendant sold the portion allotted to him in favour of defendants No.2 and 3 under two registered sale deeds both dated 6.2.1982. 40. 40. With such strong contentions, the defendants would totally deny the allegations put forth on the part of the plaintiffs that in the middle of the year 1970, out of respect to the defendants 1, 7 and 8, he agreed to allocate their shares in items No.1 and 3 of the suit properties (schedules D and F of the partition deed dated 6.9.1946 and on such agreement, the first defendant was permitted to reside in the Southern portion, the 7th defendant in the eastern portion and the 8th defendant in the North Eastern portion and thus the first and third items of A schedule got divided by metes and bounds at a later stage, are all not only false but imaginary and such an arrangement never took place at all. 41. In these circumstances, the lower Court, having discussed the evidence of D.Ws.1 to 3 pertaining to the crucial point of having parted with an amount of Rs.8,300 as a compensatory measure in favour of the first plaintiff, which would not be accepted on the part of the plaintiffs witnesses on ground that basically it was Ex.A-7 partition deed which estimates the value of item No.2 of the A schedule suit properties at Rs.8,300 and no proper accounts have been rendered nor proved in evidence, the receipt of the said amount of Rs.8,300 by the first plaintiff from the defendants 1, 7 and 8 which is their burden to prove, however, since it was partition among the family members, strict standard of proof that could be made available in a partition held among alienees cannot be applied to the family partition, the lower Court would arrive at the conclusion that accepting the version of the defendants that the said amount of Rs.8,300 would have been given in favour of the first plaintiff by the defendants 1, 7 and 8. If really the plaintiff had not accepted for such partition on receipt of the said amount, there is reason on the part of the Court to think that by other subsequent events when it comes to be proved that the defendants have been in separate possession and enjoyment of their respective shares in the Items of A schedule suit properties for years together, the plaintiffs had no reason to keep silent without agitating their genuine rights in the manner known to law. 42. 42. The lower Court has further reason to conclude that when the first plaintiff and defendants 1, 7 and 8 were having cordial relationship, there had been ample chances for the first plaintiff to have accepted for the said arrangement for readjustment and reallotment so as to allow the defendants to be in possession and enjoyment of such divided portions for over the statutory period since there is not even the allegation to the effect that the defendants either over powered the first plaintiff or compelled him with undue influence or in exercise of any other third degree methods and in these circumstances, the only conclusion that could be arrived at by the lower Court is that only in silent acceptance and approval of the first plaintiff, the reallotment had taken place and therefore would not accept the case of the plaintiffs. 43. Since it has been found that in the family arrangements made in the year 1964, item No.2 of ‘A’ Schedule which fell to the share of the first plaintiff in the partition of the year 1946 had also been considered and this item was also made a subject of partition on payment of Rs.8,400 in favour of the first plaintiff and as though nothing of that sort had happened the plaintiffs have sought for a relief to confirm allotting the property described in E schedule in the partition deed dated 6.9.1946 to the plaintiffs, which cannot be done and therefore this point is answered against the plaintiffs. 44. Point No.2: The items described schedules ‘D’ and ‘F’ in the partition deed dated 6.9.1946 are nothing but items No.1 and 3 in the A schedule properties in this suit and in the said partition they have been respectively allotted in favour of the deceased Lakshmana Iyer and for the parents as life estate and since all of them were dead, the case of the plaintiffs is that they are available for partition and therefore they have to be divided into four shares and to allot 1/4th of such divided share in favour of the first plaintiff and defendants 1, 7 and 8 as though nothing had happened regarding these items of suit properties so far. In fact, these properties form part of door Nos.80 and 81, which is a house which also in the family partition arrangement of the year 1964, had been divided and settled once and for ever and for over the statutory period, each party is in independent possession of the same and since the middle portion share was belonging to the first plaintiff, which fell to his share in the 1946 partition, he was given an amount of Rs.8,300 and left the same and therefore since proper divisions have already been made in partition and settled as aforeseen, these items of properties are also not available for partition as it is sought for on the part of the plaintiffs and therefore this point is also answered in the negative and against the plaintiffs. 45. Point No.3: So far as the ‘B’ Schedule properties are concerned, they are landed properties and they have been sold under five different sale deeds respectively dated 28.6.1958, 10.10.1958, 25.8.1960 and 25.8.1960 in favour of third parties of which the first plaintiff was also a party and therefore besides the fact being that these properties are not available for partition, the plaintiffs are also estopped from claiming anything in these properties which have been already sold. Moreover, the alienees of these properties have not been made parties to the suit proceedings and hence at this score itself the suit is liable to be branded bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. Moreover, the purchasers therein being bona fide purchasers for value, the alienation of this property himself and others under the sale deeds mentioned supra are quite valid and the plaintiffs are not at all entitled to ask for any partition of share in this schedule and hence this point is also answered against this appellants. 46. Moreover, the purchasers therein being bona fide purchasers for value, the alienation of this property himself and others under the sale deeds mentioned supra are quite valid and the plaintiffs are not at all entitled to ask for any partition of share in this schedule and hence this point is also answered against this appellants. 46. Point No.4: So far as the case concerned with the second and third defendants alienees a portion of door No.80 having been purchased from the 8th defendant who got it in the partition dated 6.9.1946, under Exs.B-135 and B-136 both dated 6.2.1946, under Exs.B-135 and B-136 both dated 6.2.1982, they are the bona fide purchasers for value and without notice and since the said alienation had taken place perfectly in accordance with law and further since it comes to be seen that they are well in possession and enjoyment of the said item of the suit properties for over the statutory period, the plaintiffs are not entitled to question the validity of either the transaction held in between defendants 2 and 3 and the 8th defendant or are they entitled to seek for a partition of this item of the ‘A’ Schedule suit properties especially in view of the decision arrived at for the first point to the effect that the plaintiffs are neither entitled for declaration nor for partition as prayed for in the suit and hence the plaintiffs plea and prayer so far as it is concerned with this time of the suit properties purchased by the defendants 2 and 3 from the 8th defendant as per Exs.B-135 and B-136 are also rejected. This point is also answered against the appellants and in favour of defendants No.2 and 3. 47. This point is also answered against the appellants and in favour of defendants No.2 and 3. 47. Point No.5: A careful perusal of the judgment of the trial Court clearly indicates that the said Court has not only considered the pleadings by parties in their proper perspective but also having framed proper issues and having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and having conducted a thorough trial allowing the parties to exhaust their remedies and examining such witnesses and marking such documents relevant for consideration in support of their respective cases and having appreciated the said materials placed on record in the manner expected by law, has ultimately arrived at the conclusion to disagree with the contentions of the plaintiffs thus answering all the issues framed, against the plaintiffs since in the estimate of the lower Court, the plaintiffs have not substantiated their case with such standard of proof of preponderance of probability and would ultimately dismiss the suit with cost. 48. So far as the question of legality involved in this case is concerned, the only judgment cited on the part of the appellants is one delivered in Guruvammal and another v. Subbiah Naicker and others Guruvammal and another v. Subbiah Naicker and others Guruvammal and another v. Subbiah Naicker and others (2000)1 L.W. 488 wherein it is held that mere convenience in enjoyment will not be sufficient evidence as to partition having taken place. On the contrary, to insist the point that in a family arrangement strict principles which are applicable for partition between strangers and that matters which would be fatal to the validity of similar transactions between strangers are not objections to the binding effect of family arrangements, on the part of the learning counsel for the respondents he would cite six judgments reported in (1) Kale and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others Kale and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others Kale and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 807 (2) G.Vasantha Pai v. Special Commissioner and Commissioner (Land Reforms), Madras and another G.Vasantha Pai v. Special Commissioner and Commissioner (Land Reforms), Madras and another G.Vasantha Pai v. Special Commissioner and Commissioner (Land Reforms), Madras and another (1988)3 MLJ. 414 (3) Arumuga Udayar v. Swamiyar alias Ramasamy Udayar and others Arumuga Udayar v. Swamiyar alias Ramasamy Udayar and others Arumuga Udayar v. Swamiyar alias Ramasamy Udayar and others (1997)2 L.W. 769 (4) Tek Bahadur Bhujil v. Debi Singh Bhujil and others Tek Bahadur Bhujil v. Debi Singh Bhujil and others Tek Bahadur Bhujil v. Debi Singh Bhujil and others A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 292 (5) A. Raghavamma and another v. A.Chenchamma and another A. Raghavamma and another v. A.Chenchamma and another A. Raghavamma and another v. A.Chenchamma and another A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 136 and (6) SK.Sattar SK.Mohd. Choudhari v. Gundappa Amabadas Bhukate SK.Sattar SK.Mohd. Choudhari v. Gundappa Amabadas Bhukate SK.Sattar SK.Mohd. Choudhari v. Gundappa Amabadas Bhukate (1997)2 L.W. 648. All these judgments drive home only one point that partition among family members would not require strict principles land norms that are adopted in a partition among alienees. Following the principles laid down therein it is quite agreeable that no strict principles governing a partition between alienees or third parties cannot be applicable in a division that takes place among the family members on certain arrangements even if it is a oral partition and the list of items prepared after partition is also sufficient to hold that there had been a full partition among the family members and therefore there is every possibility for the partition among the brothers i.e., the first plaintiff and the defendants 1, 7 and 8 to have taken place in the year 1964 as it is alleged on the part of the defendants in this case as it comes to be proved on evidence by subsequent events and are being in possession and enjoyment of those properties till date without having anything in common thereafter. The plaintiffs having come forward to institute the suit on certain facts, undoubtedly the onus is heavily on them to prove the case with proper evidence with such standard of proof and with preponderance of probability in which, it must be mentioned that the plaintiffs have miserable failed and the case as put up by the plaintiffs stands without being substantiated in law and therefore it should necessarily fail. 49. 49. This Court is in perfect agreement with the conclusions arrived at by the lower Court since the legal infirmity or inconsistency has occurred in the decision arrived at by the Court below thus answering that the appellants are not entitled to any relief prayed for in the suit. This point is answered accordingly. In result, the above appeal suit fails and the same is dismissed. The judgment and decree dated 19.3.1986 rendered in O.S.No.437 of 1983 by the Court Subordinate Judge, Madurai is hereby confirmed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.