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2001 DIGILAW 501 (JHR)

Hindustan Lever Limited v. Icon Dairy Foods (India) Pvt. Limited

2001-07-24

GURUSHARAN SHARMA

body2001
JUDGMENT Gurusharan Sharma, J. 1. On 6th November, 1995, a deed of non-competition was executed between Brooke Bond Lipton India Limited, Calcutta, and Icon Dairy Foods Pvt. Ltd., Adityapur. In the said deed there was a clause that Calcutta shall be the jurisdiction for the purpose of any dispute arising out of this deed. 2. Icon Dairy Foods Pvt. Ltd. filed Title suit No. 30 of 1999 against Hindustan Lever Limited, successor-in-interest of Brooke Bond India Limited for declaration that the aforesaid deed dated 6.11.1995 was illegal, void in operative and not binding on them in contravention of the provisions of Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act. 3. Defendant appeared and without filing any written statement, filed a petition purporting to be under Order VII, Rule 10 of Civil Procedure Code (Annexure 2) that in view of specific provision aforesaid, the Court of Seraikella has no jurisdiction to entertain, try and determine the present suit. According to it, the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta alone has Jurisdiction to determine the issue arose in the instant suit and conduct interlocutory proceedings. Prayer was, therefore, made to return the plaint to be presented before appropriate Court. 4. Plaintiff in its rejoinder denied its desire for decision on disputes arising out of the agreements in question in the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta and alleged that agreements were one sided and did not exclude specifically jurisdiction of the Court, where plaintiffs workshop/factory was situated and where part cause of action arose. 5. By impugned order dated 24.12.1999, trial Court rejected the said petition under Order VII, Rule 10 of Civil Procedure Code holding that the Court at Seraikella was competent to entertain the suit. It was observed that admittedly part of cause of action also arose within the territorial jurisdiction of Seraikella Court and the aforesaid clause in the agreement did not oust the jurisdiction of any court other than the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta. 6. Aggrieved by the said order, defendant has preferred the present Revision application. 7. It is true that there was a clause in the agreement that the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta shall have jurisdiction for the purpose of any dispute arising out of the deed of non-competition dated 6th November, 1995. 6. Aggrieved by the said order, defendant has preferred the present Revision application. 7. It is true that there was a clause in the agreement that the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta shall have jurisdiction for the purpose of any dispute arising out of the deed of non-competition dated 6th November, 1995. But there were no exclusive words like only or alone so as to exclude the jurisdiction of other courts, where part of cause of action for the suit arose. In this regard reference may be made to the decision of the Apex Court in A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. A.P. Agencies, AIR 1989 SC 1230 . 8. Mr. N.K. Prasad, Senior Counsel for the opposite party also placed reliance on the decision of Apex Court in R.S.D.V. Finance Pvt. Ltd. v. Shree Vallabh Glass Works, AIR 1993 SC 2094 . 9. On the other hand. Mr. A. Sen, counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Angiles Insulations v. Davy Ashmore India Ltd., AIR 1995 SC 1766 and submitted that in the present case, relevant clause relating to the jurisdiction of the court in case of any dispute in respect of agreement was embodied in the agreement itself, whereas in R.S.D.V. Finance (supra) such clause was found endorsed on the deposit receipts of the bank, and in M/s. Angiles Insulations (supra) there was a clause in the agreement itself that work order was issued subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court situated at Bangalore in the State of Karnataka and as such any legal proceeding will fall within the jurisdiction of Bangalore Court only. In such premises, the Apex Court held that parties having agreed to vest the jurisdiction of the court situated within the territorial limit of the High Court at Karnataka. Court of Subordinate Judge, Dhanbad, in Bihar State, where part of cause of action was said to have arisen, had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 10. In such premises, the Apex Court held that parties having agreed to vest the jurisdiction of the court situated within the territorial limit of the High Court at Karnataka. Court of Subordinate Judge, Dhanbad, in Bihar State, where part of cause of action was said to have arisen, had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 10. It is relevant to mention that in A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd., (supra) also there was clause in the agreement itself which provided that any dispute arising out of sale shall be subject to Kaira jurisdiction and as such the Apex Court held that where there is clause under which it was claimed that there was ouster of jurisdiction of Courts only stated that any dispute arising out of the sale would be subject to the jurisdiction of the court within whose jurisdiction the order was placed. But there was no exclusive words like exclusive, alone and only and like other jurisdictions having connecting factors were not clearly (sic) un-ambiguously and explicitly excluded. 11. In my opinion, the present case is completely covered by the decision of the Apex Court in A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. (supra). 12. In this circumstance there is no merit in this Revision application. It is accordingly, dismissed but without costs. 13. Revision dismissed.