KUNDAN SINGH, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition has been filed for quashing and setting aside the order dated 20. 5. 88 at Annexure "a" passed by the respondent no. 2 and the order dated 31st August,1984 annexure "d" in the review of the aforesaid order passed by the respondent no. 2 and for a declaration that a teacher is not an employee within the definition of Payment of Gratuity Act. ( 2 ) THE petitioner is the Principal of the school run by Shri Jivkor Vanita Vishram which is an educational institution. Thus, the petitioner is the Principal of the educational institution run by the Trust. The respondent no. 1 was appointed as an Assistant teacher in the primary section on 17. 11. 1947. She had been made permanent in the year 1949 and she retired from the school on 3rd May, 1982. The respondent no. 1 was getting the pay of Rs. 952. 00 at the time of retirement. The school is a private school managed by the trust and her pay was in consonance with the rules and regulations framed by the Government in 1978 under Primary Education Act, 1949. The petitioner school had complied with all the model conditions of the employer of the staff in private primary school and such model conditions of service laid down in schedule "f" of the Primary Education Rules, 1949. Since 1982, the provisions of the Provident Fund Act as per clause-40 of the Schedule "f" are made applicable and the benefit of Provident Fund Act was also extended by the school management to the respondent no. 1. After her retirement, the respondent no. 1 had not taken any steps for a period of four years and filed an application being application no. 370 of 1986 dated 23. 5. 86 before respondent no. 2 Controlling Authority under Payment of Gratuity Act claiming an amount of Rs. 19,215. 00 towards gratuity on the basis of her past service with the school. A notice was issued to the petitioner and written statement was also filed by the petitioner and the evidence of the respondents was recorded and she was cross-examined by the learned advocate of the petitioner before B. D. Bhavsar, Controlling Authority. Before the decision being taken, the Officer in charge of the Controlling Authority was changed and one Mr. A notice was issued to the petitioner and written statement was also filed by the petitioner and the evidence of the respondents was recorded and she was cross-examined by the learned advocate of the petitioner before B. D. Bhavsar, Controlling Authority. Before the decision being taken, the Officer in charge of the Controlling Authority was changed and one Mr. Lauva had come in charge and thereafter, the matter was transferred to the respondent no. 2 Mrs. Patel. On several dates, the matter was adjourned and could not be decided. On the date of the order, the learned counsel for the petitioner was not present and the matter was decided in absence of the petitioner. The petitioner got a copy of the order dated 20th May, 1988. The respondent no. 1 filed a Review Application before respondent no. 2 and that Review Application has also been rejected on 31st August, 1988. Therefore, the petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing the impugned order dated 20th May, 1988 whereby the respondent no. 1 has been granted gratuity amount of Rs. 18,671. 10 ps. and against the order dismissing the Review application mainly on the grounds that there is no provision made for the payment of gratuity by way of retirement benefit to a teacher in the provisions of Bombay Primary Education Act read with schedule "f" under the Rules, there is no provision for payment of gratuity to any of the teachers. The order is a non-speaking order without assigning any reasons and grounds therein for granting the gratuity to the respondent no. 1. That the school is not governed by the Shops and Establishment Act and it is not an interim order. A teacher cannot be called a workman as held in the Supreme Court decision. Hence, the Act is not applicable. Under the provisions of the Act, a teacher does not come within the meaning of an "employee" mentioned iin section 2 (e) of the Act. Therefore, the claim of the respondent no. 1 was liable to be dismissed. The order passed by the respondent no. 2 Controlling Authority is without jurisdiction, null and void and is not sustainable in the eye of law. The Review Application has been rejected on the ground that the Review Application was not signed by the petitioner and it was only signed by the advocate. 1 was liable to be dismissed. The order passed by the respondent no. 2 Controlling Authority is without jurisdiction, null and void and is not sustainable in the eye of law. The Review Application has been rejected on the ground that the Review Application was not signed by the petitioner and it was only signed by the advocate. The fact is denied in the petition that the application was not signed by the advocate, but just below the signature and there is a verification made by the Principal of the school and the verification is always to be read in connection with the main body of the application. Therefore, it cannot be construed that the application for review was not signed by the petitioner. The learned advocate was not in a position to attend the proceedings before the Controlling Authority due to sudden calamity in his family at an other place and the matter was decided contrary to law. The points raised in the written statement have not been considered nor have been decided by the Controlling Authority. Thus, both the orders are illegal and not sustainable in the eye of law. ( 3 ) NONE appears on behalf of the petitioner when this petition is taken up for final hearing, but lateron Mr. M. B. Gandhi appeared and made submissions. Heard the learned advocate for the respondent no. 1 and learned A. G. P. for the respondent no. 2 and perused the relevant papers on record. ( 4 ) THE learned advocate for the respondent no. 1 contended that under the provisions of Payment of Gratuity Act, an appeal is provided and this petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy under the statute. ( 5 ) I have carefully examined and considered the contentions of the learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the provisions of Payment of Gratuity Act are not applicable to teacher. The Full Bench of this Court in the case of Shantiben L. Christian vs. Administrative Officer reported in 2001 (2) GLH, 389 has settled the law that a teacher does not fall within the definition of an "employee" prescribed under section 2 (e) of Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. The Full Bench of this Court in the case of Shantiben L. Christian vs. Administrative Officer reported in 2001 (2) GLH, 389 has settled the law that a teacher does not fall within the definition of an "employee" prescribed under section 2 (e) of Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. Para-29 of the said judgment reads as under:"this Court is not called upon to decide the nature of establishment and whether an establishment as defined in the provisions contained in the Bombay Shops and Establishment Act alone would be required to be taken into consideration. The Court is called upon to decide the issue whether a teacher, in view of the nature of duties being discharged, can be said to be an employee as defined in section 2 (e) of the Act or not. In view of the clear meaning and the interpretation of the word "employee" as found in different statutes which we have referred to hereinabove, it is not necessary for us to consider other aspects. In view of what is stated hereinabove, the petitioner cannot be said to be an employee as defined under section 2 (e) of the Payment of Gratuity Act. " ( 6 ) IT has been pointed that in the case of Jotindra Nath Roy vs. Surendra Bikram Singh Agrawal and others reported in JT 1996 (4) SC, 296; 1996 (4) SCC 403 ; AIR 1996 SC, 1736 the Supreme Court has held that the provisions of Payment of Gratuity Act would be attracted to educational institutions and the appellant being a employee of an educational Trust would be entitled for gratuity also. The observations of the Supreme Court are as under:"9. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record, we are unable to persuade ourselves to accede to the view taken by the Division Bench in this behalf. The observations of the Supreme Court are as under:"9. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record, we are unable to persuade ourselves to accede to the view taken by the Division Bench in this behalf. A reading of the judgment of the learned Single Judge will go to show that it was nobodys case that the provisions of Payment of Gratuity Act could not be pressed into service but the claim of gratuity was contested on the ground that the scheme of the Trust as framed by the High Court did not provide for payment of gratuity to the retired employees through in the event of an employee dying in harness, certain provisions have been made in the scheme for payment of gratuity to the members of the family of such employee. It appears that no assertion was made before the High Court that the Trust was not an Establishment within the meaning of the relevant provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act. Neither any material has been placed before us nor any argument was advanced on behalf of the respondent that the Trust is not an Establishment as contemplated in the Payment of Gratuity Act. On the contrary, the appellant has placed on record a notification dated July 16, 1972 published by the Government of India, Ministry of Labour and Rehabilitation Department published in Part 2. Section 3 (II) of the Gazette of India whereby the Trust Estate in question was treated to be an Establishment and the provisions of Employees Provident Funds and Family Pension Fund Act, 1952 were applied to the said Trust Estate of Babu Lal Agarwal in relation to employees of the said Trust treating it to be an Establishment under the said Act. A photo copy of the said notification has been placed on record of this court which has not been disputed by the respondent. This position further strengthens the fact that the Trust has been treated to be an Establishment. Consequently, in our opinion having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case, the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act would be attracted and the appellant would be entitled for the gratuity also. This position further strengthens the fact that the Trust has been treated to be an Establishment. Consequently, in our opinion having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case, the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act would be attracted and the appellant would be entitled for the gratuity also. "it has been further pointed out that the Central Government has extended the benefits of the Payment of Gratuity Act to the educational institutions in which 10 or more persons are employed or were employed on any day preceding 12 months as a class of establishments to which the Act was applied with effect from the date of publication of the notification. The notification dated 3rd April, 1996 issued by the Central Government is repdocued as under: APPLICABILITY OF THE PAYMENT OF GRATUITY ACT, 1972 IN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS Notification No. 5-42013/1/95-SS II Dated 3rd April, 1997 :-IN exercise of the powers conferred by clause (c) of sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (39 of 1972), the Central Government hereby specifies the educational institutions in which ten or more persons are employed or were employed on any day preceding 12 months as a class of establishments to which the said Act shall apply with effect from the date of publication of this notification. PROVIDED that nothing contained in this notification shall affect the operation of the notification of the Ministry of Labour S. O. 239 dated 8th January, 1982. " ( 7 ) ON the material above stated teacher may not come within the definition of "workman" under the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act or Minimum Wages Act, but it cannot be said that a teacher is not an employee of an Educational Institute to which the provisions of Payment of Gratuity Act have been made applicable. ( 8 ) AS per norms of judicial system, the Single Judge of this Court is bound to follow the ratio laid down and the rule established and settled by the Division or Full Bench of this Court. It is further fortified on the basis of the Rule of Judicial Administration system laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of "tribhovandas Purshottamdas Thakkar vs. Ratilal Motilal Patel and others" (AIR 1968 SC, 372) which reads as under:" Precedents which enunciate rules of law from the foundation of administration of justice under our system. It is further fortified on the basis of the Rule of Judicial Administration system laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of "tribhovandas Purshottamdas Thakkar vs. Ratilal Motilal Patel and others" (AIR 1968 SC, 372) which reads as under:" Precedents which enunciate rules of law from the foundation of administration of justice under our system. It has been held time and again that a Single Judge of a High Court is ordinarily bound to accept as correct judgments of courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction and of Division Benches and of the Full Benches of his Court and of this Court. The reason for the rule which makes a precedent binding lies in the desire to secure uniformity and certainty in the law. " ( 9 ) IT appears that the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jotindra Nath Roy (Supra) and the notification dated 3rd April, 1997 had not been brought to the notice of the Full Bench at the time when the case was heard and decided. Had the Supreme Court judgment and the Central Government notification been brought to the notice of the Full Bench, the result would have been perhaps different. I am not to take a different view on the basis of the Supreme Court decision as well as on the basis of the above Central Government notification. It is vital and substantial material worth considerable and cannot be ignored. It is for the consideration of the same bench or larger bench of this Court and determine whether the provisions of Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 would be attracted to the educational institutions and the teachers, staff thereof. Hence, I propose that the said question be decided by the larger bench of this Court under Rule 5 (1) of Chapter-I of The Gujarat High Court Rules 1993. ( 10 ) IN view of the above discussion, I therefore, request Honble the Chief Justice for nominating a larger bench to decide the issue in dispute. Lay before Honble Chief Justice for appropriate orders. .